The 'Great Russian race' and the 27th Party Congress

by Konstantin George

It was largely overlooked at the time, but, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachov, in his interview with the French Communist party newspaper L’Humanité some months ago, let a very significant policy “cat out of the bag.” Gorbachov was asked what he considered to be the main problems facing the Soviet leadership. Without hesitation, the Kremlin boss replied: “. . . the low birth rate among Russians.”

The recently concluded Soviet Party Congress rubber-stamped crucial policy decisions addressing this Russian demographic crisis. These policies, motivated by the purest Soviet leadership, were developed during Gorbachov’s first year in power, and reflect the overriding Kremlin concern for the future of the Great Russian race.

Three broad, identifiable features of this domestic Soviet policy to regenerate the Russian race are already in an intense implementation phase. They are:

1) The tempo of Russian and Ukrainian colonization of Siberia, the Soviet Far East, and the far north of European Russia is to be greatly accelerated. This involves massive population resettlement. These areas will receive, almost exclusively, the great bulk of all investments in new industries in the civilian sector.

2) The Muslim Republics of Soviet Central Asia will not receive any big new projects. The final killing of the great river diversion project to shift fresh water from Siberia into Central Asia, highlights this overall policy decision. These Muslim Republics have been bluntly told—both at their own regional party congresses and at the Soviet Party Congress in Moscow—to “make do” with what they have, and expect no further investment-help from “Big Brother” in Moscow.

3) Even the fiction of local control over local issues by native Muslim party stooges has been terminated, as we shall document below with the case of Uzbekistan—by far the most heavily populated and most significant of the Soviet Muslim Republics. Now, even nominally speaking, the regional leadership of Uzbekistan is majority Russian.

On April 1, Radio Moscow officially announced that “three new cities will be created, one in Siberia, and two in the Soviet Far East.” In December 1985, the authoritative daily Sovietskaya Rossiya had disclosed that guidelines under discussion for the upcoming Party Congress called for at least “an additional 1 million workers” to be relocated to Siberia and the Far East during the 1986-90 Five Year Plan.

Involved are obvious priority considerations of economically developing new areas with energy and mineral deposits, and, necessary pre-war population dispersal programs. But a third crucial policy consideration—the racist demographic one—is involved. Moscow has discovered that resettlement and population growth go together.

In March, a detailed Soviet demographic study on the fertility rates among Russians and Ukrainians who had been resettled to the Far East, in new cities built along with the Baikal-Amur-Magistral (BAM) railway, was released and reported in a West German television documentary on the BAM’s “new cities.”

The study focused on the new city of Ner Yunggri, located at the current terminus of BAM’s northern offshoot, which, when completed, will go all the way into the heart of Yakutsk in far northeast Siberia. Ner Yunggri went from zero population to 110,000 in about five years. It is populated exclusively by resettled Russians and Ukrainians. In 1985, 3,000 children were born in Ner Yunggri—the highest birth rate anywhere in the Russian Republic, a “population explosion” comparing favorably with the last two decades in the Muslim regions.

The across the board rule discovered in the study is that satisfactory birth rates and large families among Russians and Ukrainians are achieved almost exclusively in Eastern Siberia, the Far East, and the “new cities” in the far north of European Russia. Further, what is significant is not the absolute numbers of those resettled, but the numbers compared with the Russian population of prime child-bearing age groups.

Most of the several million to be resettled will be young couples. That a high percentage will not be able to withstand the rigors of Siberian life for more than five years, is of no
concern to Moscow. Even in the cases that permanent resettlement "fails," Moscow's investment has still been a smashing success. Why?

The young couple sent from, say, Moscow to City X in the Far East, would have produced on average no more than one child in Moscow. After five years in City X, this same couple, again on average, would return to Europe Russia or the Ukraine with three children. The Soviet plan figures thus represent "net resettlement." When one factors in the "failed" cases, one gets much more than several million—net resettlement plus recycling.

From the Soviet military doctrinal standpoint of "acceptable losses" in wartime, these programs are indispensable. Again, the absolute size of the populations in Siberia, the Far East, and the far north of European Russia, are not what is significant, but the fact that these populations are almost exclusively young populations—who can be expected to have the highest survival rates in the event of general war.

Russification in Central Asia

_EIR_ has written much on the 'Great Purge' conducted by Gorbachov since he came to power. Nowhere has this purge been more thorough than in the Muslim Republics of Soviet Central Asia. With the exception of Politburo member and Andropov protégé Geidar Aliyev, a KGB veteran whose status is now higher than ever—the Muslim "mafia" in the Soviet leadership has been eradicated. The retention, for the time being, of the 74-year-old Kazakh party boss, Kunayev, on the Politburo, is pure window-dressing to cover the overwhelming Russification.

In 1981, nineteen Muslims were elected as full members of the Central Committee. After the 27th Party Congress, only five remain. This is by far the highest turnover rate of any grouping on the Central Committee.

Kunayev remains on the Politburo, and every "Kremlinologist" will cite this as "proof" that Mikhail Gorbachov "failed" to remove his opposition from the Brezhnev era, and, is "in trouble." Would these "Kremlinologists" honestly put on the table the facts of the Central Committee changes made, it wouldn't be the Soviet Empire that is "crumbling," but their lying analysis. Kunayev is a "boss" without a mafia. Five of his six Kazakh cronies on the Central Committee were unceremoniously removed. These included Baiken Ashimov, the chairman of Kazakhstan's council of ministers; Sattar Imashev, chairman of the presidium of Kazakhstan's Supreme Soviet, and three Kazakhstan regional (Oblast) first secretaries, including Kenes Aukhadiev, only 48 years old, who headed the party in the region embracing the Kazakh capital of Alma Ata.

In the period leading up to the 27th Party Congress, the first secretaries in the Muslim Republics of Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, and Kirghizia were all removed, and have since been dropped from the Central Committee. Had the long-time leader in Uzbekistan, the candidate Politburo member Rashidov, not fortuitously died in 1983, he too would have been axed, as has since happened to his entire Uzbek mafia. Gorbachov has also removed the Muslim first secretaries of each of the Muslim "autonomous regions," or ASSRs, located within the Russian Republic; the Tatar ASSR, the Bashkir ASSR, and the Dagestan ASSR.

The end of 'home rule' in Uzbekistan

By far, the most important Muslim Republic is Uzbekistan, the third largest Soviet Republic in population, after Russia and the Ukraine. Every other Republic with a Muslim majority has less than 10 million population, and in most cases less than 5 million (Kazakhstan has a majority European population, and is only nominally a "Muslim" Republic). Thus, it is not surprising that the most devastating sweeps would hit Uzbekistan.

In the first issue of 1986 of the Soviet publication _Party Life_, Uzbekistan's first secretary, Inamzhun Usmankhodzhaev, portrayed the scope of the Gorbachov massacre of the Uzbek leadership. Forty of the 65 oblast (regional) party secretaries had been removed, along with over 260 city and district party secretaries. Of the 177 people elected to the Uzbek central committee in 1981, only 34 were re-elected, and of the 85 candidate central committee members elected in 1981, only 6 were promoted to full membership, while 76 were dumped.

An even more dramatic shake-up hit the Uzbekistan Politburo. At the early February Tashkent party congress, Gorbachov began a total Russification program: 13 full Politburo members were "elected," including 6 Russians, 1 Russified Kazakh, and only 6 Uzbeks. For 'home rule' reasons, this had never been done before. The last Uzbek Politburo consisted of seven Uzbeks and four Russians. Of the five new candidate politburo members, three are Slavs, and two are Uzbeks. Also for the first time, the party first secretary for the Tashkent regional committee is a Russian.

Except for agriculture, economic planning is now under direct Russian control. Three of the six secretariat members are Russian, including the central committee secretaries responsible for industry and construction.

That Russification was coming should have been clear from the Bulgarian developments of the past year. In 1985, Bulgaria began a program to "Bulgarianize" and eliminate ethnically the 1 million Turkish minority. This couldn't have been done without the full approval of Gorbachov and company in Moscow. It clearly portended something similar for Russia.

All this is not in conflict with the upgraded importance and influence of Aliyev, who has reached new heights of prominence, meeting regularly with visiting foreign delegations from the Near East and Africa. Inside the Russian Empire, Gorbachov is trying to solve the demographic problem he revealed to _L'Humanité_, by extreme Russification and propagation of the Great Russian Race. With Aliyev, he has a foreign-policy "Muslim Card"—for export only.