We intend to lock the administration into the arms control track before summer," he said.

In the Senate, Sen. Larry Pressler (R-S.D.), intends to use the UPI leak to get a new round of hearings on banning "dangerous space weapons, especially any kind of beam weapons," the spokesman added.

But as LaRouche pointed out, if this gameplan succeeds, the world will be "locked in to war." Under MAD, the worse the depression collapse, and the associated decline in U.S. military-strategic capability with the arms control-conventional buildup policy, the greater the United States impulse to rely on the theory of "deterrence" as a rationale for a policy of increased "bluffing" with nuclear weapons. Therefore, said LaRouche, anyone, in Washington or Moscow, who is campaigning against beam weapons development, is dangerous to human survival.

Teller will soon crack beam-weapons secrecy

by Paul Gallagher

Dr. Edward Teller spoke on space-based defensive antiballistic missile (ABM) weapons at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies Jan. 18, in the face of the all-out British-Soviet campaign to stop, and ban by treaty, U.S. beam-weapon ABM development.

Teller's forceful presentation not only reiterated that first-stage ABM protection with such systems can be deployed within 5 years; he also announced that within weeks he will be freed, for the first time, from the Anglo-American legacy of secrecy regulations, and allowed to "tell the American people what the Soviet leadership knows" about high-energy antiballistic-missile beam weapons.

"If you don't say that it can be done," said Teller of the immediate prospect space-based directed-energy beam technologies, "then you are going to lose the political battle with the freeze movement." Such a defeat, Dr. Teller has stated, will lead to nuclear war during this decade as the United States relies on the disastrous MAD (mutual assured destruction) doctrine and a shrinking, obsolete deterrent.

It is widely admitted, even in the recent fraudulent UPI "military strategy leaks" aimed against beam-weapon development, that although Dr. Teller and other experts are forbidden even to mention the phrase "directed-energy beams" in public, the Soviet Union is well ahead of the United States in developing the beam technologies for space-based ABMS. The UPI "leaks" were aimed to assist a general sabotage of the U.S. beam-weapon program, inclusively by tightening the assured secrecy regulations still further.

Allowing Dr. Teller to tell the American citizenry about the fundamentally new energy-beam technologies for ABM defense being developed, could unleash a powerful counterblow to the phony UPI "leaks." In his presentation, Teller attributed the coming relaxation of restrictions on his speeches to the Department of Energy under new Energy Secretary Donald Hodel.

This and other recent moves, including continuing increases in the administration's public DOD budget requests for areas related to advanced-technology ABM development, indicate that the Reagan White House is attempting to maintain and expand its decision to accelerate beam-weapon development. But these quiet moves in no way match the high-profile intensity of the wrecking activities by British intelligence and KGB assets in Washington.

Rigged hearings

From the side of the "left nuclear freeze," Oxford-educated Sen. Larry Pressler (Rep.-S. Dak.) is holding a set of rigged hearings in February on his own resolution to ban "particularly space-based beam weapons," in his subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. After EIR learned of the hearings, Pressler-aide William Glicksman stated point-blank that no one representing the Fusion Energy Foundation or the National Democratic Policy Committee of Lyndon LaRouche, Jr., would be allowed to testify. This is an attempt to guarantee that if any experts are to speak in defense of beam-weapons at those hearings, their effectiveness will be muzzled by national security "secrecy," which does not affect NDPC or FEF experts.

On the "right nuclear freeze" side, nominally "conservative" assets of the British military-intelligence thinktanks and the Heritage Foundation are spreading disinformation meant to disorient supporters of the LaRouche and Teller efforts.

Beam-weapons experts in Washington report that Senator Malcolm Wallop (Rep.-Wyo.) and his aide Angelo Codev-
illa, who built a "Star Wars" reputation caricaturing space-based lasers over the past two years, are now spreading extreme underestimates, "off by a factor of 1000," about actual advanced laser and particle-beam potentials.

Wall's "space-wars" line has generally come direct from British Air-Vice Marshall Stuart Mena, who visited the United States in late December.

Air Force Lt. Gen. Kelley Burke was recently replaced as head of the Air Force directed-energy weapons program after spreading similar "expert" incompetence. Though out of the job, Burke and his assessment that beam-weapon ABM systems were "more than 20 years away due to their complexity and weight" were promoted in the UPI defense-policy "leak" hoax, as if authoritative. The UPI "leak" installment of Jan. 19 used Burke to try to prove that the only space-based lasers feasible during the next decade were offensive weapons and hunter-killer satellites—the Soviet KGB line precisely.

This same dangerous incompetence comes closest to the White House itself in the person of Presidential Science Advisor Dr. George Keyworth. Keyworth has repeatedly contradicted Teller's assessment on the feasibility of defensive beam-weapon systems, both before closed meetings of Congressional Armed Services Committees and in remarks printed in the public press, while maintaining the aura of a "pro-nuclear" younger associate of Teller.

Speaking at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Jan. 14, Keyworth went overboard completely and proposed shifting the work of the nation's first-rank nuclear-technologies lab to "advanced conventional weapons development." Conventional arms buildup is now recognized as the real goal of the so-called "nuclear freeze" campaign. Thinking himself in quite restricted surroundings, Keyworth was apparently surprised by some journalists' questions on nuclear-powered beam-weapons development; he answered evasively but indicated he thought such development not really necessary, nor feasible.

Quite the contrary, Teller told a questioner at the Georgetown CSIS auditorium presentation: "When you see half a dozen different possibilities, then each month they look better than the previous month, then you can say it is almost certain that at least one of them, probably more, will work . . . ."

"Of Keyworth's views, Teller remarked, "Sometimes to be very cautious, is actually hazardous." He emphasized that if the United States mounts a serious development effort, it can deploy a rudimentary form of beam-weapon ABM defense within five years, and a more complete or "strategic" system within a decade.

"By the year 2000," said Teller, "I hope that 95 percent of our defense budget will be spend on defensive weapons. . . . If both sides become defense-minded, not offensive-minded, this is a stable situation. Out of that stable situation, maybe peace will come."

What Adelman says

Kenneth Adelman, current designate for the post of director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, published an article, "Beyond MAD-ness" in the Summer 1981 Heritage Foundation's Policy Review journal. Adelman concluded his article with this statement:

The U.S. should be prepared (and be seen to be prepared) to put our strategic forces into limited play in limited crises that may arise in the wider world, such as the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Middle East War of 1973. U.S. forces should not be fashioned solely for the most remote crisis of all: that of an all-out U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear conflict. Unless the U.S. has (and is seen to have) strategic forces supple enough to respond in balanced measure, key allies can only discount the nuclear umbrella . . . .

With the fall of MAD will come the correction of this oversight. Proponents of missile and civil defense advocate that the U.S. match the Soviet efforts to acquire the capacity to fight a prolonged nuclear conflict. . . . [A] limited exchange against hardened military targets [is] the type of capability a PD 59 approach dictates . . . . A successful strike against military and political control targets would reduce the Soviets' ability to project military power abroad.

What Heritage says

Each year the Heritage Foundation has published an "AGENDA" document covering all areas of administration decision making. The chapter of this year's document that covers defense policy explicitly attacks advanced defense research and development, emphasizing a conventional military force buildup and McNamara-type cost-effectiveness approaches to kill advanced defense R&D. Excerpts follow.

This discussion is undertaken in light of the fact that our military establishment has not adapted to meet the single greatest strategic challenge of our era: the threat of conventional forces that might be used against vital American interests. We cannot today defend Europe conventionally. It is highly doubtful we can today defend Southwest Asia's oil fields conventionally. We are forced to rely on the nuclear threat in an era when we no longer possess, and are not promised, nuclear superiority. . . . The focus of this chapter is, therefore, on conventional forces.

[Within the DOD,] overemphasis on long-shots technology has diverted attention away from the most vital con-