

EIR Feature

Reagan must drop Shultz to keep the NATO alliance

by Criton Zoakos

George P. Shultz, a leading member of the faction promoting the military decoupling of Europe from the United States and the breakup of the NATO alliance, must be dismissed by President Reagan now, before Shultz's friends outside government succeed in their campaign to break up NATO. Why such presidential action is needed now, will be put in perspective once the prevailing confusion over U.S. policy is clarified by the following:

- *First*, the post-Reykjavik uproar in the alliance over the proposal to eliminate all U.S. intermediate nuclear missiles from Europe, the so-called "zero INF option," must be judged against the current, operational, Soviet war plan. That war plan, which continues to be in the hands of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, strives to create a situation in which the United States is denuded of alliances and overseas military assets, is rolled back to the continental U.S. as a precondition for a victorious Soviet general nuclear assault. Hence the Soviet pressure to reach an agreement in the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe.

- *Second*, Western Europe cannot be defended against any Soviet aggression, conventional or nuclear, if it does not have American nuclear weapons on the ground and if it does not have the further protection of U.S.-based intercontinental ballistic missiles—the reason being the overwhelming local Soviet superiority in both conventional and short-range nuclear weapons locally.

Shultz's duplicity and treason

During May of 1985, Secretary Shultz made a memorable foreign policy speech in Vienna, Austria, in which he presented the personal strategic orientation which would guide his actions during the following months—including his duplicitous relation with President Reagan in matters surrounding the Reykjavik summit. In celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Austria State Treaty of 1955, in which Austria became a neutral nation, with both its neutrality and sovereignty guaranteed by the armed forces of the Soviet Union, Shultz at the time argued that the European part of the NATO alliance should, eventually, settle its status on the basis of the example of the Austria State Treaty. The secretary then argued that



NATO Supreme Commander in Europe Gen. Bernard Rogers (left) has led the chorus of military leaders critical of the Secretary of State George Shultz's "zero option" scheme for handing Europe over to the Soviet sphere of influence.

since the Russians had, in the case of Austria, been "true to their word" and had not invaded or otherwise taken over that country, the rest of Western Europe should place a similar trust in Moscow, for its national security, rather than continue relying on the existing alliance arrangements.

Shultz had expressed these views earlier, going as far back as August 1982, when he was appointed secretary of state. He made it clear, back then, that his policy of decoupling the alliance was in conformity with Henry Kissinger's similar perspective—which placed him squarely in the camp of Kissinger's immediate collaborators in Europe, such as Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Helmut Schmidt, and Lord Carrington—generically, the Trilateral Commission crowd, for which Donald T. Regan acts as the appointed overseer in the White House.

Beginning in the late summer months of 1986, both Shultz and his confederates in Europe began a series of intensive efforts to generate motion and momentum in the direction of decoupling.

Shultz in particular spearheaded an opening maneuver which began with the Sakharov-Daniloff "no-swap swap," and concluded with the Reykjavik "no-summit summit." At the present time, most of Shultz's and his confederates' efforts to promote the cause of decoupling, are centered around actions and issues associated with that summit.

Shultz and the Reykjavik INF issue

In the course of certain circumstances whose sequence is

not yet clear, President Reagan's "preparation" and coaching for the Reykjavik summit were conducted by three persons, exclusively: George Shultz, Donald Regan, and Adm. John Poindexter. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, being out of the country for an extended tour, was kept out of it. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to their own official statements, were not consulted respecting Reykjavik and the proposals entertained there; the NATO military command was also neither consulted nor advised; the defense ministers of the European allies unanimously complained that they, too, had neither been advised nor consulted.

Even though President Reagan held his ground on the question of the Strategic Defense Initiative, during his talks with Gorbachov at Reykjavik, it appears that either through oversight or inadvertence, he failed to challenge certain proposals which had been made by the Soviets, with an eye to their propaganda value in kicking off a major decoupling campaign in Western Europe. These proposals are associated with the conditions for negotiating the elimination of intermediate nuclear forces in Europe:

According to the proposals, 50% of intercontinental strategic missiles would be eliminated by 1991. By 1996, all types of strategic and intermediate nuclear weapons would be eliminated.

Upon announcement, by Undersecretary of State Rozanne Ridgway, of these "breakthrough" proposals, the entire military establishment of the United States and Western Europe rose up in clamorous protest. Beginning with German

general Hans-Joachim Mack, NATO's deputy commander, and U.S. general Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, the military pointed out that, given overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority, as well as overwhelming Soviet superiority in short-range nuclear weapons and chemical weapons, without American "Euromissiles," without American nuclear forces, Europe would be totally defenseless should the Reykjavik proposals be realized. On Oct. 20, one week after Reykjavik, Defense Secretary Weinberger went into action at the NATO defense ministers' Nuclear Planning Group meeting at Gleneagles, Scotland. Europe's defense ministers went on record complaining that Washington had not consulted them before entertaining these proposals with the Soviets. Subsequently they passed a resolution which opposed any withdrawal of U.S. nuclear forces from Europe, unless first a balance were established in respect to conventional, chemical, and short-range nuclear forces in the European theater.

Subsequently, George Shultz's friends in Europe, beginning with U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany Richard Burt, and including various Trilateral Commission members such as Helmut Schmidt, Christoph Bertram, and, most especially, Lord Peter Carrington, the civilian secretary general of NATO, kicked off a large-scale propaganda campaign attempting to popularize the prospect of removing the U.S. nuclear protection of Europe. Under the weight of the projected image of a U.S.A. ready to abandon Europe, numerous influential, Trilateral-connected politicians of the ruling CDU party in Germany, began floating proposals for a "neutralized" and "re-unified" Germany, which would be the centerpiece of a "new security arrangement with the Soviet Union—echoing Shultz's ideas of an Austria State Treaty solution for Europe.

Subsequent events pitted the two warring factions in a competition of influence with the public: the Trilaterals trying to create the impression that the alliance is breaking up, their opponents seeking to galvanize resistance to any "decoupling" prospects. The culmination of the fight was Monday, Nov. 17. Following a weekend of meetings between President Reagan and British Prime Minister Thatcher, the White House issued a clarification on the subject of nuclear arms control, and the INF issue in particular, which was in total opposition to Shultz's and the Trilaterals' line. The White House spokesman declared: "I can only restate the obvious fact that we cannot and will not agree to any situation that would leave the United States and its allies at a disadvantage with the Warsaw Pact. . . . We would see that we and our allies do have a balance in conventional forces with the Soviets before we make drastic reductions in our nuclear forces."

On the same day, Caspar Weinberger and West German Defense Minister Manfred Wörner, in a joint press conference in Washington, stressed: "There will be no split between the United States of America and Western Europe. . . . Anybody who counts on such a split will be disappointed." Wein-

berger, scoffing at the Trilaterals' insinuations, further said: "What is most amazing about these current eulogies over NATO's bier is how familiar they are, and how absolutely wrong they continue to be." On the same Nov. 17, NATO's parliamentary wing, the Atlantic Assembly, voted up a resolution introduced by the American delegation, which laid to rest any prospect for a deal to remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, as Shultz et al. were suggesting. The resolution declared that any INF agreement must be accompanied by measures to correct existing imbalances in both short-range nuclear missiles and conventional forces. So, the lineup rejecting withdrawal of American INF systems from Europe included the American President, the British prime minister, all of the NATO defense ministers, the representative parliamentary assembly of NATO, and all the senior field commanders of NATO.

But it did not include either George Shultz or his ambassador to Bonn, Richard Burt. Neither did it include the West German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and his deputy, Jürgen Möllemann. On that same Nov. 17, Burt in Bonn and Shultz at the University of Chicago, made speeches which were against both President Reagan's policy and against alliance consensus. Shultz, characteristically, said: "The prospect of a less nuclear world has caused concern in both Europe and America. Some fear it would place the West at a great disadvantage. *I don't think so.*" In response to the objections of all military commanders that a "zero option" for INF would leave Europe defenseless, Shultz proposed that after American nuclear weapons were removed from Europe, some other "insurance policy" could be worked out: "Even after the elimination of all ballistic missile forces, we will need insurance policies to hedge against cheating or other contingencies. An agreed-upon retention of a small nuclear ballistic missile force could be part of that insurance."

Almost immediately, an "unnamed official of the White House" denounced Shultz's speech as "not having been cleared by the White House," and as "badly drafted. The language was injudicious. In fact, the key paragraph is bullshit." More important, General Rogers, who had held several long meetings with Weinberger since the Gleneagles meeting, in a statement to *Air Force* magazine (see *Documentation*, below), attacks the decoupling of Europe and America as a policy sought by some elements in Congress, *as well as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski.*

The problem President Reagan has is this: If he fails to dismiss George Shultz, then Shultz's friends in Congress, in Europe, and in Moscow will continue mobilizing momentum for a breakup of the alliance, on the basis of the argument that Shultz's continuing presence in the Reagan administration is evidence that the policies of Kissinger and Brzezinski, i.e., of the Trilateral Commission, are the hegemonic policies of the U.S.A.

Shultz must be fired before the "fix" is in for West Germany's general elections next January.