

# A U.S. policy for Greece-Turkey-Cyprus

by Phocion

The national interests of the United States, and the broader interests of the Western Alliance, are threatened with the possibility of a war, within the next six months, between Greece and Turkey, ostensibly triggered by the Cyprus dispute and related issues between those two countries, which are likely, with Soviet connivance, to pit Syria and Bulgaria on the side of NATO-member Greece against NATO-member Turkey.

The result of such a war, whether victory for either side or stalemate, will be Soviet politico-military control over the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles and, consequently, Soviet naval supremacy over the Mediterranean Sea. It would then be a matter of weeks to months, before Soviet supremacy in the Mediterranean translated into unchallenged dominance over all of Europe.

Behind the scenes, the following arrangements are known to exist: The Socialist government of Mr. Papandreou in Greece has informal assurances from Moscow that in case of such conflict, Greece would have a "certain status" over what is today Turkish Eastern Thrace, including Istanbul; Bulgaria is looking forward to acquiring a port in the Aegean Sea; Syria expects to conquer Iskenderun and the surrounding Hatay province.

The United States, on the other hand, has, secretly, made it known to Turkey that Washington, in such a turn of events, would look approvingly to Turkey's taking over Greece's Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean, would recognize Turkish control over Cyprus, and would be interested in the establishment of U.S. military facilities over that island.

All the above arrangements are in force at this time, despite any denials to the contrary, which are diplomatically mandatory at any rate.

This short-term orientation of the United States toward the problem is disastrous, despite whatever military advantages appear to recommend it. The policy's flaw lies in a misevaluation of current Turkish military capabilities to withstand a combined military challenge of Greece-Bulgaria-Syria with Russian blessings. The policy's flaw lies also in a misreading of the Turkish leadership's willingness to go to war under the present circumstances, given Washington's poor record in coming to the aid of her friends, especially in that part of the world. The Turkish leadership has another nightmare to contend with: If the local conflict turns in favor of the Moscow-favored contenders, would the United States use nuclear explosives to deny control of the Straits to Rus-

sia's navy? History shows that the sophisticated Turkish national leadership in both world wars and on other major occasions during this century has been more prudent than most in placing its nation's interests above those of its allies and friends.

In short, Washington's current posture is based on false assumptions. Once again, Washington has a blind spot when it comes to assessing the legitimate national interests of those nations who have chosen to willingly designate themselves "friends of America" over the last 40 years. Specifically on NATO's southern flank, the United States, in permitting Kissinger's policies respecting Greece to prevail in the form of the disastrous Papandreou government, has helped shatter Greece as a nation. Unless this treachery of the Greek nation is redressed, its consequences will haunt America's policies in the region, including its Turkey policy.

The United States should replace its current policy assumptions first, with the fact that the Papandreou government in Greece is an illegal government, not representing the Greek people nor the Greek nation, basing itself on vote fraud and large-scale domestic intimidation. The record of Papandreou's illegality has been compiled and is available. What is also known to agencies of the U.S. government is that the Papandreou political phenomenon is a creature of certain circles of the State Department. Papandreou's government would disappear overnight if certain State Department papers found their way to the light of day. Only extraordinary, blatant interventions into Greece's internal affairs by State and associated agencies are preventing Greece from having a nationalist, pro-Western government.

Should such a government emerge in Greece, the present Greek-Turkish crisis would be eminently soluable. Therefore, the cornerstone of any viable U.S. policy toward NATO's southern flank, must be the commitment to assist such a return to political normalcy in Greece. Under such restored conditions, all that is essentially required for resolving the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus controversy, is a return to the provisions of the 1964 *Acheson Plan*, perhaps with certain modern additions.

The Acheson Plan as it stood in 1964 called for 1) extension of Greek sovereignty over Cyprus; 2) establishment of a Turkish military base on Cyprus; 3) incorporation of Cyprus into NATO defense planning.

The 1984 addenda to the old Acheson Plan should include: 1) expulsion of the two British military bases from Cyprus, 2) their replacement with U.S. bases, if required and 3) an extensive economic development cooperation program between Greece and Turkey which will transform the current issues over the Aegean Sea from points of contention into opportunities for cooperation (e.g. the conflict over the continental shelf, territorial waters, airspace rights, etc.)

The matter hinges on whether U.S. patriots have the guts to oppose the State Department's policy toward Greece.