

Kissinger's NATO 'reform': a plan to deliver Europe to the Soviet Union

by Robert Gallagher

Henry Kissinger's "Plan to Reshape NATO" is a scheme for decoupling Western Europe from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), measures which would end in the formal withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from Europe. Kissinger proposes his "plan" in service of the European oligarchs who seek unification of Germany through the ouster of the United States from Europe and an accommodation with the Soviet Union. Europe would become a Russian satrap. States Kissinger in his memoirs, *White House Years*, the unification of Germany on Soviet terms is "inevitable."

We shall document below that Kissinger has spent 30 years attempting to bring about this "inevitability." From his espousal of "flexible response" in 1957 to his surrender of strategic superiority to the Soviets in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement to the present, Kissinger has undermined the military ability and political will of the West to resist the expansion of the Russian Empire.

Kissinger's plan has four essential features:

1. Termination of the U.S. policy of retaliation against a Soviet invasion of Western Europe with an attack on Soviet territory with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Since the 1950s the defense of Europe from Soviet attack has been based on the U.S. promise of nuclear retaliation; without it, the Warsaw Pact would already extend to the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. forces stationed in Europe were deliberately minimal—intended primarily to tie the United States to the defense of Europe. American troops comprise a mere 6% of NATO's total. Kissinger writes:

[N]either existing nor projected NATO conventional ground forces are adequate to repel a major Soviet conventional attack. Therefore, doctrine would require a nuclear response at an early stage. Yet strategic nuclear parity deprives the threat of strategic nuclear war of much of its credibility; mutual suicide cannot be made to appear as a rational option. And no alternative nuclear strategy has been developed. Partly for this reason, public opinion, essentially unopposed by most NATO governments, is moving powerfully against *any* reliance on nuclear weapons—even tactical ones. . . .

His conclusion? "By 1990 Europe should assume the major responsibility for conventional ground defense." In other words, remove the U.S. "responsibility" to use nuclear weapons against Soviet aggression. To implement this, Kissinger proposes "a gradual withdrawal of a substantial portion, perhaps up to half, of our present ground forces"—a removal of the American "trip wire," the five U.S. divisions stationed in Europe (alongside 85 European divisions). He would eventually withdraw the U.S. troops entirely.

2. Make the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) a European officer with a U.S. deputy. If the NATO commander in Europe were a European, he would have no authority over the use of the bulk of the nuclear weapons stationed on European soil since these weapons are American. Such a commander would be impotent in a conflict. Secondly, since Kissinger's proposal places the highest U.S. military authority on the continent under a European SACEUR, the United States would have to get his approval to defend Europe with the intermediate-range and short-range American missiles stationed there.

3. "Europe should take over those arms-control negotiations that deal with weapons stationed on European soil." This proposal promotes the fraudulent proposition that there are separate "European" and "American" interests when it comes to defense against the Warsaw Pact. Aimed to bolster Kissinger's plan to split Europe from the United States, it is a patent fraud. Continental Europe controls only the 18 nuclear missile warheads of the French *force de frappe*, compared to the Soviets' over 1,300 warheads mounted on SS-20 intermediate range missiles and over 6,000 on ICBMs. West European "negotiators" wouldn't have anything to negotiate with.

4. U.S. forces should be deployed, not to prevent what Kissinger calls "a hypothetical esoteric war in an area where we have major allies" (Europe), but rather against the Third World. Kissinger calls for conversion of the five U.S. divisions in Europe into "a highly mobile conventional force capable of backing up Europe and contributing to the defense of, for example, the Middle East, Asia or the Western Hemisphere." At the same time, he denounces Europe for establishing "preferential relationships" with Third World countries. Western leaders, he

writes, must “end political disputes over East-West relations and North-South policy, especially *Western conduct in the flash points of conflict in the Third World* [emphasis added].” Kissinger is demanding a free rein to use military force to back up International Monetary Fund debt collection policies in countries like Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina.

Kissinger and the ‘flexible response’ doctrine

Kissinger’s *Time* magazine piece is the logical extension of a 30-year career as a Soviet agent of influence. His aim is the destruction of the nation states of Europe—and the United States. In his memoirs he boasts of his “conviction of the obsolescence of the nation state.” (*White House Years*: all quotes below are from that source unless otherwise indicated.)

NATO’s first serious crisis came with the U.S. backdown in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Russia forced President Kennedy to withdraw all American intermediate range missiles—those capable of reaching Soviet territory—from Britain, Italy, and Turkey, and most strategic bombers from Europe and Asia as well. The first hole in the U.S. commitment to defend Europe came with the formal enunciation of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) in December 1962 by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Strange McNamara. MAD stated that if the United States replied to a Soviet invasion of Europe with a nuclear attack on Russia, only the destruction of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could result. (At the same time, McNamara killed the U.S. ABM program.) The Kennedy administration proposed to set aside the Eisenhower policy of “massive retaliation” in response to a Soviet attack on Europe and replace it with a policy of “flexible response,” that the United States would not necessarily respond to an attack with total retaliation against Russia, but that a “limited nuclear war” was also possible.

Kissinger was a National Security Council (NSC) consultant working directly under NSC director McGeorge Bundy. Kissinger is widely credited with formulating the policies of MAD and “flexible response” in his 1957 study *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, written under Bundy’s direction for the Council on Foreign Relations. “Limited nuclear war,” Kissinger wrote, “represents our most effective strategy against nuclear powers or against a major power which is capable of substituting manpower for technology.”


Adoption of the policy pulled the rug out from under pro-American leaders in Europe, such as West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, whose government fell shortly thereafter. Adenauer later warned that the new U.S. nuclear policies would “hand Europe over to the Russians.” France’s President Charles DeGaulle responded by withdrawing from NATO’s integrated military command and building an independent French nuclear missile force.

Kissinger and ‘Ostpolitik’

The end result of this shift in U.S. policy was to bring Willy Brandt and the Social Democrats to power in West

Germany. “The opposition [Social Democrats] . . . had urged a neutralist [and unified] Germany equipoised between East and West,” wrote Kissinger later in his memoirs. Kissinger was President Nixon’s National Security adviser when Brandt came to power in the fall of 1969. Previous West German governments had refused to recognize the puppet Soviet regime of East Germany whose very political existence was dependent on Soviet military power. It had been anathema to conceive of a settlement in Europe with Germany divided and dismembered.

As soon as Brandt put together a ruling coalition and even before his government was installed, he requested that Kis-



Why Europe needs a nuclear defense

The great fraud of Kissinger’s “Plan to Reshape NATO” is the notion that Europe can be defended without nuclear weapons. “By 1990,” he states, “Europe should assume the major responsibility for conventional ground defense. This is well within the capability of a group of countries with nearly one and one-half times the population and twice the GNP of the Soviet Union.”

The map shows the real story: NATO Western Europe—shown to the left and below the dark line—lacks the geographical basis for a defense in depth. The arrows show potential Soviet attack routes. A Soviet armored column can reach the French border on the Rhine within hours of crossing into West Germany. The closest reinforcements for the European line are thousands of miles away in the United States. Furthermore, Soviet military spokesmen insist that they will precede the land invasion of Western Europe with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons bombardment.

singer meet secretly with his aide Egon Bahr to work out his "opening to East." Kissinger wrote: "I recognized the inevitable, I sought to channel it into a constructive direction. . . ." Baloney. Kissinger agrees with Brandt's policy to bring about a united *Mittleuropa* under Soviet rule. Both kept their governments completely in the dark about the secret Bahr-Kissinger meetings, and also about their negotiations with the Soviets for recognition of the "German Democratic Republic." As Kissinger recounts: "My contact with Egon Bahr became a White House backchannel by which Nixon [sic] could manage diplomacy bypassing the State Department"—and the U.S. Constitution. (Soon many Europeans would attack Kissinger publicly for double-dealing. In October 1973, Kissinger ordered a world-wide military alert without any consultations with NATO. The allies were outraged. Kissinger's response? "I don't care what happens to NATO, I'm so disgusted.")

The summer following Kissinger's secret meeting with Bahr, the Soviets and Brandt signed a treaty of settlement and of recognition of East Germany. "The Federal Republic had crossed its Rubicon," Kissinger wrote. "Bonn was accepting the division of its country in return for nothing more than improvement in the political atmosphere."

Not quite. Brandt was preparing for future unification under Soviet terms. Brandt and Bahr worked for a corrupt, oligarchist elite of Europe, which considered the Soviet leadership a junior partner.

"The Soviets did not trust the Abrasimov-Rush channel alone," wrote Kissinger of the 1971 Berlin talks. "They wanted to find a forum that would include Bahr, in whom they obviously had confidence." Bahr was included in the negotiations. The next step was a third secret meeting between him and Kissinger, this time appropriately enough at a conference of the oligarchical Bilderberg Society. Bahr proposed a formula for resolution of differences with the Soviets over Berlin. Kissinger writes:

I explored Bahr's approach with [Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly] Dobrynin on Monday, April 26. He accepted with an alacrity that suggested that he was not hearing it for the first time. I have known no Soviet diplomat—including Gromyko—who would accept a new major proposal without referring it to Moscow. It was not always absolutely clear how many channels were operating and who the principal negotiator was.

Kissinger's ABM and SALT treaties

Bahr is an obvious Soviet agent of influence. But it was Kissinger who, while promoting Bahr's *Ostpolitik*, negotiated the two strategic arms treaties which seemed to seal Europe's fate as a Russian satrap, while disarming the United States.

With the ABM Treaty, the United States formally renounced the development and deployment of a defense against

Soviet nuclear attack, while granting the Soviets enough concessions to enable them to construct a nationwide defense system against most U.S. nuclear warheads and today a mobile system rapidly deployable in a crisis against the remaining threat. If that were not enough, the interim agreement on strategic arms granted the Soviets the right to 60 percent more intercontinental ballistic missiles and 45 percent more submarine-launched ballistic missiles than the United States. (See *EIR*, May 24, June 7, 1983; Feb. 7, 1984.)

With this guarantee, the Soviets built a strategic arsenal capable of making a successful, preemptive attack on the United States—a military blackmail threat capable of bringing about Kissinger's cherished "obsolescence of the nation state" and "inevitable" "neutralist Germany equiposed between East and West."

The treaties laid the basis for the Soviets to take the "Mutual" out of Mutual Assured Destruction. The Europeans panicked at what this meant for the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella: A Soviet invasion of Germany that resulted in a nuclear exchange could lead to a Soviet victory and occupation of Europe.

In response, Kissinger cynically declared 1973 to be "the Year of Europe." He threatened Europe with the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear guarantee unless it made concessions to Nixon administration economic policy. He called his arrangement "a new Atlantic Charter." After the policy flopped, many Europeans believed that Kissinger had played a role in launching the "oil crisis" hoax of 1974 as economic retaliation.

Kissinger's immoral balance-of-power politics continued under the Carter administration in the form of the "Arc of Crisis" policy towards the Middle East. Kissinger began his return to power in 1982 with a May 10 speech before the London Royal Institute for International Affairs, in which he bragged that he had been an agent of the British oligarchy within the American government.

Last Jan. 13 in Brussels, Kissinger directly attacked the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe. Speaking at a conference sponsored by the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, he said:

No leader of the West today dares to affirm what his strategy [to defend Europe] dictates: That to avoid defeat he would be obliged to resort to nuclear weapons.

Kissinger denounced Europeans who resisted his appeasement policies as warmongers:

The appropriate model is the period prior to World War I when client states pursuing regional rivalries drew their protectors into a holocaust by gradual increments, the full significance of which was not understood until it was too late.

Contrary to such pontifications, it is Kissinger's bid to dismantle the Atlantic Alliance and disarm the West before a growing Soviet military power which threatens to plunge the world into a nuclear holocaust today.