Soviets exposed for deliberate arms treaty violations

by Carol White

President Reagan has finally released the report by his Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. The report, prepared at his request, was submitted to him on Dec. 2, 1983, with the Committee's unanimous endorsement. It has now been forwarded to the Congress, but without his formal endorsement.

Scheduled for release just before the Reagan-Gromyko meeting, this indictment of the Soviets for 17 acts of noncompliance, was embargoed in order not to prejudice the climate of the discussions. Even now, the President has left the doors open for negotiations with the Soviets, while stating, with reference to the report, that the administration “continues to be seriously concerned about Soviet behavior with regard to compliance with arms control violations and commitments.”

Nonetheless, the President is not publicly endorsing the reports. Instead, he told the press that in the eight months since the report was presented to him, “Neither the methodology of analysis nor the conclusions reached in this report have been formally reviewed or approved by any agencies of the U.S. Government.” The motives for the disclaimer are easily located in the Reagan-camp election strategy to present the President as more middle-of-the-road. Not only does such a strategy seriously underestimate the support in the population for a strong stand against Soviet terror tactics, but its effectiveness is belied by Soviet response to it.

While President Reagan told reporters that despite the report’s conclusions—that “the near total reliance on secret diplomacy in seeking to restore Soviet compliance has been largely ineffective”—the administration “is pursuing several such issues in confidential discussions with the Soviet Union.”

The Soviets have treated the report as a provocation. On Oct. 11, the day after the report’s official release, the Soviet news agency Tass said that a White House report charging Moscow with violating arms-control agreements was a fabrication, and accused President Reagan of using it as an election trick.

Tass called the report “another anti-Soviet fabrication” and said that it contained no facts to back up the allegations. “The insinuations are spun out of thin air,” Tass said, “which is so evident that the White House did not dare support the fabrication in full. And on the same day, Soviet media launched a vicious attack upon Secretary of Defense Weinberger then attending a NATO defense ministers’ meeting. Attacking growing European support for the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative, the Soviets reiterated their threat that they would look upon U.S. development of anti-ballistic-missile capabilities as a cæsus belli.

While the Soviet Union is hysterically determined to pre-

In violation of the ABM treaty, the Soviets have deployed mobile ABM radar on the Kamchatka Peninsula (marked with an X) since 1975.
vent U.S. deployment of a defensive weapons system, and particularly laser defense weapons, the Soviets have systematically built up their own capability in violation of the ABM treaty of 1972. Radar stations are of course key to the command and control functions of an ABM system. The Soviets have violated the prohibition against the development and deployment of non-fixed ABM radar. They have deployed just such mobile radars on the Kamchatka Peninsula since 1975. This allows them to deploy their radar to ABM systems in excess of the one system allowed by the treaty.

The ABM Treaty also restricts the deployment of early warning radar to sites on the periphery of the national territory, with such radars only to be oriented in an outward direction. The construction and orientation of a large radar station centrally, near the city of Krasnoyarsk, violates this provision. This radar station may well be part of a central battle station which can centrally coordinate and deploy ABM sites throughout the country. The design of the facility is substantially identical to another radar declared by the Soviets to be an early warning radar. The Soviets, however, have stated that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a "space tracking" radar. All early warning radars can also perform limited "space tracking" functions, and while this radar is no exception, its location and geometry show that it is not, in fact, a dedicated space tracking radar.

Soviet agents of influence in the United States and in Europe have called the veracity of the report into question. Aside from the obvious propaganda motive for doing so, the Soviets also stand to gain from learning in as much detail as possible the extent and capabilities of U.S. surveillance of their operations. The authors of the report discount this kind of incompetent criticism in advance, writing: "Past analyses (other than the President's report to the Congress of Jan. 23, 1984) have tended to invoke standards of proof applicable only when powers to collect and to inspect evidence, to subpoena witnesses, to take testimony under oath, to prosecute for perjury, etc., are available as legal tools.

Soviet deception

"The General Advisory Committee's report distinguishes between instances for which the evidence supports high confidence that material Soviet breaches have occurred, and those cases for which the evidence gives substantial reason for suspicion but is short of being conclusive." They found recurring instances of Soviet conduct involving deliberate deception, misdirection, and falsification of data during negotiations. One conclusion which may be drawn from Soviet concealment and denial activities—which have, according to the authors, increased significantly over the past 25 years—is that they are deliberately challenging U.S. verification capabilities in order to weigh their effectiveness.


This commitment was again violated throughout the 1970-1974 period, while SALT I was being negotiated and in its immediate aftermath, by the placement of Soviet nuclear missile-carrying submarines in Cuban territorial waters. The Soviets today, of course, are flagrantly violating territorial waters with their submarines as part of their present escalating terror campaign against NATO. They are a party to the Montreux Convention of 1936, which prohibited the transit of aircraft carriers through the Turkish Straits. They consistently violate this treaty with their Kiev-class aircraft carriers, despite the fact that they hold their territorial waters and airspace to be inviolate—as witnessed by the KAL shoot-down and the seizure of an American boat which strayed out of Alaskan waterways.

It is fairly well known that the Soviets have used chemical and biological weapons in Afghanistan. In fact, although they signed a biological weapons convention in 1972, not only did they violate the provision requiring the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes of all biological agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery, but they retained their production facilities which are still in use today.

The report details a series of violations of agreements intended to limit missile deployment, despite SALT and other obligations, such as a commitment on March 16, 1982, by President Brezhnev for a Soviet moratorium on the completion of SS-20 launch facilities in the European part of the Soviet Union. In May of 1982, Brezhnev further specified that the Soviets would stop construction of missile launch positions. These were constructed and brought to completion throughout 1982 and 1983. Among the SALT I provisions was the prohibition of the conversion of launchers for light ICBMs to launchers for heavy ICBMs. Despite this, the Soviets proceeded to convert their light SS-11 launchers into launchers for the SS-17 and 19 ICBM's. The treaty also called for the Soviets to dismantle ICBM launchers as they built modern SLBM launchers in excess of 740, yet they have not done so.

As important as known violations are Soviet efforts to conceal possible violations, in definite contravention to the provisions of SALT I. In order to ensure the possibility of verifying that both sides did indeed observe the treaty, it was provided that there be no deliberate concealment of communications. The Soviets, however, have encrypted their SS-X-25 missile telemetry so that the United States is unable to determine the characteristics of these missiles. Salt II allows each party to develop only one new type of ICBM. Since the Soviets have designated the SS-X-24 as that new type, the SS-X-25 violates the treaty.