

Zumwalt, Van Cleave score the U.S.S.R.'s arms treaty violations

In testimony before the Subcommittee on Defense of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on March 28, former White House defense adviser Dr. William R. Van Cleave and retired Adm. Elmo Zumwalt scored the Reagan administration for its failure to act on Soviet violations of arms-control treaties with the United States. In January President Reagan had reported to the Congress that the U.S.S.R. has violated six treaties in seven different ways.

Soviet violations of the SALT I and II treaties, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Test-Ban Treaty, and treaties dealing with chemical and biological warfare, have given strategic superiority to the Soviet military, the two witnesses declared.

We excerpt first from Admiral Zumwalt's testimony.

The President has informed the Congress of a number of Soviet arms control treaty violations. Each of these violations has important military significance. Collectively, they have contributed to a major shift in the strategic nuclear balance from one favorable to the U.S. into one unfavorable. . . .

[T]he Soviet violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty by building a huge new ABM battle-management radar deep in Siberia, has profound military significance. This radar is reportedly located near over 200 ICBM silos in which MIRVed missiles are deployed. By my rough calculations, this radar is in position to provide battle-management coverage to over 20% of the Soviet ICBM warheads. The radar would, of course, have to be connected to smaller radars and to interceptor missiles, and these are in mass production for deployment. If the Soviets can protect over 20% of their ICBM warheads from U.S. retaliation, this fact would significantly erode the U.S. deterrence capability. The Soviets would have a significantly less vulnerable first-strike ICBM force. The U.S. has completely deactivated its one allowed ABM fired [sic] while the Soviet Union has been engaged in a series of violations of the ABM Treaty. Overall, the U.S.S.R. has overwhelmingly reduced the ABM advantage the U.S. had at the time of the 1972 signing of the ABM Treaty. . . .

Summary of the military significance of the President's Report on Soviet arms-control violations:

- large numbers of illegal missiles and illegal warheads;
- about 20% of the Soviet ICBM warheads could be protected by the illegal ABM radar;
- the Soviets have developed a huge advantage in ICBM counterforce capabilities by developing new super lethal nuclear warheads;
- the Soviets have lowered the nuclear threshold with their BW/CW [biological and chemical warfare] offensive programs or increased their capability, undeterred, to initiate strategic biological warfare;
- the Soviets have increased the risk of surprise attack against NATO and their ability to achieve political victories by the use of illegal (improperly announced) military maneuvers. . . .

A Soviet first-strike capability

The Soviets now have an overwhelming strategic offensive superiority over the U.S., a true "first strike" potential so long feared by American strategists. The Soviets are now over ten years ahead of the U.S. in strategic offensive capabilities. This Soviet first-strike capability grows ever more ominous each year, and its usefulness for Soviet political blackmail and intimidation is even more dangerously apparent. This Soviet first-strike capability is already deeply affecting the whole world's politics, because what they call the "irrevocable" shift in the "correlation of forces" in Soviet favor has made all the nations of the world ever more willing to acquiesce in Soviet provocations.

And now there are recent revelations from Defense Department officials that the Soviet Union is also ten years ahead of the United States in Anti-Ballistic Missile defensive capabilities. The Soviets may, in just another year's time, be able to defend over one-third of both their population and offensive forces from the U.S. retaliatory deterrent. The Soviets may also at any time launch the first laser anti-ballistic missile battle station into space where they have long been superior in anti-satellite capabilities.

Soviet strategic superiority results in part from their SALT and other arms control violations, together with U.S. observance of its arms control constraints and U.S. unwillingness to exercise its own right to withdraw from such agreements on the basis of supreme national interest when Soviet cheating is detected.

These Soviet offensive and defensive advantages threaten the credibility of the U.S. retaliatory deterrent, which has preserved the world's peace since World War II. If the Soviets can threaten a devastating first strike, and then also threaten to defend against a significant part of the U.S. retaliatory response, deterrence is gravely jeopardized. The U.S. is not only vulnerable to a Soviet first strike, but even more significantly, because of this vulnerability, we are increasingly subject to Soviet attempts at intimidation through nuclear blackmail.

U.S. compliance with arms control agreements despite Soviet violations has led to a process in which the Soviet Union is able to add to the advantage it has traditionally had—outspending the U.S. for strategic nuclear systems—the advantage of being able unilaterally to advance in areas in which the U.S. is unilaterally constrained. This in turn has contributed to a general weakening in the confidence that Free World nations have in the U.S. and a weakening in our alliances. It has made more pronounced the typical peacetime disinclination of democracies to face up to totalitarian threats. It has produced a significant subset of our federal bureaucracy dedicated to the mission of working against U.S. efforts to match

its adversary, in the very same way that a similar subset led Britain to look the other way while Hitler was violating the Versailles Treaty. . . .

In order to demonstrate to the Soviet leaders that there are penalties to them for arms control violations and to motivate them to cease in the future, I recommend that actions be taken as follows—in sequence as Soviet violations continue.


1) Initiate programs which are allowed under arms control agreements, making it clear that such actions are in response to Soviet violations. Such action would include: a development of defensive biological warfare systems; development of offensive and defensive chemical warfare systems; increased R&D in ABM systems; reactivation of a modernized single ABM site; etc.

2) Initiate programs to match specific Soviet violations—i.e., encryption of the telemetering of missile tests; development of battle-management ABM radars; development of a second new ICBM type; etc.

3) Announce that the time is fast approaching when our supreme national interests will require that the U.S. withdraw from the treaties and political commitments which prevent us from redressing the consequences of Soviet cheating.

Reagan is doing 'nothing'

Dr. William Van Cleave, director of the Defense and Strategic Studies Program at the University of Southern Cal-



The receiver and transmitter of the large phased-array, early-warning and ballistic missile target-tracking radar at Pechora. An identical radar in the Central USSR almost certainly violates the 1972 ABM Treaty.

ifornia, headed the team which advised President Reagan on defense issues during the 1980 presidential election campaign and the transition from the Carter to the Reagan administrations.

Given the importance and potential political impact of such a document [the administration's report on Soviet treaty violations], there has been a puzzling attempt to downplay it by both the administration and the media. There has also been little discussion of how the United States should respond to Soviet noncompliance. Any effective U.S. response was called into question only four days after the submission of the report to Congress, when the President delivered a major speech on U.S.-Soviet relations that re-emphasized arms control and the need for arms negotiations. And the question seems to have been laid to rest by the President's most immediate military action in the aftermath of the report—which was to agree to a \$57 billion cut in defense spending over the next three years. . . .

I have the greatest admiration for President Reagan's decision to make public seven examples of Soviet arms control violations, and to say publicly what his predecessors would not: that the Soviets have been violating all important arms control agreements. But what is this administration doing about it? Nothing. What is it doing to dissuade further Soviet noncompliance? Nothing. And what is it doing to correct the military advantages that the U.S.S.R. has been acquiring through noncompliance? Again, nothing. . . .

The reasons for the failure of arms control are clear. The Soviets have subordinated all other considerations to the attainment of nuclear superiority, and consequently have refused to agree to any significant constraint that might interfere with that goal. . . . The Soviets are willing to violate agreements outright in order to pursue military advantage. . . .

Despite the magnitude of this noncompliance, as well as increasingly threatening Soviet foreign ventures, there continues to predominate in the American political process an undaunted emphasis on arms control as the key to stabilizing relations between the two superpowers. Contrary to the realities or experience, domestic politics encourage the preeminence of arms control. . . .

The primacy of the arms control process to date has had the deleterious effect of lowering the standards of strategic force survivability while simultaneously establishing itself as the "centerpiece" of U.S. defense planning and national security policy. As such, U.S. force modernization is portrayed as an unnecessary arms "build-up," instead of what it actually is: a reaction to threatening Soviet programs.

What an agreement accomplishes, or does not accomplish, in terms of national security has become far less important than merely reaching an agreement. It has led to a regrettable view expressed by a recent envoy of the White House to Moscow on arms control [retired General Brent

Scowcroft]: "Any kind of an agreement that we have with the Soviet Union is going to be in our interest." . . .

The role of educator must be taken by the President. The Reagan administration should confront Soviet violations with a strong public information program which emphasizes the Soviet attitude toward arms and arms control agreements and the necessity for the U.S. to have a determined compliance policy. The realities of arms control and of the Soviet threat should be clearly explained, and arms control fever cooled. The administration should take the violations report as an opportunity to live up to its campaign promise of a new arms control realism. . . .

The Soviet walkout from the START and INF talks is no disaster. To the contrary. Given the arms control record, Soviet unilateral suspension of arms control talks might even increase the safety of every American. Rather than considering new concessions to induce the Soviets to return to the negotiating table, the U.S. should declare that *it* has now suspended arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union until it ceases violating and defeating the purposes of existing agreements and surrenders the unilateral advantages it has achieved by such actions. . . .

The Soviet leadership must clearly understand that whenever they violate a treaty some form of compensatory measures will be taken by the West, for if there is any question as to the credibility of the response, we will instead only be encouraging further Soviet noncompliance. . . .

[T]he United States government must insist that the Soviet Union cease all practices in violation of, or noncompliance with, existing agreements, and void itself of the fruit of those practices. This will require that the Soviets dismantle the corresponding programs and systems such as the Abalakovo radar, certain other ABM and air defense systems components, the SS-25 and SS-16, and all CW/BW facilities and stocks.

The U.S., otherwise, should announce itself free from the obligations of the violated agreements. And the U.S. should embark immediately on selected compensatory military programs. . . .

Such actions include accelerating the small ICBM program immediately increasing the number of deployed Minuteman III missiles by 100, adding an ABM defense to Peacekeeper (MX) and Minuteman deployments, upgrading air defense systems feasible for ABM capabilities, dispersing the bomber force and constructing austere bases for additional dispersal, and testing nuclear warheads above 150 kilotons. . . .

If the President misses this opportunity and the arms control process is permitted to continue unabated, we may find ourselves in the not too distant future confronting the Soviet Union with little more than hope. Non-reaction to Soviet arms control violations will take on the character of appeasement.