

## Weinberger refutes Kissinger at NATO ministers' meeting

by Umberto Pascali

In response to a question from an *EIR* correspondent in Italy on Oct. 12, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger attacked Henry Kissinger's strategy of decoupling the United States from Western Europe. Weinberger was addressing the concluding press conference of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Stresa. He restated in no uncertain terms the determination of the United States to defend Europe as essential for its own security.

The meeting represented a potential victory for Weinberger, the number-one supporter in the Reagan administration of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) for beam-weapons defense: The focus of the discussion at Stresa was the SDI and, for the first time, West German and even Dutch spokesmen admitted that they had been assured by Weinberger that the new space defense system would also cover Europe. "Finally we understood what these Star Weapons are," the German spokesman told the journalists. "They are not 'Star Wars'; it is a whole anti-missile system." When asked whether there had been criticism of Weinberger, "No, no," the spokesman replied. Another high-level German military spokesman said: "Many things regarding the SDI have changed since the last meeting in Turkey. The U.S. assured us that the system would cover Europe."

On Oct. 10, the day on which the Stresa meeting started, the Italian daily *Resto del Carlino* wrote that "the Americans reassured the Europeans that it is impossible that a space defense system would not cover Europe. There are even some who are suggesting that the old continent could be the first to have an anti-missile defense system."

The European shift toward grudging recognition that there

is no alternative to the SDI was immediately perceived by the Soviet Union, and on Oct. 11 Radio Moscow attacked Weinberger for demanding "unconditional support" from the Europeans for the SDI. "The U.S. plans for militarization of outer space increase the danger of nuclear disaster."

The high point of the offensive for the SDI was reached during the final press conference. *EIR*'s Marco Fanini asked Weinberger: "Recently, General Rogers warned of the fact that the Soviets are planning a blitzkrieg against Western Europe [see Documentation], while others, and notably Mr. Henry Kissinger, are requesting that U.S. troops be pulled out of Europe. Don't you think that this latter position is very dangerous?" While NATO Secretary General Lord Peter Carington began to display visible signs of nervousness, his face flushed, Weinberger replied: "I have said it so many times: yes. I do not think there is anything that can be achieved except potential damage to ourselves, the country, and to the NATO alliance, if the American troops were reduced and the U.S. commitment to NATO reduced. The efforts that you mentioned or the comments that you mentioned are made by people who, in good faith, believe that all of us, specifically including the United States, need to do more in the face of the continuing and growing Soviet threat; but my own personal feeling is that one of the worst ways of achieving that result would be to cut or to pull out the U.S. troops or reduce the American commitment to NATO."

"The American commitment to NATO," Weinberger continued, "is a vital part of our national defense and a vital part of the defense of freedom and of the West. It is my hope and my firm policy that this contribution continue intact, and

certainly today's results emphasize to me, as I have reported to the press, the tremendous benefit that can come to all of us from a continuation and strengthening of the NATO alliance."

### Battle behind closed doors

Despite Weinberger's assurances, the meeting saw an intense fight on the proposals which he submitted to the meeting, reliable sources report. While "outsiders" were kept well away from the real discussions, the outlines of the fight could nevertheless be discerned. On the question of the Soviet SS-20 missiles, for example, Weinberger declared that the Soviets are deploying many more of them, while the Dutch representatives denied this. The issue is important because it implies the necessity of a NATO counterdeployment.

Discussion of the NATO ministers also focussed on the problem of the Soviet Spetsnaz special commando units and how to defend particularly the missile silos in West Germany from Soviet sabotage. Weinberger stressed that the Western governments underestimate the Soviet military capabilities: "We are too naive."

But the fight was most intense on the SDI. At a certain point, a special formula was invented—"not construction, but thinking"—i.e., that, for the moment, there will be only research and analysis on the new defense system, not production and deployment. Another formula was: We want only the peaceful use of space. Even the Dutch spokesman declared: "Not construction but thinking; anyway, we must be ready to give an immediate answer to the Soviets also in this field."

West German Defense Minister Manfred Wörner was the most outspoken opponent of the SDI, but changed his position several times during the course of the meetings. Two days before the Stresa meeting, he had warned of the danger of war in Europe during his talks with his Italian counterpart Giovanni Spadolini; immediately afterward, he denied ever having made the statement. Spadolini then reported that he agreed with Wörner that space should only be used for peaceful purposes. Wörner himself told the press that Weinberger had devoted a large part of his report to the space defense systems. "We are going toward the utilization of space [for military purposes], but this cannot happen for five years." Wörner and Weinberger settled a long-standing dispute on the construction of NATO infrastructure in Germany. Now \$7.8 billion has been allocated for the construction of facilities for U.S. and Canadian troops arriving in Western Europe in time of military crisis.

The big surprise was the behavior of Minister Spadolini, who denied up to the last minute, and against the testimony of his colleagues, that the question of the SDI "had even been touched." Spadolini, who ordered the distribution of a picture of himself arm-in-arm with Lord Carrington, declared to the astonished journalists that nothing of the kind had been discussed, and that "I consider the British to be the reserve of

wisdom of the world." Pressed by the journalists to explain Wörner's position, he finally "confessed": "Maybe the Germans are interested in SDI, but it is an interest tainted by sadness."

---

## Documentation

---

# 'The scrapheap of revenge'

The Times of London published this editorial, "The Scrapheap of Revenge," on Sept. 19:

One would have expected such a principled declaration [President Reagan's March 1983 speech on strategic defense—ed.] to be welcomed, since it revealed a desire to break out of the depressing jargon of mutual retaliation. There was enough evidence that the doctrine of mutual retaliation was losing credibility with ordinary mortals. More important, there was overwhelming evidence that the Soviet Union had never embraced such a doctrine on principle, and had been working busily away at improving its defences against missile attack, through both its extensive civil defence programme and a persistent research effort into antiballistic systems. . . .

It is hardly surprising that the Soviet authorities reacted negatively to the Reagan announcement, in view of the fact that Soviet scientists have been working on the possibilities of beam weapons for nearly 20 years. Marshal Sokolovski discussed an "anti-rocket screening system" in a book in 1962 and by 1971 the Lebedev Institute in Moscow had succeeded in generating 300 billion watt pulses from a high-energy laser, the kind of intensive power which, to judge from all other frontiers of Soviet scientific research, would be initially pursued and evaluated for military usage. In 1982, a Soviet battleship fitted with a high-energy laser shot down a pilotless aircraft, while American intelligence has evidence that Soviet lasers have been used successfully to bring down incoming missiles. There is a military thrust behind all Soviet developments in high temperature physics. . . .

At this stage, the possibilities of beam technology can only be explored; but they should be. The detailed objections to the idea in practice reveal only a reluctance to contemplate the possibility that the foundations of contemporary nuclear theory are fallible and obsolescent. . . .

In principle . . . it must be right to prefer a defensive system, albeit an imperfect one, than to continue with the arid menace of mutual assured destruction.

*A speech by NATO Supreme Commander Gen. Bernard Rogers, at the 24th Annual General Reunion of the officers and officials of NATO, was reported by Il Giornale newspaper on Oct. 5 and 8, in a two-part article by Italian Gen. Alberto Li Gobbi titled, "Alarming report from the chief commander of NATO: The Warsaw Pact armies get ready for a blitzkrieg."*

General Rogers himself said, in summary, the following: Power in the Soviet Union is presently in the hands of two old cold warriors, Ustinov, the head of the armed forces, and Gromyko, the foreign minister. . . . Despite the serious economic and social problems the East European countries are facing, the forces of the Warsaw Pact are in a constant process of modernization. The aim is to make them more and more capable of an offensive blitzkrieg. Particular efforts have been made to increase fire power, the efficiency of "Command and Control," and to increase mobility.

Soon there will be deployed, "in forward areas," very modern planes like the Frogfoot, Fencer, and Foxbat-E, besides the new remote detection airplane Mainstay. Other nuclear submarines of the Typhoon type (20,000 tons) are in construction, and two new subs of the Oscar class have been inaugurated. . . .

Since, for the moment, there is no agreement in the negotiations, it is very important that NATO continue to demonstrate to the Soviets its firm determination to deploy the Pershing II and cruise missiles. This firm determination to continue our program, said Rogers, is the only means we have to convince the Soviets to go back to the negotiating table. . . . The experts agree that we should increase the number of nuclear warheads rather than reducing them.

In the conventional field, said General Rogers, in the unfortunate case of a conventional conflict, NATO, given its inadequate supplies, would be immediately forced to request from the political authorities the authorization to use nuclear weapons. And yet the nuclear weapons balance in Europe is 9 to 1 in favor of the Warsaw Pact.

It might look like suicide, but it cannot be forgotten that, in Europe, NATO geographically has its back to the wall and cannot afford to leave much terrain to fight an in-depth defense. This is the situation of the conventional forces. . . .

Besides, despite the improvements in some sectors, the gap between the Warsaw Pact and NATO that existed in 1973 kept increasing from 1973 to 1982, in each conventional category: soldiers, tanks, antitank weapons, artillery, air defense, and so on. . . .

[The general proceeded to propose a plan to restructure and strengthen NATO forces, including the capability to launch an immediate attack against the logistical and tactical forces of the enemy, better training, creation of adequate reserve units, better utilization of modern technologies, particular attention to electronic warfare capabilities, and rapid consultations among the NATO countries in case of operations outside NATO's area.]

Asked at the end, "What worries you the most in your mission, in case of crisis," General Rogers answered:

"1) to be able to receive quick and appropriate decisions from the responsible political authorities; 2) to 'last' in case of conventional attack; and 3) to make quick political decisions if it were necessary to use nuclear weapons."

Then he added bitterly:

"Because I already know how it will end up. At the first signs of imminent danger and at the request to be able to adopt adequate measures of alarm, the answer will be, 'My dear Rogers, you are too nervous. It seems to us that there is nothing new from the other side. Stay calm.' And to my further signals of aggravation of the danger, the inevitable answer of the usual politician will be: 'Yes, actually something is moving down there, near and even beyond the border, but countermeasures from our side would be only provocations. Please don't move and stay calm.'

"Finally, a few days later, a very nervous call will come from hell or paradise: "Goddamnit, Rogers! What were you guys doing, you and your goddamned troops in Europe?"

*The West German daily Die Welt published an editorial by Adalbert Baerwolf on Oct. 9, in support of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative:*

The country which first develops these non-material weapons to the point where they can be deployed, could politely ask the other side to please sit down at the negotiating table, as a mild expression of its own global strategic predominance. It is unthinkable that at the end of the technological battle this country will not be the United States. . . .

When President Reagan gave his famous "Star Wars" speech on March 23, 1983, this was only a remarkable speech. There was no program. And there was no program director. Today there is a "crash" program. . . . There is limitless financing. . . . Over a period of five years, more than \$26 billion shall be pumped into this program which will mobilize all technological forces in the powerful reservoir of the U.S.A. This is more than the 10-year program to put Americans on the moon cost.

[About 500 satellites with laser cannons or electro-magnetic cannons will catch potentially thousands of Soviet warheads. Those which escape will be destroyed by infrared sensors deployed on the ground.]

And who catches the SS-20 warheads which threaten Europe? The same sensors and the same weapon satellites which annihilate ICBMs could also destroy the tactical missiles from Eastern Europe which fly about 700 kilometers high into space. It is only a question of programming, trajectory parameters, and of quantities. Technology transfer is no longer a one-way street. America alone does not have in her pocket all the answers for the beam curtain, whose demonstration will deprive the Soviets of threats and bring them to the negotiating table.