Nuclear strategy: a new level of official insanity

by Lonnie Wolfe

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger gave his final approval in April to a secret five-year military guidance document that commits the United States to a policy of psychological intimidation of the Soviet Union and its allies on a massive scale, while facilitating deployments to police meatgrinder “population warfare” in the developing sector.

As President Reagan prepared to leave for more than a week of summit meetings in Europe, the 125-page five-year guidance was summarized in a front page May 30 New York Times article provocatively featuring its plans for “protracted nuclear warfare” against the Soviets. The Times article effectively circulated the guidance internationally, fueling expected demonstrations by the peace movement in Europe and the United States against the Reagan administration’s defense policies.

The document was reportedly drafted under the supervision of Weinberger’s chief deputy, Frank Carlucci, the former Carter administration deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency who helped run the Solidarist destabilization of Poland. Sources report that Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Iklé, a member of a prominent Swiss banking family, drafted the key components of the guidance, including the global nuclear war plans and the call for immediate economic warfare against the East bloc.

Defense Department sources say the strategy guidance is consistent with a recent National Security Council directive promulgated by National Security Adviser William Clark. That directive, outlined in a May 21 speech by Clark, was said to have been prepared under the supervision of Clark’s chief deputy, Robert McFarlane, former chief counsel at the State Department and aide to Henry Kissinger.

These sources report that the guidance was leaked to the Times with “unofficial-official” Defense Department approval through Iklé’s office. As one source put it, “No one gets hold of a document like this unless a higher-up in the DOD wants them to. Iklé wants to advertise to the world how tough he is. . . .”

Nuclear ‘decapitation’

A top Washington-based defense analyst with connections to the DOD planners termed the document “a doctrine of armed psychological warfare and bluff.” According to the guidance, the United States announced its intention to fight a protracted nuclear war, and to fight it according to a strategy known as “decapitation”—massive strikes at the Soviet leadership and its Soviet communications lines.

In addition, the guidance foresees non-linear escalation of warfighting. For example, should war break out at sea, the Soviets could not be assured that the United States would not launch a nuclear strike at the Soviet homeland and its leadership.

This represents a level of strategic insanity beyond even the Carter administration’s “limited nuclear war” blueprint, Presidential Directive 59. All previous doc-
trine was based on the idea that a nuclear exchange at the strategic level would be a quick affair, either limited, in the Schlesingerian view, or a total conflict which neither side would win.

Iklé and company have now opted for a twisted version of a war-winning strategy. Their view is based on the idea that the Soviet Union is an empire run by an autocratic elite. If the U.S.S.R. were decapitated, the empire would collapse, the Iklé-Weinberger doctrine asserts.

The doctrine is pure psychological warfare. There is no intention of actually fighting a nuclear war with the Soviets. The idea is to threaten the Soviet leadership with extermination during a crisis, bluffing them into backing down, despite their military superiority. It is a variation of the “mad dog” doctrine espoused by British agent Henry Kissinger, modeled on Adolf Hitler’s geopolitics: Make the Soviets believe that the United States is insane enough to launch a nuclear war on any provocation, and the Soviets will back down. The new twist is the notion cooked up by British psychological warriors and military incompetents like retired Gen. Maxwell Taylor of Vietnam War infamy—that the highest priority of the Soviet leadership is the preservation of the Soviet leadership per se, not the Soviet nation—hence they would never risk a war in which that elite’s existence was threatened.

“They’ve got it all wrong,” one analyst stated. “When the Soviets talk about protracted warfare in nuclear war, they mean after a total nuclear exchange. This [the Weinberger guidance] is complete miscalculation. If you provoke the Soviets, they will go to nuclear war to defend their homeland—whether you target their elites or not.”

Conventional bloodbaths

By threatening nuclear annihilation, Weinberger, Iklé, and their British mentors hope to force the Soviets to accept an “alternative” of unlimited conventional warfare in the developing sector.

The strategy guidance contends that the most likely military contingency to be faced by the United States and the rest of NATO is protracted conventional warfare against the Soviets or their surrogates in the developing sector. It gives priority to, in descending order, the defense of U.S. territory, Western Europe, and the Persian Gulf. In a move that is sure to anger America’s Japanese allies, the defense of Asia is ranked as a lower priority than the above, and forces from the Western Pacific may be shifted to other regions. The implication is that the Japanese will have to pick up the slack caused by such redeployments, whether they like it or not.

The guidance proposes a massive build-up of conventional forces and asserts a U.S. prerogative to intervene militarily in the Persian Gulf, whether or not it is invited by a friendly nation. The Rapid Deployment Force, the military capability designed by the Carter administration planners for such exigencies, is earmarked for deployment to the Gulf area.

The guidance further states that the United States will not necessarily intervene in conflicts within the developing sector that do not immediately threaten its strategic interests or involve Soviet troop deployments. This is a green light for population-destroying wars like that between Iran and Iraq.

The Weinberger-Iklé posture is an official endorsement of the unilateral use of NATO forces for deployments into the developing sector—i.e., out of the NATO treaty area. This extension of NATO southward has been the subject of policy discussions among the United States, France and Britain. The guidance incorporates these discussions about an informal “out-of-area directorate,” consisting of the French, the Americans, and the British, into U.S. doctrine. The reason that the United States can be primarily concerned with the Mideast is because the French will take care of Africa, and the British South America.

The doctrine also envisions arming surrogate powers in the Southern Hemisphere, which will be policed by NATO/U.S. forces should their conflicts “get out of hand.” This is an explicit population-reduction policy, authored by the same British policy circles that are directing the bloody gunboat diplomacy in the Malvi-
Economic warfare on the East bloc

The document further proposes that economic warfare against, and political destabilization of, the Soviet Union begin immediately. According to the Weinberger strategy, economic policy is to be subordinated to geopolitical military doctrine.

“Peacetime competition with the Soviet Union would put as much pressure as possible on the Soviet economy already burdened by increasing military spending,” writes the Times, describing the Weinberger strategy. “As a peacetime complement to military strategy, the guidance asserts that the United States and its allies should in effect declare economic and technical warfare on the Soviet Union. . . .”

Both Weinberger and Iklé have been publicly stump ing for such policies, focusing on control of credit for East-West trade. They have done so in the face of strong opposition from Europe, especially from West Germany. The strategy elevates a credit cut-off to a primary policy goal.

The Pentagon guidance further elevates “special operations”—guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and psychological warfare. The type of capabilities deployed during the ongoing Polish destabilization are to be enlarged.

These policies, popularized by the discredited Carter administration National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, reflect the same misguided view of the Soviet Union embodied in the insane nuclear targeting doctrine. Brzezinski’s theory—now adopted by the DOD as the basis for strategic doctrine—is that the Soviet “empire” could be weakened to the point of collapse by economic warfare and internal destabilization.

Though this theory was discredited by the Soviet handling of the Polish crisis, the view, which leads towards dangerous provocations inside the East bloc, persists among British ruling circles and their American retainers. It is a signal indication of the desperation and dangerous fantasy pervading Anglo-American strategists.

Similarly, the guidance revives another component of this “strategy of tension” against the Soviets—the so-called China Card. It calls for the United States to fund China’s military development to keep Soviet troops tied down on the Chinese border.

The quick fix

The guidance, which is to serve as a military procurement guideline for the next five years, is replete with charts and figures projecting the need to build up U.S. forces to meet its goals. In that way, the civilian defense department planners hope to sell their scheme to the more skeptical military.

Even an incomplete examination of the published Times leak exposes the proposed military build-up as an ineffective quick fix. The strategies will have to be adjusted to deal with a projected shortage of funds, the guidance admits, meaning that U.S. military posture will still be strapped into the monetarist straitjacket imposed by Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker’s tight money policies and by the resultant global depression.

Top priority is given to cheap schemes required to “project” military power. When push comes to shove in the money squeeze, new weapons programs and R&D are to be sacrificed to build up conventional forces. Similarly, while there is much talk about improving strategic forces, the only priority is given to the deployment of several thousand super-accurate cruise missiles, the modern day version of the V-1 buzz bomb, which would be useful in threatening the Soviet elite with annihilation.

Weinberger versus Haig?

New York Times analysts and other nominalists have already contrasted the hard-line tenor of the guidance to the softer policies of Secretary of State Haig. The reality is that Weinberger and Haig are two sides of the same policy—with Haig cast as a “soft cop,” playing off the “tough cop” Defense Department line. The game is obvious enough: to get the Soviets to grant concessions to the soft cop Haig, fearing the apparently more bellicose policies of Weinberger.

This comes across most clearly in the arms-control arena. The more insane Weinberger and company appear, the more likely the Soviets are to nibble at the proposals to control military technology offered by the State Department—or at least, this is the reasoning of British policy circles who back this game. President Reagan is useful only as a stage prop in this theatre. It is unclear whether he was even briefed on the guidance before he left for Europe.

Both Haig and Weinberger agree on the “crumbling Soviet empire” thesis against all countervailing reality. Both agree on the need to refocus NATO southward, and on the British doctrine of population warfare. While Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Haig railed constantly on this theme. They have both dutifully supported British policy interests in the Malvinas crisis.

The United States is thus firmly locked in a doctrine that was once called “strategic bluff.” The Soviets are undoubtedly laughing at the latest developments. Their response will be to let the Western strategic posture deteriorate under Haig, Weinberger, et al., and they are likely to give signs of playing along with them. The question is not if, but when, the Soviets will call that bluff. There are no contingencies in the Weinberger guidance for what to do when that occurs.