

which police believed to be likely terrorist targets. In January 1985, another high ranking German manager, Dr. Ernst Zimmermann of the MTU-corporation in Munich, was assassinated by RAF-terrorists, six months after his name was found on the Frankfurt terrorist list.

A European-wide meeting of terrorists and their supporters, held in Frankfurt in February of this year, passed the word to the terrorist scene that the "military-industrial-complex," namely, the SDI, is the focus of all terrorist activities for the foreseeable future. A dossier of 18 pages was circulated on that occasion outlining the terrorist strategy to strike against as many "high tech" targets as possible. The assassination of key industrial and military leaders is only the tip of this iceberg. During 1985, in West Germany, 1,604 terrorist attacks were carried out, ranging from minor arson against police cars up to outright executions and mass murder.

This is the reason that one has to conceive the terrorist attacks as what German military strategist Brigadier F. A. von der Heydte (see *EIR*, July 4, 1986, pp. 26-31) described as a Soviet strategy of "low-intensity warfare." This low-intensity warfare is by no means limited to West Germany, but is carried out all over Western Europe and beyond. But in West Germany, since the violent "demonstrations" against nuclear plant sites at Wackersdorf and Brokdorf in May-June, it has escalated to a particularly intense level. There is now a transition in progress among the hard-core strata, from improvised killer-weapons, such as deadly slingshots, to limited use of conventional weapons and accumulation of pre-positioned and other military-weapons caches.

Specifically anti-SDI

Leaving aside the earlier assassination attempts against General Kroesen and former NATO Commander Alexander Haig, and the assassination of Gen. Leamon Hunt in Italy, the terrorist hits since 1985 have had a specific anti-SDI orientation. One week after the killing of Zimmerman in January 1985, the SDI-linked Gen. René Audran in Paris was killed by the terrorist Direct Action, which closely collaborates with the RAF. At the same time, in a militarily planned fashion, the NATO-pipeline network in Europe was under constant terrorist attack. The series of assassination attempts continued against the French General Blandin (failed), against the leader of the French industrialists association CNPF, Brana (failed), and then on July 9, against Mr. Beckurts.

According to the best estimates of German security specialists, the RAF is expected to try two more major hits against high-ranking military or industrial leaders before retiring to regroup for several months. This strategy has also proven to be very successful in France and would give the Soviet threat against German SDI involvement the necessary emphasis. As a military security specialist put it: "As long as our politicians are lining up in Moscow to hand over the latest technologies, while the leaders of the companies developing these technologies are killed by Soviet-directed terrorists in their homeland, we are in a bad position."

Interview: Gen. García Conde Cenal

The defense of West is the duty of all the

General García Conde Cenal, former Chief of General Staff of the Spanish Air Force, spoke with our correspondent Leonardo Servadio, in Madrid at the beginning of June.

EIR: Spain occupies a strategic position of great importance for the defense of the Mediterranean and all Europe. There are military threats to Spain. Can you give us your evaluation of these threats, and where they come from?

Conde: There is a lot of talk of the threat from the south, an imaginable threat, but this threat has two aspects. There is a possible direct threat to Spain for reasons of territorial disputes, as in the case of Ceuta or Melilla, but this bilateral threat is not very probable, at least in the short term. And there is another, much more serious threat, also from the south, which from the point of view of defending Europe is very important: the threat that an invasion from the East would try to envelope Europe by the south.

The first threat is not very probable; the relation of force between the possible aggressor and Spain is relatively reassuring. This is not the case of the threat of the encirclement of Europe from the south, and naturally, from the north. On this terrain, the policy of the government [of Felipe González] in the joint strategic plan, is a policy we would call shamefaced. It cannot be said, as has been said when we were called to the referendum on NATO, that Spain's military non-integration into NATO has as its objective that our soldiers may not go outside our borders.

In short, let us consider what aggression from the East would look like, this famous aggression which they say would arrive in Burdeos in eight days. If the absurdity were put forward that the Ukraine Republic is going to declare war on West Germany, and Poland is going to declare war on Holland, and that some other socialist Soviet republic is going to declare war on France, in this absurd scenario it would seem natural that the German soldiers defend themselves against the Ukraine, that Holland defend itself against Poland, and that the French defend themselves against their aggressor. But in reality the scenario is not this.

The scenario is that the armies of all the socialist Soviet republics and their allies of the East are going to attack all the states of Europe. And therefore, to say that Spain integrated into NATO is only going to defend its soil when the enemy arrives at our frontiers—which is what is implied by the idea that our soldiers will not move outside our borders—is, from

Germany states of Europe

the purely military, scientific, and ethical standpoint, truly repulsive.

Germany's frontier with the East is under the threat of being attacked by all the states of the Warsaw Pact together, and it must be defended by all the states that are on this side of the Iron Curtain, and on the front line.

The proposal that the government is right now putting forward, is that our forces are in the south of Spain to defend Spain from a possible attack from the south, which means, taking it to the absurd, that after 8-10 days of war, the forces of the East will be at our borders, and 24 hours later they will encounter our forces in the south of Spain, looking at the Straits [of Gibraltar—ed.], and they will take them from the rear.

There is another case which is much talked about and which theoretically is much studied as well, that of the Balearic Islands-Straits-Canaries axis. The Balearic Islands are well defended, including by their proximity to the coast of the peninsula. But the problem of the Canaries is completely different. If you analyze the state of the North Atlantic, you will observe that the Canaries are the only island air bases in the whole Atlantic, the only ones that could be the target of an East bloc offensive, to occupy them and thus exercise a decisive influence on the whole traffic in Gibraltar.

To be sure, the Madeiras Islands are not well defended, but in no case can they be an aeronautical base, because they have no air base, nor can it be constructed, nor do they have a port capable of serving as a naval base. It is the Canaries that are, in their present state of lack of defense, an easy target, I believe, and of first priority because of their ease of being occupied by the East in case of a conflict. Therefore, the Balearic-Straits-Canaries strategic policy, as it is proposed, is absolutely absurd.

I think that the defense of Spain must be carried out beyond the Rhine, in the case that the attack of the East comes through Europe, as predicted; or in the south of Spain and in particular in the Canaries, in the case that the East tries to make a maneuver involving the south.

EIR: It seems relatively easy for the terrorists or destabilizers to pass through the Canaries to enter into Spain. What do you think of this class of indirect war threat by the Soviets, via terrorism and destabilization, as they are doing now in Germany with the Greens? Here in Spain, you have the ETA

terrorists, for example.

Conde: Given my profession, I do not have concrete data, proof of concrete accusations. But examples can be given.

The prime minister of the Spanish government went to render posthumous homage to [Swedish Prime Minister] Olof Palme after his unfortunate assassination. Olof Palme had asked for money in the streets of his country, for ETA. Palme, and his party, subsidized ETA. Whether Olof Palme was an agent of Moscow in this domain or in some other, you would have to ask the politicians more than the military men; I don't have information on this. But it is a hard fact: Olof Palme sent money to ETA. And as a corollary I can add that after the funeral, Mr. Ortega, of Nicaragua, returned to his country on a plane belonging to the Spanish government, placed at his disposal by the Spanish prime minister. Here the game is being played by international politicians who have always supported ETA, because Ortega is another one of those they have backed.

As far as the Canaries go, I can easily demonstrate that via the Canary ports, one can get into Spain without the slightest hinderance. Any Russian boat, in the port of Las Palmas, can debark its men without the least hinderance. If these persons go to the airport and get a ticket to Madrid, since the Las Palmas-Madrid flight is a domestic flight, they don't have to present any I.D. They just have to give a name. So, they can go to Madrid without any personal security check. The Canaries are a free and open port of entry for every class of foreign agents who want to get into the country.

EIR: Regarding the political backing which the terrorists can expect to get here in Spain, it seems that people from the Shining Path [*Sendero Luminoso* of Peru] and M-19 [Colombian terrorists] are finding some facilities here.

Conde: There are offices here of these terrorist organizations which are dedicated to recruiting personnel, but above all to collecting money to financially support these terrorist organizations. They have always existed, and are tolerated.

EIR: In the face of this situation, do you believe that the national defense apparatus is adequate? What do you think of the prospect of reducing U.S. troops? Can this be done without affecting the national defense capabilities?

Conde: The Spanish defense budget is, in proportion to the Gross National Product, the lowest practically of all the Western countries. Therefore, however well it may be administered, the effect of the potency of our armed forces is diminished by this fact. This diminution or limitation was partially alleviated by the presence of American forces in Spain, which now they are trying to cut or nullify. But the policy of reducing the American forces not only is going to have the consequence of diminishing our offensive power, but has the consequence that it is going to diminish also the same Spanish force.

Because, although no one says so, the reality is that the presence of American troops in Spain produces, as compen-

sation, extraordinary economic and technical aid to our forces from the United States. And no one says this. So that if the U.S. forces are withdrawn from our country, not only are we going to lose the support of their strength, stationed here, and of their technology, but we are going to lose the economic and technical support that this presumes for our armed forces.

EIR: How could one strengthen cooperation between Spain and the United States?

Conde: One thing that would have to be done is that the policy of the U.S. State Department would have to change, which has this extraordinary capacity to mistreat its friends and reinforce its enemies. Numerous examples could be cited.

Otherwise, the media here that are directly or indirectly subsidized by the communists, by the East, are trying to generate animosity against the American people. This could be compensated by the media that are not compromised with the KGB, which could compensate for the negative effect of these ultra-leftists.

But what cannot be tolerated is that the state-owned media should be the first agent promoting aversion to the people and policy of the United States among the Spanish people.

EIR: Speaking of the State Department, what examples are you referring to, of policy which goes against friends and favors enemies? Is it true that the U.S. State Department was the first to propose the reduction of the air base at Torrejón?

Conde: The base at Torrejón is a very debatable thing; it was chosen by the Americans at an earlier time. When it was built, it was much debated and had no justification. The Torrejón base should have been in Albacete or in some other place. The Torrejón base has created an extraordinary conflict for air traffic in the Spanish capital. And, moreover, it is a threat to the capital, a base which is so close to the city. We have to say frankly: The Americans, when they decided where to put the base, committed an abuse.

The Americans wanted to live in Madrid, not in the mesas of La Mancha or of Castile. It was an error; there are many billions of pesetas invested in Torrejón and really the situation from the standpoint of air traffic and military objectives is very serious. Torrejón is not an independent air base, it is so close to Barajas that it is one more runway of the Barajas airport, or if you wish to turn it around, the Barajas runways are just extra runways for the airport of Torrejón. They have to function in coordination, a plane can't take off from Torrejón without the Barajas control tower knowing it, or vice versa; the runways come together.

As far as the State Department goes, the Philippines is a past example. The case of Korea is a future example, of a State Department policy which places friendly countries in jeopardy.

Otherwise, there is a failure of propaganda. There are kinds of aid which the United States is giving to Spain in the cultural realm, the health realm, and sanitation; these are



truly extraordinary, not only in terms of scientific, but also economic collaboration. In the reconstruction of works of art, financed in some cases at an absolute loss by the U.S.; and in health, the same. This is not published, not stated, and that's how battles in psychological warfare are lost, not only in Spain, but around the world.

EIR: Do you think that technical and military cooperation between Spain and the U.S.A. on the Strategic Defense Initiative is possible, and would you favor cooperation between the two continents?

Conde: We always run up against France. Historically, Spain runs up against France. For me there is no doubt that any kind that cooperation with the United States on the SDI would be useful for Spain, not only in the military aspect, but in the scientific, economic, and development aspects. But we stumble up against France, which has inserted itself with the Eureka plan [a "counter" proposal to the SDI involving only Europe—ed.], and it cannot be forgotten that France has great sway over Spain, because there is a kind of blackmail produced in the domain of terrorism. Terrorism in Spain is 90% protected, directly or indirectly, by France. It is a harsh thing to say, but that's the way it is. I mean by this that the French proposals, such as Eureka and others, for Spain often turn out to be impositions.

EIR: The only way, then, would be to establish cooperation with France against terrorism, which would also allow better cooperation with the United States.

Conde: Yes, of course, but first we would have to see if France were disposed to establish this cooperation.