

The imminent threat of a post-Williams Reagangate intersects massively funded operations for unleashing European-style terrorism and urban riots during the spring and summer of 1982. Various intelligence sources cross-corroborate tens of millions flowing through the terrorist-linked Ramallah Foundation, in the direction of such included beneficiaries as circles of Rev. Jesse Jackson. The Khomeini-allied terrorists are now building a major terrorist base in Houston, Texas, a development following the scandalous Rothko Chapel October 1981 meeting of Islam in the West forces, sponsored by the Schlumberger interests' Madame Dominique Menil.

According to highly placed officials of the London Tavistock Institute, Tavistock, the British DI-6's psychological-warfare center, has profiled Washington according to the "urban cowboy" image, and is orchestrating foreign and domestic crises against the United States calculated to drive the manic "American cowboy" into a "depressive, existentialist" fit of rage.

In other words, credulous policy-makers around Washington delude themselves that it is they who are controlling a projected East-West confrontation for the

spring-summer period. In fact, European oligarchical circles, laughing their bellies off at the antics of the dumb Americans, are planning to hit the United States with not one, but a combination of foreign and domestic crises, aggregating to a massive humiliation of the administration, and thus a humiliation-driven rage of the American electorate generally.

The oligarchical circles project an ensuing period of a "Fortress America" pitted in a local-war-dripping new "Cold War" against a frantically arming Moscow. Britain-Switzerland-dominated Europe is intended, together with the British Commonwealth at large, to become an independent, "Third Way," force between the two wildly-armed superpowers. The objective is not actual nuclear war, but a wrecking of both the American and Soviet economies through suicidal rates of military expenditures, with British carving-up and reconquest of a ruined United States (together with a broken-up Canada) in favor of oligarchic forces around the Aspen Institute and super-rich Robert O. Anderson.

Therefore, it is past time to remove Colorado's Aspen-quivering Sen. Gary Hart from the Senate Armed Services Committee.

What Sen. Gary Hart said about defense policy

The following statements are excerpted from the article "What's Wrong With the Military," by Sen. Gary Hart (D-Col.), assisted by his legislative aide, William S. Lind, which appeared in the New York Times Magazine, Feb. 14, 1982.

In seeking to determine where we have gone wrong, we must start by looking at the basic building blocks of any military—(1) personnel, (2) tactics and strategy, and (3) hardware. . . .

One . . . of the most critical aspects of military personnel policy . . . is unit cohesion, the psychological bonding between individuals that takes place within the small, basic unit. . . . In the stress and chaos of combat, people fight less for 'king and country' than for their buddies. . . . The Army is experimenting with ways to improve unit cohesion, such as adopting the British practice of having people spend their entire service career in a single regiment. . . .

When we look at tactics and strategy . . . we need "maneuver warfare". . . . The object is to destroy the

enemy's cohesion—and the opposing commander's ability to think clearly—by creating surprising and dangerous situations faster than he can cope with them.

In research and development . . . the changes made must be quick and major, so as to make the enemy's equipment irrelevant. In our military establishment, the changes are far too slow. . . . Our procurement policy favors weapons so complex and expensive that we must keep them in service for decades to get our perceived money's worth. . . .

The real debate is between two different definitions of quality. The Pentagon defines quality in technical terms: High technology equals quality. The military reform movement defines quality tactically . . . emphasize[ing] such characteristics as: Small size. . . . Reliability, ruggedness and ease of maintenance. . . . Rapid effect. . . . Numbers. In tactical terms quantity is an important quality. . . .

The same characteristics that give a weapon tactical quality . . . also tend to make it cheaper. Thus the practical choice is not between quality and quantity but between technological quality in small numbers and tactical quality in large numbers. . . .

Bureaucratic behavior lies at the core of America's military inadequacies. It is a far more fundamental problem than the budget level of any given year. . . .