

The civil defense the West requires

In an essay titled The Risk of Nuclear War in Europe, (Fusion Energy Foundation, 1983) Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. recommended these emergency steps to establish the rudiments of civil defense for the West. Assuming that the Atlantic Alliance adopts a beam-weapon anti-ballistic missile defense program, but the Soviet Union does not agree to negotiate on the basis of "Mutually Assured Survival," the danger of war will persist in the five to seven years ahead, until the West has developed a complete defense umbrella.

The general requirements for civil defense of a population and nation against limited-scale nuclear assault are well known on two general grounds. The Hiroshima-Nagasaki studies, adjusted for known effects of thermonuclear bombardments,

define the general task and the problem of casualties. If the assault is limited, a high percentage of the nation's population can be saved, but the probable number of casualties whose survival depends upon medical and related procedures is probably massive relative to the number killed or terminal casualties. We also know that a practicable civilian defense medical assistance system will be one modeled on military medical organizations.

We require adequate redundancy in a civil defense medical system of a sort readily integrated into the military medical organization, matching the military table of medical organization in approximate ratios of paramedical, nursing, laboratory, and physicians staffing and function per casualty. Such ratios are built into the existing structure of medical procedures, which procedures cannot be modified readily.

Therefore, we must build redundancy into some part of the civilian medical practice. We require pools of medical professionals, occupied with necessary but reducible classes of duties, from which to mobilize the professional forces to be co-deployed with trained reserves of paramedical civilian volunteer units. We also require redundancy in suitable emergency facilities and medical stores, maintained in ready-to-function condition. We require a profile of skills, training in procedures, and so forth, appropriate to the high ratio of burn cases and radioactive sickness cases expected—in which the

Soviet military strategy: reality vs. propaganda

Soviet nuclear physicist Peter Kapitsa appeared on ABC-TV's "Nightline" Nov. 4, in a program devoted to Carl Sagan's "nuclear winter" horror-forecast. Kapitsa enthusiastically endorsed Sagan's conclusion that the climate of the earth would be destroyed in even a nuclear exchange limited to 100 megatons of combined explosives, and that this proved once again that nuclear war was "unthinkable" and could never be won.

But Soviet military spokesmen, addressing their own citizens and members of the armed services, insist on precisely the opposite. The U.S.S.R. has developed an extensive civil-defense training program intended to ensure the survival of the Soviet population in case of nuclear war. The Civil Defense administration is coequal in status with the five major military services, and its chief, Army Gen. A. Altunin, is a deputy minister of Defense and a four-star general. The program includes plans for city evacuation, fall-out shelters, and

the protection of industrial equipment. Urban planning has proceeded so as to restrict population density, disperse industries throughout the country, reinforce weak structures, and bury utility stations and conduits for power and water.

These excerpts from Soviet military publications show that, far from viewing nuclear war as "unthinkable," the Soviet military command has detailed battle and civil defense plans in case war should occur:

Major General A. Talensky, spokesman for Soviet General Staff:

Referring to the development of the nuclear ballistic missile weapons, the ideologues of imperialism are attempting to torpedo Marxist-Leninist theses which reveal the link between politics and war, to belittle their cognitive value for the "nuclear age." They declare that the new weapon has radically and fundamentally altered the relationship between politics and war, has disrupted the correlation between them which had developed over many centuries, and has made obsolete the formula of war as a continuation of politics by other means.

Although the development of this new weapon does introduce substantial changes into the correlation between politics and war, it does not eliminate the relationship between them.

deficiency is presently apparently relatively the worst.

Otherwise, although the Switzerland and Sweden models of civilian defense preparations may not be levels easily reached, a reasonable approximation should be considered imperative.

This will be costly, and will therefore require expansion of the in-depth economic resources of economies, an increase in per capital physical output of state-of-the-art technology product in national economies, including build-up of redundancy in food stores, in energy production facilities and distribution grids, in transportation facilities, and categories of most sensitive industrial capacities.

In brief, a *civil defense war plan of active forces, reserves, and logistics*. This should be a system adapted not only to needs arising under possible conditions of war fighting in a modified nuclear war fighting regime, but as a resource for dealing with all reasonably foreseeable varieties of civilian catastrophes other than warfare.

The same view of the nuclear war fighting challenge must be extended to the similarities of biological warfare to the threatened resurgence of epidemics and perhaps even pandemics now that endemic potentials are arising from collapsing economies in both the industrialized and developing nations. We are presently on the outskirts of the kingdom ruled by the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, and seem to be

marching toward the center of that unwholesome domain.

We require, urgently, broad-based advances in both fundamentals of internal medicine generally and biotechnology generally. Setting ourselves the target of developing the methods and facilities needed for coping with the range of cases variously suggested by biological warfare and economically fostered eruptions of epidemics, pandemics, and pestilences.

Were it not better that war might be avoided, and all such emergency mobilization thus rendered unnecessary? Unfortunately, war is not avoided by a mystical contemplation of one's hesychastic navel while hyperventilating oneself with repeated utterances of the magical word *peace*. The attempt to outlaw or restrict weapons, or the effort to design a fool-proof political design for peace, is merely exemplary of the means of policy by which Bertrand Russell and the Pugwash Conference process have led us to the brink of general thermonuclear warfare at the present time. Until the political causes for warfare are reduced, by means of action efficiently directed to precisely that root of the matter, the danger of war persists, and cannot be wished away, especially not by mass rallies presumably dedicated to that desire. . . .

In the meantime, we must mobilize to defend as much of civilization as still remains, and by whatever means possible to preserve human lives.

Nuclear war can cause substantial detriment to the development of world civilization, inhibiting the advance of the revolutionary process and would result in the death of many millions of people and the destruction of some countries, but there is profound error and harm in the disorienting claims of bourgeois ideologies that state that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world war.

General A. Altunin, chief of Civil Defense, deputy minister of Defense:

Planning on conducting a war, no matter how short and swift moving, with only the reserve material accumulated in peacetime, would be a mistake. It can be conjectured that in a future war, that the role of the war economy will not only remain what it used to be, it will even increase in importance. It is impossible to conduct war without the continuing supply to the armed forces of everything they need. . . . As noted, the supplying of the armed forces and of the population with everything necessary, the equipping of the civil defense forces with technical supplies for the successful execution of rescue and emergency repair work in the zones of devastation are only possible under condition of sustained operation of the installations of the national economy in wartime. Ensuring the stable operation of facilities of national economic significance in wartime is a most important task. It must be taken

into account that in a modern war with use of weapons of mass destruction, victory will be gained by the country having an economy which, despite losses and damage suffered in the course of the war, maintains the capability of supplying its armed forces with everything they require and supplying the country's population with food and basic necessities.

Col. A. A. Sidorenko:

A new characteristic feature of the offensive in nuclear war is the conduct of combat operations under conditions of the presence of vast zones of contamination, destruction, fires, and floods.

As a result of the mass employment of nuclear weapons by the warring sides, tremendous areas will be subjected to radioactive contamination; populated places, bridges, and other structures will be destroyed; and big centers of conflagration and inundation will be formed. The [army] subdivisions will not only be forced to fight on contaminated terrain, but also to overcome destruction, rubble, and other obstacles which may also be contaminated with radioactive substances. All this will have a great influence on the nature and methods of operation by attacking troops. . . .

Under contemporary conditions the radioactive contamination of the terrain is an ordinary and constant phenomenon. . . .