

analysis for the subject at hand: "We should know what we mean behind the formal definitions. When the Soviets talk about meat, they include things in their diet that you and I would not give to our cat," he said, adding that there are "Russian kilos and Western kilos," to the great dismay of the number-fetishists who seem to compose most of the Soviet-watching profession. Assessing the Soviet food program, he presented the facts and figures of the dismal collapse of the successive reforms, the eternal sinking of investment funds into agriculture, and buttressed the demonstration with figures, from which we have abstracted ratios indicative of trend functions in the Soviet agriculture (see fig. 1).

The period since 1975 has seen a precipitous *collapse* of the improvement in the diet of the Soviet population at large. But the same collapse occurred in *industrial* growth rates, as shown in evidence presented by Jiri Slama, of the Eastern European Institute of Munich (see fig. 2).

Slama demonstrated that most crucial sectors of Soviet industry will end the current Five Year Plan with a huge gap, as much as 10% for steel, 50% for nuclear energy, and 7% for coal extraction. "The gradual exhaustion of available resources reduces the magnitude of industrial startups while increasing the cost." Little new land, less growth in labor input and labor productivity, "the 11th plan is a failure and in 1985, the whole of industrial production will be inferior to the planned targets." Mechanical engineering and construction are particularly defective, energy bottlenecks multiply, and the process sheet in the economy as a whole is brutally disrupted. Slama concluded: "The problems that will be posed are known, but will not be able to be resolved by being compensated [by added other inputs or methods] neither today nor tomorrow, and *threaten at present to destroy the economic basis of the Soviet regime.*"


With such hard facts and figures in hand, one might have believed that the conference would have been able to get down to brass tacks and outline a research program aimed at determining the timing factor. How fast does the ongoing "collapse" trend impel the Soviet leadership toward compensating for its political-economic failure by other means, by war? What are the shifts in the internal composition of the Soviet economy that indicate the acceleration of the military production tempo, and thus indicate the strategic design of the Soviet military junta?

But no such program was forthcoming, and that is really no surprise. A few years ago, *EIR* published an exposé of the NATO civilian bureaucracy, demonstrating that it was organically part of the "One World" federalist apparatus—the Club of Rome, the Pugwash movement and the political faction generally identified with appeasement of the Soviet Empire. The insanities proffered at this conference did nothing to disprove our earlier conclusions on the necessity of eliminating this civilian bureaucracy, one of the major hindrances—intellectually, bureaucratically, and politically—to an effective defense of the West against the Soviet strategic threat.

Currency Rates


The dollar in deutschemarks

New York late afternoon fixing




The dollar in yen

New York late afternoon fixing



The dollar in Swiss francs

New York late afternoon fixing



The British pound in dollars

New York late afternoon fixing

