

Abshire (recently appointed U.S. ambassador to NATO), oversaw the transition team which set up the Reagan administration's entire foreign policy apparatus in 1980. One of the "team leaders" of the Philippines scenario, Nathaniel Samuels, was chairman of the Board of CSIS from its inception until recently, and has been a close friend and political ally of CIA head William Casey from the 1940s on.

Founded in 1962, as an adjunct to the Jesuits' Georgetown University, CSIS has been a crucial part of the back channel to Moscow, on behalf of a "New Yalta" redivision of the globe. CSIS is the operations center for numerous key figures in the New Yalta plot, including Henry Kissinger, the head of CSIS's International Councillors, Carter-era National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, former U.N. Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Bernard Lewis, the British intelligence specialist who first floated the plan for the "Balkanization" of the Middle East, etc.

CSIS is also the place of origin of plans to sabotage the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, and to wreck what is left of traditional U.S. military leadership, through Pentagon "reform."

Interview: Robert Kupperman

The following interview with Robert Kupperman, member of Georgetown CSIS's Executive Office and director of the Center's Science and Technology Programs, was provided to EIR by a Washington-area consultant. Kupperman directed the "Crisis Simulation of the Fall of the Philippines."

Q: How much was the Crisis Simulation scenario based on reality?

Kupperman: Given that it hasn't happened, it's always tough to tell, but we had two former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, the former director of the CIA, lots of your former undersecretaries of state, U. Alexis Johnson, Marvin Kalb. Nobody thought the scenario was unrealistic.

Q: Did you have a timetable?

Kupperman: *Now.* The scenario was retrospectively taken back to mid-August, in which it was presumed that Marcos died of a heart attack, and then it was taken to two days in October, last Wednesday and Thursday, when the game was played. It's our belief that it can happen at any time.

Q: How much was State, Defense, and so forth involved?

Kupperman: Not at all—the *current* people. But we have people who are quite recent in their experience and we have people who are quite involved in dealing with that part of the world. And, of course, we're dealing with ex-government officials, some of whom have very, very recent experience, all of whom were undersecretary or higher.

Q: How did the idea for this come about?

Kupperman: It's an internal CSIS matter, and we internally developed it. I directed it.

Q: You're obviously well aware of the DIA/CIA evaluation?

Kupperman: Yes. I can personally deal on a classified basis in many cases, but the Center deals purely on an unclassified basis with everything. It may be purely coincidence that classified documents say the identical things as unclassified—it would not be a great surprise.

Q: Do you think, with [Sen. Paul] Laxalt out there—that's a pretty high-powered delegation. . . .

Kupperman: Yes, but he got rebuffed by Marcos. Marcos, to my mind, is living in a delusionary world. I don't think he can keep up what he's doing. He's going to get deposed, whether for reasons of natural causes or fairly malevolent attempts.

Q: Where would you see the time-scale?

Kupperman: I think our view of the time-scale is, I don't know whether it's a month from now, a year from now, or in a strange sense, yesterday. But it's *soon*. That place is shaky, the NPA is getting stronger and stronger. With sort of selectively designed assassinations of the right generals, the army breaks up into fiefdoms and therefore there is a tremendous loss of cohesion. . . . Look, if Marcos were to disappear for whatever reason, constitutionally the successor is the speaker of the House. If he were assassinated and a few key generals were assassinated and a few command and control sites were taken out, the Philippine government wouldn't *exist*. Not for quite a while.

Q: In your wargame, do you specify the specific generals that would be taken out?

Kupperman: Some of them, yes. We didn't dwell on it, because it was televised and I don't want to get too close. We're close enough to the truth, I think that's enough.

Q: Have you talked to Armacost and Armitage on this?

Kupperman: We invited Armacost, he didn't come. I have not spoken to Armitage about it, but I've mentioned it to Weinberger. Look, we had an interesting group of people. We had U. Alexis Johnson, Gen. Edward Shimire, Marvin Kalb, Howard K. Smith, Daniel Schorr, Murray Weidenbaum, we dealt with both the economic and the non-economic. Also Richard Helms. We didn't deal with amateurs. Plus quite a number of lesser known people who were government specialists in the Philippines and related matters. As well as specialists in Soviet operations, like Ray Garthoff. No matter what one thinks or doesn't think of the quality of the job done, it was not because of a lack of qualified people.

Q: You said it went out on television?

Kupperman: We had it taped. We had a broadcast-quality taping of it, that will be produced in several forms, and most probably shown on television. Exactly where and when and

how, is a matter of negotiation. From that, transcripts will be developed. Before transcripts are developed, though, I would imagine that there will be at least some preliminary synopsis of what happened and what the analysis was.

Q: Now, on the outcome, let me make sure I have this right. There was the chaos developing after these assassinations and then the NPA took over and there was a huge crisis which developed and the Soviets actually backed down and took their own man out. Is that accurate?

Kupperman: There was more than their own man. The Daniel Schorr version [on National Public Radio—ed.] rather slim. There were a bunch of assassinations. It was unclear who took whom out. But the initial thing involved the assumption of Marcos's death, the assassination of the speaker of the House, the assassination of General Ver, the taking out of some key command and control facilities. A hostage barricade at the American embassy, a hostage barricade at the Intercontinental Hotel at the time of a meeting between the Filipino and American Chambers of Commerce. And seizure of the palace by the NPA. We also had the Vietnamese attacking Thailand. And an incident at sea, because we had an increase

a collision between an American and Soviet ship. We brought our team to the point of World War III on the first day, and the second day was to get them to back off. And that was the problem. . . . But whatever you want to call it, what I was trying to test, was this American very hawkish theme to want to take the Soviets on. . . . The real question was our strategic interests in the area, and not our tactical military problems. And what impressed me, I think more than anything else, was a real fear that things could go nuclear. And that we had to back off. We had to find ways of dealing with the Soviets to do that.

Q: How did that happen?

Kupperman: Slowly attritive, really in a simmering-down sense. People backed off. We had an initially extremely proactive President who wanted to bomb everybody. And we had an NSC calming the President down. All of this, of course, was deliberately designed. And the next day the President turned out to be a manic-depressive. I also had a psychiatrist there who treated several Presidents.

Q: Really? Who?

Kupperman: Bert Brown, former head of NIMH [National Institute for Mental Health], and now president of Hahnemann University. . . . I was very interested in the group dynamics and how a President behaves under stress. And he went from that to thoughts of resignation. It got these two teams so upset that they wanted copies of the 25th Amendment. So they got involved at that point. There's a kind of sanity question involved in game-playing, and that is, when are you playing the game and when do you believe it? These

people were wandering in and out of delusional states. Listen, I had Howard K. Smith delivering leaked commentary on television. Well-known faces. I had Daniel Schorr playing press secretary. I had Marvin Kalb wandering around helping. These are well-known people.

This took months to put together.

Q: Who was the team at CSIS who put this together?

Kupperman: Just my staff. I used Ron Palmer and others, various people with a variety of experiences. And we called them together for several meetings. But they were there to do mid-course adjustments. And to aid me in the reality of what was going on. I'm certainly not a Philippines expert.

Q: I wondered if you had any other big guns. Dr. Brzezinski has talked a lot about pulling the U.S. back to the Pacific Basin from the Atlanticist outlook.

Marcos is living in a delusionary world. . . . He's going to get deposed, whether of natural causes or fairly malevolent attempts. If he were assassinated and a few key generals were assassinated and a few command and control sites were taken out, the Philippine government wouldn't exist.

—Robert Kupperman

Kupperman: Brzezinski was not around. We had Jim Woolsey playing President. He used to be undersecretary of the Navy.

Q: Marcos's health, from what I understand, is not horrible at the moment, but you mentioned this idea of "malevolent forces."

Kupperman: Let me put it this way: We started off with the assumption that Marcos died of *natural* causes. And then the malevolent forces took over. I don't wish to belabor it, but it was an involved game.

Q: Who were your specific Philippine experts, on the generals and the army disintegrating and that sort of thing?

Kupperman: I would have to look up the list of names, but we have Ron Palmer, and Sullivan, a number of people who used to be in the Agency. Ray Cline.