

before making any statement. The message is that the coalition might break up, unless something changes—probably Fraga's leadership. The line has been coming out from some conservative quarters that while a good man, Fraga lacks popular appeal.

It is a totally spurious argument, since if Fraga has little personal appeal to the voters, the others have even less. In reality, Fraga is probably a bit less corrupted and compromised with the Trilateral Commission than many other people in his Popular Alliance. Taking Fraga away will not make things better for these "right-wingers," but only make more obvious the Trilateral control over its economic policy. Conservatives also, instead of titillating their brains with sociological analysis on their "public image," ought to learn the lesson of Garrigues Walker and change their economic policy if they want to aspire to improve their electoral performance.

Herri Batasuna, which elected 6 people to parliament, is the "political arm" of the terrorist ETA, which kills dozens of people every year. The legalization of HB was decided at the outset of the campaign, creating the most dangerous precedent for a national state, of making its main internal subversive enemy a legitimate party. Its legalization will hasten the destabilization of Spain, which can only favor the Soviets.

Strategic issues

The strategic situation of Spain is key for Europe: At the gateway of the Mediterranean Sea, it is the natural strategic backup for the NATO front line in Germany and the obvious "bridge" between Europe and America.

The Soviets have an obvious interest in forming strong political links to Spain, and the fact that Premier Felipe González was the first Western chief of government to travel to the Soviet Union after Chernobyl is the concrete expression of what a big interest the dominant economic forces of Spain have, typified by the Garrigues Walker family and the Trilateral milieu, in reinforcing Spanish ties to Moscow, in the context of the "decoupling for peace" policy which Trilateral founder David Rockefeller and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachov share wholeheartedly.

The ideology of this country tends to be isolationist, and the Franco regime had favored that isolationism. The conservatives tend not to like the United States, which "stole" the last two Spanish colonies of Philippines and Cuba at the end of the last century. In the context of the recent referendum the various communist parties united in opposition against NATO and remained united around the Spanish Communist leader Carrillo. The "leftists" have made the fight against NATO and against nuclear energy their main campaign issue.

In this situation, will Spain work for decoupling? Will Spain work for the economic and strategic integration of Western Europe under Mother Russia?

To provide a documentary picture of the present situation of Spain, we have interviewed two spokesmen of the two main parties: the ruling PSOE, and the main opposition party, Popular Alliance (AP).

Interview: Carlos de Miranda

Socialists seek cut in U.S. troops

Carlos de Miranda is an aide to the Spanish defense minister and foreign policy adviser to the ruling party, the PSOE, of Prime Minister Felipe González. The interview, abridged here, was conducted by Leonardo Servadio and Elisabeth Hellenbroich shortly before the June 22 elections.

EIR: Now that Spain is integrated into NATO, what are the threats which you think the country must meet, and what are your responsibilities in the Alliance?

Miranda: I think that the threats are the same, before and after our belonging to the Atlantic Alliance. Spain is part of Western Europe, and therefore we are aware that the Warsaw Pact represents a possible threat. Since we became members of the European Community, perhaps the perception of this threat has become more emphasized, keeping in mind also that the present government considers that Europe should move toward a unified future.

The threat for us is not that of a country on the front line with the Warsaw Pact. Rather, we have the functions of a rearguard country, although very essential ones, e.g., protection of communications, if Germany is attacked. In the south, we don't feel threatened in general. We know that the political stability of North Africa is not that of Western Europe, so we see there a potential instability which, if it continues, could lead to certain consequences. We understand that our role in the Alliance, as a rearguard country, is to secure the more strategic areas which are properly ours. We have armed forces which are being modernized. As we are not a rich country, and cannot afford to secure everything, we understand that the defense of our territory must be our responsibility. We also have to assure, for our forces and for the Alliance, the communications between the Balears and Canaries archipelagos. The Strait of Gibraltar is also very important: Our projection is essentially naval and aeronautical, to hold the strait, and also we have an Atlantic projection in the north of Spain.

These are the zones where obviously the presence of other countries concerns us, in particular if they are not allied countries, as in the case of the Soviet Union. Recently the Soviet Union carried out exercises near the Spanish coasts. We are aware of this presence and dislike it, but we have to be prepared against them. We have to keep in mind that we are now inside the Alliance, and that we are going to carry out coordination accords in the most sensitive areas, where

the Allies were, but don't have to stay, now that we are members of the Alliance.

EIR: Qaddafi stated that that he was going to have some kind of alliance with the Soviet Union. Do you think this increases the threat from the southern zone?

Miranda: I think that Qaddafi is capable of saying anything. I doubt that the Soviet Union really would commit the imprudence of carrying out defensive accords with Libya. That would destroy the credibility of Gorbachov's whole offensive of presenting plans which are interesting to consider, and which I think the allies should study positively. But, if tomorrow Qaddafi points this at us and Gorbachov also makes a deal with Libya, this would be contradictory with a peace offer.

EIR: Recently, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres proposed a "Marshall Plan" for the development of the Middle East, which we find very interesting. That plan would be constituted with funds from Europe, the United States, and Japan. What do you think of this plan for stabilizing the Middle East? Do you think that Spain could play a role in it?

Miranda: The basic issue in the Mediterranean is the Palestinian situation. True, we have established relations with Israel; our mission in the zone takes into account the need for an accord which respects the self-determination of the Palestinian people and respects those famous guarantees of the region's borders. We think that Israel has to return to the more original borders and reach a kind of accord with the Arab countries which would secure Israel's borders. We think that the issue of the Palestinian people has to be resolved. In this context, everything that could mean an improvement in the climate, seems positive to us. What I don't know is the Arab reaction, because sometimes things are presented very nicely, but then there is the fine print, which seems unacceptable to the other side.

EIR: Recently in Germany, there were Green demonstrations of a violence which is thought to be manipulated by the Soviet Union, with professional acts of sabotage. Do you think that this Green violence against nuclear plants could exist also in Spain?

Miranda: I think that the situation is very different from Germany. First of all, we have a tendency to avoid a conspiratorial vision of the problems that come up. We are aware that perhaps certain attitudes of the pacifists and the Greens are not in favor of the Allies, and that they indirectly help the propaganda of the Warsaw Pact countries. What we are more sceptical about is the notion that everything is organized from the East. In the Western world we have a freedom of expression, fortunately, which does not occur on the other side, so evidently there are people who don't think along the same lines. We don't think that all these movements are fomented by the Soviet Union; there are minorities who may think like

the policy of the Soviet Union.

Now, the situation in Germany is different, because it has a heavy installation of nuclear weapons, whereas we decided to have a different situation, of non-nuclearization of our territory. I think that the Greens don't have as much impact in Spain as in Germany because of this situation.

As for German terrorism, it is obvious that the destabilization of an allied country would have consequences even for our country. Let us say that, at present, our perception of threats, is a perception of external threats, because it is not really something being produced internally. That does not take away the fact that recently we had cases of Libyans here mounting terrorist acts. We don't accept the distinction that is sometimes made between national and international terrorism. We understand that terrorism is a phenomenon which always ends up having international connections. In our case, France has been, and continues to be to a much lesser extent, a sanctuary for ETA terrorism.

EIR: You mentioned anti-Americanism here in the population; can you say a couple of words about the causes and what can be done to improve understanding between the two peoples, the Spanish and the American?

Miranda: I don't think there is a virulent anti-Americanism. In general, nobody likes having foreign troops on their territory, so to be accepted, they have to have a very powerful reason for being there. When conflict definitely exists, in principle there is no opposition to foreign troops, allied troops, who help you. But in peacetime, the perception is different; the needs of a conflict are not there, and there is therefore a general feeling of distaste by those who think their country is theirs and why should other people's troops be there. The big difference between Spain and the rest of Europe is that in the rest of Europe, the United States waged a war that allowed it to be liberated from the Marxist or Nazi currents, and so the American presence has an origin in which there is an element of liberation—something which has permitted the consolidation or maintenance of the democratic system.

But not in Spain! Spain did not get involved in World War II; but afterward, every Spaniard whose democratic principles are well rooted, can't help but realize that from 1953 on, the United States made a pact with Franco. The United States got the bases and gave Franco international backing. This is why that there has never existed in Spain a feeling of gratitude to the Americans for concrete help in the process of democratization.

Then there was the unfortunate incident of the attempted coup d'état of Feb. 23 [1981]. Then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig was caught by some journalists with very confused information, and was asked his opinion. And he answered, it is an internal affair of the Spaniards. The perception was that to him, it didn't matter whether it's dictatorship or democracy; all he cared about was that the bases be upheld.

However, I think that relations between Spain and the

United States are very good. In the discussions we had in October and December, the Americans accepted that a reduction of their presence is logical, because the first thing is for Spain to be inside the Alliance. Spain is increasing its aid for the defense of Western Europe, because Spain was almost like Iceland, a base for American troops and no more. Now we are responsible for a zone, and our forces are modernizing.

The government has avoided demagogy in these issues and dealt with them with great serenity, and even with courage. I think that the government's decision to call the referendum [on NATO—ed.], was a decision in exercise of leadership. Public opinion, which at first was against keeping the Alliance, was convinced and in great part changed its mind.

The government's posture has always been that of a dialogue. On July 10 we start the negotiations for reductions. If we find ourselves with a situation where the U.S. is not reasonable, no doubt we will have the possibility of renouncing the present accords. But we would not want to get into this situation. I think everybody would lose, we would lose, the United States would lose, and the Allies. This means, as in all dialogues, there must be good faith on both sides.

EIR: Do you believe that Spanish cooperation with the United States on the Strategic Defense Initiative can be realized? And can this reinforce technical and scientific cooperation between the two countries?

Miranda: I must say that in technological cooperation, we have been tremendously defrauded. Following the latest decisions of the Spanish government, in the last two years, it is clear that the government wanted to stop being a simple customer. The government doesn't want to just be a paying customer, who pays with credits given to buy in the United States. We say that we are also disposed to give credits so that they can buy weapons in our country. . . .

. . . On the problem of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the politics and philosophy behind this project arouse a great deal of worry among us. We understand it more as a project that can provoke another arms race, than as a pacification of the international situation. I believe that it is very difficult for a shield to be introduced by only one power. If a shield is made on one side, the other will make a sharper sword—it's an old story. We think it is more reasonable to stop a new arms race between the superpowers, and negotiate nuclear disarmament at Geneva.

That said, we distinguish between the research phase and deployment. We think that one can investigate the technologies, because they are not subject to any treaty, because it is a product of human curiosity. For now, we are not thinking of having an accord with the SDI, because we are very critical, and worried about the attitude today. We don't want to make an accord with the United States on this issue that would be interpreted as support for the whole SDI concept, and not limited to research.

Interview: Carlos Robles Piquer

Spain needs U.S. military presence

Mr. Piquer is a deputy in the European Parliament for the Popular Alliance Party and coordinator of this party's electoral campaign policy. He was interviewed by Katherine Kanter and Leonardo Servadio.

EIR: It seems that here in Spain there is a certain anti-U.S. ideology, obviously favored by the way the referendum on NATO was conducted. How can this be changed?

Robles Piquer: The anti-U.S. feeling is very generalized, unfortunately, in the Western world, which is sometimes a frivolous world and with little sense of its responsibility and its danger. In Spain this feeling has been exacerbated in recent times on two occasions: when President Reagan came on an official visit, and when, effectively, the government organized the nonsensical referendum on Spain's continuing to belong to the defensive organization of the Free World [NATO]. We think that the Socialist government has a big responsibility, because the control of state radio and television depends on it. And since this television is the only one in Spain, the informational backing and enthusiasm with which the small anti-U.S. demonstrations were welcomed turned these, in public opinion, into very big demonstrations; it made them grow. We think that a different orientation, but conforming to the truth and less conforming to anti-U.S. propaganda, by the state-owned TV, is a decisive element to shift the status of opinion in a favorable direction.

EIR: What do you think can be done to keep from weakening Spanish defensive capability, which is in large part based on cooperation with the United States?

Robles Piquer: To attend, naturally, to the true reasons and interests of the Spanish state and its defense needs, and not to seek demagogically the applause of the more or less violent minorities, which make a permanent show of support to the anti-U.S. forces or those inimical to the defense of the West. I think that the Spanish bases, in which facilities are conceded to our U.S. allies, are assigned to strengthen Spain's defense and therefore that of the Free World to which Spain belongs.

I think that these bases could not be easily sustained if we had to pay the cost of their maintenance entirely by ourselves, and I think a good negotiation with the United States will