

The Pollard spy scandals: Will George Shultz resign?

by Joseph Brewda

A bitter faction fight has erupted in Washington, as a result of events surrounding Israeli Mossad spy Jonathan Pollard's admission of espionage before U.S. District Court Judge Robinson on June 4. Pollard's guilty plea, and the release of some of his confessions to the press, have highlighted the truth of *EIR's* charges made since Pollard's arrest last November. Pollard is merely a minor asset of a vast corrupt Mossad network within U.S. intelligence and government, of whom former Israeli defense minister Ariel Sharon is the key figure. This network could not exist without protection by such individuals as U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, who has repeatedly betrayed American interests to please his Israeli allies. Moreover, as *EIR* has documented in its March 1 Special Report, *Moscow's Secret Weapon: Ariel Sharon and the Israeli Mafia*, the Israeli network which deployed Pollard has a strategic deal with Moscow to betray the United States.

How this faction fight is resolved could well determine the fate of Shultz, who has staked his entire career on a continuing and increasingly desperate effort to sweep the Pollard affair under the rug. Shultz has continued his dangerously exposed effort, because he knows that any public airing of the true nature of the Pollard network would destroy him politically, as well as the Reagan administration faction which includes Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle, Ambassador to Indonesia Paul Wolfowitz, and former Secretary of State Alexander Haig among others. In short, the same appeasement crowd pushing a "New Yalta" accord with Moscow.

The question before patriots in the U.S. government is: Will Shultz, finally, be forced to resign?

A new Watergate

Within hours of Pollard's arrest at the Israeli embassy in Washington with a suitcase of U.S. classified documents in November 1985, the Israeli government and the U.S. State Department began a massive disinformation campaign which centered on the line that Pollard was a "rogue agent," unsanctioned by Israeli authorities. The State Department argued, as did Israel, that Israel never has, and never will field intelligence operatives in the United States. To assist in this campaign, Shultz drew on the services of the Anti-Def-

amation League of B'nai B'rith, which had compelling reasons of its own to destroy the Justice Department case.

Fearful that the "rogue agent" hoax could not be sustained, Shultz dispatched State Department legal director Judge Abraham Sofaer to Israel to "investigate" the matter, in such a fashion that the actual Justice Department investigation of Pollard would be aborted. Sofaer, a long-time friend of Ariel Sharon, accepted Israel's "explanation" and got an "apology" which denied any responsibility for Pollard's actions. Shultz pronounced himself "satisfied."

Nevertheless, the U.S. Justice Department continued its investigation of the Pollard network, over the bitter, if covert, objections of the State Department, which wanted to bury the case permanently on "diplomatic" grounds.

Despite State Department interference in this judicial matter, U.S. Attorney Joseph diGenova released a set of documents at Pollard's plea before Judge Robinson, which proved Israel—and Shultz—a liar.

Specifically, Justice charged that the alleged "rogue," Pollard, regularly carried classified documents from his Suitland offices to an Irit Erb, a secretary of the Israeli embassy, who xeroxed them, and that Pollard was "handled" by Yossi Yagur, the scientific attaché at the Israeli consulate in New York, and by Brigadier General Aviem Sella—both career intelligence officers. These charges were based on Pollard's own confessions. Moreover, Pollard confessed, and the Justice Department charged, that this entire network had been supervised by senior Mossad official Rafi Eitan, also a long-time associate of Gen. Ariel Sharon.

In arrogant, Watergate-style response to the Justice Department documents, George Shultz directed State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb to hold a press conference one week after Pollard's hearings. At that press conference, Kalb, directly contradicting Justice, asserted that the United States had "no evidence of any espionage ring involving Israeli officials." More absurdly, Kalb asserted that "the indictment and successful prosecution was made possible through the cooperation of the Government of Israel." Naturally enough, these statements were drafted by the same Judge Sofaer who had earlier stonewalled the Pollard investigation under Shultz's orders and in collusion with General Sharon.

Until the Pollard plea, Shultz had been confident that his suppression of the Justice Department had been successful. Commenting on this perception, Peter Goldman, the executive director of Americans for a Safe Israel, one of Sharon's main support groups in the United States, complained to one reporter: "I met with Shultz two weeks ago. He told me that Sofaer had straightened the whole thing out. One month ago a deal had been struck. Pollard was to quietly plead guilty, and not get a severe sentence. Both Israel and the U.S. would avoid an embarrassing trial, which both sides had reason to sweep under the rug. But there were not supposed to be any articles or leaks! . . . Some group in the Justice Department is out to get Israel."

What Shultz fears

Now that the Justice Department has seized the upper hand in the Pollard case, and is proceeding with a serious investigation, Shultz is desperate that the real truth behind Pollard will come out. Shultz fears that decades of sanctioned Mossad operations will be exposed, activities protected by the U.S. government, but espionage which has also benefited the Soviet Union.

For the last 20 years, Pollard's confessed controller, Rafi Eitan, has managed a vast spy operation in the United States, stealing everything from communications intelligence, nuclear technology, Soviet communications jamming and interception techniques, to U.S. Naval codes. Eitan's operations have been so colossal in scope, that John Davitt, a former director of Internal Security of the Justice Department, has commented that Israeli intelligence is "more active than anyone but the KGB" in the United States.

One indication of the protection of Eitan is the case of Steven Bryen.

In 1979, Steven Bryen, currently the deputy assistant secretary of defense, was discovered in a conversation with Zvi Rafiah, then Eitan's Washington station chief, where Bryen was overheard offering Rafiah U.S. classified documents. Despite subsequent admissions by Bryen that he "knew" Rafiah, and Justice Department investigators' observations that Bryen acted like a "subordinate" towards him, the investigation of Bryen was brutally crushed. In 1980, Bryen was appointed to his present position, over bitter Justice Department objections. There, he worked directly under his long-time associate Richard Perle, who had earlier been caught discussing classified information with the Israeli embassy in 1970.

It will now shortly come out, according to well-placed *EIR* sources, that Jonathan Pollard has named Bryen as a Mossad agent, and has confirmed meetings with him.

The basis upon which such individuals as Bryen have been infiltrated into government, is a series of top secret protocols signed between the United States and Israel, and dating back to before the Camp David agreements of 1978,

which provide for the placement of Mossad agents in sensitive positions within the U.S. government—such as the Perle-Bryen cell in Defense. Under one secret deal, negotiated by former Secretary of State Alexander Haig and then Israeli Defense Minister Sharon, Israel would sell arms to countries which the U.S. State Department wished to assist, but covertly—such as Iran. To implement this deal, Sharon's main U.S. financial supporter, Meshulem Riklis, detailed his aide, Arie Ganger, to become the director of procurement at the Israeli Defense Ministry under Sharon. Riklis, together with his own "godfather," Burton Joseph, is also among the major financial backers of the ADL, which has always been associated with arms traffickers.

It has been asserted that Riklis and his cronies have made bundles through the illicit sale of costly weapons systems to Iran, a business dramatically aided by the receipt of classified information from Pollard, according to some sources.

One of the organizations formed to manage this, and other secret U.S.-Israeli agreements, was the Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs (JINSA) of Washington, directed by Bryen's wife. JINSA has also been the base of former Israeli air force operative Yossef Bodansky. Bodansky has also been cited as one of Pollard's controllers, according to sources.

George Shultz has reason to fear that the Pollard case will blow these secret arrangements. Shultz's concerns have been further aggravated by the unexpected arrest of Israeli Gen. Avraham Bar-Am on April 22 for conspiring to sell over \$2 billion in arms to Iran, and the arrest of Israeli Lt.-Colonel Zevi Reiss on April 24, for attempting to sell Iran 2,000 TOW missiles. Bar-Am has threatened to tell all, if Israel does not secure his release. Naturally, Israel has described Bar-Am and Reiss as unsanctioned rogue operatives.

In addition to covertly managing arms sales to Iran, the Perle-Bryen crowd at the Department of Defense also oversees a vast empire which has crucial policy input into such areas as the Strategic Defense Initiative, NATO policy, and terrorism. But the prize possession of the cell is its Technology Transfer Group, which has far-reaching powers regarding the sale of U.S. technology abroad.

Ostensibly, the Technology Transfer Group was created to prevent Moscow from getting U.S. military technology under the cover of civilian trade. In this, it has failed miserably. Moscow is second only to Israel in getting whatever items it wants on its shopping list, regardless of the degree of U.S. government restrictions.

The reason for Moscow's success is not hard to discover. Sensitive, restricted-access technology is channeled through neutral countries, or U.S. allies, as intermediaries. The same system is used to get arms to Iran. The primary middleman in both cases is Israel.

If the story breaks internationally, it could be the end for Shultz.

Justice Dept. brief on Pollard case

The following selections are taken from a Justice Department document released June 4, billed as a "Factual Proffer." The facts completely contradict the Shultz line that Pollard was a rogue agent.

In the spring of 1984, an associate of Mr. Pollard's indicated that the associate had recently met a high-level officer in the Israeli Air Force. . . . Shortly thereafter, the associate arranged for the Israeli officer, Col. Aviem Sella, and Mr. Pollard to meet. . . .

Thereafter, Aviem Sella and Mr. Pollard arranged a meeting in Washington, D.C., in the early summer of 1984. During the meeting Mr. Pollard informed Aviem Sella that he (Mr. Pollard) wanted to work as an agent for the Israeli government and to provide United States classified information and documents to the Israeli government.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Pollard and Aviem Sella again met in Washington. At that meeting, Mr. Pollard provided to Aviem Sella classified documents. Aviem Sella informed Mr. Pollard that he (Sella) would arrange for Mr. Pollard to be paid for providing any such additional information to the government of Israel, and discussed with Mr. Pollard a possible "cover" story to explain Pollard's possession of sums of money beyond his United States government salary.

Later in the summer of 1984, Mr. Pollard again met with Aviem Sella in Washington. Aviem Sella informed Mr. Pollard that he was returning to Israel and that Pollard would therefore be assigned a new Israeli "handler". . . .

Pursuant to Aviem Sella's direction, Mr. Pollard traveled to Paris, France in November of 1984. During his week long stay in Paris, Mr. Pollard met for approximately two days with Aviem Sella, Rafi Eitan (or Eytan), and Joseph (Yossi) Yagur. Eitan, introduced to Mr. Pollard as the head of the operation, had been for many years an Israeli intelligence official. Yagur, at that time, was science consul at the Israeli embassy in Washington D.C., a position he held at least until his flight to Israel the day following Mr. Pollard's arrest.

During the above-mentioned meetings, Sella, Eitan, and

Yagur provided Mr. Pollard with detailed "tasking," i.e., specific requests for the classified documents and information which Mr. Pollard was to obtain for the Government of Israel. . . .

After the Pollards' return to the United States, Mr. Pollard met with Yagur. . . . At that meeting, which was also attended by another Israeli identified as "Uzi," Mr. Pollard delivered a suitcase of classified documents. Further, Mr. Pollard was briefed on: (a) procedures to be followed thereafter for the routine delivery of United States classified documents (to be made at the Washington D.C. apartment of an Israeli embassy employee); (b) emergency procedures to be used by Pollard in the event of unexpected developments in, or detection of, the espionage operation. . . . (c) additional "tasking" on specific documents to be obtained.

Pursuant to the foregoing operational instructions related to Mr. Pollard by Joseph (Yossi) Yagur, Mr. Pollard obtained United States classified documents and delivered them to his handlers in accordance with the following routine:

1) Approximately three times a week, Mr. Pollard would remove from his office at the Naval Investigative Service the various classified national defense documents and materials which he had gathered for the Government of Israel. . . . Thereafter, approximately every two weeks, Mr. Pollard would deliver a suitcase containing these documents to the apartment of Irit Erb, an Israeli citizen who worked at the embassy of Israel in Washington, D.C. . . .

3) In addition to these biweekly deliveries, on the last Saturday of each month, Mr. Pollard would meet with Yossi Yagur in another apartment within Erb's apartment building. The second apartment was used as the copying center for the materials which Mr. Pollard delivered. . . . It was at these monthly meetings that Yagur paid Mr. Pollard in cash. . . .

4) During the detailed monthly review with Yagur of the classified information which Mr. Pollard had delivered, Yagur would advise Pollard of specific instances in which the information had been utilized by various branches of the Israeli military. . . .

During the summer of 1985, Mr. Pollard was once again invited by Yagur and Eitan to travel overseas. . . . While in Israel, Mr. Pollard met with Rafi Eitan, Joseph (Yossi) Yagur, Aviem Sella and the previously mentioned "Uzi." Mr. Pollard discussed various aspects of the espionage operation with these individuals (i.e., the Government of Israel's need for greater quantity of classified documents and a commensurate increase in compensation to Mr. Pollard). . . .

In the fall of 1985, Joseph (Yossi) Yagur showed Mr. Pollard an Israeli passport, bearing Pollard's photograph, in the name of Danny Cohen. According to Yagur, Danny Cohen was to be Mr. Pollard's new name when he eventually moved to Israel, and the passport was a demonstration of gratitude for services rendered in that it identified Mr. Pollard as a citizen of Israel. . . .