

# **EIR**SpecialReport

## **Should the U.S. have a war plan for 1984?**


by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Several weeks ago, *EIR* established a special task force, assigned to develop the principal features of a U.S.-NATO "war plan" for the contingency of a Soviet escalation to "first-strike" threshold during as early as the first six months of 1984. Although *EIR* has no official connection to any U.S. or NATO agency responsible for such matters, one of our primary functions as a specialist international news-weekly is strategic assessments; for various reasons, it is impossible to prepare competent strategic estimates unless the evaluations staff defines and correlates all its essential elements of information by means of reference to a "war game" of the sort practiced under the German General Staff's von Schlieffen.

By examining the capabilities of two potential adversaries and their allies for fighting a general war at some hypothetical point in future time, the evaluations staff compels itself to ask each and all of the questions needed, and to fit the answers assembled into a properly integrated picture of the strategic situation as a whole.

The most general categories which must be covered by such a study include the following. 1) How do the respective powers define the vital interests for which they might be disposed to fight general war? 2) What are the respective in-depth military, logistical, and political capabilities of the powers and their allies? 3) What kind of general warfare might be launched by one of these as the mode of warfare which affords its quality and quantities of strategic capabilities the relatively greatest advantage? 4) What strategic doctrine affords the opposing power the best counteraction, in terms of its qualities and quantities of capabilities? 5) For each case, what pre-warfare kinds of preparatory deployments, including mobilization and political preparations, must tend to appear to indicate preparations for actual launching of warfare of each form considered? 6) What are a) the requirements of a war-winning potential for either power, and b) which relatively short-term counter-developments and measures represent the nullifications of such a war-winning potential by the defending power?

Such "war-plans" exercises ought to be the regular, institutionalized practice of the traditionalist military general staff of a power, and should be used by military



American Poseidon (left) and Trident missiles.

and other intelligence services of the power as a guide to intelligence-gathering, evaluations, and reporting. A coordinated, integrated view of the problems and tasks so defined is the central function of a military general staff, and the guide to peacetime planning and related functions of the military command. We emphasize: This is a *normal peacetime function* of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, and also the central, governing activity of our Department of Defense.

Such policies and practices have been the continuing policy of the Soviet general staff, and are the institutionalized practice which the Soviet command has continued for at least twenty years in preparing the global thermonuclear confrontation with the United States now in progress of step-by-step global escalation. Since 1962, at the latest, every action by the Soviet command bearing upon strategic military, logistical, and political capabilities has been a continuing preparation for *winning a thermonuclear war against the United States* according to principled features of the so-called Sokolovskii Doctrine. That Soviet doctrine has been modified by updating, as supplemented by the doctrines of Malinovskii, Grechko, et al., but the basic strategic doctrine has remained consistently in force through all these modifications.

Beginning a series of treaties which Henry A. Kissinger negotiated with the Soviet command under Presidents Nixon and Ford, persistent Soviet build-up has been able to accumulate a significant margin of military advantage over the combined forces of the U.S.A., France, and the European NATO forces. This accumulation of Soviet advantage would not have been possible but for the post-1972 build-down of

U.S. strategic capabilities, and the weakening of U.S. and Western European in-depth logistical capabilities through the continuing drift into the decay and obsolescence of a "post-industrial" utopia.

The effects of four years of the U.S. Carter-Mondale administration have been a strategic and economic disaster for the U.S.A. and Western Europe. Simultaneously, beginning no later than 1977, the Soviet Union has been engaged in a "crash program" build-up of its military capabilities, to the extent that Soviet "economic bottlenecks" permit, a build-up which exceeds published CIA estimates of Soviet spending by as much as 17 percent, a build-up whose general effect has been to prepare for a Soviet "shock-assault" in general conformity to the Grechko doctrine.

During the past two decades, especially during the period beginning 1969-72, with Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik" and Henry A. Kissinger's leadership in negotiating "détente," the Soviet command has been operating on a double track, one of strategic deception, the other of preparations for war-winning first-strike assault. Under the cover of "detente," the Soviet government has worked to lull the United States and Western Europe into overconfidence in Soviet commitment to the Nuclear Deterrence doctrine, seeking not to alarm the West into recognizing what the true, longer-range Soviet military commitments were. So, in the name of Nuclear Deterrence and arms control, we have been systematically negotiating downwards U.S. and Western European capabilities, without ever obtaining positive evidence on the full scale of Soviet build-up in various key categories of military capabilities.

Now, during the first few weeks following President Ronald Reagan's nationwide television address of March 23, 1983, it became clear that the Soviet command was committed to rapid escalation toward a new "1962-style" thermonuclear showdown with the United States.

Simply, the accelerating Soviet deployment of SS-20s and other new generations of Soviet thermonuclear missiles had led to Henry A. Kissinger's successful demand that NATO deploy both Pershing II and land-based intermediate-range cruise missiles as "forward nuclear defense" deployments to counter Soviet deployment of SS-20s then already massively in progress. The combined Soviet and NATO escalation of "forward-based nuclear defense" in this form ensured that both superpowers would be pushed to "strategic thermonuclear general assault under attack," probably by the end of 1983 or early during 1984. Indeed, the Soviet command is now entering a "launch on warning" status.

When President Reagan, beginning his March 23, 1983 televised proclamation of a new U.S. strategic doctrine, offered Moscow a new formula for general strategic negotiations, the President had presented Moscow with the only serious alternative to ongoing escalation toward "launch under attack" posture by both superpowers. When the Soviet command refused to consider even exploratory discussions of the President's and Secretary Casper Weinberger's offers of this period, the Soviet command showed conclusively that it was committed to an early "1962-style" thermonuclear confrontation with the United States unless the United States submitted to the kind of unilateral Soviet strategic demands which Soviet Secretary Yuri Andropov announced in April 1983 to West Germany's *Der Spiegel* publisher, Rudolf Augstein. Since that time, the Soviet command has deployed globally according to precisely the demands advertised through that *Der Spiegel* interview.

During the April-May period, we estimated that the Soviets would begin the countdown toward a global confrontation as early as August 1983; this writer so reported his assessment to relevant channels. During August, leading into the Soviet shooting-down of the Korean passenger airliner on Sept. 1, 1983, the Soviet global escalation began exactly as our strategic estimate of April-May had anticipated. What confronts the United States today is not a coincidental heating-up of international terrorism and various local "hot spots" around the world; this is all a coordinated, Soviet-steered process of escalation toward something broader and bigger than the 1962 Cuba Missile Crisis, possibly—possibly—as early as the first six months of 1984.

We do not presume that Moscow is seeking an actual shooting war *directly* with the forces of the United States. Terrorist and other actions against the United States in Lebanon and West Germany, and deployment of Iranian terrorist forces into the United States itself, typify the combined use of surrogates and Soviet KGB/GRU covert assets which is already in progress. Rather, Moscow is already engaged in an escalating confrontation with the United States in which

the *threat* of Soviet first-strike and related capabilities is aimed at obtaining major strategic concessions, like those which Adolf Hitler exacted from Neville Chamberlain at Munich in 1938. The point is: If the United States is caught either physically or psychologically "flat-footed," unprepared to challenge the Soviet bluff of "first-strike" attack, a U.S. backdown could win world domination for Moscow over the decades to come without thermonuclear war.

However, should the United States refuse to back down, *what then?* If Moscow were *merely bluffing*—if Moscow did not possess a credible war-winning capability for first-strike attack, then President Reagan's calling a Soviet bluff would cause a major strategic setback for Moscow, with long-range consequences. Therefore, we must assume that Moscow is not entirely bluffing; *we must assume that Moscow is assured of its military superiority over the United States, at least by the time the ongoing confrontation reaches its intended climax.*

This would mean that *Moscow is preparing to display a range and depth of military capabilities beyond what is already visible to President Reagan's principal advisers now.* At present, it is not yet evident to the U.S. command that Moscow has a sufficient margin of military advantage to actually survive and win a thermonuclear war. In other words, by the time the climax of the present escalation is reached, Moscow intends to display a margin of thermonuclear-war-fighting advantage beyond what the United States presently believes to be Soviet strategic capabilities.

Such Soviet advantages, if the Soviets have a war-winning margin of advantage in sight, must be of two probable forms. In part, this must mean that Moscow is at the point of deploying new dimensions of anti-aircraft and ballistic-missile-defense capabilities significantly beyond anything thus far reported. Additionally, Moscow is prepared to exploit its known kinds of technologies in a quantity and in a mode of deployment which it believes that the United States command has so far overlooked. There are conclusive indications that both Soviet potentials already exist or are coming on line.

These considerations we have just summarized provide the general outlines for design of a U.S. "war plan." By testing the assumption that Moscow plans to have a war-winning assault in place by a certain estimated date, and by examining several scenarios for such a date, we pose to ourselves all of the questions we must explore. We must estimate what capabilities and strategic developments Moscow would require for it to *risk* a thermonuclear war with the United States. We define the range of war scenarios associated with climactic confrontations or outright surprise shock-attack by a series of indicative dates, beginning with the interval March 15-30, 1984, including September 1984, March 1985, August-September 1985, and so forth. We estimate what capabilities and deployments Moscow must deploy in preparation for such an assault, and then work backwards from that hypothesized outbreak of war to define the questions posed for strategic-intelligence tasks of information-gathering and evaluations.



NSPS/Stuart Lewis

*Lyndon LaRouche speaking to the year-end conference of the International Caucus of Labor Committees on how to muster the political and military defense of the West, in Washington, D.C., Dec. 31, 1983.*

The included task is that of specifying what selection of measures by the United States and its allies may be taken between now and each of the projected dates to present Moscow with such increased, and visible, risks and imputable penalties that the Soviet military command pronounces the risk of global thermonuclear confrontation "unacceptable." In other words, what are the relatively few leading elements of an emergency "crash program" of development of U.S., French, and European-NATO capabilities which can quickly increase the level of risk and imputable penalties to Moscow to a high enough value to provide a substantial margin of "deterrence"?

This is the problem on which *EIR*'s task-force is working at this time.

### **Why *EIR* is undertaking this**

There are two-principal reasons *EIR* has commissioned such a strategic task force. First, such tasks fall within the responsibilities of our adopted editorial policy as an international specialist newsweekly. *Newsweek*'s recent coverage of a Sandhurst scenario for a Soviet attack into West Germany illustrates the point that all serious international newsweeklies have this subject very much under scrutiny at this time. Second, although there are many good, dedicated professionals in the U.S. government's employ, commanding resources far beyond our own, prevailing military doctrines and strategic and related policies are dominated by the wishful delusion that no such Soviet threat is "thinkable" during the year or so immediately ahead.

The chief problem of our government's policy is that for nearly a quarter century U.S. strategic doctrine has been dominated by a Nuclear Deterrence doctrine created by Pugwash Conference-centered circles associated with the late Bertrand Russell, a doctrine which Russell and his accomplices pre-cleared with the Soviet government through Pugwash and similar channels before imposing the elements of that doctrine upon the U.S. government and NATO. Russell's accomplices in this back-channel agreement with Moscow include leading elements of our "Eastern Establishment," elements of Britain's "Establishment," and influential circles in Switzerland's financial community as well as other influential circles on the continent of Europe. These circles dominate the editorial policies of our own republic's major news media and entertainment media, dominate the present leadership of the Democratic Party (around Charles Manatt, Walter Mondale, Lane Kirkland, et al.), and also dominate liberal Republican circles. The liberal elements dedicated to Nuclear Freeze and allied doctrines are an embedded part of the policy-shaping institutions of our federal government, and exert great external political-pressure influences upon the decisions of government.

Charles Manatt, Walter Mondale, Robert McNamara, the Harrimans, and so forth presently appear more or less outright collaborators of Soviet Secretary Yuri Andropov against President Reagan. Yet, looking at Mondale's list of advisers, we note something else: Mondale appears to be merely another front-man for Henry Kissinger and the Trilateral Commission, a pawn of Kissinger policies. Kissinger, who has an

ill-deserved reputation as a “hard-line negotiator” with Moscow, is a partner of Britain’s Lord Carrington in Kissinger Associates, Inc., the Carrington who, during April 1983, protested that President Reagan’s March 23, 1983 address threatened Carrington’s “asset,” Soviet Secretary Andropov! Carrington is a leading figure of today’s “Neville Chamberlains” of the British “Establishment,” and no friend of the United States today.

The situation today is such that President Reagan could not get support for needed defense measures from his own administration and the Congress unless the President took the strategic problem directly to the American people. Perhaps 80 percent of the electorate would support the President on condition that the electorate understood the threat and was convinced that the President needed their support for a credible effort to convince Moscow to break away from a global thermonuclear confrontation. At present, the “good guys” around Washington are being very cautious about challenging the liberal Washington “*Pravda*,” Katherine Graham’s *Post*, and the New York “*Tass*,” the *Times*. Being cautious about challenging the “Neville Chamberlain” news media is pretty much policy around Washington, and career-minded officials are careful to limit the “facts” they report to “facts” which do not challenge prevailing policy.

In this circumstance, *EIR*’s job is to report the facts, whether or not those facts coincide with prevailing policy. Our job is to provide our readers, and those whose opinions our readers influence, with at least enough of the facts of the strategic crisis to show both what the strategic problem is, and what measures must be taken to overcome it.

## A total strategic picture

Most military commanders in Western Europe know such a practice to be absurd, but nonetheless the U.S.A. and NATO commands continue to make a distinction between so-called “strategic” and “conventional” military capabilities.

This absurdity is based on the ideology of Nuclear Deterrence doctrine. Under that doctrine, it is argued either that a) war begins with a full-scale thermonuclear exchange, after which it is presumed that neither superpower survives, or that b) war begins as non-nuclear, or “conventional” warfare, and may escalate up to, but probably not beyond, the “threshold” at which “strategic” nuclear exchanges occur between the superpowers.

Soviet doctrine—and capabilities—are based on planning World War III as a victory won by Soviet land, sea, and air forces after a full-scale thermonuclear attack is launched against both the mainland United States, and U.S. thermonuclear missile, sea, and aircraft capabilities. In the case that the Soviets begin war with a “conventional” assault in Western Europe, for example, the Soviets assume that the threat of Soviet thermonuclear first strike or “launch on warning” against the United States forces the United States to “accept” Soviet conquest of sections or all of Western continental Europe.

Presently, the Atlantic Alliance has no war plan for either a) continuing warfare, after initial strategic barrages, or b) coping with a Soviet assault into Western Europe under a Soviet thermonuclear umbrella. The popularized usage of the term “conventional” is key to the problem.

In the classical military tradition, especially since Lazare Carnot’s 1793-94 revolution in warfare, all strategic capabilities, logistical depth (economy), and political forces, are an integrated capability which must be deployed in coordinated fashion as an integrated capability for winning general war through victory of our depth over the adversary’s depth. In such a doctrine, a division between general warfare and conventional warfare does not exist; the development and deployment of the various strategic capabilities is accomplished as a single, integrated capability.

The European commander expresses this: Without the U.S. strategic “umbrella,” Western Europe is open to Soviet air-land assault. The effort to build up a European conventional capability, such as Airland 2000, seems to respond to this, but in fact does not. The task is that of ensuring defeat of Soviet forces invading Western Europe *if that should occur during 1984!* This requires capabilities developed to meet the requirements of a war plan for such a contingency.

The U.S.A. and NATO have simply grown out of the habit of thinking in war-winning term of reference. Instead, we have conditioned our strategic planners and military commanders to the notion of limited wars planned according to negotiated rules of the game, as Dr. Leo Szilard proposed in the 1958 “Dr. Strangelove” address at the Second Pugwash Conference. We are back playing the same, impotent sort of “cabinet warfare” doctrine which French armies under Bonaparte demolished at the battle of Jena in 1806.

It is this cultivated impotence in our strategic thinking which has created the wide gap in U.S. and NATO flanks through which Soviet-commanded Warsaw Pact forces are now preparing to march to victory—in case we do not capitulate to thermonuclear terror.

In brief, we must approach our present strategic problem as Lazare Carnot approached the military problem of a France almost defeated during 1793-94. Carnot employed the world’s most advanced scientific capabilities of that time, French science, to effect a technological revolution in the character of the field of battle, accomplishing this in one year’s “crash program.” Around this technological revolution, Carnot did other things, including the *levée en masse*, changes in the order of battle and principles of deployment of arms, which finally defeated the previously almost-victorious invaders of France.

Just as we must apply such “crash program principles” to strategic weapons systems immediately now, we must also apply the same approach to qualitative upgrading of what are misnamed “conventional forces,” building a war-winning policy around this retooling. The veteran strategist, Col. (ret.) Marc Geneste, focuses our attention on this problem in the following interview.