

## U.S. policy toward Moscow after the KAL incident

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

*The following background news release was issued Sept. 6.*

President Ronald Reagan's nationwide U.S. broadcast of Labor Day evening settles two sets of facts conclusively. First, his replaying a tape-recording of the Soviet pilot describing the action of destroying the KAL 7 airliner, left no doubt that the Soviets knew that this was KAL 7, that its lights were showing in normal fashion, and that the Soviet command ordered the airliner and its passengers massacred. Second, the President presented a simple and clear set of policies toward the Soviet Union.

The President's policy-statements covered two areas. The first area was the Soviet butchery of the KAL 7 passengers, and U.S. response to that Soviet action as such. The second area was U.S. longer-range policy toward Moscow in light of the character Moscow displayed by ordering the massacre of civilian airline passengers.

Under the first area of policy, the President's message presents us with the following key policies.

1) That the Soviet command had ordered the destruction of the airliner, knowing that it was a 747 airliner with its lights properly displayed, and that there was no U.S. RC 135 in the air anywhere in the vicinity during the period of the action.

2) That U.S. efforts in connection with the Soviet destruction of the passenger airliner are directed, in collaboration with other nations, to securing Soviet acknowledgement of the deed and Soviet compensation to relatives of the victims.

3) That the United States will seek to obtain agreements with the Soviet Union and other states to the purpose of ensuring that no similar incident occurs in the future.

4) That the United States is temporarily suspending in-

progress bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, but will continue with arms-limitation negotiations. The Madrid and Geneva negotiations will be continued as scheduled.

In the second area, the following key points of policy emerged from the President's broadcast.

1) United States policy toward the Soviet Union must now proceed in recognition of the political character of the present Soviet leadership, as that political character is defined by the decision to destroy a civilian airliner.

2) The President affirmed, emphatically, continued objectives of massive reduction of arsenals of mass-destruction, as he had proposed in his March 23, 1983 promulgation of a new U.S. strategic doctrine based on defense weapons-systems, and taking-down of arsenals of "revenge weapons" of mass-destruction.

3) However, in light of recent Soviet command decisions, a realistic policy of maintaining military strength must be pursued pending Soviet agreement to enter into negotiations affording durable peace.

The proper shaping and execution of the President's policy requires a surgically precise, and public assessment of the political character of the present Soviet leadership. In aid of that I resummulate my earlier assessment of the Soviet leadership as a government motivated by a "Third Rome" variety of drive for imperial domination of the entire planet.

### **Why we should tell the truth about Moscow**

From February 1982 through and slightly beyond March 23, 1983, I and many others advised President Reagan that we believed that the Soviet government would consider a workable alternative to Nuclear Deterrence if the President



Honoring "Holy Mother Rus." Orthodox priests lead a procession commemorating the dead in the "Great Patriotic War," the Russian name for the fight against the Nazi invasion in World War II.

of the United States would deliver such an offer publicly. The President, acting in a climate of such advice, presented the Soviet leadership with a most fair and generous offer on March 23, 1983. This offer was elaborated and reemphasized by U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger immediately thereafter. It was the best and fairest offer of durable peace the Soviet Union has received from the United States during the entire postwar period to date.

Despite Soviet lies concerning the nature and intent of the President's offer, the Soviet leadership had studied the new U.S. doctrine for over a year prior to March 23, 1983, and knew full well that the proposal was scientifically and militarily workable, and also knew that the offer was sincerely as stated by the President and Secretary Weinberger.

Yet, the Soviet leadership: 1) Never acknowledged the substance of the offers made publicly by the President or Defense Secretary; 2) Lied wildly and violently concerning the nature of the offer from the President, including forcing Soviet scientists to deny the feasibility of the ABM weapons systems the Soviet Union is continuing to construct for deployment; 3) Pretended willingness to negotiate SS-20 deployments in Europe, but rejected offers, by means of escalating negotiating demands each time the President attempted to meet previous Soviet offers half-way.

Since the Soviet leadership knows that the continuation of both powers to an operating doctrine of Nuclear Deterrence means probable thermonuclear war during the near- to medium-term period, Soviet refusal to consider even exploratory negotiations of the President's offer demonstrated a Soviet commitment to risking actual thermonuclear war during the near future.

The principal long-term reason for Soviet rejection of the offer of durable peace given to them publicly by the President is the Soviet estimation that the development of strategic ABM systems based on "new physical principles" would cause a general economic recovery in the U.S.A. and Western Europe, an economic recovery of the United States which the Soviet government presently refuses to tolerate. In other words, *the Soviet leadership's medium-term strategic ambitions depend upon the assumption that the U.S. economy will collapse under weight of combined economic depression and international financial collapse during the near future, and therefore the Soviet government will tolerate no policy by the U.S.A. which portends a general economic recovery.*

Also, the Soviet Union is engaged currently in a crash effort to emplace strategic ABM defense systems on its own behalf, intending to gain a margin of advantage for launching a preemptive first strike against the United States, and will do everything possible through its Nuclear Freeze dupes and other means to sabotage and delay a U.S. "crash program" which might overtake Soviet development and deployment of strategic ABM defenses.

Finally, within approximately a month of the President's offer, this writer learned that the Soviet government at the highest levels had targeted him personally as the person Moscow viewed as the putative intellectual author of the President's new strategic doctrine. This targeting of this writer showed that the Soviet government was lying when it charged that the President had announced the offer merely to mask some contrary commitment. (More recently, the Soviet government has classified this writer as International Public Enemy Number One, basing this charge on the Soviet estimate that this writer was the intellectual author of the doctrine. Soviet KGB operations against this writer are now deployed relatively massively in Asia, Europe, and the United States itself. Encouraged by repeated overt denunciations of this writer by Soviet authorities, some Soviet sympathizers in the West have placed the writer and his wife high on a list of preferred assassination targets.)

Despite the Soviet refusal of the offer of durable peace, the new U.S. strategic doctrine stands in its own right. It is the only sane policy for the United States and its allies—especially now, since Soviet official sources have several times threatened to launch a preemptive thermonuclear attack upon the United States.

However, as of late April 1983, this writer, as one of those who had encouraged the President to make his generous peace offer to the Soviet Union, was obliged to locate and correct the included error in his own assessment of the character of the Soviet leadership, and to direct the corrected assessment to the President's advisors with the same energy and concern he had urged the President to extend the peace offer.

This writer was horrified, but not entirely surprised by

the evidence. Since approximately 1956, the Soviet Union has been in the process of entering a post-Communism phase. Contrary to wishful thinkers among Soviet specialists, the kind of change occurring in the Soviet Union is not one to justify cheers; it is a change very much for the worst. This writer and his associates had more or less accurately described this trend during 1972-1973, when he characterized the Soviet approach to "detente" as an imperialistic drive aimed at creating a parody of the old Byzantine empire, coopting Germany, and putting the world under the rule of a "New Constantinople." More recently, in a book-length report presented to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee during July 1982, this writer had warned of the need to act to secure certain kinds of agreements with the Soviet Union before a change visibly in progress might be consolidated in the Soviet leadership. The error in the writer's pre-March 23, 1983 assessment of the Soviet leadership was specifically that he had thought to prevent a development which had in fact already occurred during the Summer and Autumn of 1982.

The Soviet leadership confronting us today is the Russian Empire of Ivan Grozny, Potemkin, and Rasputin, of the letters of the Russian Nietzsche, Fyodor Dostoevsky, of Bakunin. It is the Russia of Moeller van den Bruck, the Soviet Russia which the Nazis' "national Bolshevist" faction and Alfred Rosenberg envisaged as a natural ally of the Nazis. The discrediting of Soviet Marxism both within the Soviet Union and without, from 1953-1956 onward, did not point Soviet corrective thinking upwards, but downwards. The discrediting of Marxism as the "wave of the future" throughout the world outside the Soviet Union, under conditions of military threats from the West, and deepened hatred of the West, its culture, its people, struck the Soviet leading strata as a wave of cultural pessimism, the same cultural pessimism which transformed many cultured, civilized Germans into Nazis during the course of the Weimar period. This pessimism brought forth a replacement for Soviet Marxism from the bowels of Russian history, the ideology of the Russian proto-fascists, Dostoevsky, Richard Wagner's crony Bakunin, and the mad monk from Mount Athos, the "Ayatollah" Rasputin.

This cultural pessimism struck Soviet society at many points in various ways, most notably two social strata. In the top strata, outside the Zhukov-Sokolovskiy-Ogarkov military circles of Russian nationalism, this struck a responsive current among the circles of Yuri Andropov's patron, the Finnish mystic Kuusinen. In the broader population, it struck response in the peasant cultural tradition, the *Raskolniki*. The two strata in question conflict and yet converge. A thousand years of Byzantine cultural repression—which Czars such as Peter I and Alexander II had opposed, like Pushkin, like Witte, and like some "westernizing currents" among the Bolsheviks, admixed with hideous oppression by the Russian

church during two centuries of Mongol rule, has left its evil imprint upon the culture the peasant family transmits. In this peasant heritage there are the Tolstoys, the Dostoevskys, the Bakunins, and their natural followers among the Pugachevs waiting to explode with the violence of the berserker's axe when aroused to irrationalist fits of rage—as exhibited in the massacre of 269 passengers on KAL 7.

The strata intersecting Kuusinen in the old Communist International apparatus are predominantly the heirs of a network of Venetian agents in the Russian revolutionary leaders of 1917, men like Karl Radek, N. Bukharin, C. Rakovsky, the mystics of the Bogdanov circle, and so on and so forth. These were the paid subagents of the fat man from Odessa, Alexander Helphand (Parvus), the agent of Venice's Count Volpi di Misurata. These are shrewd, intelligent, and usually outwardly "westernized," but deeply mystical men of calculating irrationality. They are "westernized" on the exterior, but conniving "Raskolnik peasants" on the inside. Russian literature is filled with self-revealing characterizations of these types.

The eruption of cultural pessimism during the 1950s intersected Soviet entry into Bertrand Russell's Pugwash Conference back-channel. Russell, who had been disposed to conduct "preventive nuclear war" against Moscow during the 1946-55 period, in order to establish his dream of Anglo-Saxon empire ("world government"), responded to Soviet development of fission and fusion arsenals, by offering to divide a world-empire with Moscow.

In the West, many have thought of Henry Kissinger, the Rockefellers, W. Averell Harriman, and others as virtual Soviet agents. In reality, they have been Pugwash Conference agents, a faction of supranational interests in the West who have entered into agreements with Moscow and Peking, to divide the world into three empires. That is why they sometimes appear to be Soviet agents—not because they are Soviet agents, but because they have a 25-year-long secret agreement with the Soviet Union's leading circles, an agreement reached behind the back of the U.S. government and people.

Over the years, especially since 1968-72, the Soviets have seized upon the Pugwash circles' offer of a Soviet empire—sometimes called a "New Yalta" agreement—as the strategic alternative to the earlier Soviet Marxist doctrine. They have accepted the offer with one qualification: they intend to cheat their Pugwash partners of the West, as their Pugwash partners intend to cheat the Soviets. It is this 25-year-long Pugwash Conference agreement which has created a world defined by conflict among the greeds of two-and-a-half empires; unless we destroy the Pugwash Conference agreements based upon Nuclear Deterrence, Malthusianism, and "New Yaltas," the logic of one empire's cheating upon another means assured thermonuclear war. The Soviets know this, and are prepared to win that thermonuclear confronta-

tion, to gain assured, perpetual world domination by means of destroying the power of the United States.

When the President offered the Soviets a door out of this descent into thermonuclear Hell, the Soviets rejected the offer of peace, because they had chosen to cling to the Pugwash Conference doctrine, and were already committed to risk general war.

The confluence of Raskolniki tendencies within strata of the Soviet population and leadership, with the lure of imperial strategic solutions made available by Pugwash, molded the Soviet leadership's evolution over the recent 25 years. The result was the emergence of a leadership combination, consolidated during Summer of 1982, whose common denominator is a modern revival of the old Russian mystical doctrine, that Moscow shall become the world-capital of the Third and Final Rome.

What is the proof that this has already occurred, that this is not merely an ominous potentiality of circles such as the notorious KGB anti-Semite Yemelyanov? The acid test has been Soviet reaction to the President's March 23, 1983 offer, a test made conclusive by the manner the Soviet government has officially defined its view of this writer's role in influencing (if indirectly) the President's choice of strategic doctrine. The decision by the collective forces of the Soviet top leadership, to proceed with the shooting-down of KAL Flight 7 is totally consistent with the "Third Rome" mentality dominating the presently ruling leadership combination. The barrage of lies since issuing from Moscow on the subject of that incident has internal features which are indelible paw-prints of Raskolniki's efforts at peasant shrewdness when caught redhanded in an act of homicide.

The objection has been raised, vociferously from some quarters, that even if all this is true, one should not say this publicly. It is argued vehemently, that saying such things will make the Russians more intractable, that it exhibits atrociously poor tactical sense, and so forth and so on.

Such critics clearly have no sense of strategy. Once we begin to lie publicly, and then to attempt to defend those falsehoods for appearance's sake, such diplomatic deceptions can have no effect upon us but to destroy our own capacity for clear thinking. We lose the power to be honest with ourselves, since we must check our inventory of outstanding lies to be sure that we say and think nothing which might injure the interest of one or more among our outstanding lies.

It is irrelevant whether or not the Soviet leadership is infuriated by stating the plain truth about them publicly. The important thing is that the Soviet leadership knows that this writer's references to the "Third Rome" policy in Moscow today is nothing but the simple truth. Do you imagine that the Soviet leadership could take this writer's proposals on any matter seriously if they believed this writer were fool enough not to recognize that they have a "Third Rome" strat-

egy after the evidence assembled in the aftermath of March 23, 1983. What do the Soviets think of leading figures who deny the Soviet's "Third Rome" strategy? *They think of them as fools!*

The Soviet leadership takes this writer very, very seriously. They estimate him as their Number One Adversary. Why? He has no "objective power," no authority to command any part of the U.S. or any other government. What is it that they fear? They fear—and respect—one who sees through them accurately, and laugh at those who make foolishly wrong charges against them. They fear that this writer's ideas might influence the perceptions and policies of governments—otherwise, they would merely laugh at this writer and his poor resources, instead of promoting his name to near the top of the terrorist hit-lists.

No! Describe the Soviet leadership accurately! Say openly what they know themselves to be! Unless you can do that, why should they believe you have the knowledge to teach them anything about themselves or the present strategic situation?

We must attempt to civilize these fellows, as the President's stated Soviet policy of Sept. 5 implicitly specifies. Naturally, they are human beings, with the potentials for good a human being possesses. However, they are handicapped by a certain defect, a cultural and moral injury done to them by the Byzantine empire and the Mongol oppression. Because of this cultural injury, they are not yet fully civilized, and under stress lack certain elementary qualities of human compassion we of the Western Augustinian heritage view as elementary morality. Their shooting-down what they knew to be a civilian airliner is exemplary of the point.

True, there are monstrous things sometimes run through the institutions of government in the West. In every case, the author of such monstrous things is the gang which the Soviets call "the realists," the fellows who are their preferred negotiating partners through back-channels such as the Pugwash Conference. The Soviets should not refer too much to the war in Vietnam, or we shall have to remind them that the fellows who pushed the United States down that long tunnel of endless warfare were then and now the Soviets' favorite Pugwash cronies of the West, the same fellows now prominently orchestrating the international Nuclear Freeze movement in concert with Moscow.

Let Moscow allege all sorts of things against the United States and President Reagan. President Reagan offered them genuine war-avoidance—peace, and they choose instead, the course of thermonuclear holocaust. By that test, and the shooting-down of the civilian airliner, they exhibited the fact that the would-be czars of the Third Rome are not yet properly civilized. We are therefore obliged to keep as much order in the world as we can manage under the circumstances, until Rasputin's Moscow gives up its mad dreams of becoming the Third and Final Rome.