

punctuated with staged demonstrations throughout Britain and around the world against nuclear testing, such as the one that occurred "in the community of Aldermaston," the center of top-secret British technology control.

Cold reflection can only find it incredible that the British had representation equal to the United States at the Geneva Conference.

Because of technical problems in verifying a ban on underground testing, in January 1959 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman Lewis Strauss sought to abandon efforts for a comprehensive test ban pending further research, and proposed instead a treaty banning testing in the atmosphere. Eisenhower adopted this view but before he had a chance to propose it to the Soviets, Macmillan rushed to Moscow to propose establishment of a quota of 20 on-site inspections as a way of policing a comprehensive ban. Senator Humphrey rushed a letter to the White House that echoed Macmillan's proposal.

Macmillan steered the negotiations between his technology-powerful rivals. It was Britain which moved to revive talks during the Kennedy administration after they had been terminated following the U-2 incident. Even following resumption of U.S. and Soviet testing in 1961, the prime minister kept the talks alive. After the negotiations died yet again following the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Macmillan revived them for the last time.

On March 16, 1963, Macmillan proposed that Harriman lead a special U.S.-British negotiating team to Moscow to initiate final negotiations. The U.S. and British ambassadors in Moscow delivered this proposal, and Khrushchev accepted it. In June Macmillan sent British Labour Party head Harold Wilson to meet with Khrushchev in preparation. Wilson reported that prospects were "excellent" for an atmospheric test ban. The Soviets had already collected the data they needed to build an effective ABM defense of Moscow.

The Moscow negotiations quickly converged on such a treaty. The only stumbling block was agreement on a provision to permit development of peaceful nuclear explosives. Then, out of the blue, Harriman demanded a withdrawal clause. The Soviet negotiators reacted with surprise. Of course; they said, any nation has the right to withdraw from the treaty should it deem such action necessary to preserve national sovereignty. Harriman wasn't satisfied. He then proposed to exchange the U.S. AEC's demand for a provision protecting the Plowshare program for an unnecessary withdrawal clause. The Soviets, amused, agreed. Plowshare was killed.

Because the treaty bans "any nuclear explosion . . . in any environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits" of the nation producing the device, the Plowshare program was barred from aiding the developing nations, since some radioactivity, however little, would be produced outside the United States in digging a new sea-level canal, for example, or digging a harbor for Nigeria, cheaply and efficiently.

## ABM accord does not ban beam weaponry

Charges to the effect that President Reagan's energy-beam development policy violates the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, are false. The treaty, which is currently under a scheduled 10-year review by the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva, does not prohibit research and development on ABM systems, though it does sharply curtail deployment of launchers and radars.

In the section entitled "Agreed Statements and Common Understandings Regarding the Treaty" is the "overview" of how the specific predicates of its prohibitions were viewed by the two nations in 1972.

Agreed Statement "D" clearly states: "the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles [than those of 1972] and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty."

Energy-beam ABM systems do in fact clearly involve fundamentally new physical principles, and they replace ABM interceptor missiles with energy or particle beams: launchers with lasers, accelerators or pulsed-power sources; and radars, at least in part, with long-range, long-wavelength infrared sensing devices.

The cited Article XIII of the treaty provides for a "Standing Consultative Commission," to "consider questions . . . and related situations which may be considered ambiguous." Further, to "consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;" and further, to "consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments . . .".

The cited Article XIV states that "each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty," and that "Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty." Such a review is currently ongoing, as the treaty entered into force in October 1972.