

The NATO summit endorses 'out-of-area' deployments

by Mary Lalevée, Wiesbaden Bureau Chief

Mme. Lalevée was EIR's correspondent at the June 10 NATO summit meeting. The following is excerpted from a lengthier report she filed from Bonn.

The chief executives of the 16 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met for a grand total of six hours in the West German capital on June 10, and endorsed three previously prepared statements. There was little deliberation, and at first sight, little departure from NATO's previous policies.

However, the heads of government officially endorsed what had been a profound break in NATO's self-definition—the defense ministers' May 7 vote to encourage support for and participation in “out-of-area” NATO deployments beyond the North Atlantic.

This was a victory for Great Britain—whose war against Argentina represented a test run for NATO deployments against underdeveloped nations. The British script has been signed into Atlantic Alliance policy: a buildup of U.S., British, and French bases and “Rapid Deployment Force” capabilities.

The resolutions and the climate

The first document ratified was a “Programme for Peace in Freedom.” It stresses that the aim of the alliance is to “deter aggression” and “strengthen peace by means of constructive dialogue.” Criticism of the U.S.S.R. as “ultimately willing to threaten or use force beyond its own borders” is mild. The document's six points specify:

1) “Our purpose is to prevent war. . . . None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. We respect the sovereignty of all states. 2) Our purpose is to preserve the security of the North Atlantic area by means of conventional and nuclear forces. . . . 3) Our purpose is to have a stable balance of forces at the lowest possible level, thereby strengthening peace and international security. 4) Our purpose is to develop substantial and balanced East-West relations aimed at genuine détente. For this to be achieved, the sovereignty of all states, wherever situated, must be respected. . . . 5) Our purpose is to contribute to peaceful progress worldwide; we will work to remove the causes of instability, such as underdevelopment or tensions which

encourage outside interference. We will continue to play our part in the struggle against hunger and poverty. . . .

“We will consult together as appropriate on events in those regions which may have implications for our security. Those of us who are in a position to do so will endeavour to respond to requests for assistance from sovereign states whose security and independence is threatened. 6) Our purpose is to ensure economic and social security for our countries, which will strengthen our joint capacity to safeguard our security. . . . [W]e attach the greatest importance to the curbing of inflation and a return to sustained growth and to high levels of employment.”

President Reagan's new “arms control” campaign, which was praised by the NATO summit resolutions, made possible a greater degree of surface unity on East-West relations than on other issues. As Chancellor Schmidt noted with evident relief, the leaders reaffirmed their adherence to the principles of the 1967 NATO “Harmel Report”—strengthening of alliance defenses alongside efforts at arms negotiations with the Warsaw Pact, the basis upon which the Chancellor in 1979 accepted the plan to deploy “Euromissile” Pershing IIs and cruises in West Germany. Rather than throw out the word “détente” altogether, as the U.S. administration proposed, the communiqué approved “balanced East-West relations aimed at genuine détente.”

The pledge to “ensure economic and social security for our countries,” included at the behest of West Germany, was more reasonable than the prevalent discussions of military strategy which ignore the West's unraveling industrial base. The reference to “responding to requests for assistance from sovereign states whose security and independence is threatened” brings us, however, to the second NATO protocol.

Entitled “Document on Integrated NATO Defense,” that agreement first specifies that the NATO members will “continue to improve NATO planning procedures and explore other ways of achieving greater effectiveness in the application of national resources to defense, especially in the conventional field. . . . explore ways to take full advantage, both technically and economically, of emerging technologies, especially to improve conventional defence, and take steps necessary to

restrict the transfer of militarily relevant technology to the Warsaw Pact.”

The formula on technology transfer foreshadowed a more stringent approach to East-West trade, which prompted West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to tell the press afterward, “While some people may take [the declaration to mean a ban on exports of] knives and forks, and say that knives and forks may be put to military use, we do not mean that. It is clear that the declaration will be interpreted in different ways by different NATO members, especially by the Federal Republic.”

Out-of-area deployments

British Secretary of State for Defense Peter Blaker had told journalists publicly at the beginning of June that the summit would discuss “out-of-area” deployments by NATO members, that the Falklands war would be a “test run” for such deployments, and that the policy would be formally approved. So it was. The “Integrated Defense” declaration concludes with a paragraph repeating almost word for word the NATO Defense Ministers’ statements in Brussels on May 7, affirming the out-of-area expansion:

“Noting that developments beyond the NATO area may threaten our vital interests, we reaffirm the need to consult with a view to sharing assessments and indentifying common objectives, taking full account of the effect on NATO security and defence capability, as well as of the national interests of member countries. Recognizing that the policies which nations adopt in this field are a matter for national decision, *we agree to examine collectively in the appropriate NATO bodies the requirements which may arise for the defence of the NATO area as a result of deployments by individual member states outside that area. Steps which may be taken by individual allies in the light of such consultations to facilitate possible military deployments beyond the NATO area can represent an important contribution to NATO security* [emphasis added].”

In her speech at the summit, British Prime Minister Maggie Thatcher expressed the momentum embodied in this provision. She made no mention of “respect for sovereignty,” no mention of “requests for assistance,” no mention of détente and economic security. She first stressed the call for a conventional arms buildup, stating that “to be credible in the eyes of a potential aggressor, we must have sufficient conventional defenses, and this means that we must convince our publics that they must pay the necessary price.” She continued: “There is another area in which change is needed. Our fortunes are affected by developments *outside the NATO treaty area* [emphasis in original]—as Afghanistan reminds us most vividly. Our dependence on imported oil supplies

and raw materials means that we have a crucial interest in the maintenance of stability throughout the world.

“But we know that the system of deterrence which has maintained stability in Europe cannot be applied elsewhere. We need to devise a strategy which exploits the assets which we each possess, whether political, economic, commercial, or military. We need to identify political trouble spots, to agree upon our objectives, and upon the measures necessary to achieve them.

“This does not require that the members of the alliance should invariably support each other, whatever or wherever they are engaged, or that members should only embark upon activities which the others support. *Nor does it require the alliance to revise the North Atlantic Treaty to enable it to act firmly outside the NATO area* [emphasis added].” As *EIR* revealed (May 4, 1982), the British plan is for “informal arrangements” rather than politically difficult treaty revision.

The third summit document reaffirmed NATO’s arms-control negotiation posture.

Splits among the allies prevented them from issuing any statement on Israel’s invasion of Lebanon or on the Malvinas crisis. NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns, faced with the job of explaining this silence to the press, said with a straight face that these crises were outside the NATO area! The European Community’s Foreign Ministers had held an emergency session just before the summit and condemned Israel’s “gross violation of international law,” while the Saudi Foreign Minister arrived for urgent in-between meetings with President Reagan and Chancellor Schmidt; Mr. Reagan was also in direct communication with Soviet President Brezhnev on the Lebanon crisis.

The U.S. President delivered the formal rationale for a conventional arms push in his speech to the Bonn parliament the day before the NATO summit, when he said that “alliance security depends on a fully credible conventional defense to which all allies contribute. There is a danger that any conflict could escalate to a nuclear war. Strong conventional forces can make the danger of conventional or nuclear conflict more remote. . . .” He omitted any reference to détente, while voicing a proposal for East-West reduction of group and air forces in Europe which represented no significant new initiative.

Chancellor Schmidt put himself on the sidelines, abstaining both from the worst side of the NATO resolutions and from an affirmation of the depth of the crisis. In his speech to the summit, Schmidt had once more accurately stressed that economic strength is essential for military security. “In the global rivalries between the systems of East and West,” he said, “the ability to maintain economic and social stability has—and I deliberately use this word—a strategic impor-

tance. For without internal tranquility, external peace is in jeopardy.”

He emphasized, after the summit, his commitment to continuing détente, stating that the alternative is nothing but confrontation; he was widely reported to have urged this view on Mr. Reagan. Pressed on the question of NATO out-of-area preparations, he repeatedly asserted that there was “no expansion of NATO.”

In reply to a question by *EIR* Bonn Bureau Chief Rainer Apel, Schmidt insisted that “neither the Middle East, Southwest Asia, nor South America belongs or should belong to Europe or to NATO; NATO’s boundaries are in Europe,” adding that West Germany would take no responsibility for actions by other NATO members outside the treaty area. He emphasized that the wording of Paragraph 5E on out-of-area deployments, referring to countries “in a position to do so,” meant *legally* in a position to do so. West Germany’s armed forces are constitutionally limited to defense of the territory of the Federal Republic. However, such qualifications are unlikely to impress Mrs. Thatcher or Mr. Haig, whose plan is for West Germany to increase its European theatre contributions to free up Britain, France, and the United States for interventions below the Tropic of Cancer.

Secretary-General Luns, a Dutch nobleman who was responsible for overseeing NATO’s creation of the environmentalist and peace movements in order to put a ceiling on global technological advances (see *EIR*, June 15), was bombarded with questions about out-of-area policy and the potential use of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force. He answered, “Out-of-area deployments? Why, that is not new. There have been many military interventions by NATO members outside the NATO area—the French in Indochina, the Americans in Vietnam, the French in Algeria. . . . Third World nations who criticize this policy had better study history; I would say they are not well-informed.”

Luns was asked again after the summit whether NATO would be expanded to include out-of-area military deployments. His banner of imperial glory drooped, and he said that he “could not remember” whether deployments out-of-area had been “specifically” mentioned during the meetings! To the astonishment of the press corps, he proceeded to affirm that he was “hot” and “needed a bath,” and hoped that the journalists would take a bath too.

Secretary of State Haig, the author of Washington’s support for Britain’s war in the South Atlantic, in his own press conference after the summit, declared how happy he was that for the first time NATO had officially recognized that “crises” outside Europe could affect NATO’s security. In future, he said, “working groups will be established to follow Third World crises.”

WEST GERMANY

Former Nazis control ‘green-peace’ groups

by Vin Berg

Nazis, featuring unrepentant former figures in Hitler’s SS, occupy commanding positions in the international “peace” and “environmentalist” movements, according to security investigators of the West German-based *Spuren und Motive* and U.S. *Investigative Leads* newsletters. The two publications, directed at a readership among the law-enforcement and intelligence communities, warn that assassination capabilities controlled by these fascist networks under cover of “environmentalist” organizations are now threatening the life of Helga Zepp-LaRouche, Chairman of the European Labor Party (EAP) and wife of *EIR*’s founder, Lyndon LaRouche.

Among the investigation’s findings:

- **Armin Mohler**, formerly of Hitler’s SS and now head of the **Siemens Foundation**, is founder and leader of the “**new right**” movement in Europe.

- **Herbert Gruhl**, former chairman of West Germany’s **Die Grünen** (Green Party), is an avowed neo-Nazi who convinced Germany’s most publicized Nazi organization, the **NPD** (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) to adopt a program of using environmentalism to rebuild Europe’s fascist movement, and “try again.” Gruhl’s own **Green Future Action** (Grüne Aktion Zukunft) organization, composed of Nazis and Nazi sympathizers, dissolved itself into Die Grünen in 1979.

- **August Hausleiter**, Die Grünen executive board member until 1980 with strong continuing influence, founded and led **Deutsche Gemeinschaft**, which changed its name and became Germany’s first environmentalist organization after a celebrated 1960s court case which found the group in violation of the anti-Nazi sections of the West German constitution.

- **Udo Reinhardt**, among Die Grünen candidates in September 1981 Hannover city elections, is also a leader of a group seeking the revival of Nazism (**Nationalrevolutionären Aufbauorganisation—Sache des Volkes**). He was exposed, but Die Grünen voted that he remain a candidate.

The investigation shows that former Nazis, elements of similar fascist pedigree in other European nations, and their “second-generation” followers, occupy leadership positions at all levels of the “green-peace” movement—largely because these **Black International** elements did most to create the movement in the first place.