Who is Yuri Andropov?

Rachel Douglas, Soviet Union Editor, explains the significance of the new Communist Party Central Committee Secretary’s ‘Bukharinite’ lineage.

On May 24, a plenary session of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee adopted the long-awaited Food Program of the party. It also installed Yuri V. Andropov as a Secretary of the Central Committee. A few days later, Andropov relinquished his job as Chairman of the Committee for State Security, the KGB.

Central Committee (CC) Secretary, unlike KGB Chairman, is a post from which the 67-year-old Andropov could ascend to the position of General Secretary of the CPSU. Brezhnev’s successor in this most important role will most likely come from the 10-man Secretariat of the CC, and already, Andropov has assumed the number-two or -three spot in the Secretariat. He is placed where he can affect Soviet policy even more than he has done as KGB chief, especially as there is no evidence that Andropov will sever his KGB links and a good deal of evidence that he will not.

‘A liberal’

What does more power for Andropov betoken? Considering the reputation of the KGB, the casual observer will have been surprised to read analyses from Sovietologists serving difference Western elite factions that Andropov is “a liberal.” Andropov’s shift closer to Brezhnev was “one of the most favorable developments to have occurred in the Soviet Union in recent years,” wrote Jerry Hough from Duke University and the Brookings Institution in the May 26 Washington Post, adding that it means “the Soviet succession will bring significant reform fairly quickly.”

The slightly more cautious London Economist editorialized June 5 that Western leaders should contemplate “the possibly beneficent rise” of Andropov, who, as an “enlightened conservative,” albeit “no liberal,” would be just the man to respond with “flexibility” to Western pressures to make the Russians lean “towards butter rather than guns.”

Not only the British think along these lines. At an April 1982 conference of the Südost Institut of Munich, an organization dominated by the European oligarchy’s nostalgia for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Vienna-based intelligence specialist Paul Lendvai was among those boosting Andropov’s rating as a liberal on economic policy, and particularly a devotee of the Hungarian experiment in decentralized decision-making.

These evaluations are a political datum of weight equal to, if not greater than, the truth about Andropov’s power and what he believes. There is something more dangerous than dangerous Soviet policies, and that is Western strategic misestimation of Soviet policy.

“Liberal,” in its usage by these analysts, is defined by the speaker’s ideology. It means various things at various times. Sometimes it means “loose,” when Soviet policy is measured on the peculiar scale of “tight” to “loose.” The logic of preferring the “loose” is that Soviet economic policy-makers who favor decentralizing economic power are also those who would lower the priority on heavy industry—and defense—in favor of consumer-goods production. Thus the Economist, which suggested pushing the Soviets toward butter instead of guns, advised that Western leaders should want Russia “to be governed more flexibly.” The Economist neglected to observe that the Soviet Union has a perfect record of not responding to such pressure.

Soviet specialists at one London think tank have put into circulation a novel definition of the Soviet “liberal,” in which flexibility hardly figures. According to this version, the KGB for decades (even when under the thumb of the thug Lavrentii Beria in the last years of Stalin’s life) has been “exceedingly liberal” because its directors always put top priority on the good life for themselves—and hence cared little for the heavy industry and defense buildup that were the hallmark of Soviet “conservatism”!
It is possible to say a lot more clearly than the word “liberal” does, who Yuri Andropov has been. We can find his roots in the wing of the CPSU which, indeed, is historically akin to the “liberal” British aristocracy. In making this identification, we discover that the rise of Soviet “liberals” may be considered advantageous by Western oligarchs who anticipate the crumbling of the Soviet Union to their ultimate gain; but it is not in the interest of Western nations. The industrial economy of the West is collapsing while the Soviet economy stagnates, and the West is ill-positioned to survive the war that is a likely outcome of economic collapse and geopolitical confrontation; and the Russian faction rashly called “liberal” has a history of aggressive asset-building overseas.

What Andropov lacks is what was crucial to Brezhnev’s ability to forge a policy toward the West that promised something other than confrontation. Brezhnev, like Prime Minister N. Tikhonov and Central Committee Secretary Andrei Kirilenko, came from the Dnepr valley industrial center of the southern Ukraine, and kept with him a guiding commitment to building industry. This commitment has supported one leg of Brezhnev’s détente policy, namely, the conclusion of trade and development deals that aim to anchor political détente in joint efforts for scientific progress and industrialization. Its high point was the 25-year economic cooperation agreement signed between the U.S.S.R. and West Germany in 1978.

A sign of the times

That leg of the policy slipped when détente partners of Brezhnev like former French President Giscard d’Estaing were lost, and fighting mounted in the West about whether East-West trade were not just bailing out a leaky Soviet boat. The other leg, which remains, is arms limitation and disarmament negotiations, which are incapable of stopping war on their own; disarmament only will avail after peace is secured by more substantial means. If great powers are hurtling toward war, sitting at a disarmament table can soothe minds that ought to be alert, and so make war more likely. For the Soviets, disarmament has become a chute down which hundreds of millions of rubles pour—all to aid a sham “peace” movement that endangers the peace by putting Western governments in disarray and shelters terrorist who might eliminate key peace-makers just when they are needed.

This spring, Andropov made his move, Soviet foreign policy has centered around this mammoth support for the peace movement and diplomatic forays into the developing sector. In the Middle East, South America, China—everywhere the United States has bungled relations with its allies, real and sought-after—the Soviet Union is maneuvering to rush into the breach.

Yuri Andropov, schooled in the acquisition and preservation of power, is just the man to rise at such a moment of opportunism.

Suslov’s shoes

Much prognostication about Andropov’s alleged liberalism hinges on the economic policies he would support. But to date, Andropov has made no attempt to assert authority on economic issues. He had an opportunity to do so, when he gave the annual Lenin Day speech on April 22; last year’s speaker, Central Committee Secretary and Politburo member Konstantin Chernenko, had devoted a long section of his speech to the subject. Andropov was brief and vague on the economy, although he called it “the main sphere of activity of the Soviet people.” He did not discuss the forthcoming party food program, and, after the Central Committee plenum, it was Chernenko, not the newly appointed Andropov, who briefed agriculture sector ministries on carrying out the policy.

What Andropov did, however, is lay claim to the position of Mikhail Suslov, the party ideologist and power-broker who died in January after more than three decades as a Central Committee Secretary. Suslov’s portfolio bridged foreign policy and internal party affairs, a double dose of power; as KGB chief, Andropov has accumulated experience in both areas.

The CC Secretariat, like the Politburo whose membership it overlaps, is an executive body of the 300-man Central Committee. Its 10 members direct the CC staff, the center of party power in the Soviet Union. There are now five Secretaries who also sit on the Politburo: Kirilenko, who has apparently reduced his workload due to illness; Brezhnev’s long-time aide Konstantin Chernenko; Mikhail Gorbachov, the CC Secretary for agriculture and only 51 years old; Brezhnev himself; and Andropov.

Andropov has been a CC Secretary before. He only went to the KGB in 1967, after a career in the party and foreign service that culminated in a 1962-67 stint as Secretary in charge of relations with ruling communist parties, i.e., Eastern Europe and China. This post is now held by another Brezhnev aide, Konstant Rusakov; Andropov has returned to the Secretariat at a higher slot in the hierarchy.

The sign that Andropov was appropriating Suslov’s mantle came in his April 22 speech, the one in which he avoided the economy. Here he held forth on a classic Suslov theme, the nature of Marxist-Leninist theory. Andropov echoed Suslov’s dictum that the party must “learn from Lenin a genuinely creative attitude to revolutionary theory, to develop it in every way,” as he said, in turn, that the principles of Marxism-Leninism “cannot tolerate stagnation . . . are alive and continue to develop.”

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The man who brought Yuri Andropov to Moscow to work in the CC department for ties with ruling communist parties was an old Finnish communist named Otto Kuusinen. After a failed attempt to become the Soviet-sponsored President of Finland on the eve of World War II, Kuusinen joined the CPSU and eventually sat on its Politburo from 1957 until his death in 1964.

Andropov was Kuusinen's subordinate, first in the party organization in Karelia, near the Finnish border, then in the CC department.

**The Comintern legacy**

In the 1920s and 1930s, Kuusinen had worked on the Executive Committee of the Communist International. Time and again, Kuusinen was caught up in rumors about his connections to British intelligence—and in this he was not unique, for the Comintern was a nexus of intelligence agencies, the milieu that produced triple agent Kim Philby. In the case of Kuusinen, the rumors often hung on his mistresses, such as the Finn Hella Wuolijoki, who had the reputation of a British spy and was related by marriage to the British communist specialist on the Third World, R. Palme Dutt, of the same Baltic noble family as Sweden's social-democratic fascist, Olof Palme.

According to the memoirs of Kuusinen's estranged wife, his best friend among Russians on the Comintern Executive Committee was Nikolai Bukharin, the Vienna-trained economist whom Stalin demolished in order to start the Soviets' crash industrialization drive at the end of the 1920s. It is the Bukharinite profile of advocating a market economy at home (in agriculture, if not for everything), and promoting revolution abroad, that the British today say they discern in Kuusinen's trainee Andropov—and call it "liberal."

Kuusinen was instrumental in effecting an institutional shift in the late 1950s which was momentous for Soviet foreign policy. Together with the Armenian Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan, he called for expanding the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the Soviet party and state. Two things resulted: re-establishment of Hungarian Cominternist Eugen Varga's think tank under the name Institute for the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), and constitution of a special CC consultants' group on international affairs, reporting to Kuusinen and then to Andropov. There was, and still is, much circulation of personnel between the think tanks (formally attached to the Academy of Sciences) and the CC staff. Georgii Arbatov, the head of the IMEMO spinoff Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada and another Kuusinen protégé, was head of the CC consultants group in 1964-67. Several officials from the CC International Department of former Comintern bureaucrat Boris Ponomarev, which is the equivalent, for non-ruling parties, of Andropov's former department, double on the board of think tank magazines.

The think tanks have been a channel into the Soviet Union for "sociological" methods of analysis, which undermine the intelligence and security of any nation, whether capitalist or socialist. They have also harbored triple agents like Kim Philby's friend Donald Maclean. But, like the old Comintern apparat, the think tanks are now an accepted, integrated part of Soviet decision-making. So too the wing of the CPSU Andropov comes from, the Bukharinite wing, is part of the ruling coalition. His is not a challenge to Brezhnev from an outsider, but a tilt within the power center of the Soviet Union.

**Control of the KGB**

When Andropov took charge of the KGB in 1967, it was to replace V. Semichastnyi, the last disciple there of Alexander Shelepin, a former KGB chief who was a CC Secretary considered able and wanting to challenge Brezhnev before the latter's power was consolidated. Andropov's first speeches as KGB chief stressed that party control over the intelligence service was necessary. That is a principle Andropov will no doubt assert once again, for what happened in the KGB leadership

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**Soviet agriculture plenum was an anti-climax**

One after another, the sources who define Yuri Andropov as "liberal" forecast that he is the one who could take the Soviet Union in the direction of a "Hungarian model" of economic liberalization, toward a market economy. The first test of this analysis was the Central Committee plenum on agriculture, the same meeting that promoted Andropov to the CC Secretariat.

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In advance of the plenum, leaks in the Italian, Yugoslav, and other press heralded a "milestone" for the Soviet economy. After all, the Hungarian experiments began in (and have largely been confined to) agriculture, where a system of heavily subsidized incentives for the individual farmer has raised productivity and given Hungary more stability in food supplies than any other Eastern European country. Then after the plenum, the Financial Times of London claimed that the reform was going to re-create the
as he left it in May signaled that he meant to remain the ranking party official with say-so over the KGB he ran for 15 years. The choice of Andropov’s successor was a power play by Andropov against men closer to Brezhnev than he.

The First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, Semyon Tsvigun, died in January a few days before Suslov. He was Brezhnev’s brother-in-law and a member of the Central Committee, but extraordinary breaches in the formulation of his obituary (Brezhnev did not sign it) and the protocol of his funeral (out-of-town delegations were reportedly barred from attendance) fed rumors that he took his own life. Nevertheless, there were two more Deputy Chairmen of the KGB, each in office for more than a decade and each from Brezhnev’s southern Ukraine clique, who might have gotten the job. But both S. K. Tsinev (75) and V. M. Chebrikov (59), as well as Deputy Politburo member G. A. Alyev, a former KGB officer and associate of Tsvigun, were skipped over. Andropov’s successor is Vitalii Fedorchuk, KGB boss for the Ukraine.

Fedorchuk is a hatchetman who made his career during Andropov’s tenure at the KGB. According to a Radio Free Europe grid of his career, Fedorchuk won political advancement when he purged the Ukrainian party organization of supporters of ousted Politburo member Pyotr Shelest. According to intelligence specialists, this was not the last of Fedorchuk’s Ukrainian exploits: in the past year, as EIR has reported, there have been stories of internecine warfare and bloodshed among the party and police in the Ukraine, under cover of an anti-corruption drive. Some of the victims, it is said, were from Brezhnev’s machine. Published Soviet sources tend to corroborate such reports: in the fall of 1981, the Ukrainian branch of the Interior Ministry (MVD), the national police force that is administered separately from the KGB, was taken to task for laxness in combating crime and speculation. Ukrainian MVD officials published self-criticism. Nationally, the MVD is run by Brezhnev’s south Ukraine associate Gen. N. Shchelokov, whose first deputy is Brezhnev’s son-in-law, Y. M. Churbanov.

Andropov, in sum, has increased his power over the foreign affairs departments of the Central Committee and the KGB. He has not totally eclipsed Brezhnev’s aide, CC Secretary Chernenko—in the first week of June Chernenko not only ran the Central Committee staff briefing on agriculture policy, but was honored with a medal from a visiting foreign communist chief, Gustav Husak of Czechoslovakia. But he has established himself as a force in the Soviet leadership for the coming months and years.

class of kulaks (rich peasants), who were destroyed in Russia 50 years ago, and once again give these private farmers huge leverage over the Soviet economy.

Word was out on the British Sovietology circuit that the plenum would produce nothing less than a Bukharinite manifesto, with Andropov leading the cheering crowds.

The program announced by Brezhnev does not justify these claims (and Andropov, as we have noted, has kept quiet about the economy). Nor does it promise a solution to the woes of Soviet agriculture. The CPSU Food Program relies on a new system of incentives to ensure that the now even higher number of rubles to be poured into agriculture will result in higher productivity. But how it will succeed where previous policies have failed is not demonstrated. There is no decision for radical change.

The mechanization of agriculture, the purpose of the “agro-industrial complex” that figures constantly in the new Food Program, was declared by Brezhnev in March 1965 the core of Soviet agricultural policy, designed to correct the disarray wrought by the Khrushchev regime—which put thousands of acres of marginal land under cultivation without adequate capital investment, for instance. In his report to the May 1982 plenum, Brezhnev vowed to continue the industrialization of agriculture and raise its share of national investment from 27 percent in 1981-85 to 33 percent by 1990!

In the Soviet farm sector, there is a dissipation of resources that would make any American farmer faint: thousands of tiny machine shops persist in thousands of collective farm sheds for the purpose of manufacturing their own spare parts, for instance, and yet a huge number of farm machines are out of commission at any given moment.

The cure for Soviet agriculture appears in the new program in the form of a mandate for building more infrastructure, an exhaustive list of types of technology to be produced for the farm sector, and even a management plan that combines local autonomy for managers in the deployment of their labor and machinery with more “simplified”—which may mean centralized—management of the agro-industrial complex “as a single unit at all levels.” But Brezhnev’s speech was much more precise about the ruble amounts assigned to incentive funds and procurement price subsidies than it was about building the crucial roads, storage facilities, and means of mechanization that Soviet agriculture most needs.

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