

Moscow's machine in U.S. Congress under attack

by Richard Cohen

When, on June 13 the U.S. Senate blocked further cuts in funding the U.S. beam-weapons program by a 47-45 vote, it was the first significant defeat for the Soviet-inspired "arms control" lobby's efforts to cripple both the doctrine and its practical implementation first announced by the President on March 23, 1983. The vote defeated an amendment sponsored by Kissinger intimate and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Charles Percy (R-Ill.) to delete another \$100 million in funding from President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In its final recommendation, the Senate is certain to authorize virtually the entirety of the (insufficient) White House request of \$2 billion to initiate its ballistic-missile defense program.

Of even greater importance, beginning with the June 12 Senate floor debate on the administration-sponsored Anti-Satellite (ASAT) program, a full-scale backlash against the year-long dominance of the Soviet inspired "arms-control" lobby over the legislative agenda and President Reagan's conciliatory re-election rhetoric was unleashed.

Typical of the debate that preceded the ASAT vote, Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) opened up asking: "Who runs this country—this Congress or the leadership of the Soviet Union!" Then on June 13, debate on the Percy amendment to the SDI reached such intensity that a number of senators took to the floor to charge that the Percy amendment was aimed at protecting the Kissingerian doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). A terrified Percy, attempted to exonerate himself by stating that his amendment was not meant to re-introduce the MAD doctrine, whereupon Sen. John Tower (R-Tex.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, shouted, "By George, it comes pretty close!" By June 14, Capitol Hill sources reported that the Wallop question of whether Moscow was dictating the U.S. Congress's defense policy through the instrument of the Soviet-inspired "arms-control" lobby was being echoed

throughout the corridors of Senate office buildings.

The Wallop charges and the sudden round of serious questioning of Soviet intervention in U.S. defense legislation followed a report to the nation on that specific subject aired on May 31 on national ABC-TV by Democratic presidential candidate and *EIR* founder Lyndon H. LaRouche. Since that broadcast, in which LaRouche detailed evidence demonstrating a direct Soviet role in drafting legislation against weaponry in space then sponsored by U.S. congressmen and senators, the LaRouche campaign staff has provided congressmen and senators, as well as the Reagan administration, with complete details on the direct intervention by Moscow into U.S. defense legislation.

So explosive is the information that in an unprecedented maneuver, House Speaker Tip O'Neill (D-Mass.), a deputy of the Soviet-directed "arms-control" lobby, on June 2 ordered a ban on the free distribution of LaRouche's information to the House. Then, on June 11, CBS network television "misplaced" a scheduled tape of candidate LaRouche's half-hour exposé of retired Gen. Daniel Graham's "High Frontier" proposal, a phony low-technology substitute for the Strategic Defense Initiative which has been given wide publicity. Capitol Hill sources reported in the wake of this week's "backlash" against the Soviet-directed Capitol Hill operation that "you [i.e., LaRouche] have something to do with it."

On June 12, Sens. Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) and Paul Tsongas (D-Mass.) were forced to withdraw their long-standing amendment demanding a moratorium on ASAT testing, for lack of support. Last month a similar measure was passed in the House.

Even more remarkable was the near-victory—in a 45 to 48 vote—of a Wallop amendment that stipulated that "nothing shall be construed to limit the ability of the President to act in a manner consistent with the national security interests of the United States." In its place, the Senate passed only a

“certification” amendment, requiring the White House to regularly certify that the administration is trying to negotiate in good faith with Moscow on ASATs.

The debate on ASATs saw the first direct attack on Moscow’s congressional machine. Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) challenged the Senate: “What are we going to wind up doing—compromise with the Soviet Union across the board?” In response to a “certification” amendment demanding that ASAT testing be consistent with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Wallop followed up by asking: “Who is to say that [the head of the Soviet’s U.S.A.-Canada Institute, Georgii] Arbatov or one of those other people who has almost total access to the press of the United States will not say that this is outside the circumstances provided for in the ABM treaty?”

This momentum carried over to the defeat of the Percy amendment on the SDI. Informed Capitol Hill sources had been predicting that the Senate might even cut more than the \$400 million the House last month slashed from the President’s request. Sen. Charles Mathias (R-Md.) had been proposing an amendment that would have cut the SDI by \$900 million, while a \$700 million slash was seen by Hill observers as the aim of other anti-SDI Senate forces. Yet on June 13 both amendments were dropped. Finally, the Percy version fell on the Senate floor. It should be noted that key Senate Democrats, including Hollings (S.C.), Heflin (Ala.), Long (La.), Boren (Okla.), DeConcini (Ariz.), and Glenn (Ohio), voted against the Percy amendment.

Reportedly, during the course of the recent London economic summit, President Reagan, joined by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, rebuffed attempts by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to get the President to make more concessions in order to secure talks with Soviet President Konstantin Chernenko. (In addition, the President reportedly scolded Thatcher for her request that Britain be officially allowed to sell small weapons to Iran.) One Reagan intimate tells me that his circle is now convinced that Moscow is certain of U.S. retaliation if it sought a provocation prior to the November elections.

Before the ASAT vote in the Senate, the President reaffirmed on June 8 that because of verification problems, the United States would not rush into an ASAT agreement. The President, with an eye to the upcoming Senate vote, was sending a message to the Hill and to the Soviets. Two days later, on the eve of the Senate vote, Chernenko, in a move clearly known beforehand to the White House, pressed publicly for an ASAT negotiation.

Then on June 12, on his return from the London summit, Reagan was confronted by two key senators representing the Kissinger wing of the Republican Party: Percy and Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.). After having stood firm in the face of Maggie Thatcher’s pressure, Reagan rejected an appeal delivered by the senators at the White House to change his approach to summitry with the Soviet leadership. Taking their cue from the campaign script of former Vice-President Walter Mondale, Kissinger’s front-men Per-

cy and Baker demanded that the President drop his requirement that a U.S.-U.S.S.R. summit be “carefully planned” and have “a reasonable chance of success.”

Baker, publicly calling these conditions “anachronistic,” made his call for an immediate summit, to later be institutionalized, when he spoke at the June 9 commencement exercises at Dartmouth University in New Hampshire. A few weeks before, the leading Soviet Congress handlers, including Georgii Arbatov, met with the supporters of Henry Kissinger and Democratic Party foreign-policy guru Averell Harriman to plot strategy at the annual Dartmouth Conference (On U.S.-Soviet relations) held at the university.

While the President was snubbing the Percy-Baker operation, Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, director of the Office of Strategic Defense, was deployed to the annual meeting of the American Stock Exchange in Washington on June 11 to debate Sen. John Glenn on the SDI. Abrahamson emphasized early deployment of anti-missile defense systems, stating that while a complete system may take five years, partial systems could be deployed in the interim as research makes them feasible. Explicitly distancing the administration’s program from General Graham’s “High Frontier”—stating that while High Frontier may be short-term, “it is less effective” than what the administration wants—Abrahamson told a friendly group of top corporate executives that American scientific and technological know-how makes ballistic-missile defense a certainty. Debater Glenn, who would later vote against the Percy amendment, could only complain that the White House was overstating the feasibility of the program, while confiding that during his short presidential campaign, he found the so-called “Star Wars” issue the hottest item, with the great majority of the population supporting it.

The day before the Abrahamson-Glenn debate, the SDI program had chalked up a major technological victory with the success of the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE)—proving that an ICBM could be intercepted and destroyed in flight (see article, page 54).

The liberal leadership of the Democratic Party responded to these developments with a new level of hysteria. National chairman Charles Manatt called a June 12 press conference to denounce the U.S. Army’s successful HOE test and to announce that the Democratic presidential nominee will oppose strategic defense. Joined by Kissinger crony and former opponent of the Apollo Moon Shot project Jerome Wiesner of MIT, Manatt called the test and the whole Strategic Defense Initiative “a radical provocation”; Wiesner termed it “absolute insanity.” Manatt then directly posed the November election as a contest between “Reagan’s preparations for war in space” and “the Democratic nominee who will support a moratorium on testing such weapons,” thus confirming the LaRouche’s assertions, in the broadcast suspiciously delayed by CBS, that a Democratic candidacy of the current liberal front-runners would be based on the Moscow-encouraged effort to destroy U.S. advanced strategic capabilities—in particular the SDI.