

## Shultz a disgrace at NATO foreign ministers' meeting

by Criton Zoakos

The Dec. 10 NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels was a disgrace, and the cause for it was U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. It could have been worse—a fully treasonous affair if Shultz's European fellow decouplers, such as Germany's Hans Dietrich Genscher and Italy's Giulio Andreotti, had their way.

As it turned out, the final communiqué which was issued after two days, was described by the ministers as “not an official policy statement,” but, merely, a listing of the participants' different views on the subject of the infamous—and now largely inoperative—“Reykjavik proposals.” These proposals, it will be recalled, were pushed on President Reagan by three persons, George Shultz, John Poindexter, and Donald Regan, and amounted to a straightforward decoupling of the defenses of Europe and the United States. Essentially, the proposals boiled down to two elements: first, elimination of all strategic nuclear weapons in ten years; second, elimination of all intermediate-range U.S. nuclear missiles stationed in Europe. The resulting logic of the proposals, as they were meant to be understood by the Soviet command, was: When all Euromissiles are removed from Europe, there will be nothing to defend Western Europe from the combined threat of overwhelming Soviet superiority in both conventional and short-range nuclear weapons—because the United States, having eliminated its long-range strategic nuclear arsenal, would have no “nuclear umbrella” to extend over Europe.

This treachery was pointed out, immediately after Reykjavik, first by NATO Generals Bernard Rogers and Hans Joachim Mack and by U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and later by all the NATO Defense Ministers together. Shultz, at the time, took the lead in the effort to deflect

these very valid criticisms. His approach against what the alliance's entire military establishment has to say, was presented in a key speech at the University of Chicago, on Nov. 17. The final communiqué which issued out of the early December foreign ministers' meeting is an exact replica of Shultz's basic argument of Nov. 17 in Chicago. That argument was: 1) Reykjavik was a turning point in history, 2) Euromissiles must be eliminated, 3) a residue of strategic nuclear weapons, “for insurance,” can be kept after the overall agreement to eliminate them—so as to deflect the defense concerns of the Europeans.

Shultz, specifically, argued: “In years to come, we may look back at their [Reykjavik] discussions as a turning point in our strategy for deterring war and preserving peace. . . . For INF nuclear missiles, we reached the basis for agreement on even more drastic reductions, down from a current Soviet total of over 1,400 warheads to only 100 on longer range INF missiles worldwide for each side. . . .” And finally, the most controversial element, designed simply to lull the critics who charged that the underlying intent of the Reykjavik proposals was to decouple Europe from the U.S.: “Even as we eliminate all ballistic missiles, we will need insurance policies to hedge against cheating or other contingencies. We don't know what form this will take. An agreed upon retention of a small nuclear ballistic missile force could be part of that insurance. . . .”

The NATO foreign ministers' final communiqué endorsed fully the proposal for the removal of all United States intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the essential ingredient of the decoupling strategy. Western Europe's leading decoupler, Bonn's Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, said, after the meeting, “This means that the alli-

ance has now clearly made its point on the zero option, and nobody should call it into question from now on. It's part of our credibility."

However, the final communiqué also included Shultz's "insurance policy," in the form of endorsing only a 50% reduction in strategic missiles (on U.S. soil). The "complete elimination," proposed at Reykjavik, would not have permitted the foreign ministers to credibly pretend that they are not selling out to Moscow, after they had voted for the "zero option" on Euromissiles.

Further similar ambiguities from the defense ministers meeting were designed to permit diplomatic "ways out" in their anticipated confrontations with the alliance's military establishment. George Shultz himself, made two points on this matter. First, he characterized the final communiqué as not a policy but rather an itemization of various positions held by various participants. "People have different views about it. Some people are intrigued, some people are enthusiastic, some are reserved, some don't think it's a good idea and that's the fact of the matter," he said.

He also told the press that the idea of retaining for "insurance policy" a certain part of the ballistic missile force, was his own and not the U.S. government's. Before a puzzled and intrigued press conference in Brussels, Shultz said, "It's not a government idea. It is my idea. I talked it over with the President and he had no objection to my mentioning it in my speech," referring to his University of Chicago speech.

The disclaimer was factually true—but only half-true. The speech was made Nov. 17, while Shultz was in Chicago and Prime Minister Thatcher was at Camp David with President Reagan. On the following day, the White House issued a statement which, reflecting the British Prime Minister's concerns, distanced the United States from the Reykjavik proposals, and defined U.S. policy to be against the decoupling implications of those proposals. On that day also, both the defense department and the White House in separate statements renounced Shultz's Chicago speech, especially its duplicitous "insurance policy" clause. In fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, took the opportunity to criticize the grammar, as well as the substance, of the offensive passage.

Subsequently, the Dec. 4 NATO defense ministers' meeting took and announced a series of decisions which removed the alliance from the dangerous path of Reykjavik, and reiterated U.S. government policies as were clarified by Defense Secretary Weinberger at the Gleneagles, Scotland Nuclear Planning Group meeting of NATO, and by the White House after Margaret Thatcher's visit to Washington.

### **A state of insurrection**

In short, not only is the NATO foreign ministers' and Shultz's policy "not a government idea. It is my idea," but it is also contrary to both U.S. government and to NATO policy.

Both NATO and the United States find themselves in the embarrassing and dangerous position of having a foreign

ministers' revolt on their hands. This matter of a foreign ministers' state of insurrection is much more serious than appears to the general public. It is one which must be remedied in short order, and no better remedial course can be recommended than the dismissal of George Shultz from his present job.

The seriousness of the matter lies in the following: As all of NATO's military commanders know, and as Caspar Weinberger has frequently emphasized, the Soviet Union's current principal objective, both diplomatic and military, is to decouple Europe from the U.S.A. What these military leaders are not at liberty to say, is that this current Soviet objective is also the cornerstone of Marshal Ogarkov's warplan for a war between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Ogarkov has argued and enforced in the Soviet leadership the idea that the only strategic war that Moscow should ever contemplate fighting is one in which Moscow's adversary should be the continental United States alone, without any allies and without any overseas military assets. As far as Ogarkov is concerned, if Shultz's and the other NATO foreign ministers' proposals were to be implemented, then the Soviet Union would be placed in a position "to shoot."

A U.S. decoupling from Europe, as implied in Shultz's Chicago speech—and in the foreign ministers' communiqué—would not only transform all of Europe into a captive of Soviet arms, and thus a mere Soviet satrapy, it would also enormously increase the Soviet Union's military blackmail power over the U.S.A. Under those conditions, few constraints would be there to prevent Ogarkov from launching war, should the United States refuse to give in to that blackmail.

Defense Secretary Weinberger, since the Dec. 4 defense ministers' meeting, has made numerous public statements warning clearly about the Soviet leadership's present intentions and policies. These official warnings do not square with the policies of the Secretary of State, nor with the assumptions underlying the NATO foreign ministers' policies. Neither the Western Alliance, nor the United States, can afford to meet the Soviet challenge while the councils of state are contaminated by the treacherous policies of the foreign ministries.

The clean-up in the Western Alliance must begin with a general change of guard in the foreign ministries. The place to begin is the State Department, and George Shultz in particular. Alone among his NATO colleagues, George Shultz is not an elected official; his appointment in office is not associated with electoral deals and constituency representation, as is, for instance, the case with Hans Dietrich Genscher. His only constituency is the President of the United States, at whose pleasure he serves. If the Secretary of State goes around saying that his policies "are not a government idea," and if he does so to the detriment of the vital national security interests of the United States, then he must go. With him gone, his fellow traitors in the European capitals will not be long to follow.

## 'No pull-out, no zero option, no SALT'

*In clear and unambiguous statements on Dec. 6, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and NATO Supreme Commander-Europe Gen. Bernard Rogers declared that there will be no "decoupling" of the United States from Europe, through a nuclear missile "zero option" or American troop pull-out. Europe is a matter of vital U.S. security interest. No sooner was this said than U.S. ambassador to Germany Richard Burt contradicted their statements to the effect that a "zero option" was still the goal of arms control. We excerpt first Defense Secretary Weinberger's Dec. 11 remarks before the American Legislative Exchange Council in Washington, in which he proclaimed the SALT II treaty absolutely dead.*

### Weinberger: SALT is dead

*From the Defense Secretary's remarks before the American Legislative Exchange Council Dec. 11.*

Every time I read in the newspaper that the United States has "violated the unratified SALT II treaty," a very unusual word keeps coming to mind. It is one of those words you expect to get in a *Trivial Pursuit* game or *wish* you could get in a *scrabble* match. That word is "oxymoron." It means a figure of speech that is a self-contradiction, like "Soviet journalist". . . .

To characterize the President's decision to end observance of SALT II as "violating" a treaty is really Orwellian. The treaty was *never* ratified. If it had been ratified, it would have expired in December 1985. And, the Soviets have *repeatedly* and flagrantly failed to uphold the major provisions of the treaty. Under international law, actions of the type undertaken by the Kremlin are more than sufficient to release the United States from any obligation to observe the treaty—even if it *had* been ratified.

America cannot allow a double standard of compliance to develop. The President's decision concerning SALT II is intended to get this vital message across to the Soviets. This is especially important in light of the agreements involving very substantial reductions we are attempting to negotiate at this time.

Yet, this decision has been subjected to truly bizarre criticism. We frequently hear that we must accept Soviet violations because they have "open production" lines, and that SALT II is the only thing standing between us and a

"massive" Soviet build-up. While it is touching to hear such concern expressed about the Soviet build-up from many of those who regularly sneer at our warnings of *existing* Soviet military power, this concern does not seem to hold sway at budget time, when these same critics seek to slash our needed defense spending, and to close *our* production lines.

In any event, this "production-line" argument is completely fallacious. It ignores the fact that the number of Soviet warheads on strategic weapons has nearly *doubled* since the SALT II treaty was signed in 1979. Indeed, Soviet strategic forces will be almost completely modernized over the next decade—with or without SALT constraints. And when Moscow found that the SALT II agreement *did* curb its force modernization, it simply ignored the treaty and cheated.

Nevertheless, the House of Representatives attempted to mandate U.S. compliance with the so-called "MIRVed sublimits" of the SALT II treaty, "as long as the Soviet Union did not violate them." For the first time in history, a legislative body of a democracy attempted to mandate compliance with an unratified treaty that was never honored by the other party to that agreement. . . .

The military threat posed by the Soviet SALT violations has been aggravated by its violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the increasing concern generated by Soviet ABM-related activities. The Soviets have clearly violated that treaty by the construction of a large phased-array missile tracking radar deep in the interior of their nation. This radar is part of a network of radars that could support a missile defense system. Moreover, our concern over Moscow's adherence to this treaty is intensified by the recent discovery of three new Soviet large phased-array radars of this type—a 50 percent increase in the number of such radars. These radars are essential components of any large ABM deployment. One of these radars, the one located near Krasnoyarsk, is a clear violation of the ABM treaty. But the deployment of such a large number of radars, and the pattern of their deployment, together with other Soviet ABM-related activities, suggest that the Soviet Union may be preparing a nationwide ABM defense in violation of the ABM treaty. Such a development would have the gravest implications on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. Nothing could be more dangerous to the security of the West and global stability than a unilateral Soviet deployment of a nationwide anti-ballistic missile system combined with its massive offensive missile capabilities, while we stand by observing the ABM treaty, but imperiling our future.

President Reagan has given the Soviet Union every opportunity to correct its violations. Compliance issues have been discussed for years in the proper forums and through senior diplomatic channels. On two occasions, the President personally raised these issues with General Secretary Gorbachov. As early as June 1985, President Reagan warned the Soviets that their noncompliance must cease or the U.S.

would take appropriate action. At that time President Reagan indicated that while Soviet violations were a grave concern, he would go the extra mile to give the Soviet Union more time to halt its cheating. In the following year, the Soviets leaders did not stop cheating, but rather continued and indeed increased it.

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Therefore, the President's SALT II decision is neither new nor unexpected and despite the alarms raised by some of the President's critics and by the Soviet Union, it has not harmed the cause of arms control.

Since the President announced his decision last May, all arms control negotiations have continued. . . . With regard to the ongoing negotiations to reduce strategic offensive arms, it was *after* the President's decision that the Soviets suggested significant reductions.

In Iceland, the Soviets tried to condition all agreements on arms reduction on our effectively killing the Strategic Defense Initiative. Of course, do not forget that the Soviets have been working on defensive technology for 25 years. In fact, it has the world's only operational anti-ballistic missile system. It circles Moscow, and is continually updated.

. . . . Clearly, those who have argued that the Soviets would never accept the concept of deep reductions have been proven wrong. Those who have argued that *we* had to accept or rationalize Soviet SALT violations to improve the climate for arms control have also been proven wrong.

The United States intends to press for the realization of our serious and deep arms reduction proposals. We cannot promise that this will be a speedy or easy process. Things of real value are not obtained easily. But we will never accept a bad agreement or Soviet noncompliance. . . .

### **Weinberger: No pull-out**

*The following is taken from the Defense Secretary's Dec. 6 interview with Die Welt of Germany.*

We are resolved never to withdraw American troops or lessen our engagement in Europe. Naturally, we can't speak for another administration, but this President will never lessen our presence in Europe.

*Concerning Soviet demands that the United States abandon the SDI.*

President Reagan is not prepared to do that. That's solid.

*Concerning the "zero-option" President Reagan apparently was prepared to agree to at Reykjavik.*

The proposals made by President Reagan . . . occurred under the consideration of nuclear deterrence remaining in place.

### **Rogers: U.S. troops will stay**

*From the general's Dec. 6 interview in Germany's Rheinischer Merkur, under the headline, "Nuclear Weapons Remain Our Trump Card."*

As long as the United States keeps 350,000 soldiers in Europe, they will have to protect them. . . . Avoid anything that could incite the U.S. to pull out these troops. . . .

The decisive factor in our deterrence is the nuclear one, and here, specifically, the option of a first-use of nuclear weapons. Maybe the Soviets doubt that we would ever use these weapons first, but they can't be sure about that. . . .

I don't trust the Russians—history proves my skepticism. Never forget this. . . . The only thing the Russians do respect is strength.

*The following is taken from Ambassador Richard Burt's essay in Die Welt Dec. 6, "Building on the Results of Reykjavik."*

At Reykjavik, the United States and the Soviet Union moved principally toward agreement on a decisive reduction of nuclear weapons. In 1981, President Reagan, in the name of the alliance and on the basis of European proposals, first put forward the "zero solution" for middle-range rockets and proposed the total elimination of this whole weapon category.

In 1982, President Reagan also proposed a decisive reduction of strategic weapons. Both proposals were originally rejected by the Soviets in principle as well as in particular. These proposals also encountered criticism in the West from some of the leading institutions that form public opinion; they were categorized as being too ambitious. In Reykjavik, General Secretary Gorbachov, however, agreed with President Reagan that decisive reduction of strategic as well as mid-range missiles is desirable, as is ultimately the removal of all SS-20, Pershing, and land-based cruise missiles in Europe. That was an important step forward.