



McGeorge Bundy Robert McNamara

George Kennan Gerard Smith

The Four Peaceniks of the Apocalypse

Will NATO fight population wars?

by Lonnie Wolfe

Investigations by *EIR* have unearthed an international conspiracy involving top circles of the U.S. State Department that would make the United States and its NATO allies vassals of a British-controlled NATO directorate which will run “no-win” population warfare in the developing sector.

As of mid-April, sources reported that Secretary of State Alexander Haig and his top advisers were working the directorate scheme into “policy options.” Their plan is have President Reagan embrace these proposals and bring them to the June NATO summit meeting in Bonn. The plan has the support of pro-British networks inside the U.S. Defense Department and in the Congress.

EIR investigations have identified two overlapping coordinating groups for this conspiracy, both of which are working directly with the Brussels NATO staff of Secretary General Joseph Luns.

The oldest group is the Atlantic Council, based in Paris and Washington, D.C., which is acting through its three-year study project on NATO deterrence forces and policy. The working group, which is dominated by pro-British former NATO officials, formulated the directorate proposal in consultation with such British think tanks as the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. Former members of the study group who are now top officials of the Reagan administration are pressing for the plan, working with former Atlantic Council

member Alexander Haig. The Council, sources report, plans seminar sessions to spell out the nuts and bolts of the plan, and brainwashing sessions for policy makers.

The Atlantic Council overlaps with the European Security Study, a project initiated in late 1981 in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s successful handling of the Polish crisis—i.e., the Soviets’ use of the Polish military to run the country, without resorting to a Warsaw Pact invasion. ESECS (pronounced “Essex”) was initiated at the behest of Lord Carver, the former British Defense Minister; Milton Katz, a former NATO official with connections to City of London and Venetian banking circles; and Carroll Wilson, an MIT professor and member of the executive committee of the Club of Rome. ESECS’s ostensible purpose is to examine NATO forces and doctrine along the central front—the line dividing Western Europe from the Warsaw Pact—but, as ESECS members make clear, their plan is to force a change in NATO doctrine along the “directorate” lines.

Representatives of both groups are sworn to secrecy about portions of their plans. They stressed, however, that they were not functioning as “policy advisers” or consultants to policy makers. They were *making policy*, and if the current group of NATO leaders did not like their policy, *the leaders would be changed*.

On April 7, former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, the outspoken advocate of global population

reduction, held a Washington press conference to call on the NATO alliance to renounce unilaterally its policy of first use of nuclear weapons and focus on building up its conventional forces.

McNamara was joined in his call for a NATO "no-first-use" pledge by three other anti-technology proponents of global population reduction, who co-authored with him an article for the spring issue of *Foreign Affairs*, the journal of the New York Council on Foreign Relations; all four had been associated with the formulation of the NATO "first-use" doctrine which they now denounce as outdated and leading to potential nuclear holocaust:

McGeorge Bundy, the Kennedy administration's National Security Adviser, who initiated the Vietnam War, and former head of the Ford Foundation, a leading funder of population control in the developing sector;

Gerard Smith, the former arms-control negotiator for the Kissinger-Nixon administration, who has fought against the peaceful use of nuclear energy because it allegedly leads to nuclear weapons proliferation;

George F. Kennan, the "Mr. X" who penned the 1947 *Foreign Affairs* article that laid out the post-war containment doctrine against the Soviet Union and who now says that population growth and the spread of technologically induced pollution are the two greatest evils facing man.

Within hours of the press conference, sections of the U.S. nuclear-freeze movement and the European peace movement had endorsed the non-first-use doctrine. The previous day, Secretary of State Haig fueled the debate with statements proclaiming that the United States was committed to first use of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the media have churned out hundreds of pseudo-analyses, op-eds, and TV commentaries.

McNamara and the others were given their script by the ESECS group. Bundy, for example, was one of the original handful of ESECS members, whose numbers have now swelled to 150.

In an interview conducted two months ago, ESECS director Carroll Wilson laid out a three-year road to a full takeover of NATO policy by his conspirators. The first phase involved the publication of articles pushing the proposed doctrine to encourage a controlled debate. By the end of this year, the first drafts of ESECS policy-implementation papers will be ready. They will be circulated through private channels to policy makers throughout the alliance, and finally be compiled into book form for wider circulation.

By 1984, Wilson added, ESECS will be in a position to dominate political debate in the three key NATO countries—Britain, the United States, and West Germany—each of which will have crucial national elections at that time. The goal, he said, is to put governments in power that will carry out population warfare.

Documentation

Who's who in ESECS

Members of the European Security Study (ESECS) include:

Carroll L. Wilson, ESECS Chairman; international executive, Club of Rome; professor emeritus, MIT; director, CFR; TC.

Robert R. Bowie, professor of government, Harvard University; senior fellow, Brookings Institution; CFR; TC; special adviser to the U.S. High Commissioner in Germany; Director of Estimates, CIA.

McGeorge Bundy, professor of history, NYU, CFR.

Field Marshall Lord Carver, former: Chief of Defense Staff; Chief of General Staff, United Kingdom.

Dr. Alton Frye, Washington director, CFR.

Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, former: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. forces in Europe; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO).

Milton Katz, professor of political science, MIT; consultant to the Secretary of Defense; National Security Council; Office of Management and the Budget; CFR; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; formerly: with RAND Corporation; Deputy Director, Office of Strategic Services in Italy.

Franklin A. Long, professor of science and society, Cornell University; former: director of Arms Control Association; assistant director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Rolf E. Pauls, West German diplomat; permanent representative to NATO; former ambassador to NATO, United States, China, and Israel.

William J. Perry, investment banker; mathematician; former Undersecretary of Defense for Research.

D. Klaus Ritter, director, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/Research Institute for International Politics and Security.

François de Rose, French diplomat.

Gen. Franz-Josef Schultze, General, West German army (ret.); former Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe.

Gen. Johannes Steinhoff, General, West German Air Force (ret.), former Chairman, NATO Military Committee.

Marshall Schulman, professor of government, director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University; former director of studies, CFR.

Richard H. Ullman, professor, political and international affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University; editorial board, *New York Times*; director, 1980s Project, CFR.

*Organizations listed have been abbreviated as follows:
Council on Foreign Relations: CFR; Trilateral Commission: TC*

McNamara formula for 'no-first-use'

From "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," by McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, Foreign Affairs, Spring, 1982.

For 33 years, the Atlantic Alliance has relied on the asserted readiness of the United States to use nuclear weapons if necessary to repel aggression from the East. Both deployments and doctrines have been intended to deter Soviet aggression and keep the peace by maintaining a credible connection between any large-scale assault, whether conventional or nuclear, and the engagement of the strategic nuclear forces of the United States.

A major element in every doctrine has been that the United States has asserted its willingness to be the first—has indeed made plans to be the first, if necessary—to use nuclear weapons to defend against aggression in Europe.

This element needs reexamination now. Both its cost to the coherence of the Alliance and its threat to the safety of the world are rising while its deterrent credibility declines. The time has come for the careful study of the ways and means of moving to a new Alliance policy and doctrine: that nuclear weapons will not be used unless an aggressor should use them first.

It is time to recognize that no one has ever succeeded in advancing any persuasive reason to believe that any use of nuclear weapons, even on the smallest scale, could reliably be expected to remain limited.

Any proposal for an Allied policy of no-first-use must provide for maintaining the effectiveness of NATO's deterrent posture on the central front. It must especially respect the interests and concerns of West Germany, which is directly exposed to Soviet threats and dependent on American nuclear protection. But the West Germans are probably like the rest of us in wishing to be able to defend the peace by forces that do not require the dreadful choice of nuclear escalation.

It is obvious that any policy of no-first-use would require a strengthened confidence in the adequacy of the conventional forces of the Alliance, above all the forces in place on the central front and those available for prompt reinforcement. It seems clear that the nations of the Alliance together can provide whatever forces are needed, and within realistic budgetary constraints, but it is quite a different question whether they can summon the necessary political will.

The first possible advantage of a policy of no-first-

use is in the management of the nuclear deterrent forces that would still be necessary. Once it is clear that the only nuclear need of the Alliance is for adequately survivable and varied second-strike forces, requirements for the modernization of major nuclear systems will become more modest than has been assumed. The savings permitted by more modest nuclear programs could go toward costs of conventional forces.

A posture of no-first-use should also go far to meet the understandable anxieties that underlie most of the new interest in nuclear disarmament, both in Europe and in our own country. Beyond strict military considerations, our interest in a policy of no-first-use is also political. The political coherence of the Alliance, especially in times of stress, is at least as important as the military strength required to maintain a credible deterrence. If consensus is reestablished on a military policy that the peoples and governments of the Alliance can believe in, both political will and deterrent credibility will be reinforced. . . .

Nor does this question need to wait upon governments for study. The day is long past when public awe and governmental secrecy made nuclear policy a matter for only the most private executive determination. The questions presented by a policy of no-first-use must indeed be decided by governments, but they can and should be considered by citizens. In recent months strong private voices have been raised on both sides of the Atlantic on behalf of strengthened conventional forces. When this cause is argued by such men as Christoph Bertram, Field Marshal Lord Carver, Admiral Noel Gayler, Professor Michael Howard, Henry Kissinger, François de Rose, Theo Sommer, and General Maxwell Taylor, to name only a few, it is fair to conclude that at least in its general direction the present argument is not outside the mainstream of thinking within the Alliance. Indeed, there is evidence of renewed concern for conventional forces in governments too. . . .

A posture and policy of no-first-use also could help to open the path toward serious reduction of nuclear armaments on both sides. But just as a policy of no-first-use should reduce the pressures on our side for massive new nuclear forces, it should help to increase the international incentives for the Soviet Union to show some restraint of its own.

In sum, what we dare to hope for is the kind of new and widespread consideration of the policy we have outlined that helped us 15 years ago toward SALT I, 25 years ago toward the Limited Test Ban, and 35 years ago toward the Alliance itself. What should be undertaken, in both public and private sections, is a fresh, sustained, and careful consideration of the requirements and the benefits of deciding that the policy of the Atlantic Alliance should be to keep its nuclear weapons unused as long as others do the same.