

Who wants a new missile crisis to explode now

by Susan Welsh

Soviet Communist Party Chairman Yuri Andropov's latest arms control offer, issued May 3 and immediately hailed by Henry Kissinger and welcomed as "a step in the right direction" by the British Foreign Office, is not intended as a serious attempt at compromise on the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe. It is a smokescreen, an attempt to blackmail U.S. President Reagan into either abandoning his commitment to a beam-weapons defense policy or undergoing a missiles crisis in which he would lose first Western Europe, and eventually the United States as well.

Although "Made in Moscow," this operation is assisted by the highest levels of the British foreign policy establishment; the common and openly admitted Anglo-Soviet aim is to oust President Reagan and to restore the Trilateral Commission/Council on Foreign Relations crew to full control over the U.

are manipulating the fears of Western Europe that the U.S. will "abandon" its allies, hence driving West Germany in particular to make its own accommodation with Moscow, and in this way to British direction.

Reagan's March 23 announcement of a new strategic doctrine for the United States based on the development of anti-ballistic missile defense systems—which he offered to share with the Soviet Union—was a mortal threat to the British and to Andropov and his supporters in the Soviet Union. During the weeks since Reagan's speech, the pages of Soviet and British newspapers have been virtually indistinguishable in their violent denunciations of the American President and what they like to call his "star wars" policy.

For the British, Reagan's shift from "Mutually Assured

Destruction" (M

an abrupt decline in the fortunes of America's self-proclaimed "junior partner." Britain's much-vaunted (and pensive) "deterrent" (its siles) was now a pile of worthless junk; the ideological of "Thatcherite" economics upon the Reagan administration was now threatened, since the ABM policy would require dirigist methods and could spark an industrial expansion in the U.S. like that initiated by President Roosevelt in the mobilization for World War II. Most important, a Mutually Assured Survival policy increases the relative importance of the two superpowers, significantly reducing the room for British manipulation of Washington, such as that which occurred during the "test case" for MAD—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

"Reagan has gone over the top," says David Watt, head of the prestigious Royal Institute of International Affairs. "The role of Britain in the next period is to be used by both sides . . . particularly by the Russians. . . . We British have a better understanding with the Russians." "What do you do when the President of the United States has gone wild? He's very difficult to stop?" asks François Duchene of Sussex University, until recently a coordinator of the British section of the Trilateral Commission.

As for the Soviets, their howls of rage against President Reagan's ABM policy have nothing to do with what Andropov propagandistically claims is a U.S. attempt to launch a first nuclear strike against the Soviet homeland. What Andropov fears is the U.S. economic recovery which a crash directed-energy beam weapon policy threatens to Soviet Union has been intensively developing its

weapons research for quite some time; it will now escalate such efforts sharply.)

The issue of the "Euromissiles" is different, and the crisis shaping up around the scheduled deployment of U.S. Pershing II missiles in Western Europe at the end of this year is what makes the current situation particularly dangerous. The Carter administration, operating under the offensive "MAD" nuclear doctrine, decided to install nuclear missiles there which for the first time would be in range of Soviet targets, with as little as a five-minute flight time and high precision. The Soviet SS-20s, which the Pershings are purportedly intended to counter, are not within reach of U.S. targets, and therefore, as distressing as they may be for Western Europe, they are not comparable to the projected NATO deployment. The NATO deployment is as unacceptable for the Soviet Union as Khrushchev's installation of nuclear missiles on Cuba was for the United States; this was known to the people who pushed through the "Euromissile decision," and the pre-programmed crisis is

If the Soviet leadership cannot get the United States to abandon both the Euromissile decision and the beam-weapon defense policy, all indications are that they intend to go for a "Cuban missile crisis in announcement by Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme that Soviet mini-submarines had penetrated Sweden's coastal waters (see in the buildup to such a crisis.

The Arbatov-Carrington game

Just as the Swedish story was breaking in the international press, two high-level "unofficial Soviet negotiators" appeared abroad: Alexander Bovin, *Izvestia* commentator and advisor to Andropov, went to London for a meeting of the elite Anglo-Soviet Round Table and gave several interviews to the press in which he announced that it was impossible to deal with the United States as long as Reagan was in the White House. Georgi Arbatov, Moscow's "America handler" and friend of Henry Kissinger, arrived in the United States for private meetings, including a session of the Dartmouth Conference. Shortly thereafter, Andropov made his "new arms control proposal."

The Anglo-Soviet strategy to force Reagan out (or force him to abandon the Mutually Assured Survival policy) is based on the psychological profile of Reagan which Britain's Tavistock Institute circulated soon after his inauguration: that Reagan is a "cowboy," who will shoot from the hip and then buckle when the pressure gets too high. (A of course, which never expected that Reagan would go with the beam weapons policy in the first place!) They plan to inundate the President with multiple crises in foreign and domestic policy: the economy unravelling, Central America becoming a "new Vietnam," the outbreak of a new war in the Middle East. The crisis in NATO over the scheduled Euromissile deployment, with rioting in West Germany and hostility toward President Reagan from West European leaders

would, they anticipate, create the conditions in which a sudden Soviet-American showdown would end with Reagan's capitulation across the board. In this crisis, Britain's Lord Carrington, Kissinger, et al. would offer a "new channel" for East-West negotiations, controlled by the British.

The push for a U.S.-Soviet summit conference began to be voiced by Carrington and was echoed by all the usual Kissingerian channels around the 1st of May. Arbatov's trip to the United States was intended to begin setting that up. Then came the rumors of a meeting to be held in Paris between Soviet Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Gromyko, and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. Carrington, the former British Foreign Secretary, in a speech to the London International Institute of Strategic Studies (excerpted in the *Washington Post* May 1) called for "dialogue" instead of "megaphone diplomacy" and proposed a summit meeting. James Reston, in a commentary in the *New York Times* the same day, declared that the Soviets are threatening "if we emplace new missiles in Europe, to put intermediate Soviet nuclear missiles within striking distance of the United States." Reston recommended a summit meeting.

A leading British strategist, asked about the rumors of a Gromyko-Shultz conference, replied: "I don't want to be chauvinistic, but I see Carrington behind the scenes of that meeting, the cunning hand of Carrington, pointing out: this is the way for the dialogue to go." The U.S. State Department is the stronghold of the Carrington tendency in the U.S. government, he said, and is "on the ascendancy. . . . Reagan may say what he will."

The Anglo-Soviet gameplan is to accentuate the crisis in NATO, to turn Western Europe against President Reagan. This, they calculate, will induce Reagan to withdraw from Europe, leaving it to the British and the Soviets. "I would be in favor of getting Western Europe together and coordinating," said the previously-cited François Duchene. "Only Germany could lead such an effort. . . . Germany has over the years become a de facto alternative policy center to the United States; it learned this reflex during the Carter era. . . . The German moves would have to work in tandem with the U.S. Congress. If they oppose Reagan's budget, express worry about the Star Wars and Mutually Assured Survival policies—if that occurred, and at the same time Germany would emphasize the importance of East-West discussions, then possibly we could pressure Reagan."

Another British strategist, former Chief of the Defense Staff Lord Carver, endorsed such moves toward an independent Europe as indispensable. Reagan's ABM policy "will stir up Western Europe and will encourage movements like European Nuclear Disarmament [EN U.S.,

ernments that they've got to do something themselves, something much more important, that they must reach their own independent modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. Of course, this reaction would play into Soviet hands," said Carver mildly. "But Carrington is right—this is what we must do."

British try sabotage of NATO defense

by Herbert Quinde

Broadly echoing Lord Carrington's perspective for decoupling Europe from the United States (see Robert Banks, British Conservative Party parliamentarian. Commenting on President Reagan's speech from his office at the House of Commons, Mr. Banks stated, "I don't think people have come to grips with it as yet . . . President Reagan gave new impetus to the whole thing [decoupling]. There is a decided unease about reliance on space systems for communications, intelligence, and so forth, and that possibly would be the scenario for war which means we have to depend on their [U.S.] satellites, communications, [and] intelligence in time of war. . . . I am not sure that everybody would be happy about seeing an escalation in the number of weapons in space."

Supreme Allied Commander/Europe, U.S. General Bernard D. Rogers, refused to be interviewed by *EIR* on Reagan's new policy, using the excuse that it would "not be appropriate" for the leader of a joint military structure to comment on the policies of one member nation. But this has not in the least prevented Mr. Banks, a British subject, from vocally opposing the U.S. Commander in Chief's initiative.

In a document anticipating President Reagan's March 23 address, Mr. Banks presents the hysterical British defense of the Mutually Assured Destruction doctrine. The document, prepared for the Scientific and Technical Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA of Military Space Systems." The NAA is NATO's "educational" and lobbying arm among the legislators of its member countries.

Sen. Larry Pressler's (R) based weapons in the U.S. Congress is best understood in the context of his participation in the on Nuclear Weapons in Europe.

Mr. Banks' argument is encapsulated in his document, where he states, "If the United States deployment of a space-based weapons ballistic missile defense (S a similar Soviet deployment, the independent British, Chinese, and French ICBMs which currently complicate Soviet strategic planning would be rendered obsolete. This would constitute a net loss for the United States security and would

probably alienate American allies. Furthermore, since the deployment of an effective SBW-BMD would vastly improve the chance for a successful defense of the United States from a Soviet nuclear strike, it might be seen by America's NATO allies as a decoupling of the United States's and European security. In other words, if war began in Europe, the United States would have the capability to limit any nuclear exchange to European soil. This could have a profoundly negative impact on Western European confidence in the United States."

Mr. Banks elaborates his thesis: "It should also be considered that ASAT [anti-satellite] powers might have a telling effect on the nuclear deterrent forces of other countries. Any ASAT attack (or on British, French, or Chinese C3 (C Communications) satellites would seriously call into question their capability to control their nuclear strike forces. For the same reason, these countries would wish to restrain BMD deployment. They would prefer to see ASAT deployment similarly arrested, i.e., to ensure the deterrent value of their nuclear forces. If ASAT are deployed, the practical effect may be an increase in Alliance reliance on United States strategic forces."

Mere ignorance? Hardly. Mr. Banks is most clearly expressing his central concern when he states, "The prospect of deploying a SBW-BMD is immediately attractive because it would transform the current strategic calculus from a strategy of assured annihilation to a formula for ensured survival. However, the precise impact of deploying such weapons is much less certain and much more complicated than this appealing but simple impression. Among other things, the deployment of a SBW-BMD would immediately . . . radically alter the existing superpower strategic relationship."

Responding to the brainwashing of its European allies by the British "Third Force" enthusiasts, U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger forcefully demolished the "Fortress America" deception in a speech on April 11 before the Aviation and Space Writers Association convention (see 10). "An effective shield against ballistic missile attack would prevent aggression by neutralizing an aggressor's offensive capability. We know the Soviet Union has been working to achieve these same defensive systems for many years, and *we hope that they will continue* [emphasis] stable superpower relationship would be one in which both sides were protected from attack. . . . As the President said in his speech, we seek the capability to defend ourselves *and* our allies from the threat of military force."

Reflecting the indoctrination in Club of Rome Malthusian ideology which permeates the NATO bureaucracy, Mr. Banks whines that technology is moving faster than political decision-making, which "may be allowing technological momentum to undermine Alliance security." He even goes so far as to blame the U.S. Space Shuttle program for creating a "relentless and amorphous technological push for space development."

'Right deal with right despot'

From a recent speech by Britain's former Foreign Minister Lord Peter Carrington, reprinted in the Sunday, May 1, issue of the Washington Post:

Our own tradition must be for the peaceful resolution of potential conflict through energetic dialogue. The notion that we should face the Russians down in a silent war of nerves, broken only by bursts of megaphone diplomacy, is based on a misconception of our own values, and of Soviet behavior. . . . The right deals with the right despots can often be in our own interests. . . . It is not our aim to drive the Russians further into nationalistic and militaristic introversion; to give them a pretext for strengthening their economic might over East Europe. . . . Soviet communism is like a particularly unappealing piece of Victorian architecture. . . . To drive at it with a bulldozer would be a bit risky, but death-watch beetles can work miracles over the years, without help from the outside. . . .

It is a plain, simple fact that for a third of a century the alliance has succeeded in its primary aim of deterring an attack on Western Europe. This has been achieved by a combination of military strength and political will, as well as by a prudent reluctance by Moscow to engage in such a venture. We must ensure that none of these factors changes. If they do not, the prospect of war will remain remote.

But do not let us overlook the size of existing nuclear forces in the West, not to speak of their accuracy. Look, too, at the quality of our conventional forces, and take into account the advantages enjoyed by the armies of a free alliance compared with the conscripted countries of the Warsaw pact.

As for morale, the British, with European and America support, have just sailed 8,000 miles to protect a handful of their kith and kin on a remote island. Does anyone doubt that we would fight to protect 55 million at home? Or that other members of the alliance would do likewise?

It seems to me extraordinary, and against the dictates of common sense, for anyone to claim that the West in military terms is in danger of sinking to its knees.

Now, my conclusion is not that we can afford to be generous in Geneva. But I am saying that these talks should be conducted in an atmosphere of calm confidence, and that the broader political dimension of East-West relations should be constantly at the forefront of the Western mind. It would be wrong to approach these important negotiations on the military defensive—on the military alert—and for our dialogue with the East to be hag-ridden by fear of military inferiority. . . .

And finally we must make absolutely clear our belief that arms control is in everyone's self-interest, not only economically but in terms of real security.

As a defensive alliance NATO has been a self-evident success. But it must be an imaginative alliance too. It is not just a pooling of arms, with the Americans throwing in the biggest stake. We must pool our ideas as well, and forge these into sound and consistent policies.

What should these policies be? Hobbes' first law of nature, it is often forgotten, was "to seek peace, and to follow it."

'Cunning hand of Carrington'

From an early-May discussion with a top British strategic planner, provided to EIR:

Q: There are reports that [Secretary of State] George Shultz will be meeting with [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko soon. What would this mean?

A: I'm not surprised that Shultz and Gromyko are going to be meeting, contrary to others. I'm just back from the U.S. Both sides realize now that either they will imprison themselves in their own rhetoric or they will have to break free of it. Both sides know that what is at stake beyond the arms control and arms talks is perceptions, attitudes. It's a sophisticated approach. Signals have been sent, considerable ones, justified ones, from both sides: they know that rhetoric is dangerous. Alexander Bovin's article in the British press was the key signal that East-West affairs must not be allowed to take on a theological aspect. It's recognized on both sides.

Q: What is your view of Reagan's new beam weapon policy? And what's behind the reports of Soviet mini-submarines off the Swedish coast?

A: Ah! that's a good question: these are the extremes. Unmanned robot/submarines and space warfare. Both sides are going to proceed with their own military operations. The submarines are highly complex, very advanced technologically, very expensive. Now for the beam weapons, look up the editorial in this week's *Aviation Week*. . . . Reagan's speech about space war was not key. Key was his speech on "Russia is the source of all evil." But I assure you, if submarines and beam weapons were decisive, Shultz and Gromyko would not be meeting. I don't want to be chauvinistic—but I see Carrington behind the scenes of that meeting, the cunning hand of Carrington, pointing out: this is the way for the dialogue to go. The Scowcroft Commission has added urgency to U.S. policies. The adoption of the MX and the single-warhead missile means important things for START. . . . We British are instrumental, in the diplomatic area and in other areas. We're engaged in dialogue at all levels with the Soviets, not only diplomats, also military people, specialists, doctors, scientists and so on; we give a professional underpinning to the dialogue.

The influence of the State Department is impressive, on

the ascendancy. Reagan may say what he will.

Q: Georgi Arbatov, too, was in the U.S. recently; I should imagine he gave a try at cooling things off?

A: Yes, yes. Arbatov facilitated this process. You know he spoke to Scowcroft? Of course, both sides weren't exactly falling over each other, but as Americans say the "bottom line" had been reached. Shultz and Gromyko meet right after Shultz's trip to the Middle East—this is very important, more important than people realize.

'Uncouth fellow in White House'

David Watt, director of the Royal Institute for International Affairs, wrote in the London Times on April 29 under the headline, "Coming to Terms with Andropov." Watt is commenting on an earlier column, published in the same London paper April 23, by Soviet commentator Alexander Bovin, in which Bovin forecast a Cuban missile-style crisis over the upcoming Pershing missile installation in Europe. Bovin is an on-the-record opponent of the Reagan beam-weapons policy. From Watt's April 29 response:

For Bovin, the paradox and puzzle is that the United States, which had its revolution more than 200 years ago and has duly progressed according to plan, has suddenly under President Reagan turned in the opposite direction and is now, apparently, determined to lead an ideological crusade against communism and the "empire of evil" that is the Soviet Union. . . .

The Russians have excellent tactical reasons for talking to us [the British] in this way at this particular moment. The French are having an anti-Soviet beanfeast; the West Germans are suspected in Washington of "neutrality." The British are not only worried—politely, but definitely and at all levels—about the Reagan administration, they also still have some influence in Washington and are in a mood to try and exert it.

How, then, if we were in the Kremlin, should we handle the British? Well, we adopt our most civilized tone. We appeal to their sense of history and moderation. We speak more in sorrow than in anger about this brash, uncouth, un-British fellow in the White House whom more mature, experienced nations have to try to restrain for the good of humanity. In short we butter them up, and who better qualified to lay it on than Comrade Bovin?

Again, there is nothing inherently impossible in Bovin's particular gloss on all this or in the supposition that Mr. Andropov has about as much practical concern with ideology as Pope Alexander VI—a potentate underpinned by an absolutist philosophy but one with whom it was possible to do business on a limited basis and even, occasionally, to dine,

provided you took suitable precautions.

Yet, at the end of the day, it scarcely matters whether the Russians are sincere and truthful in this account of their present feelings or whether it is all tactics. We have to answer the questions for ourselves. Lord Carrington supplied an authoritative set of British answers in his Alistair Buchan Memorial Lecture last week, saying in effect that a Geneva deal on compromise terms is in our interest; that the Soviet system will collapse in the end of its own accord without dangerous assistance from us; and that dogma and "megaphone diplomacy" are out of place in our deals with the East.

He is quite right. What is most required at the moment is calmness, firm self-confidence, and flexibility. And the fact that for the time being the Soviet leaders, ably represented by Mr. Bovin, would probably agree for a variety of reasons, good and bad, with the general Carrington position while Mr. Reagan would probably not, does not necessarily invalidate it.

'Britain will be used by Russia'

The following discussion with Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) head David Watt, which took place April 27, was provided to EIR. Watt is now in Moscow.

Q: You've seen the Andropov interview in *Der Spiegel*, haven't you? Isn't Andropov going a bit too far . . . practically inviting the U.S. to invade Nicaragua . . . saying that the Soviets are [acting] comparably, are defending their "national interests" in Afghanistan?

A: How else does one react to Reagan, who's completely over the top? This, and you must've heard about [Soviet commentator Alexander] Bovin's BBC appearance, is nothing strange. It's quite predictable. Reagan has really gone too far.

Q: What role do you see Britain playing in this period?

A: Britain will be used by both sides, particularly by the Russians. We British have a better understanding than Washington and the Germans with the Russians, and we will be used . . . especially if Reagan is re-elected. . . . Carrington's speech sums up the spectrum for British activity. It's narrow but nevertheless an important step. . . . Reagan's tactics . . . indiscriminate sanctions against the Russians will not work.

Q: I've spoken to people around the Reagan administration who frown on all this recent British maneuvering which they see as undermining Reagan.

A: They have been frowning at us for a long time. . . . But they will have to tolerate it. . . . They see us as the lesser evil of the two.