
Documentation

U.S. policy on terrorism stated

Excerpts from the prepared testimony of the Hon. John Whitehead, deputy secretary of state, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, April 22, 1986:

... Given the recent U.S. military reaction to Libyan terrorism, and the diplomatic activity surrounding our strike, I would like to take this opportunity to apprise the committee on the broader elements of our policy and how we expect it to evolve. I will then address the details of implementing current legislation on aviation security.

I would also like to thank the Chairman and the Committee for their vital support in combating terrorism. U.S. policy in this area must continue to be solidly bipartisan.

Libya is not the only state which supports terrorism, but it is the most flagrant violator of international law—in its organization and direct support of terrorist activities in its use of surrogates, such as Abu Nidal. More than 50 Libyan diplomats have been expelled since 1981 by the United States and its allies for reasons of terrorism, an astonishing statistic. Earlier this year, Libya's support for terrorism was the subject of a State Department White Paper. That White Paper is already outdated due to continuing Libyan terrorist acts with even more direct official involvement, including the bombing of La Belle discothèque in Berlin, probably the shooting of an American embassy employee in Khartoum, and the killing of two British professors who were innocent hostages in Lebanon. We also note the tragic murder of Peter Kilburt, in circumstances yet to be explained, and the continuing plight of the American hostages in Lebanon. The long list of Libyan-inspired threats and actions directed against the United States and Europe demonstrates that Libya is systematically using terrorism as a matter of government policy. Libya's official support for terrorism is underscored by its clear pattern of using its diplomatic representations in more than 35 countries to organize and support this terrorism.

The threat from Libya is not new, but it has increased dramatically in recent months. Our initial reactions were to improve security, and to work with host governments where we faced specific threats. The response from host governments was universally good from these governments—with one exception. In Berlin, we advised both the East German government and the Soviet Union of the activities of Libyan People's Bureau members accredited to East Germany. Both

governments noted our concerns and stated their general opposition to terrorism; but they undertook no actions to curb the activities of the People's Bureau members. And it was that Bureau which delivered the bomb to La Belle discothèque that killed and injured 250 people. I am not accusing the Soviet Union or the East German government of complicity in the bombing of the La Belle discothèque, but these governments did not use their influence and legal position to stop illegal activity on the part of People's Bureau members accredited to East Germany.

Our military response to Libya's continued policy of terrorism against us was measured. It was based on the objectives of demonstrating that Qaddafi's pursuit of his policies

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would not be without direct cost to Libya; that the United States was prepared to use force to fight terrorism along lines repeatedly and carefully defined by the President; and that the United States reserves the right to defend itself and its citizens against aggression by any state, even when that aggression takes new forms, such as terrorism.

As the President said, our action may not stop Libyan supported terrorism, but it will give Qaddafi pause, and make other Libyans question whether they want their government to support such heinous acts. It will make the Libyan people wonder whether they want their government to support such heinous acts. It will make the Libyan people wonder whether the costs are not greater than the benefits. It will also give moderate governments in the Middle East and our European allies time to undertake new steps toward preventing terrorism.

Our right of self-defense is more than just a right. It is also our duty to protect our citizens. In the months and years preceding our most recent action in Libya, we saw risks increase abroad for our military and diplomatic personnel, for American businessmen, and for tourists. All have been innocent victims of terrorists. We increased security to the utmost where there were specific threats in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, and we put all U.S. official installations abroad on high alert. We increased our outreach programs to the private sector and to tourists to alert them to the threat. From the State Department, we repeatedly urged travelers to use prudence and common sense when traveling, especially to areas where threats were highest.

America is an open and highly mobile society. Millions

of Americans travel abroad each year for business and pleasure. We must not be afraid to travel abroad. Rather, we must provide the proper security so that terrorists cannot strike, so that commerce continues to expand and tourists can continue to learn about each other's societies and cultures. We have made great strides in aircraft and airport security, which I will address in more detail later. But, until terrorism has been stopped, we cannot say that we have done enough.

Cooperation with Europe

We are more convinced than ever that effective prevention of terrorism requires multilateral cooperation. It is no secret that we have had differences with European states over what measures were necessary to deter Libya and other states from supporting terrorism. We have engaged in a long-term effort to deter Libyan support for terrorism through peaceful economic and political measures. In 1979, we designated Libya as a state supporting terrorism. In 1981, we decreed unilateral economic sanctions that decreased U.S.-Libyan trade from \$5 billion to a few hundred million. In January, we invoked legislation that virtually cut all remaining economic and political ties to Libya. In January, I emphasized to European leaders that Qaddafi needed to understand that he could not support terrorism and enjoy normal relations with civilized nations. We recognized that our allies would have to take similar measures for our sanctions to be fully effective. We also recognized that our allies would have to make Qaddafi understand that Libya could not continue to have normal political and economic relations with civilized nations, if peaceful measures were to be effective. The measures adopted were uneven; Qaddafi's attacks increased in number, geographic range and deadlines. As a result, America decided it need no longer stand idly by, that the time had arrived for a carefully designed military action.

Some of our European allies did not provide the support we would have liked to see. However, having just returned from extensive meetings with European leaders at the OECD meeting in Paris and from a meeting with NATO allies in Brussels, I would urge that this is not the time for recrimination. We have had extraordinary contacts on counter-terrorism cooperation with the EC through our ambassador-at-large for counter-terrorism, Robert Oakley, and through Attorney General Edwin Meese. European states agree that multilateral cooperation must be made dramatically more effective. In the past week and a half, EC states have been engaged in intensive sessions on counter-terrorism. We welcome this development and we welcome the invitations we have received to cooperate with European states as a group. Our allies have also gotten the message that the economic costs to them of allowing terrorism to continue can be very high, as American tourists plan their vacations elsewhere. Our strike against Libya may have helped to open a new hopeful chapter in multilateral cooperation between European states and the United States. . . .

Mossad espionage and Richard Perle

by Linda de Hoyos

Recently, the assistant secretary of defense in charge of the Pentagon's Technology Transfer Branch, Richard Perle, visited Japan. While there, he told any who would listen that, in effect, cooperation in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative should not be a Japanese priority, because the program was not likely to outlast President Reagan's second term. Such an open act of sabotage would cause any patriotic American to wonder something to the effect: Who is this jerk?

Working under Perle at the Pentagon is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Stephen Bryen. Both Perle and Bryen were aides to the late Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Both Perle and Bryen are members of a nest of Israeli-Mossad agents in the U.S. government. They are associated, in particular, with a section of Israeli intelligence which has had the special duty of providing American secrets to the Soviet Union. They are not simply Israeli agents, but "false flag" Soviet agents.

On Nov. 21, 1985, Jonathan Jay Pollard, a civilian employee of Naval Intelligence, was arrested and charged with spying for Israel. Pollard, it was determined, worked directly under that section of the Mossad supporting the political ambitions of Ariel Sharon. Sharon has an understanding with Moscow. Moscow, periodically, promises to ship Soviet Jews to Israel to populate a West Bank Sharon intends to annex to Israel. In return, Sharon's associates, among other favors, are willing to funnel high-technology American secrets to the Soviet Union.

That is the relevant background to Richard Perle, undersecretary of defense in charge of technology transfer.

Perle and Bryen are both associated with the Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs, an outfit founded in 1976, and based in Washington. Other persons associated with JINSA include:

- John Lehman, secretary of the Navy.
- Yossef Bodansky, former consultant to Perle and Bryen at the Technology Transfer Branch.
- Michael Ledeen, advisor to Alexander Haig during his tenure as secretary of state, now a consultant to the National Security Council on Middle East policy; his wife works under Perle at the Technology Transfer Branch.
- Eugene Rostow, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) tion.