

against the other.

By the time Kennedy became President, this back-channel agreement between the New York Council on Foreign Relations and Moscow was in full swing. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, back from Britain to become Kennedy's military adviser, played a key part in selling this agreement with Moscow to the new President. The first step was to introduce Flexible Response; that was the first step down the road toward thermonuclear Hell—the Hell which threatens the world from Moscow today.

Under Flexible Response, the United States evaded a firm commitment to the defense of Western Europe, while at the

same time not saying definitely that we might not decide to defend Western Europe if the whim overcame us. President Charles de Gaulle, confronted with this obscene and immoral turn in U.S. strategic policy, adopted the policy of force de frappe, "French nuclear blackmail" intended to keep the United States to its agreements on defense of Europe.

In Moscow, Flexible Response meant to Khrushchev: "Let us test exactly how flexible the United States has become." Khrushchev had met President Kennedy in Vienna and thought him easily intimidated. Khrushchev indicated his plans to test United States will in West Berlin. Washington pretended not to notice the signals. Khrushchev pushed ahead with the Berlin Crisis, not exactly discouraged either by Kennedy or by Mayor Willy Brandt—the famous protégé of John J. McCloy. Khrushchev tested U.S. nerve at Berlin, and Kennedy flinched. Immediately, on the basis of the Berlin affair, Khrushchev moved ahead to test the U.S. will in Cuba. At the point of confrontation, Khrushchev pulled back from actually developing the nuclear emplacements in Cuba; what price, in long-range strategic concessions, did the Kennedy administration pay for that pull-back of the nuclear-blackmail threat? What did Bertrand Russell negotiate in his role as middle-man negotiator between Washington and Moscow?

Since 1962-1963, policy. On the one side, it has followed the long-range strategic doctrine of Sokolovskii et al., to the level of potential for winning thermonuclear war against the United States. However, since the Soviet economy could not keep pace with the economies of France and the NATO countries as long as economic growth persisted in those countries, the success of Sokolovskii's doctrine depended upon inducing the United States and Western Europe to turn their nations into the weakened wreckage of "post-industrial societies," as we have obligingly done since the middle 1960s. Therefore, to lull us into continuing Malthusian "post-industrial society" policies, since 1972 Moscow has worn the mask of "détente." Once Moscow's slow buildup and NATO's economic and military build-down had given Moscow a large margin of strategic edge, Moscow would drop the mask of "détente," and push for a new confrontation. They would be prepared for war, but convinced that U.S. backdown would make war unnecessary. That time has now been reached, greatly aided by the Carter-Mondale administration and Paul A. Volcker's economic build-down policies at the Federal Reserve.

It is imperative that we persuade Moscow's Marshals that the United States would never back down again. It is time to mobilize to convince them we have the power to resist. It is also the time to convince Moscow that President Reagan is not another John Kennedy. The fiddle-faddle at the State Department over the secret memorandum of 1962 must be brought immediately to an end. Bringing it out into the open now might be decisive in preventing thermonuclear war as early as spring 1984.

Senator Symms: Disavow the 1962 agreements

In a Nov. 2 speech on the Senate floor, Idaho Republican Steve Symms called on the Reagan administration to renounce the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements as a necessary step in showing the Soviets that the United States has rejected a policy of appeasement. Symms said, "I would like to make several summary propositions regarding the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. U.S. disapproval of this agreement would be another act unshackling America from paralysis. It would also be an act of peacekeeping."

Although Symms does not openly charge President Kennedy with backing down in October 1962, he does catalogue the history of State Department appeasement regarding Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba which followed the agreement. Symms charged that "each time the Soviets have violated the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, the State Department has, in effect, accepted a new protocol to the agreement allowing the Soviet violation. This has happened in 1971, 1978, 1979, and 1982. These U.S. retreats from enforcing the original agreement have all occurred in secret."

Symms charged that access to the documents has been denied to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President's National Security Adviser, among others. He concludes that "the Soviets now have in Cuba a strategic nuclear offensive threat greater than they had in the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. . . . The Soviets have 52 operational long- and medium-range bombers, together with the precedent already established that they can have six or more submarine-launched nuclear missiles there. Thus the Soviet threat in Cuba today is twice what it was in 1962, fifty-eight delivery vehicles, compared to only 28 operational in 1962."