

EIRSpecialReport

Kissinger boasts of three decades of treason

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

We have included in this Special Report excerpts of Henry A. Kissinger's treasonous bragging before a British audience at London's Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA) on May 10. The excerpts should bring a surge of angry blood to the face of every patriot of the United States.

We have but to add two indispensable comments. First, we summarize, to the extent of our own knowledge, the process by which we have come to know Kissinger's treasonous remarks to be true. Second, we employ the principles of constitutional law which must guide every President of the United States in judging whether Kissinger's admissions are treasonous in fact under the clear intent of the U.S. Constitution.

Kissinger insists that since no later than the term of office of Secretary of State Jimmy Byrne [June 1945-January 1947], the foreign policy of the United States has been dictated from London by means of secret, unwritten agreements between certain U.S. officials and the Royal government. It is the documentable knowledge of myself and my associates that there are many important instances corroborating Kissinger's claims on this point. Equally important, we are well informed, if certainly not completely knowledgeable, concerning the special, unofficial channels of "secret government" through which successive presidencies have been manipulated into submitting to such unlawful forms of foreign-policy dictates by Britain.

Any good attorney would not be satisfied with our documentary proof of what we report, although for every claim we submit we have massive proof. A good attorney would demand to know at least the essentials of the process by which we were guided to discover such evidence. In a good practice of law, no evidence, however massive, is conclusive until adequate evidence has been added respecting the way in which submitted proofs were developed.

Therefore, it is our proper duty to account for the process by which we began to uncover the treasonous role of Henry Kissinger, beginning January 1974.



Barbara Dreyfuss/NSIPS

Henry Kissinger, the U.S. Secretary of State who "kept the British Foreign Office better briefed than the U.S. State Department," at a December 1981 American Enterprise Institute conference in Washington, D.C. At left is Willard C. Butcher of Chase Manhattan; at right is Nancy Kissinger.

Although this reporter is most immediately identified as an economist and a probable contender for the 1984 U.S. presidential nomination of the Democratic Party, his entry into political life as such has developed more recently, as an earlier unforeseen outgrowth of a philosophical commitment to republican principles originating in a family tradition of honoring the memory of its earlier allegiance to the Whig faction of Henry Clay. To serve that philosophical commitment, this writer has followed assorted pathways and developed a range of capabilities, some of each of a very special character.

Who are 'we'?

This philosophy is most simply and most accurately name *Augustinian Neoplatonic republicanism*, the form of Judeo-Christian republican commitments mediated into the founding of our republic chiefly by channels of the Commonwealth Party of John Milton and, later, of Benjamin Franklin. This philosophy agrees with St. Augustine and Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa on the adoption of the scientific method of Plato both as to science so-called and the foundations of the science of statecraft. However, Platonism became Neoplatonic republicanism chiefly through the subordination of Platonic knowledge to the leading principles of the Judeo-Christian impulse.

The first, historically, of these Judeo-Christian principles is the kind of commitment to technological

progress recently emphasized as the kernel of Pope John Paul II's *Laborem Exercens*, the injunction of the Book of Genesis that man must "Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it." The second is the Christian doctrine of the consubstantial Trinity, that the Logos or Holy Spirit, the lawful ordering of universal creation, is equally consubstantial with the Godhead and Jesus Christ, as set forth at the opening of the Gospel of St. John. These directly interact as man, through fulfilling his command to technological progress, obliges himself to master more perfectly the lawful composition of the universe, and so brings his knowledge and will for earthly practice into greater agreement with the Logos. On this rests the potential divinity of the human individual, the sacredness of the human personality.

It is to be acknowledged that only a relative minority of Judeo-Christian republicans actually exert themselves to understand adequately the readily available knowledge of this sort. Through the influence of the kind of Judaism represented by Philo of Alexandria and Christianity, the Judeo-Christian republican values have been embedded more efficiently, if somewhat unconsciously, in our culture. This is so to the degree that approximately three-quarters of our adult citizenry remains essentially moral today, by means of deep-rooted commitment to moral policies derived from the direct or indirect influence of Judeo-Christian republicanism.

What is so far lacking among nearly the entirety of even those moral citizens is direct knowledge of the way

in which Judeo-Christian republicanism has been in combat with an opposing, anti-republican current in European civilization over the past 2,000 years. The ordinary moral person is so preoccupied with the trials and labors of immediate personal and family concerns, that the problems of society as a whole, the problems of affects of policies over the span of successive generations, seem to the average sort of moral individual a matter of little immediate practical sort of importance to him.

For such reasons, the perpetuation of republics continues to depend upon the reproduction of a certain special sort of republican elite. This is not an elite of powerful, wealthy families. It is an elite of knowledge and special dedication to service, reflected by those American patriotic families which, over two centuries, have committed themselves to a policy of developing their children in moral qualifications and knowledge to serve alternately our diplomatic service or military officer-corps.

Such an elite is of a modest disposition respecting pursuit of hedonistic goals of earthly paradise; it locates the personal identity and self-interest of its members in the function of service to the nation and civilization, to the future its works leave after it for generations yet unborn. The individual's greatest reward is that true happiness which can be achieved only by one whose life is committed to accomplishments which survive the passing of his mortal life.

Such elites have the duty of focusing their attention on the important matters of policy of practice usually overlooked by the average moral citizen. Their education to this purpose is a mastery of 2,500 years or more of history from the standpoint of the classical Greek conceptions of the process of history and scientific progress. The principal concern for acquiring personal wealth among such elites is to achieve a standard of material culture adequate to provide such a classical education and outlook to their children.

In modern European culture, Groote's great teaching-order, the Brothers of the Common Life, typifies this concern, as did later, the Oratorian teaching-order of Italy and France. Indeed, from the founding of the Brothers of the Common Life, through the mid-19th century influence of France's École Polytechnique in Germany, such teaching and scientific institutions sprung from the classical Greek republican tradition, have produced, directly or indirectly, nearly all of the great scientists, philosophers, creative artists, and statesmen upon whose influential role the rise of European civilization from the ashes of the 14-century Dark Age has chiefly depended for leadership.

This writer's commitment to such service began to develop in the wake of his return from India at the close

of the last World War. Although the disposition for the idea of a life devoted to service was earlier imbued by the influence of Christian ministry within his family, the immediate cause for his choice of direction was the recognition that the post-war period in the United States was dominated by moral degeneration into philosophically thoughtless pursuit of the hedonistic pleasures of an emerging middle-class suburbia. In the monetary and other policies emerging during the first post-war years, the United States was already blindly drifting then toward a repetition of the kinds of follies which had produced the Great Depression and the two World Wars of the century to date.

Although this writer had learned to despise the British from meeting them and seeing their works in India, he did not initially associate the disorientation of the post-war United States with a principally British influence. That connection first became clear during January 1974, as the writer and his associates first uncovered facts proving British secret-intelligence service's guiding role in deploying both the Kissinger-Haig inside, and the Institute for Policy Studies' outside of the Watergate operations.

This writer's initial concern, especially from 1952 onwards, was to prevent a new general economic depression and a correlated drift into resurgence of fascist forms as a result of the prevailing monetarist policies associated with the Bretton Woods system.

The institutions of policy and influence responsible for their suicidal drift, he judged, must simply be either reformed or, if not reformable, replaced. Although that commitment has not been altered in direction from its beginning, the knowledge of the implications of this commitment among the writer and his immediate collaborators has been successively transformed to higher levels, especially beginning the autumn 1971 establishment of an international political-intelligence news service.

Out of the work associated with that continuing root-commitment, there has developed an international association of close collaborators among persons who are both patriots and world-citizens of their respective nations. This philosophical association, somewhat paralleling the Society of Cincinnatus established jointly by George Washington and Lafayette, is premised upon two governing commitments.

First, we are committed to a secular world order constituting a community of principle among nations committed to policies coherent with Augustinian Neoplatonic republicanism, and to the development of individual nations according to those principles.

Second, we are committed to the principle of the absolute sovereignty of each and every sovereign nation-state republic, following the principles exemplified

by Dante Alighieri's proposals and the principles of international law elaborated by Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa during the 15th century.

We function like an international Freemasonry of patriots who are also world-citizens, as the two, cited principles define such a policy.

Our principled function is not to seek positions in government or to acquire wealth. Such desires we know to be potentially dangerous, as too great an attachment to either goal corrupts morals and the powers of judgment. We prefer to promote scientific progress, to help in promoting classical culture, and in fostering institutions which spread republican knowledge to new generations. In respect to government, we would prefer to inform and otherwise assist governments in discovering right policies, than to be part of government ourselves.

Unfortunately, because of the pluralist and related decay into pragmatism among the major political parties of most nations, these parties as a whole are not constituted in such a way that they are presently morally or intellectually capable of understanding or implementing even those kinds of policies urgently required for the continued survival of civilization. Therefore, contrary to our underlying impulse, we have been obliged to participate directly and vigorously, and very factionally, in the partisan political process. There are presently, no effectively functioning bodies of republican elites ruling the governments and leading political parties of nations, except as we act to catalyze the development of such formations by intersecting ourselves those fragmented circles which are potentially elements of such an elite.

'When we forget the larger reality, the British betray us with their dirty, behind-the-doors operations using the Soviet Union to manipulate the strategic situation and perceptions of the United States.'

It is this character of our work which has caused us to be rated as "potentially very dangerous" by powerful forces intersecting the ruling British oligarchy. It is for that reason that oligarchical institutions, including the British-controlled major news media of the United States, have spent so many tens of millions of dollars launching coordinated lying vilification of this writer and his associates. It is for that reason that this writer has been repeatedly a prospective target of assassination

beginning an aborted effort of late 1973, and repeatedly a target of assassination-plots deployed internationally beginning the summer of 1977, plots concocted now by the same circles otherwise mooted new assassination-attempts against Pope John Paul II, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany, and President Ronald Reagan.

Henry Kissinger, who is documented as having abused governmental authorities in a personal vendetta against this writer since 1975, is politically allied to the circles behind both the international press-vilification and the projected assassinations.

What is the leading issue?

We first acquired a rating of "potentially dangerous" during 1973, during the period the Institute for Policy Studies deployed Communist, Trotskyist, and other hooligans in an unsuccessful effort to physically destroy our organization in the United States. The principal cause for this sort of escalated harassment was our publication that year of a series of strategic policy-studies we found it appropriate to label as the "New Constantinople" thesis.

It was made clear to us, with aid of the clinching facts concerning the Club of Rome, that certain powerful European oligarchical interests intersecting the British monarchy itself, were actively deploying a coordinated effort intended to eliminate all sovereign nation-states, and to replace those states with a global Malthusian world-federalist order. One of the options we discovered those forces to be exploring was the use of what may be described as the "Thuringian geopolitical" proposal, aided by Willy Brandt's version of détente, to make central Europe (i.e., Germany) the possible center for such a world order.

The most famous historical precedent for such a scheme, since the old Roman Empire, was the role of Constantinople from Constantine through the period up to the [tenth century] Paleologue insurrection. One might have said "New Venice," rather than "New Constantinople," since, following the rise of the Paleologues until Napoleon destroyed the Republic of Venice [1797], Venice was the coordinating-center for the same rentier-financier geopolitical policy which the Malthusian world-federalists continue to deploy today.

What made us dangerous in the eyes of backers of the Malthusian world-federalist project was not only the evidence that we had stumbled across the nature of their true policies, but that we were publishing this assessment internationally. If influential patriotic circles of favored nations were to take seriously our analysis, the success of the Malthusian world-federalist project might be jeopardized by "premature" exposure.

At the close of 1973, two of the best-known opera-

tives of Britain's MI-5, Mr. Paul Walsh and Mrs. Schroeder, were caught red-handed in an elaborate covert operation against us internationally, an operation including elaborate arrangements with New Caledonia Airlines, and coordinated through channels of Britain's psychological-warfare center, where Henry Kissinger was indoctrinated, the London Tavistock Institute, into such U.S. assets of British secret intelligence as the Institute for Policy Studies.

The uncovering of leading aspects of this particular transatlantic covert operation, in late December 1973 and the first weeks of January 1974, led us to recognize that the forces deployed against us were identical with leading elements, including the Institute for Policy Studies, setting up Watergate as an attempted destabilization of the United States. Shortly, through aid of some Republicans in the Congress and some honest elements of the Nixon administration, we pieced together proof that Henry Kissinger and his errand-boy Alexander Haig had set up the Nixon administration from the inside for the *Washington Post's* and Institute for Policy Studies' operations from the outside.

For months, through 1974 and into 1975, we struggled to sort out such questions as the indicated role of the Rockefeller interests in many more features of the subversion than were subsumed under Henry Kissinger himself. Although we had massive evidence of British guilt, it was initially not credible to us that a ruined former imperial nation, such as Britain, could be the master of wealthy American families such as the Rockefellers. What we blamed the Rockefellers for doing during those two years was accurately based on fact, but, later, with aid of a better estimate of the limits of David Rockefeller's mental powers, we were obliged to face the conclusive evidence that the British side of the connection was the controlling feature.

The fuller truth dawned on us beginning the day in 1975 Rupert Hambro telephoned our New York office, asking for an appointment. The interests of the Hambros were focused upon my proposal to establish a gold-reserve-based international rediscount facility as replacement for the decaying remnants of the Bretton Woods System. The concern of the London bankers, as they later explained their policy in the matter, was to study the reasons for the influence of our proposal during that year, in order the better to defeat it—with aid of their agent Henry A. Kissinger.

So, during 1975, on orders from London, began Henry A. Kissinger's massive use of the resources of U.S. governmental agencies and of NATO intelligence, for massive news-media libels, financial warfare, and other evil deployed against not only ourselves but every leading figure of the United States, Europe, and the developing sector sharing conceptions of monetary reform similar to our own.

Nowadays, we have regular chats with officials of the forces behind the Malthusian world-federalist projects. We are curious to know what they are thinking, and they are curious to know what we are thinking. We chat like leaders of two opposing forces preparing for all-out warfare. With aid of our international political-intelligence capabilities, we presently know more of the relevant fine detail of British policy-making than any official patriotic agency of the United States.

The reason for our superior political intelligence in this connection is not located so much in the amount of fact at our command. The important thing is to know what to look for, as any homicide or burglary detective might inform you.

The key thing is to see the United States (in particular) as our nation is seen through the eyes of the leading British oligarchy, and to understand so why and how the British intend to destroy our nation (among others). At the same time, and in the same general way, one must understand who are the Tory traitors among policy-influencing circles inside the United States, and what motivates those persons to be the Tory traitors they are. The trick of intelligence, and also science generally, is to know what constitutes an adequate body of relevant fact, and to determine so where to look for the kinds of facts which are both available and important.

How most U.S. patriots are distracted

Beginning 1917-22, and again from 1946 to the present, it is prevailing doctrine of the United States that our primary adversary is the Soviet Union and "international Communism." The reality of the military-adversary relationship to the Soviet Union is so much a thermonuclear preoccupation of most policy-influentials, that most among them see this strategic fact in the wrong practical terms of larger reference.

It would be silly to suggest that the Soviet Union is not arming at as much as twice the rate projected by early CIA "Team B" estimates, and that this Soviet arms-race is not in preparation for the prospect of a probable thermonuclear confrontation with the United States. It would also be silly to overlook the fact that a certain influential "international Communist" faction within Communist nations and among Communist parties elsewhere is committed to seeing the United States "buried" by one means or another, preferably our own internal self-destruction, as early as possible.

These are monstrously big and very ugly strategic facts. The Sun is also a very big fact of our solar system. Yet, as the galaxy dwarfs our Sun to pitiful tininess, so there are larger facts in our strategic galaxy than the Soviet adversary-situation.

Essentially, the modern radicalism out of which the Bolshevik faction split off was established under the

titular leadership of Giuseppe Mazzini, and under the joint direction of Venice and Britain's Lord Palmerston, as the "Young Europe," and Concord "Young America" transcendentalism, of the 1830s and 1840s. From the beginning, the radical movement of Europe, and its socialist outgrowths, was created by the rentier-financier oligarchical interests of Europe for the specific purpose of mobilizing a "proletariat" as a destructive social-battering-ram against the influence of the kind of industrial-capitalist institutions then represented more perfectly by the United States under George Washington, James Monroe, and John Quincy Adams. It was a representation of an oligarchical trick familiar from ancient history, the creation and deployment of wild-eyed dionysiac mobs as forces of chaos and confusion, to destroy the republican institutions of urban-centered republics.

To a certain degree, both Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin, represented contradictory impulses within the oligarchy-directed radical movements. Although Marx accepted the destruction of industrial capitalism, he and his follower Lenin projected the establishment of a socialist form of industrial state, a form of society not much less or more abhorrent to the oligarchists than the capitalist form of industrialized nation-state. Consequently, as the Soviet Union emerged as a consolidated nation-state power, and later as a world power, the oligarchs retained control over most of the international socialist movement, through the anarchist and socialist internationals, while attempting to play the United States (especially) and the Soviet Union off against one another, aiming thus to facilitate the mutual destruction of both.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt plainly had a grasp of this strategic reality, as the published reminiscences of his son Elliot help us to understand more exactly. Roosevelt's clear commitment to an "American Century" coming out of World War II, was to eliminate British "18th-century methods" from international relations, and to deploy "American methods" of high-technology development of the world's agriculture, industry, and basic economic infrastructure. To the extent that the Soviet Union was willing to accept a place as a sovereign nation-state within such an "American Century" world-order, war-avoidance between the two post-war super-powers could be effected.

Unfortunately, beginning Walter Lippmann's lying policy-interventions during the period of the 1944 Roosevelt re-election effort, the U.S. government was repeatedly hornswoggled by a combination of Britain and American Tories. With Roosevelt's death, the Tories, including Secretary of State Jimmy Byrne, led President Truman around by the nose. Instead of imposing an "American Century" on the post-war order of international relations, we accepted the degradation of the

United States to becoming a "dumb American giant on a British leash," barring such glorious moments as President Eisenhower's slapping of the British in 1956.

In brief, we must situate strategic issues respecting the Soviet Union within the larger, determining context of the conflicts between U.S. and British interests. No matter how bloody and dangerous the facts of the U.S.-Soviet conflict become, we must never permit that to cause us to lose sight of the larger reality in which the shape of that U.S.-Soviet adversary relationship is situated. When we forget, the British betray us with their dirty, behind-the-doors operations using the Soviet Union to manipulate the strategic situation and perceptions of the United States.

When we were embroiled with a war against China in Korea, at the same time Britain was keeping up appearances with a few Tommies dying on Korean battlefields, Britain was providing the most vital strategic assistance to Peking through Hong Kong. Britain plays up to the present day, the same sort of behind-the-doors games with Moscow against the United States it played with Peking against the United States at the beginning of the 1950s. Indeed, the British are playing similar games with Moscow in connection with the present British war against Argentina. Certain Soviet officials have been caught plotting with British military commanders, both chortling over the humiliation and isolation of the United States if Washington is foolish enough to permit Haig's policies to continue.

The Philby case is exemplary. Harold "Kim" Philby, presently an influential General of the Soviet KGB, is to the present moment one of the most prized assets in Moscow of the British monarchy's private household. Philby, who was sold to Moscow through aid of providing Moscow with details on the British-directed U.S.A. Albania operation, was sitting in Washington directly on top of innermost secrets of U.S. intelligence—some of which he was transmitting to Moscow—including his knowledge of every unwritten secret British-American agreement of the sort to which Kissinger refers broadly in his recent public address in Britain.

Secret but unlawful agreements

The foreign policy of the United States, under law, flows primarily from the declaration of national purpose explicitly and implicitly embedded historically in the 1787 draft of the Federal Constitution of the United States, and as typified by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams's arguments of principle and constitutional law in formulating the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Additional law can be added to foreign policy only with the consent of acts of the United States Senate, which are law insofar as those acts do not contradict the implications of our Federal Constitution.

The President of the United States, who is the only

constitutional authority for making and conduct of foreign policy of the United States, may of course make secret agreements, provided these agreements do not contravene the Constitution and existing law, or that his proposed alterations of treaty-law are duly submitted for the consent by vote of a majority of the U.S. Senate.

So, under U.S. law today, the President of the United States is not only empowered but obliged, without need to consult Congress or his Secretary of State, to kick the British out of the South Atlantic more forcefully than President Eisenhower kicked the British in 1956. That is the obligatory law and action of the entire Executive Branch of government until such time as the Senate shall explicitly repeal the Monroe Doctrine and all of the numerous treaty-laws attached to that doctrine since its first promulgation.

However, no President has the authority to make secret agreements which contravene or subvert existing law, unless authority for the interest of those secret agreements is submitted to the Congress in written form for deliberation and vote by a majority of the Senate. Any secret agreement otherwise conflicting with a law such as the Monroe Doctrine is null and void, especially if it is an unwritten secret agreement of the sort which the treasonous Henry A. Kissinger has insisted on to enable the British to govern secretly the conduct of the foreign policy of the United States.

Since such secret agreements have the cumulative object of destroying the constitutional sovereignty of the United States, and, in the most recent issue, to prompt Secretary Haig to aid what is under law a British act of war against the United States, we make not the slightest exaggeration in denouncing such secret agreements as both unlawful and implicitly treasonous.

Under the 1947 Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, which is one of the treaty-laws subsumed under the Monroe Doctrine, any British military action against a sovereign state of the Western Hemisphere, for whatever cause, is by law an act of warfare against the United States. Whatever elected or appointed public official gives aid and comfort to those actions of Britain under such circumstances, is *ipso facto* guilty of treason against the United States.

Haig, whose ignorance of U.S. history, the Constitution, and literate language generally is well established, may be behaving treasonously under the influence of his own defective mental powers. His actions are *ipso facto* treasonous, only his degree of legal mental responsibility for such acts is to be deliberated. Kissinger, although probably a moral imbecile, has made it clear through his remarks that he, Kissinger, is adequately witting of the treasonous intent in his own support of Haig's treasonally unlawful actions.

Documentation

'I kept Britons better informed than Americans'

What follows are excerpts of Henry Kissinger's May 10 speech to the London-based Royal Institute for International Affairs. Subtitles and emphasis are in the original.

All accounts of the Anglo-American alliance during the Second World War and in the early postwar period draw attention to the significant differences in philosophy between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill reflecting our different national histories. America, which had never experienced a foreign threat to its survival, considered wars an historical aberration caused by evil men or institutions; we were pre-occupied with victory defined as the unconditional surrender of the Axis. Britain had seen aggression take too many forms to risk so personal a view of history; she had her eyes on the postwar world and sought to gear wartime strategy toward forestalling Soviet domination of Central Europe. . . . The dispute was resolved according to American preferences—in my view, to the detriment of postwar security.

Fortunately, Britain had a decisive influence over America's rapid awakening to maturity in the years following. In the 1940s and 50s our two countries responded together to the geopolitical challenge of the Soviet Union. . . .

Philosophies of foreign policy

The disputes between Britain and America during the Second World War and after were, of course, not an accident. British policy drew upon two centuries of experience with the European balance of power, America on two centuries of rejecting it. . . .

Britain has rarely proclaimed moral absolutes or rested her faith in the ultimate efficacy of technology. . . . She remains Hobbsian: she expects the worst and is rarely disappointed. . . . As late as 1949, the Department of State submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a memorandum that strove mightily to distinguish the new North Atlantic Treaty from traditional military alliances and above all from any relationship to the very balance of power it was supposed to establish.

There is also a perennial American assumption that economic well-being automatically ensures political stability. . . . Disillusionment was inevitable. America fluctuated between moral crusading and frustrated isolationism, between overextension and escapism, between extremes of intransigence and conciliation. But history was kind to us. For a long time it spared us from the need to face up to fundamental choices. Not being called upon to help preserve the equilibrium—a service rendered gratis by Great Britain—we could avoid the responsibility of permanent involvement in world politics. . . .

The nature of the special relationship

Even [after World War II], Anglo-American difficulties persisted occasionally. The anguished disagreements over immigration into Palestine; the misunderstandings over atomic cooperation; competition over Iranian oil; the abrupt, unilateral ending of Lend-Lease; and the race to demobilize were only some of the items in a stream of irritants. More serious policy differences were to follow in the 50s, causing Anthony Eden to reflect on the "tough reality of Anglo-American relations. . . ." Misunderstandings and conflicts of interest continued through European integration, the rearmament of Germany, and Indochina, right up to the tragic climax of Suez. . . . That these irritations never shook the underlying unity was due to statesmanship on both sides. One factor was a brilliant British adjustment to new circumstances. To the outside world it may have seemed that Britain clung far too long to the illusion of Empire; in her relations with Washington, she proved that an old country was beyond self-deception on fundamentals. . . . By discreet advice, the wisdom of experience, and the pre-supposition of common aims; she could make herself indispensable, so that American leaders no longer thought of consultations with London as a special favor but as an inherent component of our own decision-making. The wartime habit of intimate, informal collaboration thus became a permanent practice, obviously because it was valuable to both sides.

The ease and informality of the Anglo-American partnership has been a source of wonder—and no little resentment—to third countries. Our postwar diplomatic history is littered with Anglo-American "arrangements" and "understandings," sometimes on crucial issues, never put into formal documents. . . . The British were so matter-of-factly helpful that they become a participant in internal American deliberations, to a degree probably never before practiced between sovereign nations. In my period in office, the British played a seminal part in certain American bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union—indeed, they helped draft the key document. In my White House incarnation then, I

kept the British Foreign Office better informed and more closely engaged than I did the American State Department—a practice which, with all affection for things British, I would not recommend be made permanent. But it was symptomatic. . . . In my negotiations over Rhodesia I worked from a British draft with British spelling even when I did not fully grasp the distinction between a working paper and a Cabinet-approved document. . . .

Britain, Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union

The central foreign policy problem that Britain, America, and Europe have had to confront together since 1945 is, of course, the Soviet Union. . . . The flaw in containment was not only, as the cliché has it today, that it was overly preoccupied with military counterforce but that it misunderstood that the West in the immediate postwar period was precisely at the apex of its relative strength. Containment thus deferred the moment for a diplomatic encounter with the Soviet Union to a later time by which Soviet power could only have grown. In 1945 the United States had an atomic monopoly and the Soviet Union was devastated by 20 million casualties. Our policy paradoxically gave the Kremlin time to consolidate its conquests and to redress the nuclear imbalance. . . .

In a period of nuclear stalemate, ironically, conflict became more likely at the level of local, nonnuclear crisis. In an age of decolonization, many of these clashes were bound to occur in the Third World. This was another area in which, in the immediate postwar period, American and European attitudes diverged sharply.

Americans from Franklin Roosevelt onward believed that the United States, with its "revolutionary" heritage, was the natural ally of peoples struggling against colonialism; we could win the allegiance of these new nations by opposing and occasionally undermining our European allies in the areas of their colonial dominance. Churchill, of course, resisted these American pressures. . . .

In the early stages of the Falkland crisis America hesitated between its Atlantic and its Western Hemisphere vocations. But neither of these disagreements did any lasting damage. In the end we came together; the old friendship prevailed over other considerations.

The lesson I draw is that in the Third World we may occasionally operate from different perspectives. But we must take care not to let these differences reach a point where they undermine the basic self-confidence and sense of mission of the other party. . . .

The strategic position of self-confidence of a close ally on a matter it considers of vital concern must not be undermined. It is a principle of no little contempo-

rary relevance. In this sense the Falkland crisis in the end will strengthen Western cohesion. . . .

The contemporary debate

The issue before the allies now is . . . to face our future. An alliance at odds over central issues of East-West diplomacy, economic policy, the Middle East, Central America, Africa, and relations with the Third world is in serious, and obvious, difficulty. . . .

The strange aspect is that the disarray is taking place at the precise moment that the bankruptcy of the system that denies the human spirit seems to become clear beyond doubt. The Communist world has fundamental systemic problems and has not shown any ability to solve them except by recurrent brute force, which only delays the day of reckoning. . . . Soviet economic performance is a disaster. . . . It seems impossible to run a modern economy by a system. In short, if Moscow is prevented by a coordinated Western policy from deflecting its internal tensions into international crisis, it is likely to find only disillusionment in the boast that history is on its side. . . .

The Atlantic Alliance has no institutional machinery for addressing economic or Third World issues, or any long-term political strategy; the European Community, while eminently successful in its political coordination, has no mechanism as yet for formulating a coherent European view on matters of defense. The economic summits of Western and Japanese leaders begun in the mid-70s, are an attempt to surmount this procedural impasse, but they can do little more than call key leaders' attention to key problems in an informal, unsystematic way. Procedures do not solve substantive problems. Nevertheless, creating an appropriate forum for broader and deeper consultation would be an important first step.

On Britain's side by 'instruction'

Following Henry Kissinger's May 10 speech before the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London, Executive Intelligence Review's Mark Burdman spoke with Lord Home of the Hirsell. Lord Home, also known as Alec Douglas-Home and the former Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, attended a private luncheon for Kissinger following his speech. The interview with Lord Home follows:

Burdman: What is your impression of Mr. Kissinger's speech, in which he seems to promise full backing for

Great Britain in the current South Atlantic conflict? What additional aspects did Mr. Kissinger allude to during the follow-up reception?

Lord Home: He gave an historic review of the past 30 years, that was the gist. He emphasized the close contracts that have existed between us and the Americans over the past years. He brought in the Falklands issue as such rather late, but I can say that he understands very much our difficulties.

Burdman: Would you consider Mr. Kissinger to be in fact a trustworthy extension of British interests within the United States?

Lord Home: I would say so. He's always been friendly to us. I worked with him for many years in my official capacity, and only on minor tactical details did we ever disagree. We've always been on the same road.

Burdman: Would you say Mr. Kissinger would like to ensure the hegemony of London within the Western alliance, that this is his paramount concern?

Lord Home: Yes, I would say so. Our purpose has always been the same as his, yes.

Burdman: So you would agree with the assessment that Mr. Kissinger is in fact a British agent inside the United States?

Lord Home: Not an agent. That's too strong a word. But surely by instruction and experience, he finds himself on the same side as us, yes.

Burdman: And of course there is this question of secretive "arrangement" that he spoke about. What does this amount to?

Lord Home: It's not necessarily formal arrangements. We don't have to write things down. Kissinger was referring to common purposes that don't need to be put down on paper necessarily. But to cite one good example: Diego Garcia [an island 1,000 miles south of India—M.B.] in the Indian Ocean is a good case of how we are able to cooperate in a crucial theater. On the essentials of security, Mr. Kissinger is saying, we come together.

Burdman: Your own press today quotes Mr. Reagan himself and Vernon Walters as well showing some possible doubts about going too far in support of the British, with Walters calling Mrs. Thatcher a "machita" and so on. Do you think some people may not be so enthusiastic about supporting Britain from within the American leadership?

Lord Home: No. I don't think so. Even Mr. Haig is gravely concerned about losing his friends in South America and I can understand this. But I have absolutely no doubt about American support in this situation. I am sure it is forthcoming.