

## Inside the Pentagon by Tecumseh

### Maritime Strategy not for decoupling

*Admiral Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says it's simply a framework for coordinating naval matters with the Allies.*

**T**he Naval Institute has published the transcripts of a series of seminars held to discuss the Maritime Strategy and its impact on the strategic planning process of the United States. This is a useful service, helping to create a for-the-record body of material which illustrates "who thinks what" about the Maritime Strategy; and so far there are quite a variety of opinions about just what exactly the Maritime Strategy is.

It has been reported to us, that the prevailing understanding of this concept in Europe is that it is the theoretical justification for a U.S. troop withdrawal from the continent, and a retreat to a "fortress America" posture by U.S. military planners. This perception is reinforced by popular scenarios which posit a protracted conventional war with the U.S.S.R. Such scenarios, to the extent that they are accepted as doctrine, imply that the United States has finally abandoned the commitment to using a nuclear deterrent on the European battlefield. That is exactly what Zbigniew Brzezinski and his epigones have been arguing at the hearings on national strategy now being held by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

In a recent article in *Proceedings*, F.J. West, an ex-deputy to James Schlesinger, addresses his argument to U.S. naval planners, and insists that they must become the spearhead of this attempt to force the acceptance of this concept—roundly denounced by Caspar Weinberger and other DoD officials—on the U.S. and Allied military establishments. West disparages the

tendency of naval officials to ignore the lunatic assumptions which underly his and Brzezinski's strategy, and simply address the Maritime Strategy as a framework for coordinating naval matters among the Allies. He labels this the Mustin Shuffle, referring to Vice-Adm. Henry Mustin, past Commander of the U.S. Second Fleet. The way to impose such a policy, he says is "to proceed with its interservice development—without asking the allies."

He also reveals the concerns nagging the Kissingerian geopoliticians (we hear that the Marines define geopolitician as a civilian with rocks in his head) infesting the Pentagon bureaucracy: "Some proposals for defense reorganization suggest an opposite approach: The President issues broad national security goals which the Joint Chiefs of Staff especially the Chairman, coordinates with the Commander-in-Chief to turn into a military strategy. . . . But the clock cannot be turned back to the 1940s, when Presidents worked without the presence—or intrusion—of a Secretary of Defense or the NSC staff."

Therefore, to reinforce Mr. West's concerns, we present the exchange between Sen. Sam Nunn, and Adm. William Crowe, at the aforementioned Senate hearings:

**Nunn:** What about strategy planning at the level of the JCS. . . ?

**Crowe:** I know that the most well known, or most publicized, is the Maritime Strategy, for example, and

the Maritime Strategy was originated to do just what you describe. It was a conceptual scheme that was gotten together to illustrate how naval forces could be used in various types of modern warfare, and why the types of equipment the Navy was buying was a wise idea, etc. . . . however, there is no such thing as a maritime or a Navy strategy for the United States. We have a national strategy . . . to begin with, I don't believe that the scheme known as the "Maritime Strategy" is a strategy. It's a conceptual way that you might use military or naval forces.

The unified commanders—and I . . . wrestled with the Maritime Strategy when I was Commander-in-Chief Pacific—the unified commanders take those suggestions and say, "Here are my problems, and here are my forces, and here are the things that the Navy can do in my scheme" . . . and they use those in building their theater strategy, which includes Army, Air Force, Marine as well as naval forces, and that's where the marriage is made, and it is made very well.

Now there are some things that the Maritime Strategy doesn't emphasize, such as escorts for Europe, but the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic emphasizes that mission, and he considers it his primary mission, and he has got it built into his strategy, and he takes and picks and chooses things from the Maritime Strategy, things he can do, and use, and what he can't use. And he comes up with a theater strategy which can achieve what he wants.

**Nunn:** So if the Secretary of the Navy gives a briefing on how he envisions using aircraft carriers, that is not the strategy of the United States?

**Crowe:** I do not consider it so. That is the Secretary of the Navy's view of how he wished to use naval forces.