

## Britain's 'NATO pullout' bluff could be called

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Agents and agents-of-influence of the United Kingdom are currently engaged in strategic blackmail against the government of the United States. They demand that the United States tacitly condone British military aggression against Argentina, threatening that unless the United States submits to this demand:

1. The United Kingdom will withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), allegedly thereby destroying NATO;

2. That if Washington opposes London on the matter of British military action against Argentina, Western Europe will drift into the arms of Moscow;

3. That the maintenance of a credible U.S. strategic posture depends upon military support by the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth.

The British give the government of the United States but a mere few remaining days to decide whether or not to submit to this blackmail. Once British military action against Argentina begins, a chain-reaction of incalculable strategic consequences begins.

I restate, in summary, the facts of the Malvinas crisis. I summarize the strategic consequences of U.S. tolerance of British military action. I then outline, also in summary, the means by which British blackmail-threats may be reduced to bluff.

### The Malvinas crisis

The Malvinas Islands have been territory of the sovereign nation of Argentina since earlier than the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. They were seized by military force from Argentina, by Brit-

ain, with unlawful British occupation consolidated in actions of 1839-40. Under U.S. law, the islands have been and remain Argentine territory.

Although Argentina publicized its disposition to occupation of its Malvinas Islands territory since no later than January of this year, the government of the United Kingdom, under the direction of the allegedly "duplicitous" Foreign Minister, Lord Carrington, refused to tolerate the lawful position of Argentina in this matter, and thus willfully left the government of Argentina no honorable and lawful choice but to assert its lawful rights by unilateral means.

In response to this development, the government of the United Kingdom has acted with that 19th-century "jingoistic" military imperialism so characterized by Rudyard Kipling, committing itself to military action in the Western Hemisphere.

If the United States fails now to prevent that British action, the government of the United States has violated its own laws, including the Monroe Doctrine and the 1947 Treaty of Rio de Janeiro. No secret agreement with the government of the United Kingdom could be invoked to override those two cited instances of the public law of the United States. Any use of such subterfuges as secret agreements with the government of the United Kingdom would represent connivance in violation of U.S. law by officials of the United States.

Lawfully, the government of the United States could refuse to honor the Monroe Doctrine and the 1947 Rio Treaty only by causing those laws to be repealed by consent of the Senate of the United States. Pending

consent to repeal those laws by the Senate, any failure of the U.S. Department of State or other executive branch agencies to prevent British action in a manner comparable to President Dwight Eisenhower's actions in the "Suez Crisis" would be in fact a flagrant violation of U.S. law, by those officials responsible.

The government of the United Kingdom and its agents of influence within influential U.S. official and policy-influencing positions have acted to argue that there are overriding considerations which oblige the United States to violate its own law in this case. So-called Anglophile interests, centered in the so-called Eastern Establishment, are urging capitulation to demands of the United Kingdom in this matter. The cited strategic blackmail is but the most pointed of those pressures being applied to attempt to induce the government of the United States to violate U.S. law.

### **Strategic policy implications**

The continuing and clear intent of the Monroe Doctrine was a commitment by the United States to be a *primus inter pares* of the sovereign nations of the Western Hemisphere. To the extent we had the means to do so, we committed ourselves to erecting a "steel shield" around the Western Hemisphere, against military and related actions by Britain and its treaty-partners of the Holy Alliance. The mutual security features of the 1947 Treaty of Rio de Janeiro represent chiefly a formal implementation of the intent of the Monroe Doctrine on this point.

From the beginning, as was then recognized by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, our interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was directly at variance with British interpretations of international law. British doctrine of international law was based on the principle of efficient force, e.g., a declaration of a military blockade was not viewed as valid by British and similar views of international law unless the blockade were implemented by adequate force. The states distinguished the rightness of matters at law from the question of adequate means of force at the disposal of the plaintiff in actions at law. The moral and proper lawful rights of a person or nation are not contingent upon that person's or nation's means of unilateral adequate force to compel an oppressor to submit to the right of the matter.

From the beginning, the Monroe Doctrine was a law which the United States was bound to enforce to the degree it had the means adequate to right a wrong at a particular time. Our lack of action at an earlier point does not constitute repudiation of our right to act on the same matter at some later time when we have means adequate to do so.

Beginning with the adoption of the 1947 Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, we solemnly resolved that the time had

come at which the United States had adequate means to enforce the right of law in this matter for the hemisphere.

From the beginning, in 1823, and continuing today, the only qualification respecting enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine had been our policy respecting those territories of the Western Hemisphere which were not yet sovereign nation-states. This included, foremost, the case of the British-flag entity Canada, and certain other British, French, and Dutch colonial possessions which continued to be either colonies or semi-colonies of European states. We refrained, by adopted policy, from interfering to establish the sovereignty of those territories by unilateral action of the United States.

However, once a territory of the Western Hemisphere was established as a sovereign nation-state, the Monroe Doctrine applied and applies henceforth with full force.

The role of the British government in leading British actions in the matter of the Malvinas Islands are the clearest, classic cases and a *de facto casus belli* against the United States' fundamental law by the government of the United Kingdom. In the first of these two classical cases, the British-led conquest of Mexico, we lacked the means to enforce the doctrine. Since 1947, we have entered into treaty-agreements, having force of U.S. public law, obliging the government of the United States to employ its adequate means to enforce that doctrine.

The most directly relevant dividing-line between our restraint in enforcement of the doctrine and our obligation to permit no restraint where we have the means adequate to do so, is the 1823 enactment of the Monroe Doctrine. All territories which were territories of sovereign states of the Western Hemisphere on or before the promulgation of that doctrine are protected territories according to the implications of that doctrine.

However, if any European power, or other extra-hemispheric power, makes acts of war against the Monroe Doctrine, all of that power's interests within the territories of the Western Hemisphere are subject to nullification by the sovereign states of the Western Hemisphere, as those latter states may elect to execute that plain intent of the doctrine.

Under present U.S. law, the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense are, most emphatically, obliged to enforce the Monroe Doctrine and treaties adopted as implementation of that doctrine. They are in flagrant violation of U.S. law should they refuse to do so.

### **Consequences of failure**

If British military action against Argentina occurs, without adequate, efficient efforts to prevent this by military forces of the United States—other efforts failing, the United States loses its efficient influence over

the southern portions of this hemisphere. This will have incalculable consequences globally. If that occurs, the United States no longer has a credible foreign policy or strategic posture in any part of the globe.

This is underlined by recent pronouncements of the government of Argentina. They have reported offers of assistance from the Soviet Union, offers they report that they have so far declined to accept. However, if the existence of Argentina as a sovereign political entity were placed in jeopardy, and if the United States refused to act against Britain on behalf of Argentina's sovereignty, classical military doctrine argues that Argentina will feel itself obliged to accept any credible military aid available.

Under such foreseeable circumstances, the United States's de facto nullification of the 1947 Rio Treaty and Monroe Doctrine in respect to British violations would remove the "steel shield" of the doctrine as a fully efficient policy against Soviet aid to Argentina.

This could become most deadly. The destruction of the two British carriers and of possibly one or two British submarines are developments well within the scope of possibility through reenforcement of Argentina's capabilities. The British then: a) resort to nuclear warfare in the Western Hemisphere; b) attempt to force the United States into military action against Soviet forces; or c) the British are left with nothing but a humiliating withdrawal.

Short of creating an open situation for Soviet aid to Argentina, British economic-warfare action can force Argentina to suspend payments upon its foreign debts. This could be restricted suspension, with accompanying war-measures including seizures of assets of Britain and its accomplices, or could become by force of circumstances a more generalized suspension of payments. This would threaten to detonate a chain-reaction of collapse in the unstable world monetary order of the present moment.

The government of the United States has no acceptable lawful or practical strategic options but to force the British military forces to retreat, using means comparable to those applied by President Eisenhower in the Suez Crisis.

### **Effects on Britain**

It is informed speculation in Britain and elsewhere that not only did Lord Carrington foresee the consequences we have indicated, but that Lord Carrington and other parties complicit with him must have desired those foreseeable consequences.

Among the foreseeable consequences, Prime Minister Thatcher's government is almost assuredly doomed to fall. If the U.S. government acts in support of Carrington's recent and Thatcher's present policies in the Malvinas Islands affair, the United States is subject-

ed to the greatest foreign-policy humiliation in postwar history. Such a humiliation of the United States would be fully consistent with the "third way" policy to which Lord Carrington's machinations were recently dedicated.

Carrington's "third way" policy prescribed a significant withdrawal of Western Europe from the preexisting form of SHAPE and related agreements and institutions. The thermonuclear alliance with the United States was to be continued, but the European components of the Atlantic Alliance, including France, were to be realigned under British leadership as a third force maneuvering between Washington and Moscow. The Socialist International and Libya's Colonel Qaddafi are exemplary of the principal accomplices of Carrington et al. In recent deployments to this purpose, the trans-Atlantic "peace movement" is among the tactics deployed in aid of such a development.

So, if Britain today threatens to break up the NATO alliance, and threatens a more detached role of Western Europe, maneuvering between the two superpowers, Britain is threatening to do what it has been working to accomplish in any case.

These consequences must certainly have been pre-calculated by Lord Carrington and must have assuredly informed his actions leading into the present Malvinas Islands crisis.


Bringing down the Thatcher government and savagely isolating and humiliating the United States are the leading, pre-calculable consequences of this present crisis set into motion through conscious actions by Lord Carrington.

### **U.S. counter-capabilities**

The conditions for continued existence of the governments of western continental Europe depend chiefly upon the margin of exports of the Federal Republic of Germany, plus assurance of continued petroleum-supplies from the Gulf region. Excepting exports to the Comecon nations, chiefly Soviet Urals and Siberian development, the decisive margin of exports of Europe and Japan today is provided by shrinking markets of the developing sector.

Therefore, if the United States retains its primus inter pares position in the Western Hemisphere, and so retains its favored position among most of the developing sector as well, the most vital self-interests of most of our European allies oblige them to adhere firmly to the United States in any conflict between the governments of the United States and Britain. This would be most emphatically the case in which the United States enjoyed a great surge of admiration among developing nations for its actions in upholding the Monroe Doctrine against Britain.

The central strategic problem of the government of



*The U.S. warship Constitution defeats the British frigate Java off Brazil on Dec. 29, 1812.*

the United States is a combined domestic and strategic erosion accelerating during the period since actions institutionalizing the "post-industrial society" doctrine by the Johnson administration during the period 1966-67, a doctrine otherwise represented by the "population-policy" of the Club of Rome, the Aspen Institute, the Ford Foundation, and the *Global 2000 Report*.

The population of the United States has been subjected to accumulated frustration, becoming culturally, morally, and strategically pessimistic. Our shift away from a policy of high-technology agriculture and industrial development within the developing sector has ruined and politically destabilized many developing nations, while ruining the high-technology-export markets of the United States and our allies of Western Europe and Japan.

This accelerating shift toward becoming a "formerly industrialized nation," like Thatcher's Britain today, has destroyed the economic basis for our high-technology-pointed strategic logistical and purely military capabilities, while producing the collapse of our internal economy to such effects as the presently growing rates of federal budget deficits.

The accelerating deterioration of the domestic and foreign-policy posture of the United States requires sharp action to reverse these trends, by reversing the causes in policy for these trends. This requires nothing less than dramatic action beginning such a policy-reversal by the President of the United States.

The British actions in the Malvinas case has become

a point-of-no-return imposed upon us. If we back down to London on this matter, we lose virtually all of the options in sight for correcting this downward slide.

If the United States treats Britain in this matter as President Eisenhower treated Britain and France in the Suez Crisis, an electrifying upsurge in perceived and actual U.S. domestic and strategic power will result. Those governments among our allies which join with us will be strengthened at home and in their relation to us. Those which oppose us will be doomed to earlier or later appropriate treatment by their electorates.

The British, spanked properly by the United States, may emit monstrous, threatening noises, but they have no choice but to submit, and to learn quickly to become cheerful about their submission to the wisdom of their fathers.

### **The Soviet aspect**

The possibility that a desperate, abandoned Argentina might accept some Soviet assistance in this crisis typifies the true implications of this crisis for the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationships.

It is precisely to the extent we permit Britain to wreck U.S. *primus inter pares* authority among our nation's friends and allies generally, that we permit the continuing drift toward a "post-industrial society," that we create vacuums into which growing Soviet power is drawn, whether or not Moscow originally intended such extension of its influence.

The Carter administration's support for the overthrow of the government of Iran is an example of this process. The Carter administration's attempts to use Pakistan and China as supporting forces for operations against the Soviet southern flank in an area we had no efficient capabilities, Afghanistan, is another example of this. The turn toward Moscow by Gulf states threatened by U.S. present policies toward Israel's expansionism and in support of Iran, is another illustration of this.

The strategic relations of the United States to the Soviet Union must be considered from a threefold standpoint.

First, there is the relationship of the United States and the U.S.S.R. as sovereign states. On this point, our mutual relations are purely and simply great-power relationships and are worsened or improved entirely on the basis of those considerations and those considerations alone.

Second, there is the traditional foreign policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, an historic perspective for the lawful destruction of capitalist states in favor of emergence of a socialist world-order.

Third, there is the disposition for meddling by Soviet agencies in active and potential trouble-spots throughout the world, in which meddling a mixture of pure-

and-simple great-power strategic expediency and traditional communistic global commitments intersect.

The first category of conflicts is rationally negotiable on a state-to-state basis. Insofar as the Soviet Union and its allied states pursue a self-interest of technological progress within their borders and in the domain of world-trade relationships, there is no irrepressible form of conflict between our states as states.

The second feature of the matter, traditional communist perspectives, is of no general strategic significance if we ourselves pursue a policy of energetic technological progress in development of the agriculture, industry, and basic industrial and agricultural infrastructure of developing nations, and if we act to prevent Federal Reserve policies from continuing the slide into a new world economic depression.

It is the third category of problems we define that is the clear and immediate source of strategic conflicts.

However, even in matters bearing upon the third category, Moscow would take no action intended to force the United States and its allies to war-fighting against Moscow itself. The danger of direct military engagement between forces of the superpowers arises from the chain-reaction of some accumulated set of strategic miscalculations.

The temporary withdrawal of a sulking Britain from NATO would not eliminate those other alliances which are based on the same threefold strategic view toward the Soviet threat as we have summarized here. Nor would Moscow exploit such a British withdrawal, especially under the circumstances in which the United States emerged as the hero of the developing nations as a whole, defending a developing nation against British colonialist forms of military atrocities.

Rather, such action would be the occasion for placing Moscow before a new agenda for immediate negotiations.

Meanwhile, the United States position within the hemisphere as a whole would be the best since the close of the last world war. That light which the Marquis de Lafayette and others described in such terms as "beacon of hope" and "temple of liberty" would be rekindled in the hearts and minds of peoples throughout the world. It is that light of the American constitutional republic, combined with resolution not to be degraded into a "post-industrial society," which is the foundation of our moral power as well as our material strategic capabilities in conduct of foreign policy.

The time has come for a stunning and just exercise of the power of the President of the United States, according to the law known as the Monroe Doctrine.

Let the Tories of the "Eastern Establishment" and our Jacobins howl in protest against this! Let all our patriots exult in unity, to assert once again the heritage of the American Revolution!

## Latin America reacts to Malvinas crisis

by Cynthia Rush

*EIR* has learned that while Alexander Haig has been colluding with great Britain around the Malvinas crisis, Britain's intelligence services have begun to activate their assets throughout Latin America to guarantee that there are no efforts to invoke the Monroe Doctrine. *EIR*'s sources say that large sums of money are pouring into Latin American nations, beginning with Mexico, to buy support for Britain and to back up whatever operations are necessary to prevent unified Latin American support for Argentina.

As of April 15, reports were circulating in Washington that if Argentina attempts to invoke the Rio Treaty at the Organization of American States (OAS), it will be blocked by the United States.

Alexander Haig is scheduled to return to Buenos Aires on April 15 reportedly carrying some "new ideas" to discuss with the Galtieri government. Presuming that Argentina's position has been substantially weakened by lack of U.S. support, Haig can be expected to present the Argentines with an ultimatum—perhaps threatening a cutoff in U.S. aid—if the Galtieri government doesn't agree to withdraw its troops from the Malvinas or accept "multi-national" administration of the islands as proposed by Britain.

The British oligarchy is prepared to go beyond threats however. Intelligence sources say the British are preparing for total war, and may re-establish military bases in Africa and the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support for the fleet now heading toward the Malvinas. Since Britain cannot afford to maintain a lengthy conflict or blockade, the plan is to "sink an Argentine ship or two," and force Argentina to its knees as quickly as possible. "Britain won't flinch from using force," Margaret Thatcher told an enthusiastic House of Commons on April 14.

### The consequences

The Galtieri government, which was shaky before the Malvinas invasion, could fall altogether if it suffers a political or military defeat at the hands of the British. The man said to be waiting in the wings is Interior Minister Gen. Alfredo St. Jean, a hardline nationalist whose military allies strongly oppose Swiss-born Fi-