

## Inside the Pentagon by Tecumseh

### The Guam Doctrine and irregular war

*Part 2 of a review of the Army's TRADOC study, written to provoke debate on the U.S. capacity to meet the Soviet threat.*

A recently released U.S. Army study hints that Henry Kissinger's "Guam Doctrine," which set the United States on the path of withdrawal from the Pacific, could be a big reason why the United States is ill prepared to deal with Moscow's terrorism.

As reported in this column last week, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has completed a study of the current status of U.S. capability to respond to the global pattern of "low-intensity conflict"—in military terms, irregular warfare.

Since the end of World War II, U.S. military policy has been a continuous re-statement of the principles embedded in the Yalta agreements between Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt of January 1945, which established "spheres of influence," and the responsibilities of the signing powers within their respective areas.

Each postwar administration has reaffirmed this principle; as in the Truman Doctrine, the Reagan Doctrine, etc. But Henry Kissinger's Guam Doctrine has become the model for U.S. political-military action in the recent period. The Guam Doctrine was the announcement by Richard Nixon in 1969 of the "Vietnamization" policy (the Vietnamese would fight the war and not the United States), and that the allies in the Pacific would have to defend themselves.

Even though the Guam Doctrine guaranteed the disaster in Vietnam, it has been an article of faith in the foreign policy catechism, and the bu-

reaucratic planning documents of the government genuflect before it, as they go about rationalizing the latest military or political capitulation to Soviet demands.

The TRADOC study, however, is a critique of the failures that are normally rationalized away, and offers the beginnings of a critique of the policies behind the failures. "The principles of the Guam Doctrine provide only the broadest framework for counter-insurgency strategy and little in the way of an overall approach to low-intensity conflict. When combined with presidential policy statements and the statements and plans of various federal departments and agencies, they provide guidance. . . . While collectively these statements do not prevent action, neither do they generate or ensure it." Therefore, it is virtually impossible to propose an effective war-fighting strategy under these restraints!

The report points to the disastrous effects of congressional actions in the past, and notes that "Collectively, the statutory limitations make efficient, effective United States programs more difficult to implement and create confusion and frustration among policymakers and foreign governments. Yet, congressional objectives for economic and security assistance programs appear to be essentially congruent with Executive Branch objectives as established by the Guam Doctrine."

As with other areas of defense policy, the legacy of Kennedy's Defense Secretary, Robert S. McNamara, and his systems analysts sits heavy in the

congressional budgeting process that strangles every key policy initiative. The report comments: ". . . United States government budgets as formulated through the Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution System (PBBES) will continue to be unable to meet the threat of low-intensity conflict because resource requirements for it are relatively small, they are spread through all departments and agencies, and they have no single strong proponent to articulate total needs."

The study suggests a direction for institutional changes to correct this problem, stating, "We will need the courage to depart from conventional institutional norms," and hints: "The Vice President's task force on international terrorism has publicly proposed just such an initiative in suggesting a senior National Security Council coordinator for combatting terrorism. This effort needs to be expanded to include all aspects of low-intensity conflict. . . ." Congress has recently proposed to consolidate all Special Operations Forces under NSC direction, a move which would seem to agree with the above proposal.

Of course, institutional change alone will not solve problems which originate with the flawed policies the institutions were created to serve. It is not surprising that a report such as this does not pursue the line of investigation which identifies the flaws of the Guam Doctrine, for such an investigation would soon expose the treasonous character of the current "New Yalta" policy negotiations being conducted by George Shultz.

As the authors state, this report is designed to start a debate motivated by the urgency of the crisis upon us; if so, it will soon be "open season" on Shultz, his aide Robert Murphy, and other Kissingerian apologists for Soviet imperial designs.