

Hearings on 'Manhattan project' for defense

by Paul Gallagher

The nation's press have been at pains to claim that the Reagan administration does not support the People Protection Act, the legislative mandate for a "new Manhattan Project" for beam weapon anti-missile defense systems proposed by two Colorado Republicans, Rep. Ken Kramer and Sen. William Armstrong.

This legislation, the subject of hearings in the House Nov. 10, has drawn the support of the most active campaigners for the "beam weapons" strategic doctrine adopted by the President March 23. This includes Dr. Edward Teller, who testified for the bill, and the National Democratic Policy Committee associates of Lyndon LaRouche, whom the Soviet leadership has identified as the "intellectual author" of Reagan's adoption of Mutually Assured Survival as a strategic negotiating policy. Another kind of encouragement was given when the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced on Nov. 17 that they had formally approved the formation of a Unified Space Command for all three services—a central feature of the Kramer-Armstrong bill.

If the White House is not now lobbying for the passage of the People Protection Act, it is because of the blackmail pressure applied by Henry Kissinger, and his crony George Shultz's State Department to prevent his going full-speed ahead for development of beam weapons.

Congressman Kramer defines his proposed new unified space command as a revival of the functions of the 1950s Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), junked when the MAD doctrine took over. CONAD, a "unified homeland defense command," combined the Navy's wide-ranging radar surveillance forces, the Army's anti-aircraft missile forces and embryonic anti-missile missile development efforts, and the Air Defense Command of the Air Force. After MAD was made U.S. strategic policy, this unified defense command, and the attempt to develop defensive capabilities itself, were systematically phased out.

Not on the Soviet side, however. The U.S.S.R. command, after dispensing with the annoying MAD prankster Khrushchev by 1964, proceeded to:

1) develop its initial crude anti-aircraft perimeter defense, stage by stage, into a surface-to-air ABM defense guided by a nationwide system of huge battle management radars, and smaller mobile radars; the system is potentially deployable for either anti-missile interceptors or ground-based and ship-based lasers and particle beams;

2) develop its orbital satellite surveillance capability of the 1960s into a system which today can target, track, and guide missiles against U.S. naval targets on the surface;

3) develop a huge military-space program centered upon its manned space stations; and

4) pursue continuous research and development for 20 years on laser and particle-beam anti-missile weapons.

Kramer: we need a unified space command

From the written testimony of Rep. Ken Kramer, member, House Committee on Armed Services, in support of H.R.3073, The People Protection Act of 1983, before the House Armed Services Subcommittees on Investigations and Research Development, on Nov. 10.

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan issued a historic challenge to the American people and our scientific leaders to "turn their great talents . . . to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering . . . nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete."

The President's speech was a call for a "Peace Race"—offering a vision of hope: the prospect of an opportunity to give ourselves, our children, our grandchildren, and all generations to come the priceless gift of a world freed of the specter of nuclear war that has haunted our planet for 38 years. He has questioned the morality of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction—MAD—which requires that the United States government abandon its obligation to protect its citizens from attack, leaving them hostage under the threat of nuclear holocaust. In issuing his call, President Reagan has elevated the question of how best to achieve and maintain peace to the top of the national agenda—and in so doing has set the context for future debate on the subject.

Make no doubt about it: The Peace Race challenge envisioned in the President's Defensive Technologies Initiative is a spectacularly ambitious one. Quite simply, it will require a scientific, technical, military, and organizational undertaking that will dwarf anything ever before mounted by the human race—a colossal "Manhattan Project for Peace." Clearly, it will take our best minds and a bipartisan commitment from the Congress if we are to succeed. However, the goal—bringing a halt to the arms race and ridding the world of nuclear weapons—is so important that we cannot afford to miss this opportunity. Indeed, as the *Washington Post* noted editorially, the question President Reagan has raised is this: "Why are we and the Soviets basing our defense and survival

on the terrible and incredible threat of mutual annihilation? Is there not a better way?"

I am reminded of President Kennedy's challenge that we put a man on the moon. In a speech before Congress on May 25, 1961, he said:

I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth. No single space project in this period will be more impressive to mankind, or more important for the long-range exploration of space; and none will be so difficult or expensive to accomplish.

It is important to note that, at the time this dramatic commitment was made, the United States had acquired less than 10 minutes of manned flight time in space—a suborbital flight by Alan Shepherd only three weeks before Kennedy's speech. We did not have the very high powered rocket engines needed to lift a multi-thousand ton moon rocket off the ground. Nor did we have any cryogenic upper stages to provide sufficient power to escape from the earth's orbit. There were technical problems to be overcome in nearly every area—rocket propulsion, guidance, the development of extremely lightweight lunar landing craft, navigation, safety measures, launching and recovery techniques and re-entry heat shield designs. Nevertheless, NASA—backed by a national commitment to put a man on the moon—displayed a unique can-do attitude that resulted in breakthrough after breakthrough. As a result, its mandate was completed on time and within original cost estimates despite the many unknowns which had to be overcome.

The lesson is clear: The United States can achieve remarkable and totally unanticipated technological breakthroughs if there is a driving national commitment to do so. Thus, I am optimistic that we can, in fact, develop the type of defensive technologies President Reagan referred to in his March 23rd speech—if only we commit ourselves to the task.

However, we must recognize that President Kennedy had a major asset he could count on in his quest to put a man on the moon that President Reagan does not enjoy today. Whereas President Kennedy could look to NASA and a ready-made contingent of conceptual thinkers, planners, and engineers to get his man-on-the-moon project off the ground, President Reagan does not enjoy a similar luxury.

Implementation of the President's vision requires an entirely new organizational infrastructure, both in the operational and research and development spheres. It is this vital need that the "People Protection Act" seeks to address. In brief, this bill, H.R. 3073—which has now also been introduced in the Senate by Senator William L. Armstrong as S. 2021—would:

- Restructure the Air Force Space Command as an all-service, unified command that ultimately would have full responsibility for the deployment and op-

eration of all space-defense systems;

- Create a new Army command—as a component of the unified space command—which would be responsible for the ground-based aspects of a comprehensive multi-tiered strategic defense;

- Establish a directed-energy weapons systems agency to consolidate our research and development work on laser, particle-beam, microwave, and other promising technologies;

- Transfer to the Department of Defense those space shuttles which are required for national security missions;

- Provide for the immediate development of a manned space station; and

- Overhaul our strategic and arms control policies to place primary emphasis on strategic defense rather than strategic offense.

I am very pleased to learn that many of the recommendations of the Defensive Technology Study Team (Fletcher Commission), the Future Security Strategy Study, and the Senior Interagency Group on Defense Policy reportedly closely parallel the major provisions of the People Protection Act. . . .

In order to put any new defensive systems developed under the Defensive Technologies Initiative into effective operation, the United States needs a viable "deployment" and operations organization for space defense. Creation of a unified, all-service space command would admirably serve that purpose, as the Fletcher Commission reportedly has recognized in its recommendation that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be directed to develop the management scheme for a multi-tiered space-defense program.

What would such a command do? Today, our national security depends upon support from space systems. Absolutely vital surveillance, early-warning, intelligence, communications, and weather information and functions are gathered and carried out by our spaceborne assets. Should we be denied these essential support assets, our armed forces around the world—land, sea, and air—would be rendered deaf and dumb. We would be at the mercy of the attacking forces—"Pearl Harbored" from space.

Currently, virtually none of our space systems are assigned to a unified or specified command—the only commands which, by law, can conduct military operations, including support operations. This means that most space systems do not fall within the operational command structure, that they are not directly responsive to the President and the other national command authorities.

So, in the near term, a unified space command would serve to remedy this potentially dangerous situation. It would:

- Have operational control of space systems which support terrestrial forces;

- Plan for wartime support from space, interacting with other unified and specified commands to meet their requirements;

- Be a military focal point for operational requirements;
- Be a military advocate for space solutions to military problems;
- Provide military advice to the President and other national command authorities regarding space; and
- Develop essential operational experience and expertise in military space operations and give the benefit of this experience to the developers of space-defense technologies.

In the longer term, a unified space command would be in charge of the comprehensive and strategic defensive weapons systems envisioned by President Reagan in his March 23rd speech. It would thus have full responsibility for defending the American people, our homeland, our forces around the globe, and our allies from strategic attack. It would:

- Be on constant watch for a missile or bomber attack from any quarter;
- Provide early warning of such an attack directly to the President and other national command authorities; and
- Marshal and “fight” our space-defense forces in space, in the air, at sea, and on land to defend against bomber and missile attack on a global basis.

Fortunately, such a command can build on the existing Air Force Space Command, which became operational in September 1982. As one who sought to draw attention to the need for such a command throughout the 97th Congress—having introduced legislation in December 1981 to create this organization—I have long argued that this new Air Force command should play a key role in bringing about a new American strategic posture built around strategic defenses. I have also urged the establishment of a new “strategic concepts” working group, in which the long-range planning staff of the new Space Command could take a lead role. . . .

This unified command could also build on the Navy’s new Naval Space Command. Given the vulnerability of U.S. naval forces to Soviet space-based reconnaissance and targeting and the Navy’s increasing dependence on space systems, inclusion of the Navy is essential. Although it is funded at considerably less than the Air Force program, the Navy’s space program is of increasing importance to naval operations around the world.

Finally, the fact that the President has proposed a total homeland defense posture—including defenses that can stop cruise missiles, bombers, and ballistic missiles—means that the new unified space command should include an Army component command along the lines of that branch’s former air-defense and ballistic-missile defense command. The air-defense missiles the Army deployed in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, had some BMD capability and could have acquired more had they not been phased out as they aged.

The Army also developed the BMD system that the U.S. operated for a brief period in North Dakota (1975-1976), with operational control being exercised from the NORAD command post in Colorado Springs. . . .

Let us now consider the need for a directed-energy systems agency, a need recognized by the Fletcher Commission in its recommendation that a single senior official “with his own money” be put in charge not only of directed-energy programs but of all strategic defensive technology R&D. This official would lead a separate office of the sort directed by Admiral Hyman Rickover as chief of the Navy’s nuclear power program.

Today, the American directed-energy weapons effort runs far behind its Soviet counterpart in funding and top-level commitment. It is split up among the uniformed services and the Departments of Defense and Energy, competing for a limited pool of funds with more traditional technologies and with forces having powerful protectors and constituents. Fragmentation and the lack of focus on mission objectives has so far relegated the American directed-energy program to a marginal status and has caused such systems to be viewed as an “out-years” possibility. Thus it is no surprise that in FY 1983 the U.S. spent only \$500 million on this program—less than the cost of two B-1 bombers—despite the fact that such technologies could literally make entire present-day weapons systems obsolete. The Soviet level of effort, on the other hand, is estimated by the Department of Defense to be three to five times larger than our own. . . .

However, the most critical contribution that such a new agency would make would be cross-fertilization of technologies. For example, given the urgent need for “break-through”

power sources or in large space mirrors that could reflect and precisely aim ground-sited beam sources, it is important to heavily fund “parallel tracks” for space defenses. Some approaches would use electrical power in space (such as free-electron lasers) or chemical power (the present DARPA space-based laser program), while others could dispense with space-based power sources altogether and have space-based mirrors to serve as passive reflectors of high-energy ground power sources.

The analogy with NASA’s experience in designing the moon rocket and the lunar lander is instructive here. NASA had to make fundamental decisions early into the Apollo program on how it was going to get to the moon from a “parking orbit” around the earth, land on the moon, and return to earth—basic decisions that would determine the size of the rocket, whether to go with one rocket or several, and the design of the lunar landing craft. In the same way, there are competitive approaches to strategic defenses deployable in space. The new directed energy systems agency should fund competitive approaches to the point where the U.S. could make a truly informed decision about which way is the best to go.

As part of the President’s new strategic agenda, it also

makes sense for the Department of Defense to operate its own shuttle fleet and to develop its needs for space launch and orbital operations as part of its budget. The strong possibility that a permanent manned presence on orbit will be needed to support our orbiting defense platforms and to provide a "fail-safe" element in the early-warning and battle-management loops reportedly has been recognized by the Fletcher Commission. I understand that the commission has called for a careful review of the need for such a manned presence in a national security context.

I believe there is such a need. The idea would be to develop a "space infrastructure" similar to what the Soviets have been building up. If we are to maximize the potential in space-based defensive systems, we will eventually need both an integrated transportation system that can move astronauts, materials and equipment to, from and in space, and a space-based logistics, operations and maintenance system that will help support our force structure.

Central to a discussion of these proposals is the future role of NASA. As shuttle flights become commonplace, the question we need to ask is whether it really makes sense for NASA to become merely a transportation system that is for space that Amtrak is for trains. Or, would it not make more sense for NASA to remain on the cutting edge of new research and development in space? . . .

President Reagan's policy proposals for a new defensive emphasis in strategic policy have immense implications for the U.S. policymaking process. In essence, he is calling for a strategic policy and for arms-control arrangements that will replace those around which a large policymaking community has organized itself over the past two decades. This switch will require a considerable reorientation in the American approach to ongoing arms-control negotiations, one which requires careful coordination among the Defense Department, the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the National Security Council and the Congress.

As part of the policymaking process, the President should identify for the Congress the anticipated role of strategic defenses in arms-control that he referred to in his Mrach 23rd proposal and subsequent statements. For example, a mutual deployment of strategic defenses by both the Soviets and the U.S. would make sense in the context of mutual reduction in strategic forces. Such defenses would serve as useful "defensive backstops" and enforcement mechanisms for the current SALT II agreement, as well as any START and intermediate-range nuclear forces agreements which may be reached.

We also need to understand where the President's defensive proposal fits under international laws of warfare, particularly the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. While promoting a defensive strategy that is very powerfully supported by existing international law, the President's remarks indicate a deeply felt concern over the ethics of MAD. Thus, it would be useful for the President to submit to the Congress and to the policymaking community in

general a "white paper" that discusses his proposal and the present ABM Treaty in the context of international laws of warfare that promote the protection of populations. A top-level reevaluation of the ABM Treaty in this regard has never been performed.

In conclusion, I believe that mutually assured destruction is a morally bankrupt philosophy that places government in the untenable position of refusing to defend its citizenry. What the President has proposed is a "moral recovery" in American strategic policy which would take us from the horror of MAD to the promise of mutually assured protection. . . . Granted, this transition away from nuclear retaliation to a strategy emphasizing defensive systems—this Manhattan Project for Peace—will be very costly. It will require a scientific and military commitment that will dwarf any prior effort. It will also involve some of the most complex organizational and conceptual adjustments that have ever been required of American strategic thinkers and planners.

However, the costs and obstacles must be put into perspective. No price is too great to assure that America never be devastated by a nuclear surprise attack. No expense is too dear when one considers the promise of making nuclear weapons obsolete. . . .

Teller: Soviets are building up ABM systems

From Dr. Edward Teller's Testimony on H.R.3073:

. . . . The Soviet Union is developing its defenses. Civil defense has high priority, Moscow is ringed by instruments of ballistic missile defense. This system has been powerfully upgraded in the last few years. There are many air-defense systems in the Soviet Union which probably can be used for ballistic missile defense. Research on active defense is proceeding in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, our exaggerated laws of secrecy and their overly strict interpretation prevents me from describing or even hinting at the nature of these Soviet developments. . . .

During the last few years our weapons laboratories have brought forward half a dozen ideas for defense against both non-nuclear and nuclear aggression which have withstood the tests of criticism and preliminary experimentation. These defensive weapons are characterized by being directed against aggressive weapons in action. In the ideal case they would not destroy human lives. In some cases moderate loss of life may be unavoidable. But the purpose and effect is emphatically not mass destruction.

Discussion has shown that these defensive weapons can be and should be less expensive than the offsetting weapons of aggression. Battlestations in space, based on conventional procedures will not serve the purpose. They are expensive to deploy and easy to destroy. True and effective defense will

have the consequence that the opponent will be forced into a similar mode of operation. Two armed camps provided primarily with shields present a lesser danger than two camps relying on the destructive power of swords.

Because the aggressor has to overcome distance there is good hope that defense will win on the score of efficiency and economy. On the other hand the element of surprise favors the aggressor. Thus the defense needs the exercise of intellect, invention and foresight to their utmost limit.

Therefore, I propose that in the earliest possible phase defense should be jointly conducted by the advanced free people whose common and supreme interest is the preservation of peace and their way of life. This also will put additional unity into our alliances. Active cooperation is the basis for realistic hope. Much technical knowledge is available in allied countries.

There have been proposals that the defense should be purely non-nuclear. This is a popular proposal. But defense will not be easy. We should not arbitrarily rule out any form of effective defense.

One highly hopeful development is a non-nuclear short wave laser based on the ground whose beams are guided to the attacking targets by a system of mirrors. Another essential development is specifically constructed nuclear weapons which utilize primarily the high energy *concentration* (or high temperatures) which they can produce for defensive purposes.

Another example of the same debate is the decision whether the terminal defense against incoming ballistic missiles should be nuclear or non-nuclear. In the non-nuclear kill greater weights must be lifted at a higher expense. Furthermore the agility of the defending missiles would be reduced. But, what is most important, a non-nuclear kill cannot prevent salvage fusing. This means that as soon as the incoming missile (which may have already reentered our atmosphere) is touched it will explode with full force, for instance one megaton. A small defensive nuclear missile can prevent such a big explosion. Its own energy need hardly exceed 100 tons TNT equivalent. This should happen at a high enough altitude so that the effects on the ground would be hardly observable. Thus the advocates of the non-nuclear kill may bring about a situation where truly big Soviet nuclear explosions would nonetheless occur over our country and possibly over allied countries.

The proper distinction in planning our military operations should not be the choice between nuclear and non-nuclear methods. It should be the vital difference between aggression and defense. The former should be ruled out, the latter fully encouraged.

At this time speed is of the essence. The development of a full defensive system will take a decade or more. But in half that time some defensive weapons may begin to pay off. In order to accomplish this, red tape has to be cut. The agency engaged in this vital activity must be set apart, exempted from many standard procedures and should have direct access to the White House.

It would seem appropriate and even necessary to explain the basic ideas of the new defensive weapons to the public. Otherwise the needed wide popular support cannot be secured. Furthermore the basic ideas are known to the Kremlin. Yet our strict secrecy regulations do not permit such an explanation. The details and stages of our development can and should be kept secret. The general ideas should be public.

It has been argued that defense cannot have a perfection of 100 percent. Even a small leakage will cause enormous damage. This is true. But war will always be connected with great damage. Active defense together with civil defense can ensure the survival of our country.

But the most important and final argument is that defense will deter war and do so in a thoroughly humane manner. Let us assume that an *initial* deployment of defense will reduce the fury of the attack 20 percent of what otherwise would hit us. It must be remembered that such a 20 percent figure is a paper-estimate. The actual figure may be anywhere between 50 percent and 5 percent. The decision makers in the Kremlin are exceedingly conservative. If they know that perhaps only 1 out of 20 of their missiles may reach their target and that we shall retain significant retaliatory capability then the Soviet Union will not start a nuclear war. That we shall not do so is entirely obvious.

Eventually a much higher protection percentage can be probably attained.

The People Protection Act wisely formulated and wisely applied will remove the steadily increasing threat of war. It will create the atmosphere in which mutual understanding, cooperative enterprises and all the other effective supports of peace can flourish and develop. . . .

I hardly can hope that the danger of war will entirely disappear in our lifetime. Our children and grandchildren may live to see the beginnings of real and permanent peace. Mutual assured destruction may be replaced by mutual assured survival.

This is why I dare to say that the "People Protection Act" might become one of the great historical documents of America.

Armstrong: Defense is the moral policy

From the testimony of Sen. William Armstrong (R-Colo.) on Nov. 10:

On March 23rd of this year, President Reagan offered us a vision of a future free from the spectre of nuclear destruction which has haunted us all for nearly 40 years. The President offered us a vision of a world in which American security would be based chiefly upon our ability to protect the lives of our own people, rather than upon our ability to take the lives

of other people; a world in which peace would be built on a firmer foundation than the goodwill and humanitarian instincts of the generals in the Kremlin.

Enactment of the People Protection Act would be the first solid step toward making President Reagan's vision a reality.

Representative Kramer has described to you the provisions of H.R.3073. The provisions in my bill, S.2021, are identical. Essentially, what these bills do is to mandate a shift in U.S. strategic doctrine from Mutual Assured Destruction to what might be termed Assured Survival.

The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction—MAD for short—is easier to describe than it is to defend. Essentially, it is a murder-suicide pact. The theory was that if both the United States and the Soviet Union possess the power to destroy each other, but not each other's weapons, then neither ever would attack the other, because the end result would be the destruction of both.

There was a sheen of plausibility to the MAD doctrine at the time when then Defense Secretary Robert McNamara succeeded in making it official U.S. policy in the mid-1960s. There was no known defense against the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile at that time, and ICBMs of 1960 vintage were too inaccurate to be used against "hard" targets such as missile silos or command and control bunkers, and could be used effectively only against "soft" targets such as population centers.

But the MAD doctrine was based on false premises; was never accepted by the Soviets, and is fundamentally immoral.

The first false premise was the notion that the ICBM of the late 1960s vintage would be the ultimate weapon. The MADmen assumed there would be no further advances in military technology, at least none that would matter.

This was an assumption that proved false within a few years after MAD became official U.S. policy. The development of independently targetable warheads with Circular Errors Probable of 300 feet or less undermined an essential component of the MAD doctrine. With accurate MIRVs on ICBMs, it was now at least theoretically possible for one nation to destroy the other's weapons under conditions of surprise attack.

Another fundamental flaw was that Soviet leaders never accepted this murder-suicide pact. The creators of the MAD doctrine confidently predicted that once the Soviets had obtained strategic parity with the United States, they would stop adding to their weapons stockpile. But as President Carter's Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, was to note, ruefully: "when we build, they build; and when we stop building, they build." From the beginning, Soviet leaders have derided the MAD doctrine as insane and immoral, and touted the virtues of military superiority.

There is something macabre, and worse, about basing our security on our ability to kill Russian civilians. And it is even more reprehensible to deliberately increase the exposure of our own people to nuclear destruction simply in order to fulfill the demands of an abstract, ahistorical, unproven and illogical theory.

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A unique study of the impact of the new defense-related technologies—high power lasers, particle beams, and fusion—which will become available to basic industrial production as the March 23 defensive strategic doctrine proposed by President Reagan is developed. The report is a computer analysis incorporating the LaRouche-Riemann model, which examines the little-discussed revolutionary civilian economic "spinoff" effects of the new beam weapon development program.

The study reveals that with rapid introduction of new laser and related technologies into the civilian economy, the growth of the economy would be so rapid that:

- an estimated 4 million highly skilled industrial jobs could be added to the economy per year;
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- the rate of growth of real GNP could approach 25 percent per annum.

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scale use over decade. The study major constraint on economy can expand and create wholly new industries is the speed with which new baseload electric-generating capacity can come on line.

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