

onstrated. The punks—who were not real punks, but were rather intermixed with militarily trained spetsnaz terrorists—were not afraid to be hit over the head: They take it into account, and their training includes that possibility.

What we are really talking about, is that these people, who are willing to eliminate the nation-state, want to go back to the period preceding what they call “the ideas of 1789.” During the recent degenerate spectacle at the St. Emerich Castle of Regensburg—I will spare you the details—the high point of the birthday party for Prince von Thurn und Taxis, was a feast, where all the guests were dressed in the costumes of the absolutist system which preceded the French Revolution. . . .

In the U.S., Reagan’s promises were empty: There is no recovery. The political system in West Germany, in Western Europe is no longer convincing and is empty: The “change,” the *Wende* of the Christian Democratic Union did not take place, and Chancellor Kohl is a typical example of one of these old institutions, who want to make out that what they believe is true, even if it is not. . . .

This low-intensity war is based on the strategy of indirect action, avoiding direct confrontation, and rather outmaneuvering the enemy by deliberate misguidance, luring him into losing positions until the resistance collapses. In low-intensity war, the enemy is never beaten decisively in one battle, but outmaneuvered, and the main effect is psychological. If you can convince your enemy that the new political order is historically necessary, then you have won.

How many West Germans are convinced that the borders, the status quo, are historically necessary, that to say goodbye to the Americans is historically necessary? Then you can actually say that the manipulation—the threat on one side, the propaganda on the other—have succeeded to a great extent. . . .

This is a large-scale conspiracy, involving penetration of the Army, the churches, the party officials, the student movement. It means planting secret sympathizers in crucial positions, training the fighters, preparing the logistical bases, caches, weapons depots. The attack comes in three phases: first, the preparation; second, covert operations; third, the open fight. In West Germany, we are at the beginning of the open fight. The historians say one must determine *afterwards* when the low-intensity war actually started. One could say it started with the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group; then came the different phases of the Baader-Meinhof group, the Red Cells; and then Wackersdorf. But I would say that it started in 1815, and that it has been a back-and-forth war ever since. . . .

The strongest force working against all these different plans, is patriotism and nationalism in many countries of the world, and I am convinced, that as much as this war between the two systems has intensified, nonetheless, our concept of a new just world economic order can win, if we get the true collaboration of all patriots who will act as world citizens on behalf of the human family as a whole. . . .

Von der Heydte’s treatise on warfare

by George Gregory

Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, Brigadier General of the Reserves of the West German Bundeswehr, and professor of international law at the University of Würzburg, is the author of a little-known masterpiece, *Der Moderne Kleinkrieg als wehrpolitisches und militärisches Phänomen (Modern Low-Intensity Warfare as a Military-Political and Military Phenomenon)* (Holzner Verlag, Würzburg, 1972). Professor von der Heydte’s 263-page work has mysteriously vanished from the bookshelves as far as the German-speaking world is concerned; but it was considered sufficiently important to warrant translation and covert circulation among the Soviet armed forces. It is most timely and urgent now to share von der Heydte’s insights into the nature of modern low-intensity warfare with the English-speaking public.

Low-intensity warfare was not invented in Russia, nor is it a product of “communism” or “Marxism-Leninism.” It is the special virtue of Professor von der Heydte’s treatment of low-intensity warfare as a military phenomenon, that the Soviet or Soviet-proxy “communist” and “Marxist-Leninist” variants are understood as mere selective adaptations of low-intensity warfare, which itself belongs in a comprehensive strategic setting.

Despite the fact that low-intensity warfare cannot be restricted to a particular ideological content, the political-military leadership of the Soviet Union attributes prominent importance to low-intensity warfare in its overall conception of war. The Soviets have avoided the mistaken assumption, that low-intensity warfare could take the place of a nuclear or conventional “large” war. For the Soviets, low-intensity warfare is a component of the totality of their conception of war. The Soviet conception is also not exhausted by the idea of spetsnaz commando units operating as the first wave of a blitzkrieg behind Western lines.

The bad habit of dividing post-World War II history into a “cold war phase,” followed by “détente,” with rather fluid transitions between the two, has become accepted as common wisdom in the West. This partitioning conveniently overlooks the fact, that in the entire period since 1945, with

varying intensity, the Soviet Union has pursued low-intensity warfare. The initial focus of this warfare was in the Third World. The Soviet Union played low-intensity warfare as the "interested third party," first in the de-colonialization process, and, subsequently, with more success in the post-colonial upheavals in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. As the process of low-intensity warfare unfolded, it was increasingly replaced by direct military presence and application of political power.

Since the beginning of the 1970s, and more so since the beginning of the 1980s, Soviet low-intensity-warfare strategy has shifted once again toward Western Europe. We may presume, that this is of first-rank importance for the current Gorbachov/Ogarkov leadership, working on the foundations laid by Yuri Andropov.

The following forms of battle in low-intensity warfare against Western Europe play the predominant role:

- Subversion, infiltration of institutions, with the ultimate purpose of cadre recruitment;
- Targeted terrorism against individuals, assassinations and kidnappings;
- Bomb attacks and arson, acts of sabotage;
- Disinformation campaigns and psycho-cultural demoralization;
- "Blind" terrorism, random murder or wounding of innocent people in public places;
- Kidnapping of innocent people to blackmail states;
- Civil war-like violent unrest and riots.

The climax of the Soviets' low-intensity-warfare strategy would be a condition of complete "ungovernability" and civil war in the nations of Western Europe. Under these conditions, the will to maintain the integrity of the nation and military resistance against the totalitarian East, armed to the teeth, would collapse.

The chief aim of low-intensity warfare operations is not to achieve the highest possible loss of life; nor is the material damage of acts of sabotage essential. The chief aim of low-intensity-warfare operations is the political-psychological effect. Soviet low-intensity warfare operations are aimed at terrorizing the leadership circles and the entire population of the nations of Western Europe, to wear them down intellectually and morally.

Soviet low-intensity warfare operations unfold over long periods of time, and they are not uniform. But it would be fatal to relegate them to the status of something one gets used to, something which is simply always there. The most recent escalation of low-intensity warfare in the Federal Republic of Germany emphasizes this point. The so-called Battle of Pentecost at the Wackersdorf nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Bavaria demonstrated this with shocking clarity. To judge from its intensity, duration, centralized control, and the principles of deployment of the self-proclaimed "fighters" numbering in the thousands, the Battle of Pentecost was in fact a

low-intensity warfare operation, one that can not be considered merely a "violent demonstration."

Terrorism and low-intensity warfare

Soviet low-intensity warfare is always—directly or indirectly—associated with terrorism. In the West, there is confusion on this point, stemming from a deeply rooted notion that terrorism is a "sociological phenomenon." Terrorism in and against Western Europe is thought to be attributable to anomalies of political, social, psychological, and mental development. In the case of Wackersdorf, the explanation is that the *Angst* and "desperation" of youth in the face of the "atomic danger" led to spontaneous, violent unrest.

The truth, however, is that the terrorist low-intensity-warfare operation in Wackersdorf was prepared with military precision and centrally deployed. Covert commanding cadre and cells of Eastern intelligence services controlled, logistically and tactically, the gang-like groups, in order to demonstrate to the government in Bonn just how far the destabilization potentials at the disposal of the Soviet Union in Germany already reach.

It is characteristic of Soviet low-intensity-warfare strategy, that the initial phase is that of infiltration, with the purpose of recruiting anti-constitutional persons and groups. This is done by cadre who operate covertly for the most part, so that, as a rule, the recruits are not aware of their actual assignment. Recruits are indoctrinated gradually, trained, and financially equipped, as well as psychologically controlled. Anti-constitutional groups and "movements" operate as surrogates for the East, which covertly controls and directs them. This holds just as well on the international level of state terrorism, in which countries like Libya, Syria, and Iran operate as Soviet surrogates.

We must expect that the Soviet low-intensity warfare strategy against Western Europe, and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular, will escalate in the near future.

Documentation

The following are translated excerpts from Der Moderne Kleinkrieg als wehrpolitisches und militärisches Phänomen (Modern Low-Intensity Warfare as a Military-Political and Military Phenomenon) by Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heyde, (Holzner Verlag, Würzburg, 1972).

Since the end of the Second World War, a considerable literature has accumulated about the nature of low-intensity

warfare and the principle of its conduct. From the Chinese party chairman Mao Tse-tung to the Swiss Major H. von Dach, from the South American rebel leader Ernesto "Che" Guevara to the Greek colonel Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, from the American military author Charles W. Thayer to the German Helmuth Rentsch, practitioners and theoreticians of modern warfare have studied the problem of irregular warfare, conducted by gangs, and have investigated the remarkable phenomenon, that in such a war, badly armed, badly trained, badly clothed gangs, led by amateurs, are often successful in battle against superior troops led by professional soldiers.

If one searches the contemporary literature about low-intensity warfare for a convincing definition of the nature of this form of the conduct of war, one surprisingly finds, that the majority of theoreticians who deal with low-intensity warfare still owe us a clear definition of what it is they are talking about. Everyone knows, what he imagines low-intensity warfare to be; but to draw a clear line between low-intensity warfare and a revolutionary uprising, on the one hand, and conventional war, on the other, is obviously difficult.

Usually low-intensity warfare is conceived to be an armed conflict, in which the parties are not large military units, but small and even the smallest action-groups, and in which the outcome is not decided in a few large battles, but the decision is sought, and ultimately achieved, in a very large number of small, individual operations, robberies, acts of terrorism and sabotage, bombings, and other attacks. Low-intensity warfare is "war from the darkness." In place of the powerful thrust, there is the multiplicity of no less dangerous pin-pricks; in place of the superiority of weapons—and therefore firepower in the broadest sense—there is the superiority of movement, which the enemy is no longer able to "pursue."

But in all of these characterizations, low-intensity warfare is only described by insinuation; it is neither clearly defined, nor is its nature exhaustively determined.

Low-intensity warfare is, in any case, war. It is "real" war and not a "substitute for war," not "a proxy for war," an "operation approximating war," a "condition short of war"—or whatever expression one might use in "semantic circumscription," to pick out the so-called great war, for one or another reason, as the only "real war," in which large military units and means of destruction manned by uniformed soldiers play the decisive role.

Some theoreticians do in fact recognize, that low-intensity warfare is real war; but they do not want to see low-intensity warfare as a *form of war*, but only as a *form of the conduct* of war in the context of a "big" war—comparable to submarine warfare or the bombing war of airforces. . . .

It is in low-intensity warfare that the connection between war and politics appears most clearly: Low-intensity warfare is, in a certain sense, the war of the politician, not the war of

the soldier.

The *essence* of the condition of war consists in the *encompassing reliance upon violence*, which threatens nearly all institutions of law of the state, and becomes the foundation of all relations between the states conducting war against each other. Violence need not necessarily occur as the violence of *weapons*: A war need not always be contested in the form of a *military* conflict; in war it is only essential, that the use of violence take the place of peaceful encounter, which is the basis for relations between states at peace. A single act of violence, or even a small number of such acts, does not yet mean war, as long as peaceful relations are maintained; on the other hand—and this is of particular importance for the problem of low-intensity warfare—the condition of war does exist, when the violence which the contesting states are intent upon using comprehensively is not only—or even not at all—military violence. . . .

The types of modern war

Today we confront a multiplicity of various types of wars, an entire spectrum, ranging from nuclear war—in which nuclear weapons are actually deployed, as one unconventional extreme—in contrast to the so-called non-nuclear war, in which each of the warring parties must expect that his opponent will take recourse to nuclear weapons at some point in time—and the conventional war, in which the use of nuclear weapons is improbable, if not ruled out—all the way to the modern low-intensity war, as the other, also unconventional, extreme.

The multiplicity of types of war necessarily leads to insecurities in strategic conceptions. Theoreticians who deal with questions of strategy today are generally inclined to pick just one type of war out of the colorful spectrum of various possible types of war—usually nuclear war—and focus their entire attention on that one type. The nuclear war-type is the central focus of attention in the writings of the Americans Kissinger, Strauss-Hupé, or Maxwell Taylor, in the studies of the French generals Ailleret and Gallois, or the team study produced under the aegis of Marshal Sokolovskii; each of these authors writes as if there were no other type of war—just as earlier centuries had their uniform war-type.

Among theoreticians, this fixation on only one type of war is perhaps understandable; but when the practice of overall planning of military and civil defense of a country also fixates on one single type of war, such one-sidedness can turn into disaster for the country in question.

Today it is impossible to assume merely one single type of war. All strategic considerations, as well as all concrete projects in the defense area, must have in mind the possibility of *various* types of war. The war-image of nuclear war requires a different strategic planning, different armament, different organization of troops, and, last but not least, a different training of officers and their troops, than the war-

image of a purely conventional war; the war-image of the modern low-intensity war, in turn, requires totally different strategic thinking, totally different tactics and battle technique, and, accordingly, different training.

“The essence of the condition of war consists in the reliance upon violence. . . . Violence need not necessarily occur as the violence of weapons: A war need not always be contested in the form of a military conflict; in war it is only essential, that the use of violence take the place of peaceful encounter, which is the basis for relations between states at peace.”

There is the additional element, that we must sketch the war-image of a nuclear war as well as that of low-intensity war, that conducted in a modern industrial nation, without any experience with either of these types. In the former as well as in the latter case, we have to imagine a phenomenon which we do not yet know from experience. Therefore speculation, if not fantasy, by and large takes the place of experience. Here is the first, great, and unsolved problem of all strategic thinking, all planning for military and civil defense, all armaments projects. . . .

Psychological and political combat

It would be a mistake . . . to believe in a kind of grand escalation, only one transition from the war-image of the modern low-intensity war to that of conventional war, or from conventional war to nuclear war. It is also conceivable, that, for example, a great war begun with nuclear weapons would, after the first nuclear battles, be continued by one of the parties conducting war in the form of a modern low-intensity war, and just as conceivable that the state in question had planned and prepared this transition to low-intensity warfare before the war began. That in the preparation of such a low-intensity war, which is supposed to follow the nuclear level of conflict, psychological armament obtains decisive importance, is evident. . . .

Every weapon requires a target appropriate to it. One way to prevent an opponent from employing nuclear weapons consists in offering him no targets for these weapons. He who wants to prevent the opponent from using nuclear weapons, must shape his conduct of warfare such that the opponent

will find no nuclear targets. From this standpoint, there is a remarkable connection between the two extremes of the types of war-image of the present day, between nuclear war and low-intensity war: Modern low-intensity warfare knows of no nuclear targets, and thus precludes, by and large, employment of nuclear weapons. It is the only fundamental alternative to nuclear war.

In more than one respect, low-intensity warfare is the contrary of nuclear war. . . . While employment of nuclear weapons requires clarity as concerns the disposition of lines and a clear differentiation between operationally or tactically relevant terrain, such that all doubts concerning the forward edge are removed, the conduct of low-intensity warfare forbids any strictly drawn line, any clear definition of terrain.

Nuclear war, by its nature, requires an approach which Liddell Hart has called “direct.” He who employs nuclear weapons takes the bull by the horns: He is willing to force the final—the nuclear—test of power, in order to impose his will upon the opponent by demonstration of a military superiority, a fearsome demonstration, and thus to end the war in a *military* victory. The modern low-intensity war, on the contrary, knows of *no* “direct” approach, by its very nature: The military balance of forces becomes irrelevant, because it is not the ultimate test of power which is at issue. He who conducts low-intensity warfare seeks to avoid such direct tests of power, and seeks instead to unsettle, surprise, and tire out his opponent, to throw him off balance, to wear him down intellectually and morally, without ever offering the opponent the opportunity to employ his weapons, which, as a rule, are superior. At the end of low-intensity war, there is not only a *military* victory, but also a total *political* victory. . . .

Low-intensity warfare is, in the first place, a fight of single fighters, or small groups. It is realized in the multiplicity of isolated acts of violence. These acts of violence, in the ideal case, are distributed over the entire territory of the state, against which low-intensity warfare is directed, or in which low-intensity warfare is conducted against a foreign occupier. Low-intensity warfare knows of no front and no limited battlefield. Its front is everywhere. The actual terrain of battle changes like a kaleidoscope, from one single action to another.

In low-intensity war, everywhere can suddenly be “forward.” If the *guerrillero* operates skillfully and successfully, his enemy will seek in vain to localize the conflict. Once he believes he has “reestablished order” in one place, this order will unexpectedly be shattered in another place by new low-intensity-warfare actions. *Guerrilleros* fight everywhere and nowhere. They turn up where they are least suspected, and they disappear when one attempts to pin them down. If an action is successfully conducted, they leave the battlefield to the enemy, because it no longer has any significance for them. . . .

The *guerrilleros*' adversary will often not have sufficient

forces at his disposal to control the entire area which has become a terrain of operations. He will then have to restrict "firm" control to key objects, and only exert an "insignificant" control over other areas of the territory in question. That creates a "spatial vacuum" on the part of the adversary in a military respect, in which the forces of the *guerrilleros* "operate freely or semi-freely, whereby they continuously develop their own assault capabilities."

Since low-intensity war knows of no "front" and no "forward," there is also no *forward* defense, no depth, no possibility to prepare oneself in the *rear*, and especially no movement forwards or backwards. Low-intensity-warfare operations—although always aggressive by nature—are not, by their very nature, a "moving forward," which would be comparable to the forward motion of an attack. The normal evasive movements after completed low-intensity operations, by the same token, cannot be compared to a "moving back" in a "large" war. . . .

Just as low-intensity warfare knows of no forward or backward movement in the usual sense, so it also knows of no "occupation" and no "holding" of space by *guerrilleros*.

In conventional war, troops *occupy* a strip of terrain. In low-intensity warfare, there are not only no troops who would be able to implement such an occupation; the very *conception* of occupying space contradicts the essence of low-intensity warfare.

A specific space is neither "occupied" nor "held" by the *guerrilleros*; it is rather "contaminated" by them. "Contaminate," in this connection, means the extensive limitation of the freedom of action of the enemy in the area in question, by means of a growing number of low-intensity-warfare actions, particularly in this area. Without offering one's own forces for engagement with the enemy in the "contaminated" area, the *guerrillero* disrupts and paralyzes the enemy with increasing acts of sabotage, especially against transportation routes, attacks on reporting stations, isolated weapons, solitary traveling vehicles, and small supply columns, and last, but not least, by terrorizing the civilian population. . . .

The conception of victory

Low-intensity warfare should lead to the adversary's gradually bleeding to death, physically and psychologically. To that purpose, it is first of all necessary to rid the adversary to the *belief in the possibility of a victory* over the *guerrilleros*. To the adversary, the guerrilla movement must appear as a form of Lernaean hydra: If one cuts off one head of this multi-headed monster, two heads grow in its place, and one of the heads is immortal. If a low-intensity-warfare action is unsuccessful, or if a group of *guerrilleros* is betrayed, discovered, captured, taken out of action, or destroyed, new actions must demonstrate to the adversary within a very short time that the movement is still alive, and that the unsuccessful action was no "decisive" blow against them. Just as no low-intensity-warfare action can be decisive by itself for the *guer-*

rilleros, it must be demonstrated to the adversary, on the other hand, that for him, too, there is no "decisive battle" against the *guerrilleros*.

It is the *order of the adversary* which is to be destroyed in low-intensity-warfare actions—in fact, *every* form of order, the military as well as civilian, the economic as well as political. Clausewitz, too, speaks of such a destruction of order; but he means by this only the destruction of the order of an army, which is to be obtained in a major battle, and he calls *this* destruction the *decision*. Low-intensity war is *total* war, in which the issue is not only the existence of armies, and in which therefore the destruction of the order of an army *alone* does not yet signify the decision. Just as nuclear war leads to chaos, the successful low-intensity war gradually dissolves *every* order of the *guerrillero's* enemy.

Beaufre characterizes low-intensity war accurately as "total, long-term fighting of lesser military intensity." At its conclusion stands the survival of whomever can hold his breath longer. Victory in low-intensity warfare comes unnoticed, to a certain extent through the back door.

Victory in low-intensity war does not signify—or at least not in every case—that the adversary has been *militarily* defeated, but it always signifies, that he is exhausted and bled dry, that he is *psychologically* defeated. If "victory" signifies *that* success in which, by means of violence, that aim is achieved, on account of which violence was resorted to—and Clausewitz also spoke of a victory, which is *more* than mere success on the battlefield—then there is also a *real* victory for the *guerrilleros*. The path to this victory, of course, does not lead through a decisive battle, but over countless single, small actions, and not seldom the world only discovers after the fact—as in the case of the low-intensity warfare of the Mau-Mau in Kenya, or of the Ukrainian freedom fighters in the first years after World War II—with a certain astonishment, that a low-intensity war has just ended with the victory of one or another party. It is even possible that he who has achieved victory, only becomes aware of his victory much later—possibly too late. . . .

The movement in low-intensity warfare, of course, is of a special kind. Low-intensity warfare knows of marches in the sense of "large" war only in rare exceptional cases. *Guerrilleros* normally do not march in more or less closed columns or units. Instead, they seep—individually, or in small and very small groups—silently and unnoticed into the area they want to reach. The seeping movement, infiltration, is the characteristic form of movement for low-intensity warfare, in the operational as well as tactical realm. On the other hand, it should be noted, the seeping movement is by no means restricted to low-intensity warfare. In World War II and afterward, the Soviet army demonstrated in numerous cases, that it has mastered the art of infiltration at every level—in the large and the small, from the seeping staging of entire armies to the infiltration of a shock force into enemy positions—also in "large" war. . . .