

Simmering policy differences are now coming to a head

by Vivian Freyre Zoakos, European Editor

"Shades of Suez" blared the London *Guardian* and London *Times* the week before Thanksgiving, amid a plethora of articles describing the current state of relations between the United States and its "closest ally," Great Britain. "Britain Losing Faith in U.S." announced London's *Sunday Telegraph* on Nov. 7, reporting the results of a hastily gathered Gallup poll. The poll, whose findings constituted the lead article of that newspaper, indicated "a marked deterioration in British confidence in the Atlantic Alliance and also in President Reagan. Less than a quarter of the British public think he is a 'good President.' "

These announcements of British displeasure with Washington were further elaborated in the *Telegraph's* accompanying editorial, which emphasized that the real problem lay not only in America's anti-British vote at the United Nations Nov. 5 on the Malvinas resolution submitted by Argentina. Rather, "much more worrying and fundamental are differences of perception about how to cope with the Russian threat, since these really could strike at the heart of the Alliance, affecting its very *raison d'être*." The London *Guardian* on the preceding day noted that "the special relationship between the United States and Britain . . . has been put under more strain than at any time since Suez. . . . That vote [at the U.N.] is the culmination of months of tension in the Anglo-American relationship. . . . The family quarrel described by President Reagan was becoming a violent domestic dispute. . . . Other serious strains exist, not least the fears in the American intelligence community about security in the wake of the infiltration of the [U.K.] government communications headquarters at Cheltenham."

The violent tenor of Anglo-American relations at present has reached such a pitch, and cuts across so many policy areas, that even the most cautious observers are forced to admit that something qualitatively new is going on, even as most Britons and American anglophiles hasten to add that similarities still far outweigh differences.

The Anglo-American "domestic dispute" resurfaced most recently when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made a stinging response to the Nov. 5 United Nations vote in which the United States voted in favor of Argentina's resolution without informing or even consulting London, as Washington otherwise is wont to do on most significant matters. Prior to that, difficulties had arisen in the complex area of intelligence-sharing which constitutes the core of the London-Washington special relationship.

Spy scandal or coverup?

As the cited *Guardian* quotation referenced, American intelligence has become wary of trusting Britain with sensitive information for fear that it would be leaked to the Soviet Union—at Britain's convenience. To patch things up, the British in July arrested a secondary figure in their Cheltenham communications center, one Geoffrey Prime, as being the source of the leaks, putting him through a speedy trial that ended this month. Additionally, London went through a series of motions to "tighten up the security apparatus." A sop, in other words, was thrown to the Americans to quell much more broad-ranging concern over the wisdom of intelligence-sharing as practiced at present.

Still another quarrel surfaced this week over the New York trial of members of Noraid, the Irish Northern Aid Committee, which has been accused of funneling weapons into the IRA. The defense argued during the trial that the CIA had supported the Noraid group, an accusation immediately picked up by the British and which has generated a gigantic amount of rage, intersecting the broader Anglo-American political-intelligence warfare.

In an article entitled "CIA and IRA Arms Link Denial Sought," the *Telegraph* reports that "The United States government should be asked to give 'very definite and binding assurances' that the CIA has not been involved in supplying arms to terrorists in Northern Ireland, a Conservative Mem-

ber of Parliament demanded yesterday.”

The M.P. in question was Dr. Brian Mawhinney, a secretary of the Tory Northern Ireland Committee. An accompanying article lumped together last week's United Nations vote and the acquittal of the Noraid group as being two contributing factors to “the present anti-Americanism in Britain.”

What is clear from the above is that there is an across-the-board gnashing of teeth going on in Britain with respect to the United States. The underlying reasons for that British state, however, are not disclosed by focusing on the public side of the quarrel. These are only known to the higher levels of British and American elite circles.

Particle-beam weapons

The just-published 1982-83 edition of *Jane's Weapons Systems*, the British world survey of arms, for the first time includes “particle beams” as being under development in both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The authoritative and nominally impartial *Jane's* nonetheless reveals the British point of view by dubbing these weapons “potentially destabilizing” in East-West relations and points to the secrecy with which both sides are shrouding these programs.

A series of interviews conducted by *Executive Intelligence Review* with the highest circles of the British think tanks turned up the following information and perceptions: that London is not only concerned about an American decision to move with a rapid development of space-based, particle-beam weapons, but is also planning a campaign to have such weapons internationally outlawed; that London is against the existence of the United States as a superpower, seeking instead to organize a multipolar world as rapidly as possible, taking advantage of the collapsing monetary system; that the philosophy of this new world would be hedonism; finally, that London, as part of creating the new, multipolar age, wishes to revamp NATO military policy to do away with the first-strike doctrine and replace it with a massive conventional arms buildup.

On Nov. 9 *EIR* spoke with Dr. Jasani, director of a major project on the implications of beam-weapon technologies conducted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), an anglophile think tank for the world “peace” movement. Jasani reported that until recently he had been in a minority at SIPRI and the London International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in his insistence that the arguments used thus far against beam weapons were no longer adequate. Jasani referenced the recent speeches by the American Dr. Edward Teller urging the development of such weapons, and the fact that it is now admitted that only “technical problems” remain to be solved for the production and deployment of the weapons. Therefore, he said, those arguments originating with Dr. Costas Tsipis at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, that attempt to pooh-poo the technical feasibility of these weapons, must be urgently revised on more realistic, sophisticated grounds. These new argu-

ments, according to Jasani, are not yet fully elaborated, but “We must somehow stop it [beam weapons].”

Jasani indicated that he and others who are advanced enough in their understanding of the physics of these weapons are moving to agitate for some kind of “anti-satellite treaty.” He is hoping that the next session of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament will include this on its agenda.

Hatred for American technology

Col. Jonathan Alford, director of the IISS, refused at first to acknowledge the hideous possibility that the United States might actually move in the direction of beam-weapons development, at least for the immediate future. Having said this, however, he proceeded to unburden himself of his hatred for “the American tendency to expect technology to solve problems. . . . I think the Americans are always searching for technical solutions to save them from uncomfortable decisions.”

Asked by *EIR* what these uncomfortable decisions might be, Alford responded, “Keeping up conventional forces. You're not doing much of that, are you?” What is wrong with the American approach, he added, voicing his fears of the present situation, is that “in America there is a technological optimism. . . . What has the space program done? For Christ's sake . . . why are you [Americans] so worried now about what the Russians are doing in space? Why does [Defense Secretary] Weinberger keep getting up and expressing concern over the Soviet space program?”

Alford's colleague at the IISS and a senior staff member at the Bavarian-based Max Planck Institute, Dr. Horst Afheldt, went further in discussing the military implications of space-based beam-weapon development. “If you introduce particle-beam weapons, you create the possibility for the superpowers to defend themselves and wage war and fight their war on our own ground. . . . [In other words, British and allied policy becomes irrelevant—ed.] There should not be any superpowers. Right now we still must accommodate ourselves to the fact of their existence, but . . . Europeans know that only a multipolar world, without superpowers, without bipolarity, can be a peaceful one. . . . See [Henry] Kissinger's studies on the matter.” In short, said Afheldt, “I'm 90 percent with McNamara; I'm against Teller.” (See *International Intelligence*.)

Afheldt also saw the current global economic collapse as helping to achieve his aims. He gleefully predicted that “The world economy has 100 percent chance of collapsing.”

The McNamara-Kissinger multipolar world advocated by Afheldt would have hedonism as its foundation, according to Dr. Michael Foster, director of the Tavistock Institute, the most infamous of British psychological manipulation centers.

To the world in which beam weapons would spur rapid growth, Foster counterposed the “black market economy”-dominated world, with “people working for themselves and avoiding the whole system of paying taxes . . . a general tendency to hedonism.”

The British press takes a look at disobedient American decisions

Ever since the United States voted against the British on the issue of the Malvinas in the United Nations on Nov. 5, the British press has begun to speak openly of the rift in the "special relationship between London and Washington." Here are some examples of the British complaints that the United States might break its special alliance with London, an alliance that has in fact subverted U.S. interests.

Guardian, Nov. 6, 1982: "The Growing Strain of a Beautiful Friendship": Few leaders in the world are ideologically more on the same wavelength than Mrs. Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. It is therefore even more remarkable that under their stewardship the special relationship between the United States and Britain should have been put under more strain than at any time since Suez. . . .

That [United Nations] vote, however, is the culmination of months of tension in the Anglo-American relationship. . . .

The Falklands dispute, the pipeline and trade disputes . . . have without doubt put pressure on the special relationship [between Britain and the United States]. Other serious strains exist, not least the fears in the American intelligence community about security in the wake of the infiltration of the [U.K.] Government communications headquarters at Cheltenham. But the special relationship is not skin deep. . . . It is a military relationship which gives Britain unique access to American nuclear technology such as the Trident submarine. . . . It is a relationship in which successive Secretaries of State from Kissinger to Schultz have used Britain as a sounding board and intermediary on such delicate matters as détente with the Soviet Union. . . .

Daily Telegraph, Nov. 6, editorial: "Stirring the Teacup": Too much is being made by some people of the fact that the United States voted for the United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for resumption of negotiations between Britain and Argentina on Falkland Islands sovereignty. Mrs. Thatcher said in Paris yesterday that she found the American vote "incomprehensible and disappointing." Disappointing it may be, but incomprehensible it was not. Mr. Pym was nearer the mark when he described the U.N. debate and the resolution as a sham and a charade, and said it would make no difference to Britain's attitude. . . . Justly

nationalistic feelings of pride over the outstanding performance of Britain's armed forces in the South Atlantic should not be allowed to create the delusion that Britain is capable of "doing anything and going anywhere" entirely on her own. Britain's alliance with the United States remains the bedrock of all our defense planning. An alliance between two such mature democracies must imply readiness to accept minor differences along the way.

Sunday Telegraph, Nov. 7: "Britain Losing Faith in U.S.": The *Sunday Telegraph* lead story reports on a Gallup Poll commissioned by the newspaper denoting a shift in the British population's perception of the status of the "special relationship" today as compared to the period of the Malvinas war. The *Telegraph* sums up the poll's results as showing "a marked deterioration in British confidence in the Atlantic Alliance and also in President Reagan. Less than a quarter of the British public think he is a "good President."

Sunday Telegraph, Nov. 7: "How 'Dear Ron' Upset No. 10": The American vote at the United Nations on the Argentine resolution "has made much more questionable whether Britain can convert her military triumph [in the Malvinas] into a lasting political victory. Britain's moral backing, abetted by the United States, has been publicly ended. . . . Shades of Suez!"

Sunday Telegraph, Nov. 7, editorial: "Friends Apart": The dispute over the United Nations vote is not the most serious issue confronting the special relationship. "Much more worrying and fundamental are differences of perception about how to cope with the Russian threat, since these really could strike at the heart of the Alliance, affecting its very raison d'être."

London Observer, Nov. 7, editorial: "Talking to Argentina": By announcing its vote at the United Nations well in advance, the United States actually encouraged others to follow its lead. The vote can be defended by the United States on grounds of "expediency", although whether upholding dictatorships will be shown to be expedient in the long run is another matter. Although the vote itself is not mandatory, "it should not be dismissed altogether as one of those empty flourishes of which the United Nations is so richly capable. . . ."