

of Benigno Aquino, the cancellation of Reagan's trip, and the relentless pressures of the IMF. Kissinger circles in the State Department are cooperating with the opposition to President Marcos, and with the forces pushing for the Fund's totalitarian austerity measures. It is clear from the continuation of "business" unrest that the IMF, which forced a 21 percent devaluation of the Philippines currency in early October, is working to create the conditions for more upheaval.

As for the Soviet dimension, guerrillas in the Moro Liberation Movement, a Qaddafi-linked Muslim group, declared a state of war against Marcos the weekend of Oct. 9. The activation of their 10,000 rebels to achieve "independence" for the island of Mindinao will probably dovetail with the offensive of the official Communist Party-related opposition; it parallels collaboration of Soviet and Nazi International "separatists" throughout Asia. This alliance is already on the march in the Indian subcontinent, where Nazi International agents in the Khalistan Liberation Movement, Baluchistan, Assam, and the Sind are working with the Soviet "liberationists" to tear India and Pakistan apart—with the full complicity of the Kissinger-Shultz State Department, as shown by the disgusting antics of U.S. Ambassador Barnes last summer.

Enter Dr. Kissinger

Kissinger does not intend to leave it to anyone else to take the reins in this area of intensifying conflict.

On Oct. 31 Kissinger plans to be in Djakarta, Indonesia together with State Department Global 2000 advocates who are collaborating with the IMF to shut down the most enterprising economies left in the world. Kissinger's trip to Indonesia follows a visit to Hong Kong, where he will keynote a two-day conference on "Political and Economic Development in Asia in the 1980s." His record on development is shown in his attacks on industrialization in Mexico, Iran, and every other nation he has shown concern in.

In addition, rumors abound that Kissinger will accompany President Reagan to China next spring. The architect of the China Card would move to sell Reagan on the line that the United States could use China against the Soviet Union—a move not only useless militarily, but based on the delusion of Chinese loyalty to the West.

In Japan, the Kissinger-contrived Lockheed scandal has finally succeeded in its purpose of bringing down Prime Minister Nakasone's political ally, Kakuei Tanaka. Tanaka was found guilty Oct. 12, and is under heavy pressure to resign his seat in parliament. Combined with the State Department policy of demanding destruction of the Japanese industrial policy, this move could shake the bastion of stability in all Asia. Kissinger reportedly will stop in Japan after visiting Hong Kong.

What will happen as control of the already weak U.S. presence in Asia is turned over to the "economic diplomacy" of Henry Kissinger? Torn apart by separatism and IMF dictates, the area will move even more rapidly into the orbit of the Soviet Union.

The New York Times lies

The real authorship of a front-page Oct. 7 *New York Times* article containing a special type of disinformation respecting matters inside U.S. government intelligence agencies originated within the Soviet government, it was charged on Oct. 11 by *EIR* Editor-in-Chief Criton Zoakos. The charge pertained to a *New York Times* article by reporter David Shribman titled "U.S. Experts Say Soviet Didn't See Jet Was Civilian."

"Though the *Times* has in the past assisted in dissemination of Soviet-authored disinformation campaigns," Mr. Zoakos said, "Mr. Shribman's particular item is made of quite a different cloth from any past *Times* collaboration, documented or otherwise, with Soviet authorities. At issue right now is the Soviets' and Henry Kissinger's drive to cause the United States to unilaterally disarm itself of its remaining strategic defenses."

"True, Mr. Shribman cites as his source certain 'U.S. intelligence experts,' and proceeds to air these fellows' insinuations. In my capacity as intelligence director of the *EIR*, I find myself obliged to point out to the *New York Times* that it is their duty to order Mr. Shribman to publicly reveal his sources in this matter," Mr. Zoakos said.

"This obligation of the *New York Times*," he continued, "flows out of the following considerations: Shribman's article claims that his informants told him that 'most American intelligence specialists' now believe that the Soviet pilots did not know, on Sept. 1, that they were shooting a commercial airliner when they shot down the KAL 7 flight.

"This claim is patently false. There exists no such change of mind in the official U.S. government intelligence services and functions. To this day, the intelligence agencies of the government view the KAL incident in precisely the manner described by President Reagan on national television and subsequently reiterated in breathtaking detail by Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick at the U.N. Security Council.

"Merely those Japanese-supplied tapes on which the President and Mme. Kirkpatrick based their presentations established permanently and incontrovertibly the fact that the Soviet pilots knew they were shooting down a civilian airliner. No future evidence can possibly reverse this judgment

on the KAL 7 atrocity

unless it proves that the Japanese tapes are not authentic. But their authenticity has not been challenged by any Soviet spokesman, including the Soviets' chief spokesman in the matter, Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov.

"Beyond this," Mr. Zoakos said, "additional evidence in possession of U.S. intelligence agencies would be of the type which would shed further light, not on the already settled issue of the Soviet pilots' identification of the aircraft, but on the subject of the Soviet military chain of command which issued the orders to shoot to kill.

"Mr. Shribman's 'informants' attempt to create the impression that the shooting of the plane was the result of a local command decision. There is no public evidence to suggest that this is the official U.S. government evaluation. Moreover, my own organization has developed high-grade evidence indicating that the decision to cause the massacre was a top-level decision of the Soviet high command, including not only Marshals Koldunov, Govorev, and Ogarkov, but also Defense Minister Ustinov, among others. We made this evidence public in a Special Report issued on Sept. 16, titled 'The Strategic Secret Behind the Korean Airline Massacre.'

"The reality is that the shooting was part of a major strategic decision of the Soviet leadership, a decision which includes certain dramatic strategic moves by the Soviet military between now and December—moves most likely to involve Soviet attempts at military breakthroughs in Western Europe, the Middle East, and that area of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran known as Baluchistan.

"The political and military effect of the signal sent through the *New York Times* by Mr. Shribman's 'informant' is to encourage further Soviet aggression along the lines of the Soviet leaders' newly adopted *Schrecklichkeit* policy"—Mr. Zoakos was referring to Adolf Hitler's practice of terrorizing his targets—"by suggesting that the United States government and its agencies are in that sort of disarray and disorientation which would result in a negligible response to any future Soviet aggression.

"It is this consideration, primarily," Mr. Zoakos said, "which obliges the *New York Times* to reveal Shribman's

informants.

"We would not be surprised, of course, if the *New York Times* ignored our recommendation on this matter. Such a failure to divulge their sources," Mr. Zoakos continued, "would place the corporate *New York Times* in very compromised company, engaged in a very dangerous, treacherous undertaking at this time. I am referring to Henry Kissinger, Gen. Brent Scowcroft, and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt, among others currently engaged in maneuvers to cause the unilateral strategic disarmament of the United States between now and December.

"Henry Kissinger has succeeded once more in putting across a defense policy posture, the so-called build-down, which if carried out will land the United States in the greatest strategic disaster in its history.

"President Reagan was forced to announce his 'build-down' proposal against his own best judgment for two reasons. First, Kissinger's and the *New York Times*'s friends in Congress threatened the President that they would block final appropriation for the MX missile unless he first went for 'build-down.' Second, the President made this offer hoping that the Soviets themselves will reject it. Either way, the President was once more caught in Kissinger's web at a time when Kissinger is again acting as nothing less than a Soviet agent of influence.

"In this highly unstable strategic situation, the last thing you would need is the misinformation added by the *New York Times*," Mr. Zoakos said. He added that the *Times*'s coverage since the KAL incident has contributed two types of disservice: First, by attempting to contaminate U.S. government evaluations of the Soviet leadership's strategic drive by painting Moscow as innocuously bungling and peace-loving, and second, by feeding the Soviets misimpressions about the goings-on inside the U.S. government—misimpressions of the type exemplified by Mr. Shribman's "informants," whose net effect is to further encourage the Soviet leaders in the kinds of aggressive and high-risk policies that the *Times* probably covers up or explains away.

"It should be borne in mind," Mr. Zoakos said, "that the *Times*'s former diplomatic correspondent, Kissinger crony Richard Burt, is now our Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs. From his days in journalism, Mr. Burt had accustomed all of us to strong doses of fatuous pettifoggery. Now, one day after Mr. Shribman published his piece of KGB *dezinformatsia* on the front page of the *New York Times*, Burt came along at a news conference of NATO's Special Consultative Group in Bonn, West Germany to volunteer the opinion that the Soviet leadership is not uninterested in the 'build-down' proposal. The point he wanted to make was that the Soviet leadership is still a reasonable negotiating partner.

"The point that came across despite his intention was different: why should a foolish American diplomat, such as Burt, be in rapt ecstasy if the Soviet leadership looks benignly at a U.S. proposal for unilateral U.S. disarmament?"