

The man who brought Yuri Andropov to Moscow to work in the CC department for ties with ruling communist parties was an old Finnish communist named Otto Kuusinen. After a failed attempt to become the Soviet-sponsored President of Finland on the eve of World War II, Kuusinen joined the CPSU and eventually sat on its Politburo from 1957 until his death in 1964.

Andropov was Kuusinen's subordinate, first in the party organization in Karelia, near the Finnish border, then in the CC department.

### The Comintern legacy

In the 1920s and 1930s, Kuusinen had worked on the Executive Committee of the Communist International. Time and again, Kuusinen was caught up in rumors about his connections to British intelligence—and in this he was not unique, for the Comintern was a nexus of intelligence agencies, the milieu that produced triple agent Kim Philby. In the case of Kuusinen, the rumors often hung on his mistresses, such as the Finn Hella Wuolijoki, who had the reputation of a British spy and was related by marriage to the British communist specialist on the Third World, R. Palme Dutt, of the same Baltic noble family as Sweden's social-democratic fascist, Olof Palme.

According to the memoirs of Kuusinen's estranged wife, his best friend among Russians on the Comintern Executive Committee was Nikolai Bukharin, the Vienna-trained economist whom Stalin demolished in order to start the Soviets' crash industrialization drive at the end of the 1920s. It is the Bukharinite profile of advocating a market economy at home (in agriculture, if not for everything), and promoting revolution abroad, that the British today say they discern in Kuusinen's trainee Andropov—and call it "liberal."

Kuusinen was instrumental in effecting an institutional shift in the late 1950s which was momentous for Soviet foreign policy. Together with the Armenian Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan, he called for expanding the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the Soviet party and state. Two things resulted: re-establishment of Hungarian Cominternist Eugen Varga's think tank under the name Institute for the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), and constitution of a special CC consultants' group on international affairs, reporting to Kuusinen and then to Andropov. There was, and still is, much circulation of personnel between the think tanks (formally attached to the Academy of Sciences) and the CC staff. Georgii Arbatov, the head of the IMEMO spinoff Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada and another Kuusinen protégé, was head of the CC consultants group in 1964-67. Several officials from the CC International Department of former Comintern bureaucrat Boris Ponomarev, which

is the equivalent, for non-ruling parties, of Andropov's former department, double on the board of think tank magazines.

The think tanks have been a channel into the Soviet Union for "sociological" methods of analysis, which undermine the intelligence and security of any nation, whether capitalist or socialist. They have also harbored triple agents like Kim Philby's friend Donald Maclean. But, like the old Comintern apparatus, the think tanks are now an accepted, integrated part of Soviet decision-making. So too the wing of the CPSU Andropov comes from, the Bukharinite wing, is part of the ruling coalition. His is not a challenge to Brezhnev from an outsider, but a tilt within the power center of the Soviet Union.

### Control of the KGB

When Andropov took charge of the KGB in 1967, it was to replace V. Semichastnyi, the last disciple there of Alexander Shelepin, a former KGB chief who was a CC Secretary considered able and wanting to challenge Brezhnev before the latter's power was consolidated. Andropov's first speeches as KGB chief stressed that party control over the intelligence service was necessary.

That is a principle Andropov will no doubt assert once again, for what happened in the KGB leadership

## Soviet agriculture plenum was an anti-climax

One after another, the sources who define Yuri Andropov as "liberal" forecast that he is the one who could take the Soviet Union in the direction of a "Hungarian model" of economic liberalization, toward a market economy. The first test of this analysis was the Central Committee plenum on agriculture, the same meeting that promoted Andropov to the CC Secretariat.

In advance of the plenum, leaks in the Italian, Yugoslav, and other press heralded a "milestone" for the Soviet economy. After all, the Hungarian experiments began in (and have largely been confined to) agriculture, where a system of heavily subsidized incentives for the individual farmer has raised productivity and given Hungary more stability in food supplies than any other Eastern European country. Then *after* the plenum, the *Financial Times* of London claimed that the reform was going to re-create the

as he left it in May signaled that he meant to remain the ranking party official with say-so over the KGB he ran for 15 years. The choice of Andropov's successor was a power play by Andropov against men closer to Brezhnev than he.

The First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, Semyon Tsvigun, died in January a few days before Suslov. He was Brezhnev's brother-in-law and a member of the Central Committee, but extraordinary breaches in the formulation of his obituary (Brezhnev did not sign it) and the protocol of his funeral (out-of-town delegations were reportedly barred from attendance) fed rumors that he took his own life. Nevertheless, there were two more Deputy Chairmen of the KGB, each in office for more than a decade and each from Brezhnev's southern Ukraine clique, who might have gotten the job. But both S. K. Tsinev (75) and V. M. Chebrikov (59), as well as Deputy Politburo member G. A. Aliyev, a former KGB officer and associate of Tsvigun, were skipped over. Andropov's successor is Vitalii Fedorchuk, KGB boss for the Ukraine.

Fedorchuk is a hatchetman who made his career during Andropov's tenure at the KGB. According to a Radio Free Europe grid of his career, Fedorchuk won political advancement when he purged the Ukrainian party organization of supporters of ousted Politburo

member Pyotr Shelest. According to intelligence specialists, this was not the last of Fedorchuk's Ukrainian exploits: in the past year, as *EIR* has reported, there have been stories of internecine warfare and bloodshed among the party and police in the Ukraine, under cover of an anti-corruption drive. Some of the victims, it is said, were from Brezhnev's machine. Published Soviet sources tend to corroborate such reports: in the fall of 1981, the Ukrainian branch of the Interior Ministry (MVD), the national police force that is administered separately from the KGB, was taken to task for laxness in combating crime and speculation. Ukrainian MVD officials published self-criticism. Nationally, the MVD is run by Brezhnev's south Ukraine associate Gen. N. Shchelokov, whose first deputy is Brezhnev's son-in-law, Y. M. Churbanov.

Andropov, in sum, has increased his power over the foreign affairs departments of the Central Committee and the KGB. He has not totally eclipsed Brezhnev's aide, CC Secretary Chernenko—in the first week of June Chernenko not only ran the Central Committee staff briefing on agriculture policy, but was honored with a medal from a visiting foreign communist chief, Gustav Husak of Czechoslovakia. But he has established himself as a force in the Soviet leadership for the coming months and years.

class of *kulaks* (rich peasants), who were destroyed in Russia 50 years ago, and once again give these private farmers huge leverage over the Soviet economy.

Word was out on the British Sovietology circuit that the plenum would produce nothing less than a Bukharinite manifesto, with Andropov leading the cheering crowds.

The program announced by Brezhnev does not justify these claims (and Andropov, as we have noted, has kept quiet about the economy). Nor does it promise a solution to the woes of Soviet agriculture. The CPSU Food Program relies on a new system of incentives to ensure that the now even higher number of rubles to be poured into agriculture will result in higher productivity. But how it will succeed where previous policies have failed is not demonstrated. There is no decision for radical change.

The mechanization of agriculture, the purpose of the "agro-industrial complex" that figures constantly in the new Food Program, was declared by Brezhnev in March 1965 the core of Soviet agricultural policy, designed to correct the disarray wrought by the Khrushchev regime—which put thousands of acres of marginal land under cultivation without adequate capital investment, for instance. In his report to the

May 1982 plenum, Brezhnev vowed to continue the industrialization of agriculture and raise its share of national investment from 27 percent in 1981-85 to 33 percent by 1990!

In the Soviet farm sector, there is a dissipation of resources that would make any American farmer faint: thousands of tiny machine shops persist in thousands of collective farm sheds for the purpose of manufacturing their own spare parts, for instance, and yet a huge number of farm machines are out of commission at any given moment.

The cure for Soviet agriculture appears in the new program in the form of a mandate for building more infrastructure, an exhaustive list of types of technology to be produced for the farm sector, and even a management plan that combines local autonomy for managers in the deployment of their labor and machinery with more "simplified"—which may mean centralized—management of the agro-industrial complex "as a single unit at all levels." But Brezhnev's speech was much more precise about the ruble amounts assigned to incentive funds and procurement price subsidies than it was about building the crucial roads, storage facilities, and means of mechanization that Soviet agriculture most needs.