

him. We'll budget-cut it to death!" The reality of the matter has not fully overtaken their consciences. What the President has done is done. It is irreversible.

By speaking with his authority as Commander-in-Chief, President Reagan has established a new U.S. strategic doctrine. He has not merely proposed a change in policy; he has accomplished a change in policy, a change entirely within the scope of his independent constitutional powers. Moreover, no Soviet leader would ever believe that the United States was not operating on the basis of ABM beam-weapons-systems development, no matter how loudly spokesmen for the U.S. government attempted to deny it. The Soviet Union will now accelerate its ABM defense-systems development. The world is now locked into the new reality which the President unleashed with that address.

As for our allies, they are locked into the same new realities. The chorus of European politicians' quibblings against the new strategic doctrine, are simply British-orchestrated quibblings. There is nothing anyone can do to reverse the effects which the President unleashed on March 23. There are only successful dinosaurs of the Mesozoic Age having difficulty adjusting intellectually to the sudden arrival of the Cenozoic.

In part, the same is true in Moscow's leading circles. Politicians and others who imagined that they each had their future plans more or less neatly arranged, boarded a boat one night, as a man filled with the spirit of Manhattan might have boarded the Hoboken ferry in the old days and discovered in the morning that he was on a ship bound for Shanghai. "This can't be happening to me, and to all my fine plans!" he exclaimed. "Stop the world, and turn it around. Take me to Hoboken."

What stuns these politicians is the fact that the President of the United States had the power to make a single address, and that the mere words he uttered with that address could change the course of human history. The power of those words, when spoken under such circumstances by a President of the United States, is a power which none of the clever, calculating politicians of Europe, including those of Moscow, previously imagined to exist. The President has spoken words which have changed the world, and all the words these politicians might shout, whisper, poetically declaim, or howl in the streets and parliaments of the world, can not undo the powerful effect on history the President's words have produced.

Unfortunately, the world has not completely changed. We are in a deepening new economic depression, and at the brink of the greatest financial collapse in history. Around our shoulders hang still the thermonuclear relics of the absurd Nuclear Deterrence doctrine which has ruled the world's affairs too long. This is still a dangerous period, the more dangerous because of confused political figures in Moscow and elsewhere, who still might insanely miscalculate. There are still politicians wearing manhole-covers on their heads.

## The President has put Moscow on the spot

by Rachel Douglas

When President Ronald Reagan committed the United States to the development of strategic defensive weapons and then seconded Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's statement that Soviet development of a like capability could be welcomed, he confronted the Kremlin with a historic opportunity for which, to judge by the first response, the Andropov leadership was quite unprepared. Not during the entire period of Brezhnev's detente, not since Dwight Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace policy and John Kennedy's plan to put a man on the moon, has an initiative from an American or Russian leader so threatened to deprive the rule-writers of post-war arms control, chiefly operating from middle ground in London, of their prerogative to dictate caps and ceilings on the technological development of the two great powers.

It is a moment at which the attitude toward the United States of Soviet Marshal Georgii Zhukov at the end of World War II, which sent chills up and down the spine of Winston Churchill, might be recalled: "If we are partners, there are no other countries in the world that would dare to go to war when we forbade it," Zhukov told Gen. Dwight Eisenhower in the first days of victory.

Andropov, however, either could not recognize that Reagan was turning three-and-a-half decades of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine on its ear, or chose not to. Responding to Reagan by way of a *Pravda* interview on March 27, Andropov ignored the fact that Reagan had posed his policy as a fundamental shift away from MAD, when the President said: "It is inconceivable to me that we can go on thinking down the future . . . that the great nations of the world will sit here like people facing themselves across a table each with a cocked gun."

The implications of this approach for Soviet foreign policy are momentous: four decades of Soviet investment in peace movement/disarmament efforts to undermine the West can suddenly stop yielding a return.

### Missile crisis interrupted

Before Reagan spoke on March 23, a crisis eerily mimicking the great missile crisis of 1962 was taking shape between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Indeed, Reagan's opening the door to development of a strategic defensive capability was a crucial move to avert that confrontation—

not least because such defenses would render all long- and medium-range missiles obsolete, including the Soviet SS-20 missile, the medium-range weapon whose existence has been invoked in NATO to prove the need to station Pershing II rockets in Europe, with their six-minute flight time to Soviet targets.

It was the Pershings whose imminent deployment occasioned warnings from Moscow that sounded like a countdown to a new Cuban Missile Crisis. From professional political commentators, from ministers and military officers, there were threats of counter-measures on a big scale.

*Jan. 24, Central Committee staffer Vadim Zagladin to the Italian daily Paese Sera:* "Given the fact that these are American missiles that can strike Soviet territory, we should have to see to it that American security would be in the same situation as our own." The interviewer asked, "Missiles in Cuba again?" Zagladin: "Modern technology makes different solutions possible." Zagladin denied *Paese Sera's* suggestion that this must be "an allusion to the possibility of arming satellites."

*March 7, Col. Gen. Nikolai Chevrov of the Soviet General Staff on Swedish television:* "They would . . . force us to adopt countermeasures, which would not only affect the countries in Western Europe which will receive these missiles, but also U.S. territory."

*March 16, Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov to troops in the Arctic Sea port of Murmansk:* "Washington wishes to gain time before the end of this year, in order then to begin the deployment of its medium-range missiles in Western Europe. But if this were nevertheless to happen, the Soviet Union will be able to give a timely and effective response. Let no one doubt this. Our nerves are strong and our strength sufficient. . . ."

*March 16, Chief of Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov in a highly unusual interview, to Leslie Gelb of the New York Times:* "This increases the U.S. nuclear strategic arsenal relative to the Soviet arsenal. Therefore, adequate retaliatory steps will be taken. If the U.S. would use these missiles in Europe against the Soviet Union, it is not logical to believe we will retaliate only against targets in Europe. Let me tell you, if some of your experts think this, they are foolish."

Reagan's announcement could have served as gravel on the ice to keep the United States and the Soviet Union from skidding into catastrophe. But Andropov didn't grab hold. Instead, he branded various of Reagan's statements "un-

truth" and "importunate verbiage." While the official news agency TASS inaccurately charged that the new American program would be violating the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty of 1972, Andropov claimed that the doctrine would not be defensive at all.

His complaint, in answer to *Pravda's* question about Reagan's announcement of a "new, defensive conception," ran as follows:

This is something that needs special mention. After discoursing to his heart's content on a 'Soviet military threat,' President Reagan said that it was time a different approach was adopted to ensuring U.S. strategic interests and announced in this connection the commencement of a large-scale effort to develop highly effective antiballistic missile defenses.

On the face of it, laymen may even find it attractive when the President speaks out about what seem to be defensive measures. But this may seem to be so only at first glance and only to those, who are not conversant with these matters. In fact, the strategic offensive forces of the United States will continue to be developed and upgraded at full tilt and along quite a definite line at that, namely that of acquiring a nuclear first strike capability. Under these conditions, the intention to secure itself the possibility of destroying, by means of ABM defenses, the corresponding strategic systems of the other side, that is of rendering it unable of dealing a retaliatory strike, is a bid to disarm the Soviet Union in the face of the U.S. nuclear threat. One must see this clearly in order to appraise correctly the true import of this "new conception."

When the U.S.S.R. and the United States began discussing the problem of strategic arms, they agreed that there is an unbreakable interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive weapons. And it was not by chance that the treaty on limiting ABM systems and the first agreement on limiting strategic offensive arms were signed simultaneously between our countries in 1972.

In other words, the sides recognized the fact, and recorded this in the above documents, that it is only mutual restraint in the field of ABM defenses that will allow progress in limiting and reducing strategic systems, that is, in checking and reversing the strategic arms race as a whole. Today, however, the United States intends to sever this interrelationship. Should this conception be converted into reality, this would actually open the floodgates of a runaway race of all types of strategic arms, both offensive and defensive. Such is the real import, the underside, so to speak, of Washington's "defensive conception."

Summing up his response to Reagan, Andropov said:


The incumbent U.S. administration continues to tread an extremely perilous path. The issues of war and peace must not be treated so flippantly. All attempts at achieving military superiority over the U.S.S.R. are futile. The Soviet Union will never allow them to succeed. It will never be caught defenseless by any threat. Let this be firmly grasped in Washington. It is time they stopped devising one option after another in the search of best ways of unleashing nuclear war in the hope of winning it. Engaging in this is not just irresponsible, it is insane.

### More marshals

Reagan's intervention came just as Moscow was making a major change in its foreign policy institutions, a change

whose full import is not yet known. On March 25, Andrei Gromyko, foreign minister of the U.S.S.R. since 1957, was named first deputy prime minister as well.

There are two other first deputy prime ministers under Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov: Ivan Arkhipov, who is an old industrial manager and close associate of the late Leonid Brezhnev, without Politburo rank, and Geydar Aliyev, the Azerbaijani former KGB official promoted to the Politburo after Brezhnev died. Particularly because it came in the midst of rumors that Andropov's chronic diabetic condition had flared into a kidney disorder requiring hospitalization, Gromyko's appointment caused speculation that he was being promoted within the Council of Ministers to offset Aliyev, or that an even bigger leadership fight was on. The naming of a foreign affairs official to the first deputy premier's job, which is unprecedented, also pointed to an across-the-board



Christopher Sloan/New Solidarity

reorganization and centralization of foreign policy functions.

A party Central Committee Plenum is expected to take place in April, at which time further personnel shifts and policy debate may reveal how much Andropov has succeeded in consolidating power.

It is an open question, whether any figure at all in the Soviet leadership is capable of shifting, in response to Reagan's breaking the anti-technology stranglehold on U.S. policy, to the attitude Marshal Zhukov had nearly 40 years ago, before Britain provoked the Cold War. But what is not in question, is that the Soviet military will lay claim to an even bigger say in national policy, as it had already begun to during Brezhnev's last months and Andropov's first as general secretary.

No high-ranking Soviet military officer commented on Reagan's speech in the first week after it was given, but three of them, including Strategic Rocket Corps Commander Vladimir Tolubko, were promoted to the rank of marshal.

Tolubko is one of the officers to have intervened into the discussion that is swirling around Soviet economic policy overall, and investment practices in particular. He published an article in the party journal *Kommunist* in February, in the same issue where Andropov outlined a program of chiefly organizational measures for improving economic performance. The point Tolubko stressed, quoting Andropov, was that the Army and Navy must get what they need "especially in the present international situation." He went on to say that "The Soviet Armed Forces are . . . tied by thousands of strong threads to many branches of the country's economy," so that any improvement in overall economic performance means that "very importantly, considering the deterioration of the world situation, the defense potential of the U.S.S.R. will be reinforced."

The military's claim was staked even more strongly by Gen. V. M. Shabanov, Deputy Defense Minister for Armaments, in a late February article for the Central Committee weekly *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*. He echoed a benchmark *Kommunist* article Ogarkov wrote in 1981, which called for a tighter interface between the civilian and defense sectors of the Soviet economy. Under the subheading "The Economy and Defense," Shabanov wrote:

It is only possible to strengthen the country's defense capability on the basis of a highly developed economy, above all industry. . . . For strengthening the country's defense capability, great significance attaches to the positions of the 26th congress of the CPSU on the primary development and technical re-equipping of the basic branches of industry. . . , which have been and remain the foundation of the economy and defense, and on the introduction and production of equipment and technology that is new in principle, which raises the flexibility of production, its ability to shift from one type of production to another without violation of production rhythm.

---

## Documentation

---

# Europe responds to the end of MAD era

*The following are excerpts from Western European commentary on the March 23 strategic policy statement by President Reagan, and its implications.*

### Great Britain

Reaction in Britain to President Reagan's beam weapons policy has been uniformly hostile. Newspapers across the political spectrum from the left-liberal *Guardian* to the right-wing *Daily Telegraph* all denounced the policy as "star wars" and played up the Soviet negative reaction to it.

*Times* of London, March 25: "In less time than it takes to watch the Johnny Carson show, President Reagan announced on television two nights ago one of the most fundamental switches in American strategic concepts since the Second World War. It sounded, and still sounds, amazing—even when placed in the context of bitter political infighting over his defence budget. But the response from the Russians, which was prompt and antagonistic, indicates that they at least take it seriously. Should we do so too? . . ."

"President Reagan's statement . . . is more likely to alarm his allies than comfort them. . . ."

*Guardian*, March 25: "Ronald Reagan frightens ordinary people. . . . Now, almost randomly, toward the end of yet another television session, Mr. Reagan prepares the world for a future of lasers, microwave systems and particle beams in outer space. 'Star wars,' says Senator Edward Kennedy. 'Terrifying,' says Senator Mark Hatfield. What can the old man in the White House be thinking of?"

*Winston Churchill III*, Tory Member of Parliament and stepson of Averell Harriman's wife, Pamela Churchill, in an interview with *EIR*: "Every system has a counter-system. It is quite absurd to say that you can destroy 2,387 Soviet missiles from space. Anyway, space systems themselves are highly vulnerable to anything. Look, the U.S. has said all along it won't let the Soviets put these things into orbit. So, by the same token, the Soviets won't allow it. Before they become operational, they will be zapped." When informed of recent overtures by Defense Secretary Weinberger and others for U.S.-Soviet parallel development of ABM systems in space, Churchill III sputtered: "These are grandiose state-