

The Kissinger scandal the American press refuses to cover

by Vivian Freyre Zoakos, European Editor

On Nov. 10, Corrado Guerzoni, an associate of the murdered former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro, testified in court that Henry Kissinger had repeatedly threatened Moro with grave retaliation should Moro refuse to change his policies. At that time, Moro was leading the negotiations on behalf of the ruling Christian Democrats to bring the Italian Communist Party (PCI) into closer cooperation with the government and provide the chronically crisis-ridden country with a stable government and productive labor-industrial relations. He was subsequently kidnapped and assassinated after a two-month ordeal spanning March through May 1978, in an action which was carried out by the Red Brigades terrorist gang.

Years of investigation by the Italian authorities had established that the Red Brigades, together with the rest of the Italian terrorist movement, were not independent agents but the political tool of some international conspiracy.

Then, last summer, Moro's wife and son gave official testimony that Aldo Moro had been repeatedly threatened while on visits to the United States. They specifically cited a 1977 dinner given at the Italian embassy in Washington, where leading American government representatives and leading U. S. political figures were present, including Henry Kissinger.

Moro's associate Guerzoni has now given the courts the bombshell information that it had indeed been Kissinger who repeatedly threatened Moro unless the Christian Democrat abandoned what Kissinger alleged to be his dangerous policy toward the PCI.

On the day following this testimony, the Italian press was filled with headlines about the Kissinger role in the most dramatic Italian terrorist act in the post-war period. Unable to ignore the publicity, Henry Kissinger attempted to deny Guerzoni's information in a statement published by *La Repubblica* on Nov. 17. Here Kissinger insisted that Guerzoni was merely part of a plot hatched by *Executive Intelligence Review* founder Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., to defame his, Kissinger's, good name.

Neither LaRouche nor any of his representatives had ever met or even heard of Mr. Guerzoni prior to his appearance at

court.

Other information began to be leaked to the press. The Nov. 17 issue of the well-known newspaper *Il Giorno* reported that the Soviet KGB was in possession of information about Henry Kissinger's sexual proclivities, information whose obvious blackmail potential had once led the Central Intelligence Agency to suspect that Kissinger might be acting as a KGB mole.

Kissinger's rather pathetic attempt at self-defense, citing LaRouche, has now led to a new rash of articles in the Italian press, including the *Il Giorno* commentary we reprint here, following excerpts from earlier coverage of the Guerzoni revelations.

The November 10 court testimony of Corrado Guerzoni, a close aide to former Italian prime minister Aldo Moro who was murdered by the Red Brigades in 1978, produced banner headlines throughout the Italian press and elsewhere in the world. Despite the fact that Guerzoni confirmed that Henry Kissinger had threatened Moro in an attempt to change his policies, this news service remains the only source of that information in the United States. Excerpts from the press coverage follow.

La Repubblica, (Rome), Nov. 11, page 1: "Kissinger intimidated Moro, 'You must not open to the PCI,' " by Luca Villosi:

ROME—Clamorous deposition before the Court of Assizes in Rome by the ex-press attaché of Moro, Corrado Guerzoni. . . . The Christian Democratic party president, Guerzoni reported, had a stormy discussion in 1974 with Henry Kissinger. The American Secretary of State said, without mincing his words, that he did not care for the rapprochement of the Communists to the government. Moro was so shaken by that encounter that, after having returned to Italy early because of illness, he even considered abandoning political life. Also according to Guerzoni, the U. S. State Department moreover tried to ruin the image of the DC [Christian Democratic] leader letting it be understood that he himself was

the "Antelope Cobbler" of the Lockheed scandal. The journalist will return to the witness stand Monday to be interrogated by the defense attorneys. . . .

The hearing seems like one of the normal routine ones. Few lawyers, few journalists. It starts out with Stefano Silvestri, one of those "eggheads" who in the days of the Moro kidnaping collaborated with the Viminal [Interior Ministry—ed.] in mapping out anti-terrorism strategy. It ends, surprisingly, in a vague atmosphere of international intrigue, evoking a stormy conversation about which, given the death of one of the two protagonists, the Christian Democratic leader killed by the Red Brigades, only Henry Kissinger, the ex-U.S. Secretary of State, could now report.

Kissinger—Guerzoni tells the judges at the Court of Assizes—had a tense conversation with the then Italian Foreign Minister, in 1974. The United States did not like the policy of rapprochement with the PCI. Nixon's collaborator said it in extremely clear terms, moreover reinforcing his thesis with arguments so crude and realistic that Moro was shaken to the point of being stricken with illness shortly afterward and, leaving early to return to Italy, even arrived at considering abandoning politics. . . . Guerzoni tells about Moro's habit of always carrying with him, in one of the bags robbed by the terrorists in Via Fani [scene of the kidnaping—ed.], the documents, including secret ones, which were needed for his daily activities. Which were they exactly? Perhaps the ones related to the Lockheed scandal. . . . since it was precisely in those days that the High Court of Justice had issued a decree on the affair.

And from Lockheed he arrives at speaking of Kissinger. "Moro," Guerzoni reports, "returned very shaken from the trip he made in 1974 to the U.S.A. together with President Leone. The reason was a private conversation, very bitter, which he had with the man in charge of U.S. foreign policy, during a reception at the Italian Embassy. The next day after that conversation the president [Moro] felt ill in the Church of St. Patrick. And, when he had returned to Italy, he went so far as to think about abandoning political activity for at least two or three years."

"Kissinger," the witness continues, "had expressed an extremely negative opinion about Moro's policy, which he considered harmful. Moro, in any case, was depicted in American circles as pro-communist: they used to say he was a person who, even without being part of it, favored corruption to weaken the DC and force it into coming to terms with the Italian Communist Party. . . . I learned the terms of the conversation with Kissinger, partly from Nino Valentino, at the time the head of Leone's press office, and in part from other collaborators of the president. Moro from then on started to worry, even without explicitly saying it, about what might happen."

"The president was not very cautious in his judgments about American politics. He complained that all of our decisions, including the most delicate and painstaking, were evaluated in the U.S.A. on the basis of bad, 30-line intelligence

briefings. He wrote for *Il Giorno* a quite tough article, which was then not published precisely for reasons of political convenience."

Guerzoni spoke on the problem of relations with the Americans with Moro for the last time the evening of March 15, 1978, the day before the kidnaping. "The newspapers in those days were making a few hints at Moro as a person who might become entangled in the Lockheed scandal. We feared a big flareup after the decree of the High Court which was closing the affair. And we knew that, in order to discredit the president [Moro], the U.S. State Department had launched an attempt to identify him as Antelope Cobbler." Antelope Cobbler was the code name of the principal beneficiary of the commissions paid for the sales of Lockheed aircraft.

"A functionary close to Kissinger had showed some journalists a daily with his photo and had hinted: The Antelope is he," the witness continues. "We had been talking about exactly this for a couple of hours the evening of the 15th. And we had remained agreed that if any other mention were to come out in the press we would have clearly said how things really were. And that was that there was a whole political story coming out of the U.S.A. and intended to hit Moro." The morning of the 16th, Guerzoni telephoned Moro's house. But the DC leader had already left the house, heading toward Via Fani.

Il Mattino (Rome), Nov. 11, page 1: "Guerzoni confirms yesterday at trial: Kissinger and Moro had a bitter clash in 1974":

ROME—One evening in September 1974, at the Italian Embassy in the United States, there was a meeting between Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign Minister Moro, who was accompanying President of the Republic Leone on a state visit to Washington. The witness Corrado Guerzoni, at the time Moro's press attaché, is recounting to the judges. At a certain moment, Kissinger turned to Moro and said, "I do not believe in dogmas, I am not a Catholic. Therefore, I do not believe in your political line because I consider it a strongly negative element." . . . Returning to Italy, Moro confided in Guerzoni that he would not carry out political activity for at least two to three years, and would not have accepted becoming Prime Minister. "He was very scared." . . . The witness adds that the President of the DC did not consider Kissinger capable of understanding the Italian political situation through the thirty lines of intelligence notes that reached him by diplomatic channels. . . . In February 1978, Moro prepared an article for *Il Giorno*. It was an article very critical against the U.S. policy toward our country. "I myself was the one who advised him not to publish that manuscript to not make an old polemic more bitter." The article in question was published by *L'Unità*, on the eve of the 1979 political elections.

Moro's widow had already spoken of the trip to the U.S.A. Signora Eleonora [Moro] mentioned in the courtroom her husband's worries and his intention of leaving politics for

some time. Mrs. Moro also referred to *threats*, not specified, and to *intimidations*, of which her husband would have been the object, during the state visit to the U.S. A. with Leone. . . .

What does Guerzoni know about the two briefcases that ended up in the hands of Moro's kidnapers. . . ? The witness recalls that the evening before he telephoned Moro. The conversation slipped into the possibility that the next day, the day of the presentation to the Houses of Parliament of the government of national solidarity, presided over by Andreotti, that some newspaper might go back to the Lockheed question, given that the acts of the inquest were about to be deposed. Someone might point to him as the mysterious "Antelope Cobbler." This character, Guerzoni says, was pulled out by someone of Kissinger's State Department. In one of the two bags, Moro had the "Lockheed case" documents. "I have logical certainty of this."

Corriere della Sera (Milan), Nov. 11, page 7: "Guerzoni told judges of differences between Moro and Kissinger":

ROME—At least five witnesses have talked of it, but without supplying a single detail. Not even Eleonora Moro could say the name of the person who threatened her husband during a reception in Washington. Now here today is Corrado Guerzoni, one of the closest collaborators of the DC president, who tells: "There was a very bitter discussion between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Moro. Kissinger said to Moro: 'I don't believe in dogmas, I am not Catholic, and I cannot believe in your political line because I consider it a strongly negative element.' It was a strong clash, full of resentments. And the next day, at the Cathedral of St. Patrick, the president felt downright ill."

Guerzoni has a calm, dry tone. He goes on: "In the circles of the American Secretary of State, Moro was widely described as an anti-party, pro-communist man who favored corruption in Italy; he was not part of it, but he favored it to make the DC weak and therefore force it to come to terms with the communists."

. . . Guerzoni specifies, "In December 1974, when certain conditions had ripened through which the possibility of his candidacy to the prime ministership arose, he seemed to me to be decided to refuse such a proposal at all costs." Fear of the "threats" and "intimidations" of which Eleonora Moro and the children Giovanni and Agnese have spoken?

In February of 1978, Aldo Moro decided to break definitively with Kissinger. And he wrote a "furious article" against him. Guerzoni says: "I was the one who advised him not to publish that manuscript, to not make an old polemic more bitter. I filed it and gave it to Mrs. Moro only after the killing of her husband. But it is still a mystery to me how *L'Unità* managed to publish it on the eve of the political elections of 1979."

There's more. Behind the scenes of this seventieth hearing in the trial against the Red Brigades, reappears the ghost of "Antelope Cobbler," the mysterious intermediary for the Lockheed affair, perhaps the most lacerating scandal in the

history of the Republic.

Two days before the slaughter in Via Fani the acts of the inquest had been deposed. Moro had had a copy for some time and was preoccupied that the papers might take up the old rumor that identified himself with Antelope Cobbler. The evening of March 15, 1978, that is a few hours before the kidnaping, Guerzoni spoke about it with Moro on the phone.

"If something of that kind should be repeated, I said to the president, I will be the first to reveal how things actually went. That is, to recount that it was Kissinger's man who accused you of being Antelope Cobbler, pointing casually to a photo of you. And then we will orient the press in that direction," Guerzoni recalls.

. . . In Kissinger's memoirs there is no trace of this verbal clash.

Il Tempo, Nov. 11, page 1: "Guerzoni: Moro considered withdrawing after an abrasive conversation with Kissinger":

. . . Corrado Guerzoni, one of the closest collaborators of Aldo Moro and present director of Channel Two of the radio, seems to offer the exact key to read those "threats" and "intimidations" to which Mrs. Eleonora Moro and the Moro children had drawn attention of the judges of the Court of Assizes, and even earlier, of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry.

. . . Evidently, outside the circle of his family members, with whom he was, to say the least, nebulous (he had not revealed, for example, from whom the pressures came, even though he had specified on what occasion he had received them and where), Aldo Moro had confided only with his closest collaborators, but not with his party colleagues and government colleagues who, called to witness, have always said they were in the dark about the American episode.

Corrado Guerzoni added that the Kissinger-Moro conversation was confirmed to him by the then press attaché of President of the Republic Giovanni Leone, Dr. Nino Valentino. The latter however said in the evening that it was limited to speaking about the difficulties Kissinger had in understanding Moro's views, which he called "involved," and added: "The declarations of Guerzoni attributed to me are totally false and a product of fantasy." The American Secretary of State's negative appreciation of the policy pursued by Aldo Moro are not news, as the recently published memoirs of Kissinger also attest to this, but do not, however, speak of this specific episode.

Yesterday morning Corrado Guerzoni reconstructed before the judges the whole picture of American hostility to the statesman. . . .

Il Messaggero (Rome), Nov. 11, page 15:

. . . The testimony of Corrado Guerzoni offered points of notable interest, above all because it served to put into better focus some disconcerting declarations of the widow of the statesman. The episode of the conversation came up when the presiding judge turned to the witness with this question:

"Tell us about the trip to the United States which Hon. Moro made as a foreign minister."

Guerzoni, after having recollected the discussion between Moro and Kissinger at the Italian Embassy, added that he had learned the judgment that was circulating in the environs of the U.S. Secretary of State about the Italian DC leader. . . . The testimony of Franco Tritto, Moro's assistant at the University of Rome, was shorter; he was the recipient of five phone calls from the Red Brigades. He declared, in substance, that the statesman never manifested preoccupations for his own safety, but rather for that of his family.

L'Unità (Milan), Nov. 11, page 1: "*In 1974 Kissinger ordered Moro to change policy*":

ROMA—It was directly the American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, from the fall of 1974 on, who ordered Aldo Moro to abandon his policy of opening to the Communists. The intransigent opposition of the U.S.A. government to the line followed by the DC leader was expressed for the first time by Kissinger in the most brutal and threatening terms in a dramatic face-to-face with Moro, visiting the United States in the entourage of Leone. It was Corrado Guerzoni, ex-close collaborator of the DC statesman and present director of the second radio channel, who revealed the upsetting details of this episode in the courtroom.

The revelation on the Moro-Kissinger encounter arrives almost suddenly, unexpectedly, in a room which slowly gets more tense and silent. Guerzoni replies to a question of the presiding judge on the threats of which Moro was said to have been the object and recounts: "During a reception at the Italian Embassy in Washington, in September 1974, there was a very bitter conversation between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Christian Democratic leader. . . ."

Il Giornale (Milan), Nov. 11, page 7: "*Denied before the judges the widow's suspicions on an international plot; Guerzoni, right-hand man of Moro, speaks: Kissinger criticized him, but did not threaten him*":

ROME, Nov. 10—Everything, by now, seems quite clear even though, for prudence's sake, the judges intend to deepen their investigation of the question: Moro was not threatened in the United States over his political program and, therefore, he was not the victim of an international plot. The insinuations and suspicions of the widow must have been only the consequence of a clamorous mistake: the story of Corrado Guerzoni in the courtroom at Foro Italico, today, leaves in fact little room for doubt.

Corrado Guerzoni . . . 52 years old and for almost 20 years close to Moro as public relations adviser, journalist, and director of the second channel of RAI (Italian Radio-Television)—was very precise: Aldo Moro never enjoyed the sympathies of the White House and above all Kissinger always criticized his intention of bringing the Communists into the majority.

. . . We must recall the version and thesis of Mrs. Moro.

"My husband," she has always maintained, "told me that, during a reception in New York, he was threatened if he should have insisted on carrying all the political forces into the government and said that he was considering the possibility of leaving political life." The wife had already told the parliamentary commission investigating Moro's death that she believed in the existence of higher ups who gave the orders behind the Red Brigades.

Corrado Guerzoni's story refers to a confidence he had from Moro but checked afterwards with others including Nino Valentino, former press office head at the Quirinal with Leone, who however immediately denied the circumstance. . . .

(*Editor's Note: Il Giornale* is directed by Indro Montanelli, who in an article in the weekly magazine *Oggi* earlier this year asked that Mrs. Moro be incriminated and concluded, "All of this reinforces in me my old idea that public officials should take their widows to their graves with them. Widows are very dangerous.")

La Repubblica (Rome), Nov. 12: "*Here is the U.S. plan that confirms Guerzoni's charges*":

. . . Completely different is the opinion of Franco Fedeli, director of *Nuova polizia*. The magazine will publish in its next issue an unpublished and top-secret document elaborated by the Intelligence Board, the liaison entity between the U.S. secret services (CIA, FBI, DIA and NSA).

The document contains an in-depth analysis of the Italian reality in terms surprisingly similar—Fedeli maintains—to those expounded by Guerzoni and indicates directives of intervention which can supply a key to reading successive and dramatic events.

The document concerns 20 countries, and as far as Italy is concerned, is not limited to the Moro-Zaccagnini case [Benigno Zaccagnini was secretary-general of the Christian Democratic Party while Moro was its president and shared his policies—ed.], but goes into the trade union situation and contains directives pointed to a very high level. Hence not a simple theoretical analysis, but a package of precise operational indications to intervene and modify the Italian political picture.

What *Nuova polizia* published (the document goes back to the same period as Moro's trip to the United States) therefore reinforces what Guerzoni stated, refuting the refutations.

El Universal (Caracas), Nov. 12: "*Henry Kissinger intimidated Aldo Moro*":

ROME, Nov. 11 (EFE)—Henry Kissinger, in a stormy discussion held in 1974, in the U.S.A., intimidated Aldo Moro, president of the Italian Christian Democracy, calling him a "negative man" for his policy of rapprochement to the Italian Communist Party.

Moro, who afterwards, in 1978, was kidnaped and assassinated by the Red Brigades, felt "ill" after the bitter conversation with the North American Secretary of State.

He returned "frightened" to Italy before he had planned to, and even considered abandoning his political career.

This is the version of Corrado Guerzoni, Moro's press aide, recounted Wednesday in front of the judges who are judging the terrorists who participated in the kidnap and murder of Aldo Moro.

Il Giorno, Nov. 18: An Esposto [Legal Brief] Against Kissinger:

From the outset, a number of theories have been brought forward as to who was behind the kidnaping and lurid assassination of [former Italian Prime Minister] Moro. Among those cited for the crime have been the CIA, the KGB, the secret services of Eastern Europe, and even domestic political factions. What was lacking was the hypothesis that those pulling the strings actually consisted of a globally interrelated network. The person to advance the latter was Miss Fiorella Operto, a Milanese and a former teacher who is now general secretary of the POE, whose characteristics are still somewhat mysterious. She has presented a denunciation of Kissinger, accusing him of being the black hand behind this plot.

According to the magazine *EIR—Executive Intelligence Review*, published in the United States and linked to the POE—Kissinger is involved in a sordid gang involving a "homosexual international" which is a sort of "gay confraternity." Neither Kissinger nor the British secret services nor the KGB are strangers to this, the KGB being continually in search of sexual secrets in order to carry out complex black-mail schemes.

This is a rather complicated story, therefore, with certain fantastic overtones. Nonetheless, Miss Fiorella Operto has taken it forward to the point of presenting a legal brief to the magistracy. This denunciation is currently in the hands of Judge Leonard Agueci in Rome, who has opened an investigation on the basis of the 16-page legal brief submitted by Miss Operto.

La Repubblica, Nov. 19, from an interview with Henry Kissinger: U.S. Ex-Secretary Contradicts Guerzoni. . . Kissinger: 'I had no discussion with Moro'

New York, Nov. 16—"It is an atrocious and repugnant lie which does not have the least basis in fact and for which there is no documentation." With this declaration, Henry Kissinger denied the story told by [close Moro associate] Corrado Guerzoni before the judges of the Criminal Court, according to which Moro and the U.S. ex-Secretary of State had a conversation in 1974 so strained and harsh that the Italian statesman became ill and considered abandoning his political life. In circles close to Kissinger, it is maintained that Guerzoni's "lie" could have originated with a campaign against the ex-Secretary of State, orchestrated for some time by an American political group, the so-called Labor Party of Lyndon LaRouche, who accuse Kissinger of being at the center of many "international conspiracies," not excluding the kidnaping of Moro.

Interview: Dr. Ghulam Hussein

Pakistani opposition's pillars of strength have

Dr. Ghulam Hussein is the Secretary General of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the party founded by former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and led since his murder by the Zia regime in 1979, by Bhutto's wife, Begum Bhutto.

EIR correspondent Mary Lalevée interviewed Dr. Hussein in Bonn, West Germany on November 11, the day before General Zia's government was forced to announce that Mrs. Bhutto was free to leave Pakistan for medical treatment. The announcement came just hours after Dr. Hussein and other PPP members had joined the Club of Life in a series of simultaneous demonstrations organized worldwide. Excerpts from the interview follow.

Lalevée: Could you explain what happened to you personally, and what your previous posts in Pakistan were?

Dr. Hussein: I was twice elected to the National Assembly, in the 1970 and 1977 elections. I held various political posts in the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and in the government. In 1970 I was appointed advisor to the governor of the Punjab. At that time I was also deputy secretary general of the PPP in the Punjab. When I was re-elected in 1977, I was appointed Railway Minister of Pakistan in Mr. Ali Bhutto's government. I was also made secretary general of the PPP. When martial law was imposed on July 5, 1977 I, along with many other leaders and workers, was sent to jail.

I was kept in jail for three-and-a-half years, under different charges, without trial. In March 1981 I was forcibly exiled to Syria, on the demand of hijackers of a Pakistan International Airlines plane. I had nothing to do with the hijacking, and when the authorities asked me and my friends if we wanted to leave the country, we said—and in writing too—that we had nothing to do with the hijacking, and that we were against it. We said that we wanted to face our trials, to answer the charges under which we had been kept in jail. . . .

We applied through the United Nations for political asylum, to western democratic countries. After one full year of verifications and investigations, the United Nations organization for rehabilitation declared us political refugees, and innocent. They recommended that we be granted political asylum in various western democratic countries.

I was granted political asylum in Sweden, along with three or four other friends. So, after one year in confinement