

tion, a faction fight between the Socialists of the government and the conservative opposition, with Spanish neutralism and anti-Americanism as the only ingredient reflecting the outside world. No political leader has spoken out on the strategic reasons why the Atlantic Alliance is necessary; none has even hinted at the dramatic increase in Soviet fleet operations and Soviet influence in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Atlantic, as the reality in the context of which the Spanish NATO debate must be located.

This has lent plausibility to González's posing of the false alternative between either leaving NATO or staying in NATO in an anti-nuclear, anti-U.S. mode, which Gorbachov will doubtless appreciate. González himself declared during the parliamentary debate, "Not even the Warsaw Pact countries have an interest in a neutral Spain." The exact game González is playing may be clarified if some non-public deals he made with the Moscow leadership concerning NATO during a visit to Russia in 1982 were made public. It is significant that the same day as the NATO debate, it was announced that González will visit Gorbachov in Moscow *the day after the referendum*.

The voice of the "Western branch of the Empire" was heard in Spain in an article dictated by International Monetary Fund director Jacques De Larosière, published Feb. 9 in *El País*: The prospect outlined is that West Germany and Japan, taking advantage of the fall in oil prices, will become the new "locomotive" of the world economy in their respective areas. The division of the world into "dollar," "yen," and "ECU" economic and strategic areas, the last encompassing Eastern and Western Europe, is the old Trilateral plan. González's actions fit right in.

Portugal

Communist vote seals Soares comeback

by Laurent Murawiec

After years of hurling epithets at Portugal's Socialist leader, Mario Soares, the Communist Party of Alvaro Cunhal played the decisive role on Feb. 16 to send him to the presidential Palace of Belem, in the run-off of the presidential election. Soares, who had captured less than 30% of the vote in the first round, beat by a thin margin of 2.5% his right-wing rival, Diego Freitas do Amaral, who had himself missed victory by only 3%.

Most commentators had foreseen the triumphant entry of Freitas into Belem Palace. Had his sponsor, the young Prime

Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva, not swept last September's parliamentary elections? A 'dynamic of victory' was unfolding between their parties, Cavaco's Social Democratic Party and Freitas's farther-right CDS.

Many voters may have feared an 'unbalanced' domination of right-wingers, and especially the heavily monetarist-tainted crew around their presidential candidate, whose entourage is by no means free of nostalgia for one or the other form of the rotten Ancien Regime overthrown in 1975. Since Cavaco Silva seems firmly entrenched as prime minister, voting Soares into the less powerful presidency might have been a "hedge" by parts of the electorate.

But the crucial factor, undeniably, was the solid Communist vote by Cunhal's forces for his supposed arch-enemy, Soares, one of the vice-presidents of the Socialist International, the man who became Portugal's prime minister with the money and backing of Willy Brandt and the French Socialists. It is Moscow's liking for Willy Brandt, the West German Social Democrat who invented "détente," that is behind Cunhal's shift of the Communist vote to Soares. Soares harvested in the second round virtually all the votes cast in the first in favor of the Communist-backed candidate and pacifist-Catholic contender Maria Pintasilgo, herself supported by a bevy of left-radical revolutionary officers.

Cunhal's party had overwhelming reasons, beyond the fear of contributing to the election of a "right-winger." Soares has incurred a debt to the Communists; it will have to be paid. His predecessor, General Ramalho Eanes, had owed his 1980 election to the Communists, and paid dearly for it. The debt was coined in the form of political influence, Communist infiltration of the administration, Soviet penetration in Lisbon, and facilitation of Soviet enterprises in Portuguese-speaking Africa.

Observers in Lisbon deem that Soares, known as "the State Department's candidate," owes his new job to a deal passed between State and Moscow. Soares, "the symbol of April 25 [1974]," will use the international position of Portugal on behalf of the common aims of his patrons, first the destabilization of southern Africa. Alvaro Cunhal, Lisbon-based sources report, will soon retire from his leadership in the PCP to become some form of Soviet roving ambassador for Africa.

Internally, the election was a wasted opportunity. The discredit that swept Soares's party out of parliamentary power was due mostly to his slavish kowtowing to the International Monetary Fund. Prime Minister Cavaco Silva, whose political wings have been somewhat clipped by the failure of his presidential candidate, is also a monetarist adherent to IMF recipes. After three national elections in six months, a pause will be decreed in politicking, affording some degree of empty stability. Parliamentary elections will probably be decreed by Cavaco within one year in order to consolidate the parliamentary base of his minority coalition government.