

The demonstration is also being supported by various U.S.-based groups linked to the Green Party of West Germany. The Greens are not only pro-terrorist, anti-American, and KGB funded; their program is modeled explicitly on that of the Nazis. They support the same "appropriate technology" genocide pushed by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, and they have recently taken to praising "brother Hitler," as one of the Green leaders did publicly at the party's conference in Hamburg. The Greens were recently denounced in Israel as anti-Semites and Nazis. But the overtly Nazi character of the Greens doesn't seem to faze either Jackson or his pals at the ADL, despite the fact that blacks and Jews would be slated for genocide if the Greens had their way.

Various Green followers in the United States have recently indicated that they see anti-apartheid issue and Jackson's Rainbow Coalition as the most promising vehicles for creating a Green-like movement in America. Randy Toler, the head of the Chicago, Illinois-based U.S. Green Party, told a caller that "our next big initiative will be a series of anti-apartheid demonstrations across the country, on the Friday before St. Patrick's Day. . . . We are in touch with Jesse Jackson on this. We think of Jackson's Operation Push as part of the Green Alliance. For us, it's a good issue, in terms of the local political situation. There is a large black population out here, a black mayor, and a lot of divisiveness."

Florentine Krause, a key Green Party ideologue who was deployed to the United States four years ago to help build the Greens, agrees with Toler. Krause says the two-party system in the United States makes it "very difficult" to set up a Green party, but, "All the limbs of the Green movement are in place—the environmentalists, the gays, women's groups, the freeze movement. All we have to do is organize it."

This is where Jesse Jackson comes in, Krause said. "Jackson's campaign, and his Rainbow Coalition in particular, was the first step. . . . It already exists as a political institution. Our strategy is to work within the Democratic Party, but to field slates of local candidates who will run on a Green-oriented platform. Jackson's operation will be crucial."

Jackson himself met with leaders of the West German Greens back in 1983, during a tour of Europe, and then proceeded to appoint Green sympathizers such as Anna Grygory and Barry Commoner to key posts in his presidential campaign apparatus. Jackson will undertake another trip to Europe in January to forge stronger links between the Rainbow Coalition and European Greens.

What this amounts to is using a black man to organize blacks for their own destruction—because that is what the Green operation is all about. According to both Toler and Krause, the individual most likely to become the Greens' national spokesman is Huey Johnson, who, as California Human Resources director under ex-governor Jerry Brown, campaigned for Chinese-style methods such as mass sterilization to cut population.

Weinberger on the

The following is slightly abridged from the text of the speech by U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger before the Foreign Press Club in Washington, D.C. on Dec. 19, 1984. All emphasis is in the original.

Thank you for inviting me to join you today. This is a good time for us to meet together, as President Reagan prepares to begin his second term. Before his reelection, Ronald Reagan told the American people where he stood on the most important issue before us, how to prevent nuclear war and build a more secure world, so that this generation—and future generations—will live in peace with freedom.

President Reagan has made it clear that he wants to reduce the threat of all nuclear weapons, particularly the most dangerous ones—the nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. By strengthening conventional forces—through both traditional and new technologies—he has begun with our allies to restore a balanced deterrent and to reduce reliance on nuclear arms in Europe. And now, by initiating a research and technology program on defenses against ballistic missiles, he has opened the door to a future in which nuclear missiles will become less and less capable of their awful mission, until we could hope for the day when the threat of nuclear weapons could be resolved entirely.

The American people have overwhelmingly endorsed these objectives. In the second Reagan administration, the President is determined to meet his commitment to the American people . . . and to America's allies. For in presenting the challenge of strategic defense, he said of our global allies: "Their safety and ours are one; no change in that technology can, or will, alter that reality."

This journey to a safer world will not be easy . . . nor short. The strategic defense research program will have to bear fruit before we will be in a position to make any decisions on deployment options. I am confident, though, that we can master the technical task before us, as we have accomplished so many other technical miracles in the past.

For 20 years now, the Soviet nuclear missile forces that threaten our nation and our allies have grown relentlessly. I am afraid they will continue to do so, unless we can convince the Soviet leadership that we can mutually agree to reduce

strategic doctrine

the nuclear ballistic arsenals through negotiations. We are also embarked on a program that we, and I am sure all men and women of good will, hope will render these missiles impotent and obsolete. The President's Strategic Defense Initiative can contribute to curbing strategic arms competition by devaluing nuclear missiles and thus imposing prohibitively high costs on the Soviets, if they continued in their quest for missile superiority.

In the 1960s and 1970s, we had different expectations. For example, one of my predecessors even predicted the Soviets would be satisfied with a few hundred ballistic missiles. He said they had given up trying to match, much less surpass, our strategic force. We thought our self-restraint in offensive nuclear forces, combined with a ban on missile defenses, would lead the Soviets also to restrain *their* offensive arms, abandon defenses, and accept mutual nuclear deterrence between our countries for the indefinite future. The United States acted on this expectation.

Through the 1960s until the end of the 1970s, we cut the budget for nuclear forces every year. Today, the total megatonnage of the U.S. stockpile is only one-fourth the size of our 1959 stockpile. Seventeen years ago, we had one-third more nuclear warheads than we do today. We thought this would induce the Soviets to restrain the growth of their nuclear forces.

We also thought we could reinforce Soviet restraint and facilitate limits on offensive arms by guaranteeing our own total vulnerability to a Soviet ballistic missile attack. We unilaterally gave up all defense, not only of our cities, but of our minuteman silos as well. We did so even though the ABM treaty permitted each side one ABM site. Advocates of this policy reasoned that if the Soviets could easily strike American cities, they would have no incentive to deploy more missiles.

In the mid-1970s, however, the scope and vigor of the Soviet build-up became apparent. Once more, we tried to restore stability by negotiating the SALT II treaty. Despite the lessons of SALT I, American negotiators again expected that the Soviets would curb their build-up if we continued to deny ourselves protection against Soviet missiles.

Again, we were wrong. Improvements and additions to

the Soviet missile force continue at a frightening pace, even though we have added SALT II restraints on top of the SALT I agreements. The Soviet Union has now built more warheads capable of destroying our missile silos than we had previously predicted they would build, even without any SALT agreement. We now confront precisely the condition that the SALT process was intended to prevent. That is why the President and I have always criticized the SALT II agreement so vigorously. It will *not* reduce arsenals. And the so-called "limitation" of arms permitted, and indeed accepted, the Soviet build-up of nuclear arms.

Moreover, as the President reported to Congress, the Soviet Union has violated several important SALT provisions, including a ban on concealing telemetry of missile tests. Since that provision was designed to allow verification of the SALT agreement, even President Carter stressed that "a violation of this part of the agreement—which we would quickly detect—would be just as serious as a violation of strategic weapons themselves."

The vast majority of Americans are deeply concerned about this pattern of Soviet violations. Yet some people who pride themselves on their expertise and concern for arms control have taken an upside down view. Instead of recognizing the problem of Soviet violations, they have criticized President Reagan for informing Congress about these violations. They argue that this showed that he was "not sincere" about arms control, as if sincerity required that we ignore Soviet violations.

I do not wish to be captious about past mistakes. My point here is that we must learn from experience. Some people who refuse to learn from the past now assert that President Reagan must choose between having his initiative on strategic defense, or trying to obtain set arms reductions. Yes, a choice is necessary. But the choice is between a better defense policy that offers hope and safety and which could bring us genuine and significant reductions, or to continue with only disproven strategic dogmas that have put us in a far less secure position.

The real choice is between strategic defense which will facilitate genuine reductions in offensive arms with greater security for East and West, or a perpetuation of our total vulnerability to any attacking missiles—whether launched by accident or by design—in the hope, twice proven vain, that this would slow the Soviet arms build-up.

We are all agreed that nuclear war must be prevented. This is the overriding imperative for our defense policy today, and has been for decades. However, we need to recall the United States and the Soviet Union have experienced vast changes in their relative strength, in their basic strategies, and in the types and number of weapons each possesses.

During the first four years of the nuclear era, there was no *mutual* nuclear deterrence—we had a monopoly. Because the monopoly was ours, no one seriously feared nuclear war. Even Stalin—often described as defensive minded—violated the Yalta agreement on Poland, crushed democracy in Czech-

oslovakia, blockaded Berlin, and encouraged North Korea's attack on South Korea. He had no fear, paranoid or otherwise, that the U.S. would launch its nuclear monopoly to maintain compliance with Yalta, much less to launch an unprovoked attack.

Later, when the Soviet Union also built nuclear weapons, there was still no mutual deterrence based on absolute vulnerability. For during the 1950s we spent some \$100 billion (in current dollars) to defend against Soviet strategic bombers—then the only nuclear threat to the United States. At that time, some of today's loudest critics of strategic defense advocated a large expansion of defensive systems against the bomber threat, and urged development and deployment of a ballistic missile defense for both our cities and our critical military forces.

It was not until the Kennedy and Johnson administration that we began to abandon our efforts to defend against nuclear attack, and instead base our entire security on the odd theory that you are safe only if you have no defense whatsoever. It came to be known as Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD. It has played a central role in the U.S. approach to arms control for the past 20 years, even though for many years now, actual U.S. strategy has adjusted to the fact that the original MAD concept was flawed. Our strategy has moved well beyond this to the point that it now seeks to avoid the targeting of populations.

Today, supporters of the traditional simplistic MAD concept supply most of the criticism of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative. Sometimes they admit that if both sides could protect themselves perfectly the world would be better off, but they oppose any effort, including seeking major arms reductions, that could move the world in that direction.

True believers in the disproven MAD concept hold that the prime, if not the only objective of the strategic nuclear forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union is the ability to destroy each other's cities. They believe that any U.S. defense against this threat is "destabilizing." It will, they say, inevitably provoke an overwhelming increase in Soviet forces and will increase Soviet incentives to strike preemptively in a crisis. They fail to appreciate the deterrent value of missile defenses, because they wrongly project upon the Soviet military their own irrational idea of the purpose of a Soviet attack. In fact, the Soviets have designed their offensive forces to be capable of destroying allied and U.S. military forces, in particular our silo-based missiles and military targets in Europe. At the same time, the Soviet Union has never abandoned its objective of defending its homeland against nuclear attack.

The ABM treaty never blinded the Soviets to the need for effective defenses. They have continued to place great emphasis on air defense. They are now ready to deploy a defense system with capabilities against both aircraft and many ballistic missiles. They have a massive program of underground shelters. They have built five ABM radars, with another one

under construction, that give them double coverage of all ICBM approaches to the Soviet Union, and they have exploited fully the provisions of the ABM treaty and—what is more—almost certainly violated it, as they advance their capacity for deployment of a widespread ballistic missiles defense. Since the signing of the ABM treaty, the Soviet Union has spent more on strategic defense forces than on strategic offensive forces. Clearly the Soviets do not share the MAD philosophy that defenses are bad.

So, it is quite wrong to argue that the President's "Initiative on Strategic Defense" would upset 35 years of "mutual deterrence," and spoil a successful approach to arms control and stability. On the contrary, the President's initiative will finally correct the conventional wisdom, which is so often wrong.

History is filled with flat predictions about the impossibility of technical achievements that we have long since taken for granted. Albert Einstein predicted in 1932: "There is not the slightest indication that [nuclear] energy will ever be obtainable. It would mean that the atom would have to be shattered at will."

As we proceed, we will of course not give up our triad of deterrent offensive systems. Rather we will continue to maintain deterrence and indeed strengthen and modernize all three elements of our triad, because we do not know when we will actually be in a position to put our strategic defense system in place. But reliance exclusively on these offensive systems, without pursuing effective defenses, condemns us to a future in which our safety is based only on the threat of avenging aggression. Our safety and that of our allies should be based on something more than the prospect of mutual terror.

Another mistake critics of strategic defense make is to contend that effective defense is technically unobtainable. History is filled with flat predictions about the impossibility of technical achievements that we have long since taken for granted. Albert Einstein predicted in 1932: "There is not the slightest indication that [nuclear] energy will ever be obtainable. It would mean that the atom would have to be shattered at will."

Based on our research so far, we cannot now say how soon we will be in a position to make decisions on defensive options, nor can we today describe all the specific forms of

such defenses. But clearly, the Soviet military and their scientists at least are confident that strategic missile defenses will be effective. Their extensive effort to acquire such defenses give ample evidence of their conviction, as does their major effort to stop us from proceeding with our defense initiative.

We all recognized from the outset that a complete system or combination of systems for strategic defenses could not be deployed overnight. There could be a transitional period when some defenses would be deployed and operating before others would be ready. Some have argued that this transition would be particularly dangerous, that it would upset the present deterrent system without putting an adequate substitute in its place.

The opposite is the case. If properly planned and phased, the transitional capabilities would strengthen our present deterrent capability which is one of President Reagan's high priorities. In fact they could make a major contribution to the prevention of nuclear war, even before a fully effective system is deployed. If the Soviet leaders ever contemplated initiating a nuclear attack, their purpose would be to destroy U.S. or NATO military forces that would be able to oppose the aggression. Defenses that could deny the Soviet missiles the military objectives of their attack, or deny the Soviet confidence in the achievement of those objectives, would discourage them from even considering such an attack, and thus a highly effective deterrent.

But we would not want to let efforts towards a transitional defense exhaust our energies, or dilute our efforts to secure a thoroughly reliable, layered defense that would destroy incoming Soviet missiles at *all* phases of their flight. Such a system would be designed to destroy weapons, not people. With such a system we do not even raise the question of whether we are trying to defend missiles or cities. We would be trying to destroy Soviet missiles by non-nuclear means. And I emphasize again—by non-nuclear means—before the Soviet missiles get near any targets in this country or in the Alliance. The choice is not between defending people or weapons. Even the early phases in deployment of missile defenses can protect people. Our goal is to destroy *weapons* that kill people.

Thus, based on a realistic view of Soviet military planning, the transition to strategic defense would not be destabilizing. In fact, initial defense capabilities would offer a combination of benefits. They would contribute to deterrence by denying Soviet attack goals. And should deterrence ever fail, they would save lives by reducing the scope of destruction that would result from a Soviet military attack. The more effective the defenses, the more effective this protection would be. This objective is far more idealistic, moral, and practical than the position taken by those who still adhere to the mutual-assured destruction theory, namely that defenses must be totally abandoned.

I know that some Europeans fear that our pursuit of the

defense initiative would tend to “decouple” America from Europe. This is quite wrong. The security of the United States is inseparable from the security of Western Europe. As we vigorously pursue our strategic defense research program, we work closely with all our allies to ensure the program benefits our security as a whole.

In addition to strengthening our nuclear deterrent, such defenses would also enhance NATO's ability to deter Soviet aggression in Western Europe by reducing the ability of Soviet ballistic missiles to put at risk those facilities essential to the conventional defense of Europe—airfields, ports, depots, and communications facilities, to name just a few examples. An effective strategic defense would create great uncertainties in the mind of the aggressor, reduce the likelihood of a successful conventional attack on Western Europe, and thereby reduce the chance the Soviet Union would contemplate such an attack in the first place.

Yet some of the discussions of the President's initiative are based on the assumption that the United States can prevent indefinitely Soviet deployment of defenses merely by abstaining from *our* research and technology program.

Soviet history, the doctrines elaborated by their military leadership, and their current programs amply show that the Soviet leaders do not feel they are restrained by the ABM treaty's prohibition against a widespread defense against ballistic missiles. If the Soviets develop such a system from their intensive research program, in all probability they will deploy it.

Recent political comment on the relationship of arms control and strategic defense fails to confront that reality. Our Strategic Defense Initiative truly is a bold program to examine a broad range of advanced technologies to see if they can provide the United States and its allies with greater security and stability in the years ahead by rendering ballistic missiles obsolete. We have approached this program from the beginning according to the principle that SDI and arms control should work together . . . that each can make the other more effective. SDI is a research and development program that is being conducted completely within the ABM treaty.

In the near term, our initiative on strategic defense also provides a powerful deterrent to a Soviet breakout from the ABM treaty, a prospect made more worrisome by recent compliance questions—such as the new Soviet radar which is almost certainly in violation of the ABM treaty. Our strategic defense research program also makes clear that we take seriously the Soviet build-up in offensive arms. We have reminded the Soviet Union that both sides agreed to the ABM treaty in the first place, with the understanding that it would be followed by effective limitations on offensive arms. The Strategic Defense Initiative is not only the strongest signal we can send that we mean what we agreed to, it is the only real hope for a future without nuclear weapons. So we cannot accept the refusal of the Soviet Union to agree to real reduc-

tions in offensive arms, as we pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative.

In the long term, strategic defense may provide the means by which both the United States and the Soviet Union can safely agree to very deep reductions and, someday, even the elimination of nuclear arms. Many *talk* about such reductions, but we are *working* on the means by which they could actually come about without creating dangerous instabilities. We have sought to engage the Soviet Union in comprehensive discussions on how to make arms reductions more effective in the near term and on how to provide a safer future for all mankind.

This is not a process that will be aided by partisan or uninformed rhetoric aimed at forcing unilateral restraint upon

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the United States, as the history of the ABM treaty itself has shown us that.

Progress toward a more secure future will, instead, require both a determined strategic defense R&D effort, and persistent and patient dialogue with the Soviet Union in the months and years ahead.

Of course, we must negotiate with the Soviet Union—not for the purpose of freezing forever the vast numbers of existing warheads or permitting more and more of them—as SALT II did—with their hideous threat of total destruction and mutual vulnerability. No, we should negotiate with them to find a path to escape from that horror. That is why President Reagan holds before us a vision of a future world free from the threat of nuclear destruction. We must try to get the Soviet Union to join us in making such threats impotent, so that we can someday rid the world of the nuclear arms that underly such threats. This goal may seem far away, but difficulties should never cloud an inspired vision, nor slow us in our constant striving to realize that vision for all humanity. Let us move on the bright, sunny upland where there is hope for a better future for all, of which we all dream.

What follows is an NSIPS dispatch from Washington on Secretary Weinberger's Dec. 19 press conference, following the Foreign Press Club speech.

Secretary of Defense Weinberger called for the sharing of Strategic Defense Initiative technology with the whole world.

Answering a question on President Reagan's statement that he would be ready to share technological information on the SDI with the Soviet Union, Weinberger answered, "What the President actually said was that if we can get this technology, to have a very reliable defense against incoming missiles, we'll share it with the world, because it is vital to make clear to everyone that these missiles would no longer have either any utility or use, so they could indeed be destroyed. So there is no military advantage to be received. In fact it is the way to make these missiles obsolete."

In answer to a question from a British journalist on whether the SDI would cause the decoupling of the U.S. from Europe, Weinberger said: "A Fortress America just won't work. It can't work. It was recommended by some people in two world wars, and it failed both times. America could not live in a world in which Europe was overrun. A Strategic Defense Initiative of the kind we're planning will be equally effective and perhaps secure earlier success in dealing with intermediate-range missiles than strategic-range missiles. There's not the slightest possibility that America will be decoupled from Europe by the pursuit of this vital initiative."

He repeated this theme in answer to *Ad Dustur/London* journalist Mary Lalevée, who asked what Mutually Assured Survival would mean for Europe, in distinction to Mutually Assured Destruction: "There could be developed, for example, means to destroy incoming SS-20 missiles, which are still being added, as well as two new types of missiles. If you could destroy those before they hit any targets by non-nuclear means, you would not only have a better and more hopeful Europe but a far better and more hopeful world. It seems essential to me to try to base our strategies for survival and protection in the future on something other than the balance of terror. One of the early misconceptions about the SDI was that it would only apply to intercontinental missiles. This is not true at all. If we can do what we want to do—and we don't know that we can yet—that's the purpose of the research program, to find that out—but I have every confidence we can do it, because we have solved all kinds of technological miracles [sic] in the past. People have made many predictions which look foolish today. If we can do it, we will have a far safer, happier, and more hopeful Europe, and a far safer, happier, and more hopeful world."

An Italian journalist asked about the potentials for U.S. cooperation with its allies on the SDI. Weinberger said: "I think they are very great. We need all the help we can get on this. This is a massive task. There are a great many Japanese and European technologies that we use every day. I have very high hopes that there will be a strong worldwide movement to join in trying to work together on this technology and on this research and development program. It is to everyone's advantage. And as I said a moment ago, if we can get it, the President is prepared to share it with the world. I would hope that in the development of it, we will have the help we urgently need on the technology side, the development side and on the construction side."