

ceasefire—which, after some noise-making, the Syrians accepted.

By this time, Prime Minister Begin had been caught up in the war and eagerly endorsed Sharon's bloodletting. In an emotional outburst, the Israeli Prime Minister called the invasion of Lebanon, which had left 10,000 dead in the first week, the "greatest operation in the history of the Jewish people."

But Reagan began to have reservations when Israel attacked Syrian forces. Undoubtedly, reports are correct that Reagan was upset when Israel broke its promise that it would confine its attack to a 25-mile zone. With pressure from Moscow, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere, the President drafted a series of personal letters to the Israeli Prime Minister. They went unheeded, however, probably because of assurances from Haig and Habib to Israel that Sharon's original plan should proceed on schedule.

To their respective bosses, Sharon and Haig argued that Israel had no option but to attack Syria in force, out of military necessity.

### **Falling out between Israel and Syria**

As the war progressed, then, it became clear that the original agreement between Sharon and the Syrian government of Hafez Assad had also begun to unravel. Before the start of the fighting, Sharon and Assad were united in several causes: their hatred for the Palestine Liberation Organization, their opposition to Jordan and Iraq, and their support for Khomeini's Iran. To consolidate the Israeli-Syrian "strategic consensus," Sharon proposed to divide Lebanon into two separate states, one to be controlled by Israel and one by Syria. But the Israeli advance seemed to indicate that Israel had a broader goal and that Assad had been deceived. The advance by Israel to the gates of Beirut and into the Bekaa Valley revealed Israel's intent to completely reorganize Lebanon in a manner not necessarily coherent with the interests of Syria.

A grave danger of superpower confrontation has developed as a result of the unraveling of the secret agreements that allowed the war to occur. If the British suddenly realize that the Soviet Union does not intend to play their "New Yalta" game, London may demand that American power in the east Mediterranean—now represented by three and possibly four U.S. aircraft carrier task forces—bail out the British in the region. Israel, trapped in an overexposed military position deep in Lebanon, may find its adventure turning into a disastrous predicament. Caught in this position, Sharon might lose restraint and lash out against Syria itself. And the Soviet Union, with troops on alert in Czechoslovakia, the mountainous regions north of Iran, and in Afghanistan, and with its own fleet moving toward the conflict zone, will be forced to respond.

## **Habib shuttling for Ditchley Foundation**

by Barbara Dreyfuss

Since July 1981, President Reagan has dispatched crisis-management negotiator Philip Habib to the Middle East every time Israel has threatened to unleash General Ariel Sharon and the Israeli army against Lebanon. Habib, who served as a Mideast shuttle negotiator under U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in 1979 and was reappointed to this position by Alexander Haig, is put forward as a seasoned U.S. diplomat, whose skill, and in some part perhaps his Lebanese heritage, has reassured Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the other Arab nations that the United States will not abandon their cause in the Middle East.

*Newsweek* and the *Washington Post* call Habib's brand of operations diplomacy. But a closer look at the State Department envoy's pedigree, and the circles in which he travels when he is off the shuttle circuit, reveals that Habib is running a nasty protection racket, built on false promises to the moderate Arab nations that the United States will restrain the Israeli military menace if those nations do not challenge the Haig State Department's Middle East policy.

### **Habib and Ditchley**

Habib in particular maintains a very close working relationship with the elite Ditchley Foundation, a center of Anglo-American policy making. Twenty-four hours before the Israeli blitzkrieg into southern Lebanon on the evening of June 6, Habib could be found chairing a conference on the Camp David peace process at the foundation's Ditchley Park headquarters near Oxford, England. The Ditchley Foundation was created in 1958 by the leadership of Great Britain's Royal Institute for International Affairs and its U.S. subsidiary, the New York Council on Foreign Relations, and has served since then as a transmission belt of Anglo-American establishment policies to educators, diplomats, bankers, legislators, and businessmen at the secondary level of policy implementation.

The Ditchley Council of Management and Board of Directors include the cream of British aristocracy, such men as Lord Saye and Sele, Lord Aldington, Sir John Keswick, Lord Caccia, and the Earl of Cromer. Leaders of the American Ditchley Foundation include George



*Henry Kissinger: "still Habib's boss."*

Franklin, the North American head of the Trilateral Commission, and Stephen Stamas, one of the leaders of the Council on Foreign Relations.

In the words of one participant, the recent Ditchley conference was called to discuss "the role of the United States and its allies in the Middle East peace process and the obstacles to progress." Before this strategy session on Anglo-American Mideast policy had gotten into full swing, however, Habib had flown off to the Middle East on orders of Secretary of State Haig.

Habib left behind him at the Ditchley estate a full roster of American and British functionaries being initiated into the inner workings of the strategy laid out by Britain's Lord Carrington to destroy U.S. influence in the Middle East. The Americans attending included a number of high-level U.S. government officials working closely with Haig and Habib, among them David Newsom, a top official in Vance's State Department; Jeffrey Kemp, the man in charge of Middle East policy for the NSC; Michael Ameen, president of Mobil, Middle East; Lowell Thorpe, of the Foundation for Middle East Peace in Washington; Najeeb Halaby, former head of Pan Am and father-in-law of Jordan's King Hussein; Fuad Ajami, director of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced and International Studies' Middle East program; J. G. Clark, senior vice-president of Exxon and a Ditchley director; Richard Viets, the U.S. ambassador to Jordan; and Richard Goldman, a close friend of Habib and a member, along with Habib, of the San Francisco World Affairs Council.

From Her Majesty's aristocracy and its coterie the attendees included His Excellency John Leahy of the British Foreign Office; J. A. Morrell of Henderson-

Baring Management; Edward Mortimer of the *London Times*; Gen. Sir Anthony Rarahali of the Allied Forces, Northern Europe; Dr. David Sambar, chairman of Financial Arab Trust; Patrick Seale of Patrick Seale Books; Albert Hourani of Oxford; Lord Bethel; Phillip Windsor of the London School of Economics; Noah Lucas of the University of Sheffield; the Right Honorable Roland Moyle, the Labour Party spokesman on the Middle East; Dr. Clarence Awisha of the University of Southampton; and the Honorable T. C. F. Prettie of the Information Trade Center.

### **Habib, Vance, and Kissinger**

One very active former director of the Ditchley Foundation is former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. It is not unlikely that Habib was first introduced to Ditchley by Vance, who was also instrumental in promoting the special envoy's diplomatic career. Habib worked closely with Vance throughout the Vietnam War, as head of a special State Department task force on Vietnam in 1967-68. Habib was the highest-ranking career diplomat in the U.S. delegation at the Vietnam peace talks in Paris from 1968-71, where his friendship with Vance blossomed.

Henry Kissinger too worked closely with Habib, whom he had met at the U.S. embassy in Saigon in the mid-1960s, when Kissinger, then a professor at Harvard, made a fact-finding trip to Vietnam. Habib at the time served as counselor in the embassy. As Secretary of State in 1974 Kissinger pulled what State Department insiders termed a coup d'état when he made Habib, then the ambassador to South Korea, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Another man had been appointed to the post by Secretary of State Rogers, but when Rogers was forced out by Kissinger just before the presidential approval for the appointment went through, Kissinger immediately put Habib in. Two years later Habib's old friend, Vance, promoted him to the post of Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. Habib became Vance's chief adviser on Middle East and Soviet relations. Although he formally resigned from the State Department in 1978 because of heart problems, Habib was asked by Vance to continue serving as a special Middle East adviser. Beginning in 1979, Habib began his own shuttle diplomacy on Lebanon, operating in much the same way he did in 1973-74 when Kissinger had him going back and forth to the Middle East. "Whatever his personal feelings, his loyalties lie with State Department policies and with Kissinger, who was and still is his boss," declared one Middle East specialist recently.

With a boss like Henry Kissinger, a mentor like Cyrus Vance, and Alexander Haig planning his itinerary, Philip Habib can be doing no good for U.S. interests in the Middle East.