

EIR Strategic Studies

How Soviet low-intensity warfare targets the West

by Helga Zepp-LaRouche

Since the May 16-18 weekend, when the German Green Party and associated "punks" unleashed a campaign of violence and sabotage at the nuclear construction site at Wackersdorf, Bavaria, and in Lower Saxony, Moscow's drive for world domination has moved into a new phase. Helga Zepp-LaRouche, speaking to a conference of the Schiller Institute in Mainz-Hechtheim on June 21, underlined the significance of the Wackersdorf events: The Soviets are waging an undeclared war, a low-intensity war against Germany. She stressed the importance of the analysis of such low-intensity warfare by Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, Brigadier General of the Reserves of the West German Bundeswehr, in his book Der Moderne Kleinkrieg als wehrpolitisches und militärisches Phänomen (Würzburg, 1972). We present here excerpts from her remarks, followed by selections from von der Heydte's study.

First, it must be stated that modern low-intensity warfare is *real war*, not a pre-form of war, and not between peace and war. It is real war with all the characteristics thereof. What von der Heydte notes, is that the peculiarity of modern low-intensity warfare, is that unlike a great war, it can remain unnoticed for a long period; the aggressor can disguise himself as a freedom-fighter—he likes to maintain the illusion for a long time that he can live in peace for eternity, while in fact he has begun the war. Modern low-intensity war is based on the strategy of targeting the totality of states and populations over a long period of time, with physical violence and confrontations of increasing intensity, such that the victor will be the person who, in the end, psychologically and physically has succeeded in isolating his adversary completely, so that he gives up politically.

If you apply that to the particular situation in West Germany, your hair stands on end, because this has already gone

very far. Our only defense is to wake up the population to what is actually happening.

The definition of modern low-intensity war, is that under certain conditions, irregular hordes of bandits, in the fight against regular troops of army or police, can be successful, because they conduct a war out of the darkness. They conduct terror, sabotage, bombings, kidnappings, and the aim is to exhaust and undermine the adversary, so that after some time, the adversary is physically and psychologically unable even to articulate a clear political will, and therefore becomes unable to act. West German politicians are already close to that point. . . . In the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of yesterday, on the front page, there is the report of Bundeswehr General Inspector Altenburg concerning the Soviet 9:1 superiority in short-range missiles and the real plans of the U.S.S.R. Two pages later, at the party congress of the Social Democratic Party in West Berlin, the SPD declares that the U.S.A. is the problem, and the U.S. must get out. They have already capitulated to the psychological blackmail. . . .

Like a real revolution, low-intensity warfare can also create new legal orders, if it succeeds. It is not simply a violation of law, because otherwise it would not be able to create such new legal orders. In a revolution, the political belief, will, decision, and act, are an inseparable unity, guided and motivated by a political formula, which leads, eventually, to a complete change of the existing political order in the social and economic form. Those who deploy this low-intensity war are motivated by the will to implement this New World Order. Once the guerrillas or terrorists are motivated by this new formula, which can be Greenie ideas or ideas of other kinds, they are ready to die for those ideas.

Those who were in Lower Saxony, both police and our own organizers, reported that what was absolutely shocking was the incredible criminal energy which these people dem-

onstrated. The punks—who were not real punks, but were rather intermixed with militarily trained spetsnaz terrorists—were not afraid to be hit over the head: They take it into account, and their training includes that possibility.

What we are really talking about, is that these people, who are willing to eliminate the nation-state, want to go back to the period preceding what they call “the ideas of 1789.” During the recent degenerate spectacle at the St. Emerich Castle of Regensburg—I will spare you the details—the high point of the birthday party for Prince von Thurn und Taxis, was a feast, where all the guests were dressed in the costumes of the absolutist system which preceded the French Revolution. . . .

In the U.S., Reagan’s promises were empty: There is no recovery. The political system in West Germany, in Western Europe is no longer convincing and is empty: The “change,” the *Wende* of the Christian Democratic Union did not take place, and Chancellor Kohl is a typical example of one of these old institutions, who want to make out that what they believe is true, even if it is not. . . .

This low-intensity war is based on the strategy of indirect action, avoiding direct confrontation, and rather outmaneuvering the enemy by deliberate misguidance, luring him into losing positions until the resistance collapses. In low-intensity war, the enemy is never beaten decisively in one battle, but outmaneuvered, and the main effect is psychological. If you can convince your enemy that the new political order is historically necessary, then you have won.

How many West Germans are convinced that the borders, the status quo, are historically necessary, that to say goodbye to the Americans is historically necessary? Then you can actually say that the manipulation—the threat on one side, the propaganda on the other—have succeeded to a great extent. . . .

This is a large-scale conspiracy, involving penetration of the Army, the churches, the party officials, the student movement. It means planting secret sympathizers in crucial positions, training the fighters, preparing the logistical bases, caches, weapons depots. The attack comes in three phases: first, the preparation; second, covert operations; third, the open fight. In West Germany, we are at the beginning of the open fight. The historians say one must determine *afterwards* when the low-intensity war actually started. One could say it started with the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group; then came the different phases of the Baader-Meinhof group, the Red Cells; and then Wackersdorf. But I would say that it started in 1815, and that it has been a back-and-forth war ever since. . . .

The strongest force working against all these different plans, is patriotism and nationalism in many countries of the world, and I am convinced, that as much as this war between the two systems has intensified, nonetheless, our concept of a new just world economic order can win, if we get the true collaboration of all patriots who will act as world citizens on behalf of the human family as a whole. . . .

Von der Heydte’s treatise on warfare

by George Gregory

Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, Brigadier General of the Reserves of the West German Bundeswehr, and professor of international law at the University of Würzburg, is the author of a little-known masterpiece, *Der Moderne Kleinkrieg als wehrpolitisches und militärisches Phänomen (Modern Low-Intensity Warfare as a Military-Political and Military Phenomenon)* (Holzner Verlag, Würzburg, 1972). Professor von der Heydte’s 263-page work has mysteriously vanished from the bookshelves as far as the German-speaking world is concerned; but it was considered sufficiently important to warrant translation and covert circulation among the Soviet armed forces. It is most timely and urgent now to share von der Heydte’s insights into the nature of modern low-intensity warfare with the English-speaking public.

Low-intensity warfare was not invented in Russia, nor is it a product of “communism” or “Marxism-Leninism.” It is the special virtue of Professor von der Heydte’s treatment of low-intensity warfare as a military phenomenon, that the Soviet or Soviet-proxy “communist” and “Marxist-Leninist” variants are understood as mere selective adaptations of low-intensity warfare, which itself belongs in a comprehensive strategic setting.

Despite the fact that low-intensity warfare cannot be restricted to a particular ideological content, the political-military leadership of the Soviet Union attributes prominent importance to low-intensity warfare in its overall conception of war. The Soviets have avoided the mistaken assumption, that low-intensity warfare could take the place of a nuclear or conventional “large” war. For the Soviets, low-intensity warfare is a component of the totality of their conception of war. The Soviet conception is also not exhausted by the idea of spetsnaz commando units operating as the first wave of a blitzkrieg behind Western lines.

The bad habit of dividing post-World War II history into a “cold war phase,” followed by “détente,” with rather fluid transitions between the two, has become accepted as common wisdom in the West. This partitioning conveniently overlooks the fact, that in the entire period since 1945, with