

Kissinger stages a new confrontation with Europe

by George Gregory in Brussels and Lonnie Wolfe in New York

Within sight of the NATO headquarters in Brussels, Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State and professional traitor, has once more exerted himself to undermine the policies of President Reagan in Europe and to foment a split in the Atlantic Alliance.

The scene of Kissinger's dirty work was a Jan. 12-14 conference organized by his Jesuit friends at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), whose title was "The Future of NATO and Global Security." What transpired was a stage-managed brawl between between the "Americans," represented by Kissinger and his clones such as Helmut Sonnenfeldt, and the "Europeans," led by former West German Social Democratic chancellor Helmut Schmidt. The brawl was amply chronicled by the international press, as headlines on both sides of the Atlantic read: "Parley Exposes Rifts Between U.S., Europe."

The Brussels conference was part of a campaign for decoupling Western Europe from the NATO alliance, a campaign whose public sponsors include the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies and the New York Council on Foreign Relations. All are directed toward affecting the split as rapidly as possible.

In Brussels, Kissinger set the tone for this staged confrontation. His remarks were designed for maximum effect on a European audience.

To give his speech an official U.S. policy stamp, Kissinger boasted that the Reagan administration had moved away from confrontationalist postures, insinuating that it was now listening to his advice. As if to demonstrate his power, he argued for the creation of "private channel" discussions with the Soviets. Hours later, word came from Washington that the Reagan White House was actively considering such an

approach to East-West relations and would probably make such a proposal in the meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State George Shultz in Stockholm. The message: Kissinger has clout, so listen up, you Europeans.

Brandishing limited nuclear war

Only if European leaders openly accept the risk of limited nuclear war—i.e., of a nuclear exchange that would destroy Europe, without the total backup of U.S. strategic forces—will Soviet planners be deterred, he continued. Europeans should not indulge in the illusion that the threat of all-out nuclear retaliation would dissuade the Soviet Union from ever attacking Europe, Kissinger intoned. This threat has lost its credibility.

With these words Kissinger pronounced President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to be liars. Both had within the last month reaffirmed the inviolability of the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella over Europe and denounced the idea of limited nuclear warfare on European soil.

At the same time, Kissinger criticized Europeans for "creeping neutralism" and pacifism, singling out the NATO two-track strategy of linking deployment of new missiles to progress in arms control. Whatever problems Europe was experiencing were its own fault.

Kissinger's statements terrified and enraged his European counterparts, as they were intended to. Next Helmut Schmidt rose to defend Europe's honor in this stage-managed show, launching into an hour-long vilification of the United States the day after Kissinger's keynote.

Attacking U.S. budget policies for creating "the highest real interest rates since the birth of Christ," Schmidt demand-

ed that the deficit be cut, including cuts in the U. S. defense budget. Britain, France, and West Germany have a “grand strategy towards the Soviet Union,” while the United States has constantly reversed its policies.

All this no doubt amused Kissinger. While railing at the United States, the pitiful, cowardly, terrified Schmidt had not stated one point which Kissinger did not privately agree should be U.S. policy. Kissinger had succeeded in provoking the Europeans to attack Reagan, as he had misrepresented the President’s policies.

As Schmidt fell back into his seat puffing on his pipe, James Schlesinger, the former defense secretary who is high on Europeans’ list of detested Americans, rose to defend the honor of the United States. Schlesinger, the RAND robot who imposed the limited nuclear war doctrine on Europe, attacked the NATO partners for taking America for granted. The United States, he said, might just pick up its marbles and go home, leaving Europe to fend completely for itself. Americans have a fundamental distrust of “entangling alliances” like NATO; this is especially true of people in the present administration, he claimed, and might assert itself at any moment.

The West Germans, he declared, are unable to defend even their own border and refuse to share adequately in the NATO defense burden. How dare they attack the United States? “Candor should be a two-way street,” said Schlesinger, looking at Schmidt, and asserting that many Americans share the view that Europeans act like “damned ingrates.”

The current crisis of confidence in NATO, Schlesinger continued, is more severe than any in the past because the “level of disenchantment” is higher.

Kissinger accomplice William Hyland, soon to become the editor of the Council on Foreign Relations’ journal *Foreign Affairs*, repeated that disenchantment with Europe is mounting in the United States, and “there are questions from serious people about the wisdom of continuing this alliance.” Hyland declined to mention that his CFR has set up a study group to plan the decoupling of the United States from Europe (see box). Nor did he mention that Kissinger is among those “serious people” who question the value of the alliance.

All this speechifying was accompanied by private cocktail parties and smaller seminars. The seminars were uninteresting; stars like Kissinger and Schmidt didn’t bother to show up.

At the corridor discussions and cocktail parties it was the “Americans” against the “Europeans,” with some foolish individuals intermittently attempting to mediate. “Some of the guys were so angry that they couldn’t get any sleep,” said Rep. Tom Foley (D-Wash.), a member of the Kissinger “American” team.

Kissinger’s ability to pose as a representative of the administration comes from the assignments President Reagan has given him, like his recent chairmanship of the Central America Commission. It is enhanced by his friends George Shultz and Bud McFarlane of the State Department and sections of the National Security Council, and by the role of

Kissinger ally Brent Scowcroft in shaping strategic policy.

It is fair to say that Kissinger in Brussels came close to undoing whatever good might have been done by the President’s recent *Le Figaro Magazine* interview stressing the U.S. commitment to defend Europe. The Soviets are no doubt delighted. Their reading from the Brussels sideshow must be that the NATO leadership is at war with itself. The European appeasers will pursue their own “grand strategy,” as Schmidt termed it, while the United States will not defend Europe—Reagan’s statements are lies, didn’t Kissinger say so? Thus the decouplers move the world closer to nuclear war.

Kissinger in Brussels

We publish here excerpts from Henry Kissinger’s keynote speech at a conference in Brussels, Belgium on Jan. 13 sponsored by Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies. The meeting was titled “The Future of NATO and Global Security.”

There are two conventional ways of speaking about NATO. The first is to praise its achievements: the peace that has been maintained for 35 years; the cooperation among 16 sovereign nations that has been sustained for longer than any modern alliance; the crises that have been overcome; and most recently the decision that was upheld to redress the nuclear balance in Europe.

Alternatively, it is also possible to deplore the unresolved issues: the gap between the announced military strategy and what is being implemented; the imbalance between détente and defense; the pace and direction of arms control; and the growing mistrust—nurtured by the Soviets—between a generation of Americans and Europeans who have lived their entire lives sheltered by the alliance they assault.

Both interpretations offer elements of the truth. NATO is one of the most successful alliances in history. It has also increasingly maintained the appearance of unity by evading some fundamental issues. The newly elected Secretary-General of NATO, Peter Carrington, walked the fine line between optimism and despair with elegance and wit in a seminal speech at the Institute of Strategic Studies last April. He will no doubt lead NATO with vigor, intelligence, vision, and humanity; he is in fact one cause for optimism. I tend to be—let us be frank—somewhat apocalyptic. What I say hopefully reflects the spirit of his remarks; but freed of the responsibilities that inhere in a diplomat, I am more explicit about some of the unsolved problems of NATO as I see them. . . .

The premises of NATO strategy have thus been systematically eroded partly by choice, largely by inevitable trends. But NATO doctrine did not change. Lip service was paid to increased conventional defense; some increase in fact did take place, though never enough to catch up with the massive Soviet rearmament effort. Flexible Response, based on the gradual though systematic escalation up the nuclear ladder

has remained the NATO doctrine. . . . No leader of the West today dares to affirm what his strategy dictates: that to avoid defeat he would be obliged to resort to nuclear weapons. President Reagan and Secretary Weinberger were widely condemned in Europe when they referred to the "winnability" of nuclear war. The idea of "winning" a nuclear war was hardly felicitous. But the verbal formulation probed for an elemental truth: unless some rational military objective can be assigned to nuclear strategy, both leaders and publics will become increasingly demoralized by the still firmly enshrined NATO doctrine.

Since then, both the President and his cabinet have not only retreated; they have explicitly disavowed their claim that nuclear war is winnable. It is a tragic symptom of the gap in understanding between our administration and its European critics that these fervent affirmations are disregarded and disbelieved; that most of our critics insist on holding President Reagan and Secretary Weinberger to their original declarations. . . .

There can be no question that NATO should be in a position where it is not forced to resort to use nuclear weapons

at an early stage of a conflict. . . . It is one thing to advocate a strengthened conventional defense—as I have consistently done with many others here. It is quite another to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons. If history teaches anything, it is that deterrence with conventional weapons is a chancy enterprise. . . . If the no-first-use doctrine makes any sense it must mean that we and our allies would rather be defeated with conventional weapons than resort to nuclear weapons. But once the readiness to accept defeat is granted, why should it matter with what weapons it is accomplished? . . . If an aggressor analyzes the implications of the no-first-use doctrine in this manner, he would have an incentive to warn that any war will quickly become nuclear. This would face the West with the choice of surrender or the kind of war of which our countries will then be incapable as a result of years of stigmatizing the weapons around which their defenses are built and with which our adversary's arsenal is replete.

But if we are prepared to use nuclear weapons rather than see Europe overrun, we are back to our original problem: the proper mix between conventional and nuclear forces and the appropriate strategy for the use of nuclear weapons, albeit as

Council on Foreign Relations plans for a post-NATO world

The New York Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) has put together a project focused on "redesigning the U.S.-European relationship at a point when that relationship is falling into disarray," as a CFR source describes it. "What are the possible benefits for the United States that might result from a decoupled Europe or a Europe less dependent on the United States? These are not necessarily things to be feared, if we are prepared for them, if we steer the process."

The Council group, chaired by CFR director Andrew Pierre, is governed by a 35-member board which consults with others in government positions—including U.S. Ambassador Arthur Burns in Bonn, an active decoupler.

The board is co-chaired by former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and former Carter Deputy Secretary of State Robert Hormats. It includes investment banker George Ball, a former undersecretary of state and advocate of sweeping population reduction for the Third World; former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who has repeatedly sounded the theme that the United States should not and will not use nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe (or itself); "neo-conservative" Irving Kristol; Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Henry Kissinger's "Soviet expert" during the SALT I negotiations; David Aaron, the adviser to

Walter Mondale who was accused of being a security risk during his tenure at the Carter National Security Council; Venetian banker Nathaniel Samuels; former congressman John Brademas, president of New York University; former Carter State Department spokesman Hodding Carter III; and Amalgamated Clothing Union official Murray Finley, an intimate of AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland. Sitting in on meetings are Andrew Pierre and former *Foreign Affairs* editor William Bundy, Dean Acheson's son-in-law.

The project, begun early last year and scheduled to last for two more years, was described by CFR spokesmen as a "mini-1980s Project." The original 1980s Project, also chaired by Cyrus Vance, advocated the "controlled disintegration" of the world economy. It was a CFR project in the 1950s that excreted the policy of "flexible response" and "limited war."

The steering group "assumes that the NATO alliance will undergo a fundamental transformation involving strategy and concepts of defense. This must also be guided. . . . All of this will be dominated by the redefinition of the East-West relationship," said the CFR source. "There is no problem that is not influenced by the search for a new relationship with the East."

The study plans to produce 10 books. The first, to be released in late January, will deal with NATO nuclear strategy and will feature contributions by former Carter arms-control negotiator Paul Warnke, Kissinger aide William Hyland, West German Social Democratic Party leader Carsten Voight, and British nuclear strategy "expert" Lawrence Freedman.

a last resort. The question of how nuclear weapons should be used without destroying mankind remains unavoidable. . . . Politics and morality both demand that so long as nuclear weapons exist and nuclear war is at least conceivable (not to say built into our strategy), governments seek ways to limit their use and to terminate such a war before it turns into a world holocaust. In a world of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, it is reckless to teach that any nuclear incident must automatically escalate into a cataclysm. If the worst happens—for whatever reason—governments have an obligation to humanity and to history to limit the consequences. Only nihilists or abstract ideologues can shirk that duty. . . .

[The consensus on defense policy has broken down, which] could not happen but for two comforting illusions. Europe chooses to believe that in the end America will either prevent aggression or resist it with its ultimate weapon if it has no other choice. America chooses the illusion that with intensive consultations Europe will be induced to increase its defense contribution in the conventional field. Neither expectation is realistic—the European one only slightly more so than the American.

If present trends continue we run the risk that we will be left with no coherent defense posture, with a precarious combination of the formal NATO doctrine of Flexible Response which, however, now—unlike when it was first developed—has to be applied under conditions of nuclear stalemate, growing nuclear pacifism, and continuing inadequacies in conventional forces. Left with no coherent defense policy we will ourselves have crippled our capacity for military response while sitting on the most destructive stockpile of weapons the world has seen and against an adversary whose political and economic system seems to have lost all vitality. . . .

The *détente* of the early 1970s was assaulted by an odd and unprecedented coalition of liberals and conservatives who could never have been united but for the collapse of executive authority caused by Watergate. . . . [In the United States] the trouble has been that each new administration has felt no responsibility to the legacy of its predecessor, indeed has prided itself on starting all over. Each reassessment of American policy left victims among European leaders who—trusting American representations and briefings—had committed themselves to the previous dispensation. Each reassessment shook confidence and encouraged European neutralism to become less dependent on our restless quest for novelty. . . . While it is easy to compile a record of ill-considered remarks of the Reagan administration, it is difficult to point to much in the way of rash actions. Beyond muscular rhetoric the Reagan administration has actually behaved with considerable restraint. What has it actually *done* to earn such opprobrium among our European critics? . . . Why has the recent change in tone of the Reagan administration—sometimes verging on the repentant—been largely ignored by critics and most allied leaders? Is it because the critics seek an excuse for a barely disguised neutralism and the leaders require—or believe they require—at least the

pretense of “moderating” American obtuseness and intransigence as a unifying element in their domestic policies? . . . The appropriate model is the period prior to World War I when client states pursuing regional rivalries drew their protectors into a holocaust by gradual increments, the full significance of which was not understood until it was too late. . . .

Whatever the invective of Soviet leaders, when convinced that the current administration is likely to be reelected, they may well make some agreement by summer. A reelected administration, hence unconstrained, may be a prospect they would prefer to avoid. But it is also possible that the Soviet leaders are under domestic pressures which prevent any policy adaptation or *any* farsighted policy for that matter. Before we yield to this proposition, however, we must test the possibilities of a dialogue systematically and persistently. . . .

[One has to start at the highest level, but not a summit, which is too risky, and can only put the seal on that already achieved behind the scenes.]

would be for each side to designate a special representative enjoying the full confidence of its head of government and foreign minister. He should be authorized to conduct private, exploratory conversations on their behalf, preferably without publicity. Each of these special representatives should have access to the head of state of the other side. Both parties would commit themselves to a global review of their entire relationship. As soon as the conversation between the special representatives demonstrates hope for progress, preparations would begin for a summit meeting which would then approve a full-scale work program for coexistence. . . .

The Soviet Union must decide whether it is a country or a cause. It must be willing to define security in terms other than the impotence of potential adversaries. . . . Such a process requires the restoration of bipartisanship in the United States and an end to the constant “reassessments” that disquiet our friends and confuse when they do not embolden our adversaries. The national interest does not change every four or eight years; at some point it must be fixed in the public mind if we are not to become an element of instability through our endless quest for ever new dispensations. And it is time for our European allies to abandon the charade that their principal foreign policy goal is to moderate an intransigent America—a role more appropriate for neutrals than allies. Those committed to the proposition that the precondition for peace is to insist on the moral equivalence of the two superpowers are in fact tempting a continuation of tensions by abdicating their judgment. . . . The Soviets are realists. Sentimentality on the left tempts them into aggression; sentimentality on the right tempts them to exploit domestic and allied divisions. . . .

Too rarely—if ever—is there a real attempt to project a strategy for the rest of this century. . . . I do not believe the present structure of NATO lends itself easily to such an effort. . . . The Reagan administration has in practice abandoned its confrontational style. Our allies need now to avoid using the past as an alibi to avoid difficult choices.