

EIR Strategic Studies

A draft of a proposed revision of NATO doctrine

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

1.0 The imminent threat

1.1 According to its own doctrine, the Soviet Union is already in a state of war against the United States of America and its allies: (A) It is in a full-scale war-economy mobilization of a type and degree which Soviet doctrine prescribes to be a state of war; (B) Its military and war-economy mobilizations are consistent with rapid development and deployment of total-warfare capabilities, meeting the specifications of the maximum military option included in the Ogarkov Plan; (C) It is escalating a consistent propaganda-mobilization of its military and civil populations for imminence of a "Holy War" against the United States and its allies; (D) It is already deploying strategic actions, in Scandinavia, the Balkans, the Middle East, and elsewhere; to adjust the strategic correlation of forces in Soviet favor, for the prospective outbreak of warfare; (E) It has begun to deploy escalating assassinations- and sabotage-forces and actions against categories of personalities and institutions of the NATO countries, a spectrum of actions consistent with preparations for war-fighting.

1.2 The known strategic objective of the Soviet command, is to establish Moscow as the capital of a "third and final" form of the Roman Empire. The principal objectives include: (A) The elimination of the United States as a strategic military and economic power; (B) Bringing the Federal Republic of Germany into the Soviet political-economic sphere of strategic influence, and thereby bringing all of Western Europe into the status of semi-autonomous satrapies of the Soviet Empire; (C) To accomplish as much of this as

possible without military action, by aid of developing and deploying the capability for launching, winning, and surviving a general thermonuclear assault against the home territories of the United States and Western Europe; (D) To implement the maximum capability outlined in the Ogarkov Plan, if lesser actions are insufficient to accomplish the objectives by approximately the close of the present decade.

1.3 The Soviet strategic doctrine is essentially the elaboration of principles outlined in Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii's 1962 *Military Strategy*. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov's War Plan is a concrete application of those principles. Essentially, Thermonuclear War can be survived and won, if the specific problem of strategic ballistic missile defense, coupled with "passive" BMD of the civil population and structure of the home economy, plans is fairly described as a blend of oriental mysticism and military rationalism, of a sort which might be expected had a modern Fyodor Dostoevsky qualified for the Prussian General Staff. The motivation for warfare is irrational mysticism, blended with military rationalism bearing upon its execution.

1.4 The maximum option of the Ogarkov Plan, features what is fairly described as "intercontinental thermonuclear blitzkrieg, launched from the barracks."

1.41 It begins with an unlimited intercontinental barrage against the territory and military deployments of the United States, and simultaneous barrages of the NATO capabilities in Western Europe, in the Atlantic, in the Pacific, and in the Indian Ocean. The tasks which must be solved by this assault, include: (A) supersaturation of the land-based,

sea-based, and aircraft strategic capabilities of the U.S.A. and its allies, to reduce to the greatest degree the capacity for counterstrike against Soviet territory and military capabilities; (B) elimination of the possibility of U.S. logistical support for military resistance by Western Europe, by destroying U.S. Atlantic seaport cities, and U.S. naval and maritime assets, as well as air-lift capabilities; (C) Maximum neutralization of NATO military potential in Western Europe. This must include preemptive action against the naval ballistic missile capabilities of NATO and France, especially the SLBM capabilities.

1.42 The initial twenty-five to thirty minutes of barrages, intercontinental, intermediate-range, short-range, also prepare the assault through the Federal Republic of Germany, through Baltic sea-borne assault, and land and air-borne assault from Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. The assault should be expected to reach Bristol, England within about two weeks.

1.43 The prescription for such a blitzkrieg, must be, that the Soviet Union must win the war, and must not endure greater losses than approximately those experienced during World War II. This requires: (A) Neutralization of counterstrike potential of NATO and France within less than thirty minutes of the launch, probably by aid of submarine-launched "pin-down" detonations over U.S. territory within the time-frame estimated to exist between launch and U.S. missile-launch, plus continuing ICBM and other barrages of U.S. territory, to keep the U.S. counterstrike capabilities neutralized to the maximum degree; (B) Combined effects of Soviet strategic BMD and passive defense, to reduce the effectiveness of a U.S. counterstrike with surviving missiles.

1.5 Such a plan of assault prescribes its own principal limitations:

1.51 The command and control capabilities implied must be rehearsed and consolidated.

1.52 The depth of assault-missiles capability required must be deployed, in terms of both launch-installations and reload capacity.

1.53 The ASW capability required, including improved attack submarines, must be deployed.

1.54 Strategic BMD must be deployed.

1.55 Passive strategic defense must be readied, including the accumulation of grain-supplies through imports, and including anti-CBW measures, such as inoculations.

1.56 NATO and French forces must be in a state of zero-growth quantitatively and technologically, to permit the Soviet build-up to achieve absolute superiority.

1.57 The U.S.A.'s Strategic Defense Initiative must be aborted at all costs.

1.58 NATO must be prevented from adopting a "launch on warning" strategic thermonuclear policy.

1.6 If these conditions are met, the U.S.S.R. will be prepared, materially and psychologically, to deploy the maximum option of the Ogarkov Plan by approximately 1988.

2.0 NATO doctrine: war-avoidance

2.1 The general objective of NATO and its allies, must be to avoid war, by postponing the date at which the Ogarkov Plan's maximum option could be implemented. All of the measures taken to this effect center upon providing Moscow a known and assured penalty substantially greater than the maximum level of Soviet losses "acceptable" to the Soviet command, and by deploying rapidly a strategic and tactical ballistic missile defense, and neutron-bomb and related enhancement of counter-measures against naval and armored assaults by Warsaw Pact forces.

2.11 The first measure must be an operational doctrine "launch on warning": Maximum Deterrence. (A) more than a few missiles of the types capable of conveying thermonuclear warheads are deployed, a full-scale, "all birds fly," bombardment of all first and second priorities of Soviet and Warsaw Pact targets must occur automatically. (B) NATO will not accept limited nuclear warfare, "theater-limited" or other; the first launch of Soviet missiles in numbers exceeding several, is an automatic trigger for "all birds fly" bombardment of Soviet targets. (C) "Second Strike" is defined as the firing of reloads, plus airborne strategic weapons assaults. (D) This policy must be known and assured to the Soviet command.

2.12 The second measure is complementary to the first. NATO will not accept so-called "conventional" warfare in the European theater. Any assault will be met instantly by deployment of tactical nuclear devices, including enhanced-radiation devices, and such other existing capabilities for neutralizing such assault at the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany, or any other NATO nation whose territory is assaulted. The next phase of escalation is "all birds fly."

2.13 Improved ICBMs and IRBMs must be deployed at rates comparable to Soviet deployment of such launchers and reloads. Mass-production of "cold start," "precision-targeting" missiles, is a priority for making "launch on warning" deterrence credible and efficient.

2.14 Strategic and Tactical missile-defense must be developed and deployed in a "crash program" mode.

2.15 Measures of civil defense, especially in matters of food-supply and medical capabilities, must be launched at the greatest rate possible, with January 1988 target-dates adopted for establishment of a 12-18 month food-supply.



**NATO Secretary General
Lord Peter Carrington
(center)**

2.16 Security measures in port-cities of the United States and Western Europe, including strategic BMD point-defense measures, must be supplied, with January 1988 target-dates for deploying every possible means of point-defense.

2.2 All NATO countries and their allies must commit themselves to immediate and continuing programs of economic mobilization, providing both necessary military means and logistical strength in depth. All otherwise idled capacity of agriculture, basic industry, and the machine-tool industry must be utilized, and those categories technologically upgraded at the most rapid rate possible.

2.3 Tactical capabilities for resisting sea-borne, land, and air-borne assault in the European theater must be increased to the degree that war, if fought, will be carried immediately to Eastern European territory, abandoning withdrawals in the Federal Republic of Germany. Enhanced-radiation devices are presently indicated as leading features of resistance to naval and armored assault. This must be an immediate-response capability, constantly mobilized.

3.0 Strategic and tactical BMD

3.1 The development and deployment of existing "new physical principles" of technology shifts the balance of warfare, from absolute superiority of the offense, toward superiority of the defense. The key to this lies in the fact, that these types of defensive weapons-systems have an order of magnitude or greater superiority in firepower and mobility, and an implicitly realizable order of magnitude of superiority of costs of defense relative to costs of offense.

3.2 Strategic BMD and its "spill-overs" into tactical applications, are based upon primary and secondary technologies. The primary technologies are those which define the firepower and mobility of the weapons-systems; the

secondary technologies are those needed to assist the deployment of the primary technologies.

3.21 The primary technologies are: (A) Controlled fusion of plasmas; (B) Coherent, directed beams of energy; (C) Optical biophysics.

3.22 The secondary, or auxiliary technologies are those required to manufacture primary technologies' devices, or to detect and acquire targets, to aim at those targets, and to position primary systems for their assigned functions. These include improved computer technologies, such as parallel processing and improved analog-digital technologies. These include the supporting role of so-called "biotechnology" as supplementary to optical biophysics.

3.3 The potential gain in cost-advantage for defense, is twofold. Firstly, intrinsically, developed systems of defense, using "new physical principles," require less energy of combined production and deployment to kill a missile, than the combined energy of production and deployment of the missile they kill. Secondly, nologies into civil production, increases the productivity of operatives qualitatively as well as quantitatively. This twofold cheapening of the cost of production of defense, increases the firepower and mobility per-capita of the NATO countries, to the degree that NATO's defense is qualitatively superior to Soviet offense.

3.31 On the first count, it should be standard practice, to compute the average cost of killing a Soviet missile, and compare this with the cost of producing and deploying such a missile.

3.32 In the first phase of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the objective is to turn known varieties of principled capabilities into weapons which work, at any price, and to deploy these as rapidly as workable prototypes are produced.

3.33 In the second phase of SDI, the objective is to realize the gain in cost-effectiveness, such that: Given two powers with equal balance of combined offense and defense, and equal economic potential, the one which emphasizes the more the defense will win the war, because it can buy effectively more defense than its opponent can buy offense.

3.34 It must be NATO strategic doctrine, to deploy SDI-related technologies to effect rapid decreases in the per-capita costs of defense to the NATO countries as a whole. SDI technologies must spill over into the civil economies, to cause rapid increases in the per-capita physical-goods output of the NATO members and their allies. This must be accompanied by measures to steer the flow of investment away from so-called "post-industrial" shifts in the structure of economies, toward very-energy-dense, capital-intensive modes of employment of operatives in production of physical goods.

3.35 NATO's doctrine of strategic technology, must focus upon the fact, that a three-fold to four-fold increase in the energy-flux-density at the point of production, above present modes, means a qualitative advantage in terms of redefining the meaning of the terms "materials" and "natural resources." The combined development of controlled fusion and directed-energy systems, requires and makes possible the production and processing of new kinds of ceramics, signifying a revolutionary transformation in the metallurgical and machine-tool sectors. The transduction of very-high-temperature plasmas into coherently organized, directed-energy systems, must be at the center of policy-targets, by means of which the spectrum of "raw materials" is advantageously redefined, and metallurgy and machine-tool technology advanced by an order of magnitude or more.

3.36 To achieve these indicated objectives, the combined images of Leonardo da Vinci, Leibniz, the 1794-1814 Ecole Polytechnique, Gauss, and such successful "crash programs" of the twentieth century as the Manhattan Project, Peenemünde, and the pre-1967 postwar aerospace research-and-development, must be the adopted conceptual reference-points for development and deployment of both military and civil applications of "new physical principles."

3.4 To accomplish these urgently needed results, the NATO countries must supply preferentially low prices and quantities of credit for military and civil production essential to the development and deployment of military and civil applications of "new physical principles."

4.0 Strategic depth

4.1 Just as civil production is the depth of military capability within nations, the scale and productivity of physical-goods output of developing-nation and other trading-partners are an essential part of the strategic depth of the NATO countries and their allies as a whole. The political, social, and economic stability of these trading-partners, and their technological progress and increase of productivity in

per-capita physical-goods output, is a most vital strategic interest of the NATO alliance.

4.2 It is therefore an essential part of competent strategic doctrine of NATO, that national currencies be pegged to the relative physical-goods purchasing power of those currencies in the internal economy of the national currency, and that stable currencies be established and maintained through such energy-intensive, capital-intensive modes of technological progress as increase the per-capita physical-goods-output of the entire labor-force of each and all nations.

5.0 The question of will

If we do not adopt military, monetary, and economic policies to the effect indicated here, it must be concluded that we are unwilling to adopt policies and measures indispensable for achieving effective strategic depth, and that we are therefore not truly serious about defense of civilization against the Soviet imperial offensive now being positioned for an onslaught as early as approximately 1988.

If we lack the wisdom and will to employ all such means as are necessary to an efficient strategic defense, then it must be judged that our nations, like the Roman Empire before us, will fall prey to the barbarians because we have lost the will to change those strategic, monetary, and economic policies adequate to the continuation of our society.

In this universe, there are laws, which scientific discovery may place increasingly at our advantageous disposal, but which nations may not defy except that such nations be crushed in consequence of such defiance. Against the laws of the universe, the contrary opinions of the mere gods of Olympus are the cause of both death of those gods and also of those credulous nations and peoples which permit themselves to be misled by awe for the Olympians.

The imminently crushing menace of the barbaric pestilence about to launch itself from the east of Europe, is an affliction which could not efficiently menace us, had we not ourselves erred, in adopting and tolerating wrong turns in strategic and related policies over the course of, most emphatically, the recent twenty years.

There is, repeatedly, in the history of nations and empires, the recurring *punctum saliens*, at which point nations either abandon policies in defiance of the laws of the universe, or by choosing to refuse those changes in policies flowing from such laws of scientific and technological progress, such nations choose to be conquered or even swept from the pages of future history.

Such a *punctum saliens* is now. The NATO countries have all but exhausted the possibility of efficient resistance to conquest and enslavement. If we can not change our policies now, we are left with no resorts but either, disgusting surrender, or to make the nobility of our heroism in defeat memorable and inspiring to the cause of some future renaissance.