Book Review

Black Hundreds, Red Hundreds: the true history of Soviet Russia

by Laurent Murawiec

Les Russes sont arrivés:
L'infiltration soviétique en Occident
by Cyrille Henkine (Kirill Shenkin)
Scarabee & Co., Editors, Paris 1984
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Recounting the mere facts of Russia’s 20th-century history is enough to show that there is not one shred of truth in any of the “facts” that the citizens of the West have been taught to accept as the True and Hallowed History of the Communist Revolution. This book (the title means, The Russians Have Arrived—Soviet Infiltration of the West) by Kirill Shenkin, a Russian émigré, published in French translation in Paris in 1984, is a startling example of the extent to which what Western policy-makers and citizens think they know about the Soviet Union is a heap of absurdities.

Shenkin starts from the curious, recent development of a new social phenomenon, the “half-Soviet” emigration, that is, the thousands of émigré Soviet citizens who keep close trade and personal contact with Moscow, freely shuttle back and forth between East and West, and entirely fail to conform to the cliché of a clean break between emigres who leave the Russian Motherland forever, and the Soviet system. To the contrary, he insists, thousands of such emigres altogether depend on Russian exports, which they channel (furs, diamonds, icons, art, etc.), not only their resettlement in the West, but also their meteoric social ascent here.

“Soviet society has always been criss-crossed by informants. But today’s emigration is but an emanation, a segment of that society . . .” Why did the Soviet leadership allow hundreds of thousands to emigrate? Shenkin ridicules the arguments put forth, that the KGB greatly feared dissidence, radicals, and Jewish activists or that the pathetic U.S. Senate frightened it. Why grant one whole segment of the Soviet population a privileged status—since leaving the U.S.S.R. is a privilege? Why allow enormous quantities of intelligence to emigrate, tucked away in thousands of minds? Why deprive the country of a sizable portion of its scientific intelligentsia?

Shenkin’s preliminary answer is worth meditating:

The present flow of emigration, contrary to its predecessors [post-1917 and post-1941], did not start spontaneously. It took off at the right time, at the very instant when it was decided from above, and has remained under the strictest control . . . it has been carefully screened. Those who were let out were those whom one desired to let out, after completion of an exhaustive study of their files. But most important, while letting them out, it is not only the past of the candidates that was taken into account; plans were drawn up for the future. . . .

Old Russia’s Okhrana

Having made this bold statement—which has not endeared him to much of the Russian emigration—the author plunges back into Russia’s 20th-century history: Are past Soviet operations a guide to understanding today’s paradoxical emigration?

Old Russia’s intelligence service, the Okhrana, was no less almighty and ubiquitous than today’s KGB. It is the Okhrana that orchestrated and organized the several waves of murderous terrorism that shaped and weakened the last decades of the Tsarist regime, Shenkin reports, drawing notably on the revealing case of Evno Azev, the head of the most “efficient” of the terror groups, the Combat Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionary (SR) party. The Okhrana’s own documents, Shenkin shows how the political police determined who would attain and exert the leadership of the same SR party. The operational arm of the Okhrana and all the revolutionary parties of pre-1917 Russia were “indistinguishable.”

Why should that startling reality be the case, of a political police designed to serve a regime—that of the Romanov dynasty—and organizing stepwise for its demise? While author Shenkin does not delve explicitly into the puzzle, ele-
ments are provided, as we shall see. One of them is this sketch of Okhrana leader Colonel Zubatov—the man who invented "police trade-unionism," "police socialism," as they were known in Russia then, but also the institution of the Soviet:

Zubatov dreamt of fighting [the Socialists] movement in a rational manner, by means of creating a healthy, Russian organization which would have tackled differently the solution of those problems that awarded the revolution chances to succeed. From such premises, he elected to give legal standing, within a national workers’ organization to which his attention had been drawn, to a minimum political and economic doctrine, similar to those of socialist programs, but preserving the principles of Autocracy, Orthodoxy and Peopleness. . . .

Interestingly, this portrait is excerpted from the souvenirs of a former head of the Okhrana itself, writing from his French exile in the 1930s. Shenkin’s own comment draws the conclusion:

To implement a design similar to Zubatov’s, a totalitarian police state would have been required. A centralized, homogeneous power would have been needed, endowed with a unanimous conception of its self-interest. The autocratic regime [i.e., Tsarism] did not display such traits. A Revolution and a few decades of a totally new power, of a system without historical precedent, the gradual elaboration of a thoroughly new state structure, that of the Socialist State, will first be necessary for this to become possible.

The Trust and the trusts
Shortly after the Russian Revolution of November 1917, Russian fascists, anti-Semites, “militarists,” etc., started flocking back to Moscow and rallying the Bolsheviks, while at least 1 million Russians emigrated. “The Soviet [secret] services threw themselves like wild beasts on the hapless émigrés.” Both processes were coordinated. The method is described: “Create links and the appearance of an interplay between the émigré organizations and their partisans within the country, create a simile of communication between them. Launched in the 1920s, the scheme of this complex operation, which was used a great many times over, has passed into history under the name of The Trust.”

Concretely, former Tsarist officials who had rallied the regime were sent abroad, made contact with former colleagues, and gradually “revealed” their membership in oppositionist organizations described as powerful and as having succeeded in penetrating the high spheres of the regime. Once the link established, the émigré organization was lured into being thoroughly penetrated by the internal oppositionists, who were, to a man, agents of the Soviet regime’s own Okhrana, the dreaded Cheka, later renamed GPU (today’s KGB).

A series of such “trusts” were set up, each specialized in one “target population” inside Russia and outside, from the best-known, the Monarchist Organization of the Center of Russia (MOTsR), to the “military trust,” the “German colonists’ trust,” the “mines trust,” the “workers’ trust,” etc. Inevitably, the Trust envoys would tell their anxious émigré collaborators that an evolution in the regime’s economic and political line was afoot, that pro-monarchist “symptoms” were appearing in the population, that a coup was being prepared with the support of high-ranking military, intelligence and bureaucracy elements—and that no amount of pressure ought to be applied from outside upon Russia for fear of foiling such noble efforts.

All such trusts were run under the fingertip of Cheka boss, Felix Dzerzhinsky, a Central Committee member of the Bolshevik Party and one of the very few men that Lenin “trusted” entirely.

The Shulgin trip
A zenith of success for the Cheka was the long clandestine trip through Soviet Russia of one of the most prestigious leaders of the “White Russian” emigration, Vassili V. Shulgin, in 1921, an underground odyssey aimed at setting up the great clandestine organization that would replace Communism in power. Shulgin was neither a beginner nor a second-rate personality: a raving anti-Semite and pogrom organizer-in-chief, Shulgin had been the head of the grand-daddy of all of the 20th-century’s fascist organizations, the Black Hundreds, whose political branch, the Union of the Russian People, he had headed. Shulgin had been one of the two members of Parliament that had visited Tsar Nicholas II in February 1917 to force him to abdicate. Sponsored by MOTsR, the original Trust, he traveled through Russia, making ample harvest of meetings and impressions, and returned saying that “the vivifying force of inequality has returned . . . the new Yid masters are going to be ousted. . . . Communism has been but a passing episode,” and praising the new regime in a best-selling book that caused an immense shock in the Russian emigration.

That in 1926 the GPU, for their own purposes, revealed that the latest detail of the Shulgin trip had been supervised by them did not even destroy the latter’s standing. Shulgin, lawfully, later returned to the Soviet Union to lead a peaceful life of service to Stalin’s Holy Mother Russia.

Secret services and ideology
And the Shulgin affair is only one of many similar cases reported by Shenkin. Beneath the surface of operational, secret-service operation, a deeper level generated it all the author points out, and that was ideology, the common ideology shared increasingly by the Bolshevik regime and its nominal, “White” opponents. Shulgin himself expressed it well:

If [the Bolsheviks] unconscionably shed blood, it is only to reestablish the might of God-protected Rus-
sia. . . . And if this be so, it means that the White Idea, after it crossed the front-line, has taken over their unconscious. . . . We have compelled them to accomplish with their red hands the white work. . . . We have triumphed. . . . The White Idea has vanquished.

In the ferment of Russian emigration, from Prague and Paris to Sofia and Harbin in Manchuria, similar ideas were emerging. Russian princelings and Okhrana leaders, Black Hundred chieftains and White generals partook in the evolution. After the shock of revolution, Mother Russia reemerged, and had to be strengthened. The common, Dostoevskian hatred for democracy, for the West and Western freedom, for the Renaissance man of science, technology and the urban life, possessed the Politburo no less than those émigrés. The Nazi White Russian organization “Young Russia” that acclaimed its Glava (Russian for Führer), who “later” reverted to Moscow, the “Eurasians,” the “Scythians,” and other such movements all agreed: Russia must be helped, defended, strengthened. To quote from the Young Russia Party’s own statements:

The threat from outside has definitively pushed the [Soviet] power on the way of a defense policy and this in turn has accelerated the awakening of nationalism among the masses. . . . This same policy has served as a convenient pretext to get rid of many remnants of old Communism. . . . We serve Russia. Soviet power is abandoning Communist positions. A new ruling class is slowly coalescing. . . . It is that which is gradually becoming the carrier of the Idea of the State and nationalism. . . . The Socialist Motherland is Russia again. Socialist construction struggles for Russia’s might. This victory is ours. Stalin’s evolution sets off the process of national revolution. . . .

Ideology and secret services had converged to recuperate the lost flock and reunite the sons of Mother Russia. Some returned to Russia—and survived the purges—while others remained in the West, busy penetrating its policy-making circles and its secret services. While Hitler’s Sicherheitsdienst (SD) thought it was penetrating British intelligence with White Russian operatives, it was truly doing great service to Stalin.

The ‘third emigration’

After the post-revolutionary wave and the unhappy wave of those who succeeded in escaping Moscow’s rule during the war—millions of whom were forcibly returned to their horrible deaths in Russia by the cowardly Allies—a new emigration started in 1968, with each emigrant’s file stamped “departure possible; corresponds to the interests of the State.” This is not to say, Shenkin stresses à propos this, as well as the earlier waves of Russian emigration, that every émigré is a witting agent of the KGB! There is a story within the story, which his book usefully pulls apart.

At the end of 1968, prior to and without any international pressure, the Moscow government decided that its Jewish subjects could be allowed to leave the country. Several hundred thousand have since done that, resettling in Israel, but increasingly in the U.S.A. and other Western nations. In fact, many of the “Jewish” emigrants are not Jewish at all, though presented—by the KGB—as Jewish. There have been other examples of emigration from Communist countries—such as Fidel Castro’s expulsion, under the name of “opponents,” of thousands upon thousands of Cuban gangsters and mobsters, homosexuals, spies, etc.

Experience showed Moscow that it was important to maintain throughout the world a scattered Russian presence, a numerically-important and permanent presence. . . . The decision taken at a high level to expel from the country a fraction of the population only acquired a rational form after a little while. . . .

In order to be allowed to emigrate, the Russian Jew is subjected to an excruciating, grueling and cruel process, tantamount to conditioning, which involves the establishment of an extraordinarily-detailed file on the candidate and his family and friends by the Interior Ministry (MVD), the KGB, and the Central Committee. This process, Shenkin insightfully comments, “is the substitute for the old pogroms.” The result is “a human mass that did not shape up spontaneously, but has been from the start subjected to a rigorous selection.” Once more, the individual émigré is not generally a KGB agent—but his resettlement abroad is a convenient cold-storage for the KGB. Some, many, may escape the net, but this does not bother the KGB, whose aims Shenkin sums up as follows: 1) get rid of a heterogeneous racial minority which they do not want to assimilate; 2) but supremely well-studied and known by the KGB; 3) be able to determine the stature, repute, importance of dissidents either at home or abroad, controlling the routes of the Samizdat (self-edited dissident journals) and the Tamizdat (literature smuggled from abroad) and manipulating the dissidence altogether.

Thus has been born the new layer of the “half-Soviet, half-émigré” citizens, dubbed “Soviet citizens with a foreign passport” by the Soviet authorities!

In 1975, the KGB even created an overt coordinating body for the emigration, the Rodina (motherland) society “for cultural links with fellow-citizens abroad.” For the Soviet authorities have always considered the former fellow-citizens as being temporarily out of their dependency, and to whom, in case of need, accounts could be demanded, with the full rigor of the law.” A lot of direct KGB personnel
have been “exported” in this manner.

‘The great mission’

Disadvantages of the emigration are nullified by the pusillanimy of the West. Shenkin gives the astonishing example of the leading American academic specialist in Russian Studies, Prof. D. Simes, head of Soviet Studies at Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), whose malicious comments that the Soviet authorities were perfectly justified in cracking down on the “criminal” dissidents within Russia, were liberally reproduced in the Soviet press as emanating from an “objective” commentator. The good professor happens to be Dmitri Konstantinovich Simes, formerly a leading member of the Soviet foreign policy think-tank and subversive operations against the West, IMEMO, one who abruptly turned from party faithful to indomitable dissident, obtained an emigration visa in record time, spectacularly “fooled” the Soviet authorities to “escape” from Russia—and ended up as a U.S. “Special Adviser to the Secretary of State.” When Moscow’s U.S.A. Institute head Georgii Arbatov, one of Russia’s principal manipulators of the U.S. Congress and media, comes to Washington, he is able to save on his hotel bill by staying at the house of the fierce émigré Prof. D. Simes.

Moscow’s ability to so manipulate, Shenkin points out, is based on their absolutely centralized design and strategy, the unity of execution for the Great Mission of taking over the Western world. For that reason, thousands are allowed out—provided all elements concur on an ability to use them at some point are supplied. For example, the Soviet mobster, from Leningrad to Odessa, is a privileged recipient of the emigration visa, which has much to do with Moscow’s global role in the world drug trade and narco-terrorism. And the criminal émigrés do maintain close contact with the Socialist Motherland.

In the past, the relation between the [Soviet] authorities and the emigration have been built according to the scheme of the Trust. . . . In the scheme of the New Trust, the role of the plotters of yore . . . is essentially played by mythical groupings supposed to be oppositionists within the Politburo and the party apparatus: dogmatists and pragmatists, army and industry, advocates and opponents of the KGB, Russian nationalists and minorities, etc. . . .

A comment which is extraordinarily appropriate to the totality of “Kremlinology,” the bit of witchcraft which is so essential to misleading and misleading Western leaders, the media and public opinion on the reality of Soviet strategy.

The Trust, writ large

Shenkin’s book, if it were to be read by the common citizen in the West, would leave few myths standing in what constitutes “what I know about the Soviet Union.” What the author did not explore, within the limits of his book, is what that citizen “does not know about the Soviet Union,” the reality of the East-West collaboration through The Trust: The Okhrana did not overthrow the Tsars on its own—it collaborated with powerful forces in the West which have never relented on their community of interests with Russia, in spite of occasional disputes, primarily caused by different appreciations of which part of the pie should go to whom. Those in the West who liberally paid and supported Lenin and the Bolsheviks, who saved the Russian regime from abject economic collapse over and again, who built and armed Russia to the very teeth that Mr. Gromyko found so impressive in Mikhail Gorbachov, those forces that gave away gratuitously one-half of Europe at Teheran and Yalta to the oh-so-friendly Uncle Joe, and have been disarming the West and wrecking it from the inside ever since, are not blinded by pusillanimy or ignorance. The real history of Russia’s revolution and its Western supporters remains to be written—which EIR will be doing in print in the next few months. From the pre-Nazi Black Hundreds that merged into the Bolshevik Party, and whose masters ran the self-same party of Lenin, to the Red Hundreds of Andropov, Ogarkov and Gorbachov, Mother Russia has remained, and so have her Western helpers.