

International reactions to the Kissinger plan

International reactions to Kissinger's March 5 Time magazine piece on the restructuring of NATO were swift and frequently harsh. We present here a sampling of them, pro and con.

The State Department punts

John Hughes, a State Department spokesman, gave this official response to the Kissinger policy statement at a Feb. 27 State Department briefing.

We note that Mr. Kissinger has re-affirmed the centrality of the transatlantic defense relationship to Western security and world peace. We share that view. We believe that the NATO alliance is healthy, that its structure is sound, and that its strategy is valid and viable.

The administration believes all allies should make a greater effort to strengthen NATO defenses, and is pleased to note the progress that is being made in this regard. The United States, for its part, will continue to make an undiminished contribution to the strength of the alliance. Views such as Dr. Kissinger's represent his own thinking, and are constructive contributions to the healthy consideration of issues within the community of alliance security concerns.

Europe hits Dr. K's 'irrational pessimism'

During meetings with President Reagan March 5, **West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl** complained to the President about Kissinger's program, according to a **senior Reagan administration official** who briefed reporters on the session. Because of "discussion which has appeared in public print" about "reshaping NATO," the official said, it was necessary to reaffirm the relationship between the United States and Europe. "There should never be any doubt in Europe about American commitment to Europe, nor should there ever be any doubt in the United States about the importance of an American presence in Europe," the two heads of state agreed.

"Are you referring to Kissinger's piece in *Time*?" *EIR*'s reporter asked. "Yes," he replied. "Was Kissinger discussed

in the meeting?" another reporter asked. "Yes." "Who brought up Henry Kissinger, what was discussed?" The official answered: "The Chancellor made it very clear that troop withdrawal proposals would be counterproductive. . . . That should give you an idea of who brought up Kissinger and in what context."

"You have been quoted as calling Kissinger's proposals bizarre. Is that an accurate quote?" *EIR* asked. "Yes, it is. Now, I don't believe I was referring specifically to Dr. Kissinger, but in this situation, when NATO has just achieved one of its greatest victories, the successful deployment of the Euromissiles, I find it bizarre that anyone would suggest we need a major overhaul of NATO. My motto is, 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it.'"

Alois Mertes, the highest ranking undersecretary in the West German Foreign Ministry, rejected Kissinger's proposals as "irrational pessimism" damaging to the Alliance, in a Feb. 27 statement to the press. "The supreme command of NATO should be kept in American hands because only an American will have political weight with the U.S. President in a crisis, which no European can have," he said. Mertes rejected Kissinger's ideas as "an unjustified dramatization of the problems of the Alliance. Rough cures of this kind only serve to weaken the credibility of the United States among its friends and enemies."

In an interview March 16 with the weekly *Die Zeit*, Mertes declared that withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe would mean "giving up Western Europe if the Soviet Union attacks."

Karl Feldmeyer, *military correspondent of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, wrote in the newspaper's lead editorial March 6:

In the final analysis, it is the U.S. nuclear umbrella that counts. Only the risk this umbrella creates is credible and unacceptable for the Soviet Union. Only it can prevent Moscow from imposing its will upon Western Europe—be it by political or military force. . . . It is from this aspect that Kissinger's thrust has to be considered problematic. It can only reinforce Moscow's hopes that it can avoid a revision of its own policy because the West will not stick to its own

policy. . . . Security is not to be found in the land of make believe. Security results from recognizing that NATO cannot fulfill its tasks without taking into account, together with the Americans, the global lever of Soviet policy. What is required is not ways out, but respect for reality.

The Swiss financial newspaper the Neue Zürcher Zeitung editorialized in its March 4-5 issue:

It seems that self-doubt, anxiety about the future, and internal controversies are the elixir, or possibly even the vital sustenance, which has kept the Atlantic Alliance going for 35 years now—*dubito, ergo sum*. But almost as soon as it successfully withstood the demanding political trials of counter-armament, it is now once again plunged into the abyss of a new transatlantic discussion over whether it can survive at all. And once again, the immediate trigger for this exercise is a provocative analysis by Henry Kissinger published in this week's *Time* magazine—an exposé which one is not unjustified in associating with the author's relentless ambition to play an active political role in Washington once again. This new controversy, however, has brought some things to light which have been knocking around for some time within the American-European relationship. . . .

In his arguments, Kissinger burrows all the way down to psychoanalytic depths. He would like to cure the "feelings of guilt, self-hatred" and status-seeking, which comes along with the Europeans' voluntary inferiority. But there remains the nagging question whether the altruism of this therapeutic prescription might not be an alibi for withdrawal movements with different motivations, or even for an isolationist temptation.

We are also at pains to see the well-versed international politician at work here. As tempting as the thought might be to rouse the Europeans with a shock therapy and force them out of their comfortably passive satellite existence and into independent action, this politician ought to know what the European response would be to a radical reduction of America's commitment to the old continent, in view of past experience: instead of a revival of the desire for joint defense, there would be a flight into "relaxation of tensions"—a delicate term for *accommodation* to the will of the "other" power.

David Watt, head of London's Royal Institute for International Affairs, wrote in *The Times* March 9:

The necessity of having to say something about NATO seems to bring out the worst in politicians and pundits. Either they resort to laborious tactics of the "common heritage and shared values" variety or they go into a frenzy of doom and gloom about the erosion of Western defences, the barbarian hordes at the gates and the necessity of a radical restructuring of the entire edifice. . . . A beautiful case of the second was Dr. Henry Kissinger's largely preposterous article in a recent *Time* magazine. . . .

LaRouche: a Soviet backed-policy

Many of the observers cited so far spoke out against Kissinger's plan because of tactical disagreements, while supporting his "New Yalta" design overall. The only fundamental opposition to the Kissinger doctrine came from U.S. Democratic presidential candidate Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. who issued this statement March 12:

In the March 5 issue of the newsweekly *Time*, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger presented what was, in reality, Soviet policy for dissolving the strategic alliance between the United States and the nations of Western continental Europe. The policy Kissinger is campaigning to put into effect is called "decoupling." That Soviet doctrine is presently being promoted by the Aspen Institute, in collaboration with Kissinger and NBC President Thornton Bradshaw.

As Kissinger himself insisted . . . as recently as 1979, if the kind of "decoupling" which Kissinger now proposes were to be put into effect, all of Western Europe would be "Finlandized," reduced to the status of a Soviet sphere of strategic influence, reduced . . . to the status of "captive nations."

This development is fully consistent with Kissinger's record of performance as a Soviet agent of influence in such matters as SALT I, SALT II, and the 1972 ABM treaty.

Admittedly, we are rapidly approaching the point at which a Soviet shock-assault invasion might be expected on any or a combination of three targeted regions: 1) The Federal Republic of Germany—either the Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg regions only, or the entirety of West Germany; 2) Austria; 3) The "Finnmark" region of Norway. In the case that a Hart-Mondale administration were inaugurated in January 1985, the Soviet military junta would assume, with excellent evidence to support this conclusion, that a "Neville Chamberlain" government had been installed in Washington; it would act as it chose to act, and could then reach the Rhine river within 72 hours of shock-assault invasion. Were Kissinger's influence over the Reagan administration to continue at the present level, the Soviet military junta would tend to view the administration as too politically impotent to take effective measures against a Soviet aggression of the varieties indicated.

Europe is defensible

However, under proper arrangements, Western Europe is militarily defensible.

The essential strategic problem of Europe is not military capabilities as such, but an erosion of the in-depth strength to sustain needed military capabilities and political will.

In Britain: Already, before the summer of 1983, Britain was fairly described as a "formerly industrialized nation," reduced to a junk-heap under impact of "post-industrialization" policies introduced by the Harold Wilson government and pursued by Margaret Thatcher. During the late spring of 1983, Mrs. Thatcher stated she was committed to reversing this industrial rot. However, an "Establishment" coup of

forces allied politically to Lord Carrington reduced Mrs. Thatcher's government to an instrument of Carrington's policies.

On the Continent: The relative stability which France, West Germany, and other nations had contrived to maintain into 1980, despite the Carter-Mondale administration in the U.S.A., was wrecked by the impact of combined disasters: the radiating disorder caused by the Khomeini dictatorship in Iran, the Polish crisis, and the October 1979 inauguration of the U.S. Federal Reserve's policies of "controlled disintegration of the economy," jointly inaugurated by President Jimmy Carter and Fed chairman Paul A. Volcker. These disasters were compounded by the collapse of world-trade levels, a collapse caused by the "conditionalities" policies of the Swiss bankers and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The present state of crisis in Europe was detonated by the fall of the West German government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, engineered with complicity of Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Liberal Party of that country. Although Schmidt was and is a follower of Britain's Lord Carrington and Henry Kissinger, as long as he remained Chancellor his policies reflected a combination of pro-industrial and other forces within his own Social-Democratic Party and the trade-union and business organizations. With Schmidt's deposing, the combination of forces associated with his government dissolved, The Social-Democracy was taken over by forces allied to the Soviet-linked "environmentalist" party of Germany, the Green Party. In this circumstance, certain among the conservative factions in Germany entered understandings with the Soviet government paralleling the nakedly pro-Soviet policies of the Green Party and sections of the SPD leadership.

The present political dangers within West Germany are increased by the collapse of the nation's hard commodity export-trade. The collapse in levels of world trade caused by Volcker's policies and the "conditionalities" policy of the IMF is driving levels of production in German industry below the national "break-even point." This collapse fosters insurgence of deep cultural pessimism, akin to the cultural pessimism which destroyed the Weimar Republic of the 1920s from within.

Given the shattered state of the Danish, Belgian, and Italian economies, and the looming financial crisis of France, the erosion of West Germany becomes the threat of Soviet takeover of all of Western continental Europe as a "sphere of Soviet influence"—"Finlandization." This point is underlined by a glance at the map of Western Europe: What are the possibilities of defense of the remainder of Western continental Europe the moment Soviet assault-forces have reached the vicinity of Koblenz and Bingen along the Rhine? (Those who served under Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. in the Third Army drive through that region will be readily capable of supplying an informed estimate.)

In the case that the United States avows a commitment to a process of decoupling from Europe, as Kissinger and

Thornton Bradshaw's Aspen Institute, among others, have proposed with increasing vehemence, Soviet control over Western Europe becomes immediately an established fact of life in the policies of practice of governments of those nations.

The military defense of Europe requires more than military capabilities as such. It requires the correlated economic, political, and morale factors. We must not merely affirm our defense of Europe to the point of openly repudiating Flexible Response. We must rid our nations of the accursed depression in basic and capital-goods industries. We must repudiate the "conditionalities" policies of the IMF, the Volcker policies of the Federal Reserve, and establish a gold-reserve monetary order adequate to forestall the 1931, Hoover-style international financial collapse now threatening to plunge the world into the worst depression in centuries.

The Soviet military junta will not believe that the United States and the Atlantic Alliance have the will to resist a Soviet, Hitler-style military adventure in Europe, as long as Kissinger's circles remain within the U.S. government, or the possibility of the election of a Hart-Mondale ticket is believed in Moscow.

Applause from Kissinger's supporters

Former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt wrote an essay titled "A Bulls-Eye," in the Hamburg weekly Die Zeit March 8:

There's no doubt about it: once again Henry Kissinger has done a great service, not only to his own country but to the whole world. . . .

Kissinger is right when he states: Whenever one country dominates the alliance on all essential matters, the dependent countries will feel no motivation to undertake efforts toward political coordination. I would like to add: dependence corrupts—it corrupts not only the dependent partner, but also the overblown, almost solely determining partner. . . .

Kissinger has hit the bulls-eye: The Alliance needs a new global strategy—but this must finally once again include the conduct of all its partners in the world economy! This is what was originally written in the text of the North Atlantic Alliance. A global strategy needs to be firmly grounded upon political and economic solidarity amongst the allies; that is to say, it will also require the allies to limit and curb their competition and self-serving goals, even though this may seem in principle unavoidable. . . .

Henry Kissinger has expressed two truths and one probability. The first truth is that most European governments rely all too much upon American nuclear weapons, and that most of them are neglecting their own conventional defense. The probability is that a new American generation, inexperienced in world affairs, could react to a continuation of such neglect with the withdrawal of a substantial portion of American armed forces from Europe. The second truth is that both

the U.S.A. and the Europeans put much too much confidence in nuclear deterrence; in the event we needed to defend ourselves, our so-called flexible response would remain flexible for only a few days—after this it would shift into the nuclear destruction of central Europe.

Therefore, in the context of a re-formulated global strategy for the alliance we also need a reform of our military strategy. Not a ban on nuclear weapons, but rather a better conventional balance! It is not necessary to put one West European soldier onto the field for every Soviet soldier—the defender can get by with a certain numerical disadvantage. But we must certainly have better-equipped French reserve personnel. We need British reserve personnel! We need to strengthen our conventionally deployed air force and have more conventional ammunition for the German army. Under such qualitatively and quantitatively improved conditions, moreover, a partial withdrawal of American troops would not necessarily be bad. The Europeans would play an independent role!

The Daily Telegraph of London editorialized March 8:

Dr. Henry Kissinger's critique of NATO, published earlier this week in *Time* magazine, has generated some alarm in European capitals. The outgoing Nato secretary-general Dr. Joseph Luns has described Dr. Kissinger's words as "a bolt from the blue." There is a sense of shock that the supposedly Eurocentric Kissinger should want to rock the boat. In fact, Dr. Kissinger's remarks are not at all out of character. He has for years been anxious about the credibility of NATO's central doctrine of flexible response, at times quite explicitly so. He is possessed of a restless intellect which is challenged rather than dismayed by bureaucratic rigidities. Above all, Dr. Kissinger hopes to be invited to serve as Secretary of State in a second-term Reagan Administration. . . .

The main thrust of his argument is that Europe's defence should become a more explicitly European task, which would enable the United States to devote more resources to the maintenance of the global balance of power in other areas. The objection to Dr. Kissinger's suggestions is that they can be made to appear just another way of lessening America's commitment to Europe. However, if his prescription can be challenged, his description of NATO's malaise cannot. The best response is hard thinking and not a wail of protest.

The Financial Times of London editorialized March 5:

One might think that a contribution to the debate by a statesman with as much experience on the international scene as Henry Kissinger would call for deliberate consideration. But no, dismissal has been instant and sweeping from the German foreign ministry and from the civilian and military leadership of NATO. . . . The Kissinger ideas deserve serious consideration. And they deserve it all the more if it is true as some suggest that the good doctor still entertains hopes of

returning to high office in Washington, perhaps in his old post of Secretary of State in a second Reagan Administration.

The Kissinger lobby in the Senate

Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), U.S. Senate majority leader, had Kissinger's article inserted into the *Congressional Record* March 6, with the comment that "Dr. Kissinger has written one of the most logical yet provocative treatises on the Atlantic alliance to appear in a very long time. It is a masterful treatment by a master of diplomacy, and it richly deserves the careful consideration of the Senate."

Another Senate backer is **Larry Pressler** (R-S.D.), who on March 5 endorsed the Kissinger program and argued that if the United States engages in military activities in the Middle East, it should do so as a partner with other countries which have a stake in the region. Europe and Japan should take the initiative if military action is called for, and should be willing to lead the operation since it is being done for their benefit. "I feel very strongly that we should heed the advice of Secretary Kissinger."

Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), chairman of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and the leading Senate advocate of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe, is preparing legislation to help implement the Kissinger plan.

U.S.S.R.: Kissinger does not go far enough

The Soviet news agency TASS complained in a March 7 dispatch that Kissinger does not go far enough in splitting Europe from the United States. Making a play to the Europeans, TASS treats the Kissinger bid as yet another move by Washington to dominate the continent.

Attempts are now being made in the U.S. to "energize" the NATO bloc . . . and to tie Western Europe closer to Washington's adventurist course. This sort of "restructuring" of NATO is, this time around, being "pioneered" by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who detailed his program in *Time* magazine. . . .

His principal proposal is to make Europe shoulder "the brunt of the responsibility" for the "non-nuclear defense" by the year 1990. As can be seen from the program proposed by Kissinger, the measure sets itself two main objectives: to release part of the U.S. forces stationed in Europe, for use in other "hot spots" of the planet and to draw Europe into a new round of the arms race with the clear aim of undermining its competitiveness in the world market. . . .

The Kissinger plan does not, however, provide for a U.S. withdrawal from Europe. The new distribution of responsibilities does not make irrelevant the argument in favor of keeping significant U.S. forces in Europe, he says. . . .