

EIR Special Report

Why the New York Times went berserk

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

The Jan. 10 *New York Times* is almost apoplectic in reaching new extremes of irrelevance on the Polish crisis, in an editorial attack on both George Kennan and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

The *Times*'s favorite geopoliticians, including Zbigniew Brzezinski, gambled on making escalation of the Polish crisis the beginning of a chain-reaction destabilization of the Soviet Bloc as a whole. They assumed that by discrediting previously ruling institutions, such as the Communist Party of Poland, the edifice of Soviet command as a whole could be undermined.

Something quite different occurred. For years to date, I have repeatedly warned that the kind of geopolitical games being played by Kissinger and Brzezinski would prompt the Soviet leadership to don World War II military uniforms. I predicted the Soviet military operations in Afghanistan on that basis, but the *Times*'s friends learned nothing from that experience. So, now the nationalist military has replaced the communist party of Poland, and military uniforms have recently become a more significant element in the Soviet command itself.

George Kennan and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt have responded to this reality of the Polish situation, if from slightly different points of reference. Both have insisted, with echoes from leading strategic think-tanks in Britain, that any effort to redraw the Yalta map of Europe must lead to nuclear war, and that approaches to East-West relations must be premised on courses of action which in no way presume an early redrawing of the map.

The *Times* responds like the fellow who dove into a dry swimming-pool. The *Times* blames Kennan's and Schmidt's alleged lack of "positive thinking" for the failure of lunatic Zbigniew Brzezinski's Polish fantasies. If the onlookers had mustered more positive thinking, the fellow who dove into the dry pool might not have broken his leg.

It is not the defeat of Solidarność in Poland which provokes the *Times*'s display of editorial hysteria. As one backer of the *Times*'s Polish fantasies recently stated the matter, the *Times*'s friends were relying upon what some among them described as the Polish peoples' alleged disposition for periodic



Brezhnev, in the uniform of a Marshal of the Red Army, greets fellow Soviet veterans of World War II.

episodes of national suicide. The *Times* was never concerned with the well-being of the Polish people; it was hoping for a very bloody Polish shirt, hoping that the Polish people would impale themselves upon Soviet bayonets, all for the sake of the *Times's* Brzezinskiian dreams.

There is a far broader and deeper reason for the *Times's* acerbic outbursts. If the Warsaw Pact is entering a new form of internal stability, based on increased influence of the military, then the entire Malthusian world-federalist dream must be given up for the foreseeable future. If the Soviet Union is to continue to be a potent industrial nation-state, then it is becoming virtually impossible to transform the United States into a "technetronic" sort of Clockwork Orange nightmare. U.S. basic industry, high-technology agriculture, and liberal promotion of nuclear energy must be put back on to the policy drawing-boards, and the most-profitable proliferation of mind-destroying marijuana and other drugs must be aborted.

Either the United States promptly dumps Paul A. Volcker, and reorients toward "Hamiltonian" forms of dirigist economic recovery, or the consolidation of Soviet-Bloc command around military elements means that in the course of the deepening world depression, Moscow might come to dominate the world by default. To some degree, at least, this point is recognized in relevant British circles; in any case, there is no other alternative.

Over the recent period of *détente*, the East-Bloc nations contracted a substantial debt to Western governments and banks. This debt was undertaken chiefly for capital-goods purchases or to purchase imports of

food. The incurring of debt was premised on the assumption that East-Bloc commodities could be sold at favorable prices on Western markets, and debt-service incurred could be offset by such export-earnings.

However, the Bretton Woods System has been sliding toward a new world depression. Recently, we have in fact entered the first phase of an actual economic depression—no mere "recession"—worldwide. The depression on volumes and price-levels of world trade, combined with rising interest rates, has had devastating effects on every nation significantly involved in the world market. As the East Bloc's indebtedness qualitatively increased its economies' exposure to the world market, the Western depression has hit hard into the internal economies of those sections of the East-Bloc economies with the relatively highest rates of debt-service exposure.

Among these economies, the only instance of gross mismanagement has been the Polish economy. Although Polish industrial development has been good, the backwardness of the social organization of Polish agriculture, a built-in problem since the 1956 crisis, has been a major drain on the economy overall. Poor performance in Soviet agriculture, also chiefly for social reasons, has been aggravated by bad weather, increasing the entire Bloc's dependency upon food-imports. However, although the Polish agricultural ulcer made that economy the most vulnerable of the Bloc as a whole, the effects of the foreign-debt burden have been a combined monetary and economic crisis throughout the Bloc.

This past week, the *Wall Street Journal* indulged itself in a manic fit respecting a Wharton Econometrics study and supplementary remarks by the certifiably mad Z. Nagorski. The *Wall Street Journal's* editors curiously overlooked the evidence that Wharton econometrics have consistently proven their total incompetence over the period since October 1979. The *Journal* absorbed itself in serving as a conduit for economic incompetence and matching strategic hogwash on the nature of the East-Bloc debt-problem and problems and vulnerabilities of the Soviet economy.

Apart from the problems arising from the social organization of policy and much of Soviet agriculture, the East-Bloc economies are not so badly managed

relative to Western performance. Indeed, as we have emphasized in summary, the chief source of East-Bloc economic problems has been East-Bloc exposure through indebtedness to a depression in the Bretton Woods System.

The great crisis within the Soviet economy itself is the fact that while Soviet science is presently advancing at a high rate, this science is bottled-up, because of bottlenecks in the process of translating new technologies into large-scale productive practice. Since 1966, there has been a qualitative improvement in the technological potential of the new entries into the Soviet labor-force. The overlapping of bottlenecks with the increased technological potential of the labor-force

From the New York Times editorial

From the Sunday, Jan. 10 New York Times editorial titled "The Kennan Doctrine":

George Kennan has the courage of Helmut Schmidt's convictions and makes what case there is for acquiescing in Poland's suppression. He says the Soviet Union will always risk more to keep Poland supine than the West should risk to make it freer. So why impose sanctions that can only damage the peace of Europe? . . .

Even Mr. Kennan and Chancellor Schmidt are uncomfortable arguing that might deserves to prevail. So their acquiescence leads them to contend that might should at least define right in world affairs.

Thus they argue that Soviet security is a higher imperative than Polish or Western sensibility. They even struggle to deny the Soviet hand in the Polish crackdown: asking that Moscow order Warsaw to reverse course is, in Mr. Kennan's logic, granting the Kremlin the very authority over Poland which "we profess to deplore." And they rush to blame the victims for their oppression, berating Solidarity for misjudging the limits of Communist tolerance. . . .

When people in the Soviet sphere see what their system produces compared with the West's and then rise in rebellion, the threat to Soviet security can be said to lie in every prosperous democracy. As the Helsinki accords declare, there is no safe way to divide Europe without maintaining an active concern for the quality of life in both halves.

The West can be faulted for mismanaging its interests in East Europe. It lent \$70 billion to help make the Soviet system work, but got no political or commercial collateral. The allies are torn even now by the lure of selling grain or buying gas. . . .

It is simply not true that Solidarity's extremists provoked the terror. What strength they gained came from the Government's refusal to honor even its modest concessions to the union. Solidarity did not overthrow the Communist Party; the Party collapsed of its own dead weight. The union never challenged Poland's pro-Soviet foreign policy.

What was threatened in Poland was not geography, not the security of Soviet borders, but ideology, the Soviet system of concentrating power in a Communist oligarchy. That system destroys initiative everywhere and thus produced Solidarity in the first place. It will never succeed in a modern economy until it makes peace with the people it governs.

Left to their own devices, Polish Stalinists will now maintain the terror until they find new opportunists willing to reconstitute the Party and form a bogus Solidarity. Western "realists" will then be asked to pretend that Poland has recovered its productive powers and to extend and enlarge its loans.

What President Reagan is struggling to assert is that the Polish economy and the Stalinist system are equally bankrupt. The idea behind sanctions is to stop throwing good money after bad until Moscow faces that fact.

If the suppression persists, a formal default will become inevitable anyway, damaging the Soviet bloc more than the West. But if Poland's junta is still free to seek a genuine accommodation with the genuine leaders of Solidarity, there are powerful reasons of state and humanity for the West to underwrite a Polish evolution. There will be time later for defeatism.

must tend to force drastic shifts in priorities within Soviet policy-making, as was reflected in part in the proceedings of the most recent conference.

Under conditions in which external strategic pressures catalyze a military-tinged shift toward emphasis upon "command" in economic policy-making, especially in face of threatened technological boycotts, the potential improvements in Soviet economic management will be forced through by "command."

The unfortunate feature of much strategic thinking in the United States today, is that the habit of "positive anti-communist thinking" impels analysts to overestimate the relative viability of our own economy and to underestimate both the resilience and potentials of the Soviet economy. In this way, it is usually overlooked or even foolishly denied, that as long as we continue our foolish policies of monetarism and toleration of "environmentalism," the medium-term prospects for the U.S. economy are far worse than for the Soviet sector.

What frightens me most today is the fear that the truth of my analysis will be recognized too late. Later down the road, the sense of the need to crush the monetarist and environmentalist policies will probably incline some to impose dictatorship upon our nation, out of contempt for a rotted-out political system, rotted with marijuana and environmentalism. Unless our political system can muster the capability of changing our policies democratically today, not many years from now the result of refusing to do this democratically will be dictatorship, defeat or both.

In the Soviet-Bloc case, the rise of the nationalist military in Poland and echoes of similar tendencies in Moscow, shows that the East-Bloc economies are readily susceptible of developing new forms of institutional response through which to sort out some of the most obvious aspects of mismanagement of those economies. In the Soviet case, this shift in institutionalized response will tend to take the form of a neo-Stalinist war-economy, a form which works—whether one likes it or not.

If we can change our policies democratically now, dump Volcker, opt for "Hamiltonian" methods, and restore priority to science and technology in schools and investment, the advantage will be on our side. Otherwise, not. This choice will become clearer over the coming months.

This is the reality the *Times* so far hysterically refuses to face. The *Times* still nurtures Malthusian fantasies of a world in which nation-states have more or less ceased to exist, in which illiterate labor-intensive serfs drudge in the soil outside those places in which the ruling elite revels amid the Sodom and Gomorrah delights of a non-stop "Studio 54"-style orgy. The Polish military has thus spoiled the *Times's* dream of such a perpetual orgy.

The *Times* is naturally hysterical.

Chronology

Poland before and since December 13

by Irene Beaudry

On Dec. 13 Poland's Prime Minister Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski declared a state of martial law, a move he had vowed he would make only as a last resort. Weeks prior to the declaration Jaruzelski had been trying to put together a program of National Accord which would have brought together the government, the Church, and Solidarność. In fact, at the Nov. 4 meeting among Jaruzelski, Primate Jozef Glemp, and Lech Walesa the prospects for creating calm in Poland were quite favorable. Two events, however, forced Jaruzelski's hand and led to the declaration of martial law.

Dec. 4: The Solidarność National Commission, meeting in Radom, degenerated into a screaming match dominated by repeated calls for Walesa's ouster. With Walesa relegated to the sidelines, the radical protégés of the British intelligence-guided group KOR launched plans to overthrow the government. Two days before the declaration of martial law, Solidarność called for a national referendum to decide the government Poland was to have and whether Poland was to continue its military alliance with the Soviet Union. In one stroke, Solidarność overthrew basic provisions in the 1980 Gdansk agreement that brought the trade union into being.

Dec. 12: From the other side, Politburo member Stefan Olszowski and ousted member Tadeusz Grabski reportedly made a bid for power against Jaruzelski. Sources described the bid as a hardliners' coup slated for Dec. 16. Both Olszowski and Grabski have reputations as orthodox Marxist-Leninists with close links to the KGB. Grabski, although ousted from the Central Committee in the summer during the party congress, recently began to surface in the press of the synthetic chauvinist Grunwald Union.

Dec. 13: Jaruzelski's speech declaring martial law changed the entire geometry. With evident Soviet backing from the Brezhnev leadership majority, Jaruzelski moved swiftly and decisively to crush his opposition. Addressing the nation "as a soldier and head of the Polish government," and omitting any mention of the party, which he also heads, Jaruzelski laid stress on the anarchy and chaos sweeping Poland. He posed martial law as a question of "national salvation."