

# Soviet sub Palme tries to torpedo U.S. beam-weapon defense program

by Mark Burdman

The Soviet military daily *Red Star*, which chooses not a single word lightly under conditions of the U.S.S.R.'s global prewar mobilization, could only find words of effusive praise for Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme in its Dec. 5 issue.

As if it was republishing accounts from the U.S.S.R.'s own foreign ministry special propaganda division, *Red Star* cited Palme's speech before the New York Foreign Policy Association two days earlier as the most convincing argumentation available that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative was the main threat to world peace.

There, Palme had stated: "It is not possible to seek security from nuclear destruction through even further development of military technology." Why not, one may ask?

The *Red Star* piece emerges from the same military apparatus that has spent considerable energies during the past year and a half deploying Soviet submarines illegally into Swedish territorial waters. In fact, the deployment of Palme to the United States was carried out with the same devotion and energy: Palme, himself, is a Soviet submarine, and it was the Soviets who most carefully guided his actions during his U.S. stay.

Prior to arriving in New York, Palme had been in Chicago, Illinois, nominally presiding over the Nov. 30-Dec. 2 meetings of the misnamed "Independent" Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, a.k.a. Palme Commission.

In reality, the meeting was presided over by top-level Soviet case officers, U.S.A.-Canada Institute chief Georgii Arbatov and GRU military intelligence Gen. Mikhail Milstein. It was these men, on-site, who orchestrated and directed the three-day meetings and final resolutions, which notably featured an attack on the "dangerous escalation of the arms race" into outer space.

The meeting provided an ample supply of malleable and gullible Western appeasers all too ready to bow to Soviet imperial demands, including Egon Bahr of West Germany; Cyrus Vance and James Leonard (coordinator of the Aspen Institute East-West Project) of the United States; Pierre Trudeau of Canada; Joop den Uyl of the Netherlands; and others.

Since the Commission meetings were especially focused on stopping the U.S. beam-weapon program, there was also a squad of quack anti-SDI scientists in attendance, including the Brookings Institution's Barry Blechman and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's George Rathjens and Jack Ruina.

Fresh from these meetings, the Soviet submarine surfaced and docked in New York during the evening of Dec. 2. His mission here, too, was to establish connections with the "crème de la crème" of the appeasement crowd which has been working so hard against the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The public highlight of the New York stopover was the Dec. 3 appearance at the Foreign Policy Association, which is a semi-private club for the "bluebloods" of the New York City area. Before 150 of such people, Palme repeatedly backed up the Soviet strategic evaluation, justifying the "tremendous distrust in the Kremlin over this [Reagan] administration" and poo-hooing the Soviet strategic threat to Scandinavia.

Palme even warned about the dangers posed by *American* airspace incursions over Swedish territory!

On the Strategic Defense Initiative, as *Red Star* so happily reported, Palme was emphatic, asserting: "We can't achieve security by technology. This just increases the arms race. . . . The ABM treaty was by far the most constructive agreement of the Kissinger years."

The reference to Kissinger was hardly fortuitous. When this correspondent challenged Palme that he was willfully behaving like a Soviet submarine in his posture on the beam-weapon question, he raced to the microphone, a sardonic gleam in his eye, exclaiming, "Ladies and gentlemen, this is a familiar event. This is the LaRouche organization. They follow me and Henry Kissinger to every event. On this, Henry Kissinger and I have a common interest. When it comes to Lyndon LaRouche, Henry Kissinger and I are very close."

Obviously, Mr. Palme was trying to communicate something profound, since the question had never referred to Kissinger at all.

The mystery of this was cleared up the next morning, when Kissinger showed up at the 117 East 64th Street residence of Swedish special envoy Anders Ferm, where Palme was staying, to have breakfast with the Soviets' favorite Swede. Observers on that street report that a welcoming committee of supporters of LaRouche were on hand to appropriately greet Dr. Kissinger, who had affirmed in a recent interview with a Swedish weekly that he agrees "70% with Olof Palme" on many issues.

Evidently, when it comes to the question of torpedoing the U.S. development of beam-weapon strategic defense systems, the percentage goes up considerably.

# Palme: 'alarming' arms race in space

*The following are excerpts from a speech by Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme before the Foreign Policy Association on Dec. 3, 1984 in New York.*

We are now . . . faced with the threat of new technological developments in armaments. I refer to plans for new weapons systems such as anti-satellite weapons and nuclear missiles with greater precision, and even defense systems with anti-ballistic missiles. And perhaps most alarming is the prospect of an arms race in outer space.

Putting weapons into outer space would introduce many new and dangerous elements into the ongoing arms race. And the whole discussion about an effective defense against ballistic missiles raises several serious questions:

1) Is it really possible to have an impenetrable missile defense system? A system which will guarantee that not one single missile will get through? According to the expertise [sic], this is a very doubtful proposition.

2) Even if it would be deemed possible to construct a perfect defense against ballistic missiles—could not nuclear weapons be delivered in many other ways than by ballistic missiles? For example, by airplanes, by cruise missiles, etc.? And perhaps even more means of delivery may be developed in the years ahead?

3) How would a system of missile defense conform with important treaties already in effect: the Outer Space Treaty, the ABM Treaty, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty?

4) If one of the superpowers were to deploy an effective missile defense system, would this not be a strong incentive for the other superpower to follow suit, and to take what it deemed to be appropriate counteraction?

5) To try to build a strategic missile defense system would be an expensive experiment. The costs are presently estimated to exceed \$1,000 billion. Is there not a better use for these huge resources?

It may be that those who argue in favor of strategic missile defense honestly think that this is a way out of the dilemma of deterrence. It is becoming more and more obvious that people do not trust deterrence: this way of keeping the whole of humanity as a hostage. Deterrence is a fragile system of security. Its stability is constantly undermined in the never ending arms spiral. It is like an addiction to a drug—you need a larger and larger dose of it. And at the end of the road, nuclear deterrence holds out the prospect of the apocalyptic abyss.

To meet this skepticism, to reassure one's own people, a technological breakthrough which will give a fool-proof defense is brought forward as a real possibility. But the only real answer to the dilemma of deterrence is a strategy of common security, of security ensured in cooperation with other nations and not at their expense, of negotiated political solutions and not unilateral, technical approaches. . . .

I came here to New York straight from Chicago, where we have had a meeting with the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. This is an independent group of senior political leaders . . . from East and West, as well as from North and South. We published our final report in 1982. . . . Our Commission has, in a modest way, provided a forum for continued contact and dialogue during years when such East-West dialogue has been scarce or even non-existent. . . . It is therefore natural that we have strongly welcomed the news that the United States and the Soviet Union will meet in Geneva in January to begin talks with the objective of reaching agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space arms. And at our meeting in Chicago, we put forward eight recommendations as to what these talks should aim to achieve.

1) Improved East-West relations, including regular summit and high-level meetings on an annual basis, with arms issues as an essential part of the agenda.

2) Mutual pauses: an agreed and verifiable pause in the testing of new types of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and a similar pause in deployments of nuclear weapons systems.

3) Substantial reductions of nuclear weapons.

4) Strengthen the ABM Treaty, and prevent deployment of weapons in outer space.

5) A comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

6) Preserving the non-proliferation treaty.

7) A battlefield nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Europe.

8) Confidence-building measures. . . .

What may be somewhat special about these ideas is the fact that they are the result of an intense discussion at a meeting where both East and West was represented. Our session this weekend in Chicago was the first one held with participants from both sides after announcement of the Geneva talks.

There ought not be any overwhelming technical problems in agreeing on any of these points. The final question is therefore whether there is enough political will on both sides. . . . And I believe that we who represent the non-nuclear nations of the world will do everything we can to promote such a political process.

To conclude: It is not possible to seek security from nuclear destruction through even further development of military technology. The only way to reach security is through political means: a lessening of tensions, a reduction in suspicion and distrust, and agreements on arms control and disarmament.