

The Scowcroft target is beam-weapons policy

by Graham Lowry

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee May 11, Commission on Strategic Forces Chairman Brent Scowcroft fully confirmed that the current effort to blackmail President Reagan into making the Scowcroft Commission report the basis of U.S. arms control policy is aimed at overturning the new defensive strategic doctrine announced by the President March 23. Scowcroft joined former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, a leading architect of the lunatic doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) that Reagan repudiated with his decision to develop beam-weapon anti-missile defense systems, in attacking the President's historic initiative.

Scowcroft announced that "I want to associate myself completely" with Schlesinger's statements to the committee demanding that the administration adhere to "the rules of the game" established in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty "that both sides would not try to destroy the deterrent capability of the other side." In addition to this insistence that MAD be adhered to at all costs, Scowcroft called for establishing a new "bipartisan" commission on arms control that would oversee the implementation of new MAD prescriptions on strategic arms control.

'Bipartisan' defense of MAD

Against President Reagan's decision to shift U.S. strategic doctrine to Mutually Assured Survival through development of defensive beam weapons that would make nuclear missiles "impotent and obsolete," a "bipartisan" congressional alliance of Kissinger Republicans and Harrimanite Democrats has sought to blackmail the President into submission to the dictates of the Scowcroft Commission report

issued last month. The commission report rejected the President's beam weapons program in favor of a Kissinger-backed agenda for U.S.-Soviet arms control talks. Scowcroft himself is a long-standing top aide to Henry Kissinger, and currently serves him as executive director of Kissinger Associates, Kissinger's "consulting" firm that features former British Foreign Minister Lord Peter Carrington on its board.

The circles of Henry Kissinger and Averell Harriman have coordinated their campaign against President Reagan's new strategic doctrine in direct collaboration with the British Foreign Office and in parallel with Soviet leader Yuri Andropov—as both London and Moscow oppose the thoroughgoing revival of America's defense capabilities and economic power that will result from the development of beam weapons technologies. Georgii Arbatov, head of Moscow's U.S.A.-Canada Institute, recently met with Scowcroft and another former top Kissinger aide, William Hyland, at a U.S.-Soviet gathering of the Dartmouth conference in Denver, Colorado. According to a top British official involved in secret Anglo-Soviet coordination, Arbatov's meetings in the United States "facilitated the process" of tightening the grip of Kissinger's circles over the Reagan administration.

On Capitol Hill, that effort has featured threats from Kissinger Republicans and Harrimanite Democrats that the White House will not get approval for deploying the MX missile unless the Scowcroft report and a special commission to implement its recommendations are fully endorsed by President Reagan. Letters specifying such conditions were delivered to the White House May 2, drafted by a "bipartisan" group of senators and congressmen including Sen. Charles Percy (R-Ill.) and Rep. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.). The follow-

ing week, as President Reagan began personal lobbying for the MX in Congress, the blackmail threat produced a series of meetings with White House officials and the President himself, pressing him to revise the U.S. strategic arms position at Geneva in accordance with the Scowcroft report.

Following delivery of the letters, Council on Foreign Relations mouthpiece Charles Percy, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told reporters he was targeting “certain people around [the President], in the National Security Council and the Defense Department, who will do anything to prevent arms control. These are the guys I am out to get.” The Kissinger-Harriman crowd has made it clear that they want to crush the influence of National Security Adviser William Clark and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, the two most prominent backers of the President’s beam weapons policy in the administration.

Percy’s Senate hearings May 11, called to discuss the arms control implications of the Scowcroft report, were carefully orchestrated to promote the “continuity” of MAD and raise “apprehensions” about the President’s defensive doctrine. In his opening statement, Percy urged “strong bipartisan support” for the Scowcroft panel recommendations, and added, “I have been concerned about the lack of continuity in arms control over the decades, and the commission report is a good first step.” Percy cited the letter he and other senators sent to the President calling for a new “bipartisan” arms control commission, and elicited Scowcroft’s endorsement for the proposal.

Attacks on the President’s beam weapons program were elicited by Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), member of the genocidalist Club of Rome and a co-sponsor of a Senate resolution calling for a ban on all space weapons. Pell asked the witnesses to state their views on “the President’s space-based missile defense proposal,” giving Schlesinger the opportunity to say that it “undermines” the 1972 ABM treaty’s premises that neither side would destroy the other’s deterrent capability, “and that makes me apprehensive.” Schlesinger portrayed the missile defense system as “something which you may have in 2010,” arguing at the same time that it “augments the Soviets’ fears, and it augments the ability of the Soviets to play upon European fears.”

Scowcroft then jumped in to say, “I would associate myself completely with what Dr. Schlesinger has just said in being apprehensive about the consequences of this. . . . The perils of getting from here to there, and the skepticism about how soon—if ever—we would have operational systems, leaves me very cautious.” Instead, Scowcroft reported to the committee that he and other members of his commission have continued their inputs into the administration on a “wholesale revision” of its strategic arms proposals, which “should be stretched out over some period of time.” Scowcroft also called for closer coordination of arms control and weapons development policies, complaining that too often “the two components have gone in different or independent directions.”

While Scowcroft pushed for MAD’s doctrinal supremacy on Capitol Hill, his boss Henry Kissinger was addressing a

convention at the Washington Hilton, insisting that the priority is to enforce a consensus on strategic policy for the long term, and *then* determine what weapons systems should be deployed.

Reagan administration is not capitulating

The fight within the administration over the Kissinger-Scowcroft blackmail operation has been intense. Defense Secretary Weinberger and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Robert Vessey have strongly objected to changing the U.S. position at the Geneva talks, and a National Security Council meeting called on May 11 to discuss altering the basis for the negotiations reportedly ended without making any concrete decisions. The same day President Reagan sent his reply to the nine House members who wrote demanding the Scowcroft report be made the basis for the Geneva talks, especially its proposal to shift the MAD equation for relative nuclear force levels, currently based on the number of launchers or missiles, to one based on the number of warheads deployed.

The intended trap for the President in a strategic posture that would mean fewer warheads but more missiles deployed, is the ostensible endorsement it would give to the Scowcroft report’s call for putting a priority on overcoming Soviet ABM defenses rather than developing American defensive systems. James Schlesinger and his fellow MAD devotees also hope that would lend credibility to the charge that “there is no such thing as a leakproof system,” especially if both sides were increasing the number of missiles that would have to be intercepted by ABM defenses.

In his reply to Congress, Reagan wrote of “our common goals of insuring effective deterrent forces” and of his agreement “with the essential theme of the Scowcroft Commission’s approach to arms control: the attainment of stability at the lowest possible level of forces.” He pledged to “bring the proposal of a small, single-warhead ICBM to fruition on a high-priority basis,” and said that he saw “merit” in the proposal for a bipartisan commission and working closely with the Congress. But he added, “However, we are giving careful consideration to determining which follow-on arrangements best meet our common objectives.”

The carefully worded and deliberately vague formulations of the letter were nonetheless sufficient to obtain House committee approval of appropriations for deploying the MX missile, but Reagan continues to emphasize that his long-term arms control policy is to make nuclear weapons obsolete by developing defensive beam-weapons. While congressional committees were considering the MX request, a leading West German magazine published an exclusive interview with the President aimed at dispelling any European “fears” of the sort Schlesinger was insisting upon.

Reagan told *Bunte Illustrierte*, “I do not believe a limited nuclear war is possible” and that any Soviet nuclear strike would be aimed at the United States as well as at Europe—thereby repudiating Schlesinger’s “forward defense” madness established as “rules of the game” during the Nixon-Ford administrations. The President invoked his March 23

speech and again attacked past reliance on “deterrence with offensive nuclear weapons,” noting that he has ordered “a comprehensive examining of technologies and other areas dealing with defense in its broadest meaning, in order to evaluate how our and our allies’ security can be guaranteed by such methods.”

The President also emphasized the need to “maintain our basic industries,” through “investments in new machinery and equipment” and “the mastering of new technologies” that will lead to an “increase in standards of living made possible only by productive technology on our farms, in our factories, and in our offices.”

What’s wrong with the MX commission

by Lonnie Wolfe

Henry Kissinger’s former aide Gen. Brent Scowcroft and his Commission on Strategic Forces, more commonly known as the MX Commission, have produced a series of recommendations aimed at undermining the President’s stated commitment to end the era of Mutually Assured Destruction through the development of defensive anti-missile beam weapons.

According to defense intelligence sources, every member of the commission, with the exception of former Air Force Secretary Thomas Reed, strongly disagreed with the President’s March 23 speech ending the MAD era.

While admitting that the Soviet Union is developing a ballistic missile defense capability, the report states under a section on ballistic missile defense in the portion of the report headed Technological Trends for Strategic Forces: “Substantial progress has been made in the last decade in the development of both endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric ABM defenses. However, *applications of our current technology offer no real promise of being able to defend the United States against massive nuclear attack in this century.* [emphasis added]” The report suggests that a limited ABM defense might be used to defend fixed hardened silos, but points out that “even this will be a difficult feat.”

Later, in a section on ballistic missile defense under the heading of Strategic Modernization Programs, the report argues that while research should be conducted within the limits of the 1972 ABM Treaty to avoid a “technological surprise” by the Soviets, “at this time, however, the Commission believes that no ABM technologies appear to combine practicality, survivability, low cost, and technical effectiveness sufficiently to justify proceeding beyond the stage of technology development.”

Since the Commission had access to classified research

on beam weapons technologies of the type that informed the President’s March 23 speech, one can only surmise that it has chosen to use its report to refute the findings of the President himself and his closest advisors on the feasibility of a layered, comprehensive beam weapon defense. Instead, the commissioners go on to recommend that the United States place a higher priority on developing counter-measures to a Soviet ABM system—a statement of strategic lunacy, repeated in a recent interview by Henry Kissinger.

The Commission made the following recommendations:

- First, they recommended that the MX missile be based in existing Minuteman missile silos, hardened to resist attack with existing concrete technologies. As the Commission report admits, the commissioners recognized that this proposal would in no way make MX missiles invulnerable to attack.

By making this admission, the Commission deliberately encouraged a debate on whether a fixed, heavy payload land-based component of the strategic nuclear triad was necessary, since it could not be defended. In public statements analyzing the report, both Kissinger and Scowcroft have argued that the MX is not really a strategic system at all, but some kind of bargaining chip to be placed on the table in arms control talks with the Soviets. In that way, the Scowcroft panel is trying to force all discussion on strategic weapons systems into the MAD-dominated arms control arena.

- Second, the Commission recommends that the U.S. move quickly to develop a small mobile single warhead missile, dubbed the Midgetman. They argue that such a missile would have a high probability of surviving a Soviet attack. Implicit in this recommendation, and supported in direct statements elsewhere, is the advice to move away from heavy launchers and multiple warheads (MIRVs).

Both proposals parallel a recent attack by Henry Kissinger on the President’s missile defense program, in *Newsweek* magazine. One source reports that Kissinger, along with former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, originally pushed the MIRV concept to counter what were thought to be Soviet anti-missile defenses in the 1960s. Those defenses centered on shooting down incoming warheads with a warhead carried by a missile. By placing more warheads on a single missile, Soviet ABM defenses would be overloaded.

This source reports that Kissinger now recognizes, despite public pronouncements to the contrary, that Soviet ABM technologies are designed to shoot down missiles from space using directed energy weapons in the first minutes of flight. It therefore no longer matters how many warheads are carried on a single missile. Instead, Kissinger and Scowcroft want to proliferate launchers to make an effective ABM system more difficult. Hence the Midgetman scheme.

- Finally, the Commission recommends that the administration modify its arms control proposals to count warheads instead of launchers. This proposal was endorsed this month by Soviet leader Yuri Andropov. As with the Midgetman scheme, the hidden purpose behind the recommendation is Kissinger’s new desire to proliferate launchers.