

## Why Yuri Andropov is laughing these days

by Richard Cohen in Washington, D.C.

Washington journalists and diplomats recently reported that a frail Soviet Communist Party Secretary Yuri Andropov had to be physically assisted into a room for meetings with Finnish Prime Minister Miuno Koivisto. No doubt State Department Soviet-watchers, along with congressional experts and the leading Eastern press, will make much over the reported "uncontrolled trembling" of Andropov's hands at the meeting, which, "reliable Soviet sources" later leaked, was attributable to a case of Parkinson's disease.

More practiced observers of this nation's capital, however, think Andropov's apparent condition was more likely the result of restrained continuous laughter over the fact that Secretary of State George Shultz and his two more powerful collaborators, Henry A. Kissinger and former British Foreign Secretary Lord Peter Carrington (not to mention many in the U.S. Congress), are mobilized to sabotage by the end of this year President Reagan's March 23 commitment to the rapid development and deployment of space-based directed energy beam strategic missile defense systems. Andropov's elation is attributable not only to the fact that Shultz and his congressional collaborators have committed themselves to remove the most important military and economic obstacle to Andropov. The Soviet command accurately assumes that Shultz and the misled Congress will perform such a removal under a deal which the Soviet Party Secretary has no intention of living up to.

Intelligence sources report that Shultz and his associates, after recognizing the failure of initial efforts to sabotage the President's March 23 announcement through an international campaign of "Star Wars" ridicule, have now decided to pro-

mote a so-called compromise aimed at *tolerating Reagan's initiative while undermining it.*

### The demands and the Iklé problem

According to these sources, this bipartisan "compromise" demands that the President abandon his planned \$100-billion-plus multi-year Mutually Assured Survival program of high-energy antimissile beam weapons development when he reviews the administration's fiscal year 1985 budget proposals this October. Instead, they demand that the program be restricted in its conception to a research and development phase—with no deployment phase.

Second, they demand that expenditures be limited to a level equivalent to a "consensus perception" of the monetary level of the Soviet program. And finally, they press the idea that the entire program be pursued as a mere bargaining chip in arms control negotiations.

These sources identify Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Fred Iklé as a central figure in this "bipartisan" effort. Iklé—whose brother Max is a chief figure in the Swiss National Bank—is Swiss-born and from one of that country's most prominent families. Iklé's relationship with Kissinger dates back to their joint tenure at the Rand Corporation in 1959, and was renewed in the early 1970s when Iklé became director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It was Iklé who, in the weeks leading up to the President's March 23 address, was said to have argued for watering down presidential insistence that his national announcement identify these new defense technologies as effective, deployable

within a decade, and as reversing the strategic doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

At that time, Iklé's objections were reportedly overridden by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. White House sources say that a close Iklé associate, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Planning, Richard N. Perle, is an even more outspoken opponent of beam weapons within the Pentagon. Perle, a former aide to Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), is the most ardent spokesman among administration officials for both the Israeli lobby and AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland's Foreign Affairs Department. A proponent of the Israeli Lavie military project, Perle has become an important Pentagon arm of Shultz.

### **Appeasers on the White House staff?**

Other Washington sources claim that the Shultz-Iklé-Perle effort within the State Department and the Pentagon has gained ground in further sections of the Reagan administration. They report that White House Chief of Staff James Baker III and his chief assistant Richard Darman have joined the opposition. It has been Baker who, since the autumn of 1981, along with Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman, has conspired to attack the President's strategic modernization program; and it has been Baker who, since the spring of 1982, has consistently advocated appeasement of the U.S. "peace movement."

Lyn Nofziger's understudy Ed Rollins, Director of the White House Office of Political Affairs and sure to be a key figure in a Reagan reelection drive, may have been convinced to join the effort. Reportedly, Rollins is concerned about recent national polls conducted by White House pollster Richard Wirthlin

among the category of women voters. White House pollsters attribute Reagan's allegedly serious problem with this section of the electorate to his strong position on national defense. They claim that it is here that Reagan is most vulnerable to the "warmonger" charges.

The Shultz-allied forces within the administration are part of a broad "bipartisan" effort which now includes a number of "important old boys" dating from the Truman and Eisenhower years, typified by New York Republican John J. McCloy. These old boys have recently been making calls at the White House at an unusual pace.

### **How 'bipartisan consensus' works**

Any success for this operation would largely depend on its influence in Congress. Following the March 23 presidential address, Shultz moved to create a ruling bipartisan consensus on Capitol Hill. Shultz's first success, the Scowcroft Commission (President's Commission on Strategic Forces), was based on his ability to manage key "swing factors" in the Senate and the House. On May 6, operating under the influence of the Averell Harriman-centered foreign policy establishment of the Democratic Party, Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.), proposed in a speech on the Senate

floor the compromise. During that same week, Republican "liberal" Senator Larry Pressler (R-S.D.), justly regarded as the most fervent opponent of any space-based defense system, suddenly changed his mind, endorsing the basic principles of the compromise in a letter to the editor of the *New York Times*.

Overall, Shultz has developed a firm alliance with the Senate Republican leadership, nurtured since his arrival at the State Department in July 1982. More recently, in the House, Shultz has consolidated a more covert but nonetheless solid relationship with the Democratic leadership. Prominent in these arrangements is Shultz's close policy relationship with Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), as well as his tactical alliance with House Speaker Tip O'Neill (D-Mass.) and House Majority Leader Tom Foley (D-Wash.).

The day after the successful Senate vote on the MX missile—a vote very important for the President—an astounding array of Shultz-Baker Senate Republicans sent a warning to President Reagan, stating that on the basis of presidential pledges to Scowcroft and others, Reagan is now "obliged" to reform the strategic arms START talks in line with the Scowcroft Commission recommendations, to immediately develop the so-called Midgetman missile, to establish a long-term bipartisan advisory panel on arms control, and to engage in a meaningful "build-down" agreement with the Soviet Union. The letter was signed by Shultz favorite Charles Percy (Ill.), the Foreign Relations Committee chairman; Pressler; Baker protégé Warren Rudman (N.H.); Kissinger friend Rudy Boschwitz (Minn.); Shultz followers Arlen Specter (Penn.), William Cohen (Me.), Pete Domenici (N.M.), Richard Lugar (Ind.), John Danforth (Mo.), Dan Quayle (Ind.), Slade Gorton (Wash.), and Nancy Kassebaum (Kans.); Majority Whip Ted Stevens (Alaska); and conservatives Alfonse D'Amato (N.Y.), Mack Mattingly (Ga.), Robert Kasten (Wis.), Frank Murkowski (Alaska), and Alan Simpson (Wyo.).

Pressure on the White House to deal with Andropov increased when, on July 3, Percy's Senate Foreign Relations Committee leaked a staff report supporting a "secret" intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) verbal agreement arrived at last summer between U.S. and Soviet negotiators, which President Reagan later openly rejected. The staff report, which concludes that the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship is now at an all-time low because of the failed INF talks and the "still worse" START talks, will be the basis of late-June hearings in Percy's committee, to be led off by George Shultz.

Shultz's "swing vote" control in the Senate has been replayed in the House of Representatives. Ardent beam weapon opponent Albert Gore (D-Tenn.) and liberal Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), an asset of the anglophile wing of the CIA, played the public role in splitting liberal Democrats in the House away from total opposition to the MX missile and in support of the Scowcroft Commission report, which called for increased compromise and obliquely attacked the move away from MAD.

However, far more important, O'Neill collaborators, in-

cluding Foley, rose to vehemently defend the Scowcroft Report. And, speaking to a nationally televised audience after his four days of meetings with Andropov and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko June 5, Averell Harriman—having closely coordinated his trip with Shultz—reported that he had arranged for U.S. congressmen, bypassing the President, to meet privately with Andropov. Harriman reported that House Majority Leader Foley will be the first, going to Moscow on June 15.

### **The Scowcroft question and Central America**

As I reported last week, the net result of this lobbying effort per se on the President has been marginal. On June 8, Reagan announced his revised START talks position. After acknowledging that he wants the Scowcroft Commission to remain in existence until January 1984, he reported that his new position at START is modeled on the Scowcroft report.

However, the new Reagan package in total concedes little to Reagan's opponents. Senior White House sources confirmed that the plan does not endorse the build-down concept advocated by Shultz allies on Capitol Hill, but simply commits it to further study and does not incorporate it as part of the administration's START position. In addition, officials stated at the background briefing before the President's START announcement that Mr. Reagan will still demand "exact parity" on throw-weight, and the administration's proposed bomber ceiling will remain unchanged. The only concession will be more "flexibility" in the number of deployed missiles allowed. Originally, the administration set 850 as its bargaining limit; now they will bargain from a number between 850 and 1,450, not to be publicly announced.

Shultz's swing votes can veto the MX missile in the future, if Reagan does not hop to Moscow. But the June 8 presidential moves to finesse this Shultz operation demonstrate how weak it is. And if it is that weak on the question of the MX, it will be worthless against the President's March 23 program.

Thus the Secretary of State (in addition to positioning himself to wield economic blackmail against the White House by means of key congressmen) has built a congressional "consensus" among the same Hill factions on important other foreign policy issues.

Shultz ally Howard Baker, speaking on national television June 5, made the operation explicit. Stating that he would support sending a small number of additional military advisers to El Salvador, the majority leader emphasized that the war in El Salvador will be "decided in Washington and Moscow," and went on to suggest that Reagan and Andropov begin discussing Central America. Baker's focus on this hot spot was in the explicit context of the need for an arms control agreement.

In short, the Baker proposal is nothing more than what Shultz and his chief operative Thomas Enders, the just-removed assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, had been engineering for months on Capitol Hill. Forging a

bipartisan coalition of swing votes in both houses paralleling the Scowcroft Commission effort, Shultz and Enders manipulated Congress to endorse White House-backed military support efforts in Central America, while ensuring that those efforts are confined to a support mode.

The Senate leadership, backed by the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees has, with Enders's assistance, established September as the cut-off date for U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan "Contras." Enders had also secured liberal Republican Senate support, heavily conditioned by restrictions for military aid to El Salvador. In the House, Enders secured important Democratic help to get marginal increases in aid to El Salvador.

Thus, when Enders was ousted, the credibility of the congressional coalitions he engineered began to quiver. Only when Shultz appointed Kissingerite Thomas Pickering as Ambassador to El Salvador was his coalition placated.

However, issuing a warning, the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 7 voted 20-14 to cancel funding for covert operations in Nicaragua. Importantly, all 20 votes were Democratic. While the full House will overturn the committee vote, that vote bolsters a growing Washington theme that Central America is Reagan's war and National Security Adviser William Clark is its mastermind.

In the autumn, as Central America heats up further, Reagan will be faced with a choice: *either escalate to a new mode, at which point Shultz will collapse the "bipartisan" coalition and Reagan will be confronted by Congress, or the President can take Baker's suggestion and ask Andropov for help.*

Indeed, congressional fear over the potential deployment of U.S. troops in Central America has sent a chill throughout the Hill regarding all U.S. troop deployments. During the week of May 24, the House amended a supplemental appropriations bill for financing U.S. marines in Lebanon. The amended bill stipulated that the War Powers Act would have to be invoked if the President decided to either increase the number of U.S. troops there or move the existing force elsewhere in the country. The amendment buoys Shultz's Middle East machinations. Senior members of the national security apparatus believe that Shultz's Israeli withdrawal agreement only ceded control over events in the region to Israel and the Soviet Union. With U.S. forces prohibited from entering the area, U.S. loss of control in the region is absolute. But for Shultz, as for one of his predecessors, Cyrus Vance, (the latter writing in an interview in the Moonie-run *Washington Times* of June 8) Yuri Andropov can bail out the United States by working his will on Syria.

With such help from "Uncle Yuri," how could Reagan and the nation refuse an arms control agreement and a "compromise" undercutting the March 23 strategic defense commitment? That is the thinking of Shultz and his friends, and that is why Andropov is laughing. Andropov only wants one thing—the elimination of the beam-weapons policy, and for that he will give nothing except promises.